Pari , you make a fair point. Part of what gets my goat is what appears, at least to me, as personal shots that Ven. T takes at scholars who disagree with him. The tipping point for me was comments he made, about a year or so ago, about Bhikkhu Bodhi’s position on the 1st precept and the kammic consequences of a “just war.” I felt the comments AT made were personal, though he claimed they were attacks on the themes, and not the author. I found this disingenuous, akin to telling someone “the statement you made could only come from an idiot. But, I’m only attacking the statement” Here again, the statements have an ad hom flavor to them. I respect and appreciate Ven. T’s scholarship and longterm efforts to bring translations to ATI, and the many volumes he publishes and distributes freely. But, I get the sense that he has appointed himself an arbiter of the "True Dhamma,"and those that fail to agree with his views, no matter how well researched and cited to the texts, are met with contempt.
I feel that men and women of reason can discuss and debate this issue, with attention on the issues, without worry that anyone opposing Bhikkhuni ordinations on textual bases will be seen as a misogynist. I feel that what we’re doing here on D&D is giving every contributor a fair and equal platform to discuss this issue.
In one of Ven. T’s essays, he discusses the development of western case law, and statutory authority. I won’t pick nits with his characterizations, but one aspect of the discussion that was missing from his lecture on case and statutory law was the idea that the law is intended to do equity, and to allow for just results. When statutes conflict, or when cases conflict in differing jurisdictions, usually the best resolution to any dispute is to find the most fair and equitable outcome. It is this aspect of Ven. T’s discussion I found lacking, as well, aside from what I felt were his less than convincing discussions of the evidence from the Suttas and Vinayas.
Just to clarify an ambiguity … when you write of “minor rules outside the pātimokkha” do you mean to refer to those rules outside the Pātimokkha whose transgression would be a minor offence? Or do you mean that all rules outside of the Pātimokkha are to be viewed as minor, regardless of what class of offence their transgression would be?
I fully agree that AT’s personal remarks about other (eminent) scholars are entirely unnecessary and counterproductive to a civil conversation and level-headed investigation into complex topics, such as the revival of the bhikkhuni-sangha.
While this can be truly off-putting to the reader, we still should make an effort to understand the substance of what he is pointing to and then see whether his (Vinaya-based) arguments are well-founded or not. If not, then we can dismiss them, no problem, but our dismissal should not be influenced by our distaste for the author’s (somewhat confrontational) style of presentation.
Considering that we find 68 thullaccaya offences outside the pātimokkha, it follows that importance/severity of the offence was not the only consideration for which rules got included in the pātimokkha, and which did not.
We can only speculate, but it seems to me that considerations of what comes up regularly in daily life (see the various sekhiya rules related to food, how to wear robes and teaching activities), have Donald trumped over considerations of severity of the offence.
In this sense maybe we can say that these dukkaṭa offences that are mentioned in the Sekhiya rules are more important to hear regularly (every fortnight), rather than the more heavy offences that usually don’t come up for monastics on a daily basis (e.g. thullaccaya for cutting off one’s penis).
Thus, a rule’s inclusion in the Pātimokkha is not necessarily a sign of increased importance of the rule itself, but of increased importance of hearing the rule on a regular basis.
Well, let’s leave aside the thullaccayas, at least for now. But the whole question of which rules are from the earliest period is certainly an interesting one.
In the Anguttara we find only four classes of offences: pārājika, saṅghādisesa, pācittiya, and pāṭidesanīya (AN 4.244). The Parivāra then gives us a choice between 5 or 7 classes of offences. My guess from this and other evidence is that there must have been an evolution in the number of classes of offences after the Buddha passed away. Some of the rules probably existed as injunctions from the earliest period, but gradually became solidified as rules with corresponding offences.
Generally, I agree that the Pali EBTs are quite a reliable source. But specifically on the issue of women / bhikkhunis, it seems to me that they often have a more critical attitude than the parallels, such as for example in the Nandakovadasutta MN 146, the Migajalasutta AN 6.44, the Bhikkhunūupassayasutta SN 16.10, Mahapajapati’s ordination story AN 8.51, etc.
So I don’t see why they should have preserved the most accurate version of the Bhikkhuni Patimokkha.
Apart from the Parivāra, here are some passages from the Vibhaṅga, as well as the CV that mention all seven classes of offence:
A monk is seen committing an offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order; in the offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order there is a wrong view as to an offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order. If he reprimands him for a matter involving defeat, saying: “You are not a (true) recluse . . . nor a ceremony performed by a chapter of monks,” thus it is connected with a different kind of offence and a pretext is taken up: for each speech there is an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order.
A monk is seen committing an offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order; in the offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order there is the wrong view that it is a grave offence . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence requiring expiation . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence which ought to be confessed . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence of wrong-doing . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence of evil speech. If he reprimands him . . . for each speech there is an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order. (Saṅghādisesa 9)
If one who is ordained, desiring . . . to shame . . . speaks of a low thing with low words—of being guilty of an offence of defeat, of being guilty of an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order, of being guilty of a grave offence, of being guilty of an offence of expiation, of being guilty of an offence which ought to be confessed, of being guilty of an offence of wrong-doing, of being guilty of an offence of wrong speech . . . speaks of a high thing—a stream-attainer with low words . . . speaks of a low thing with high words . . . speaks of a high thing with high words . . . there is an offence of expiation. (Pācittiya 2)
“What are the seven suspensions of the Pātimokkha that are not legally valid? If one suspends the Pātimokkha on an unfounded (charge of) an offence involving defeat . . . of an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order . . . of a grave offence . . . of an offence of expiation . . . of an offence which ought to be confessed . . . of an offence of wrong-doing, if one suspends the Pātimokkha on an unfounded (charge of) an offence of wrong speech, these seven suspensions . . . are not legally valid.
“What are the seven suspensions of the Pātimokkha that are legally valid? If one suspends the Pātimokkha on a founded (charge of) an offence involving defeat . . . on a founded (charge of) an offence of wrong speech, these seven suspensions . . . are legally valid. (Cv.IX.3.3)
Above examples are not at all exhaustive, but sufficient to illustrate that at least at the time when the Vibhaṅga was finalized, all 7 classes of offence were already well know.
I am not sure whether an argument from silence can be made on account of AN 4.244, which omits the classes thullaccaya, dukkaṭa and dubbhāsita. Argument from silence - Wikipedia
In fact, a sufficiently large amount of occurrences of those classes are found even in several parallel-versions of the Vinayapiṭaka, which rather points to the earliness of those classes of offence.
While there may indeed have been an evolution in the number of classes of offences, I see no reason to why this evolution cannot have happened in the early years of the Saṅgha, while the Buddha was still alive.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the elders were very reluctant to add or remove rules, which even became an important topic at the 1st council.
It seems rather unlikely to me that such conservative monks would take the liberty to invent three entirely new classes of offence (thullaccaya, dukkaṭa and dubbhāsita) after the Buddha’s passing away.
I think arguments from silence have to be used with great caution. Otherwise one could likewise suggest that instances where the Buddha only spoke about two types of feeling (pleasant and unpleasant) are early, but instances where 3, 6, 18… types of feeling are mentioned, are a later development. Atthasata Sutta: The One-hundred-and-eight Exposition
I also tend to take lists from the Anguttara with a grain of salt, especially when considering the book of ones or twos stating “There is one thing/two things that lead to…”
Often those lists are rather incomplete and elsewhere in the canon we find the same list, but with additional elements. The same could easily be the case with AN 4.244, which mentions only four out of seven classes of offence.
I’ve seen a few bhikkhunis teach in person and I’ve seen nothing less worthy of respect than the bhikkhus I’ve seen. Discounting inertial hang-ups (e.g. sexism, adherence to tradition), there is no rational reason why there shouldn’t be bhikkhunis.
However, I do think that if well-known abbots were to come out in favor of bhikkhunis, it’s possible that the support for their monastery via the ethnic laypeople could drop substantially, to the point of making monasteries insolvent. My impression is that the vast majority of financial support of Western monasteries comes from ethnic people, even those not residing in Western countries. Perhaps it’s different in Australia, but that’s my impression in California. So it’s a balance: one may favor bhikkhuni ordination but be hesitant to come out blatantly for it due to legitimate concern of monastery survival. What does one do here: come out blatantly (as there is no other way) in favor of bhikkhuni ordination or keep silent? Either way, you are blamed by somebody. Alas, that’s the way of the world but of course the Buddha taught how to approach this in e.g. AN 8.6.
Right, and we should really expect this. All seven classes of offences are found extensively in the Vinaya, and it would be rather strange if this was not reflected in the enumeration of such classes. What is interesting to me is that there are deviations from this pattern. It is always in the abnormalities that we find clues to the historical development of literary works.
I think the evidence points to a lot of editorial work and even addition of rules after the Buddha passed away. This is clear from the great variety in the number of sekhiya rules between the different traditions. These variation could really only have arisen once the various Buddhist schools were relatively independent of each other, perhaps a couple of centuries after the Buddha. Then there is the bhikkhunīpātimokkha, where important differences are found even in the pācittiya rules. So far as the Khandhakas are concerned, the differences seem to be even more pronounced (see Frauwallner’s “The earliest Vinaya and the beginnings of Buddhist literature”), although detailed comparative study of this part of the Vinaya is still lacking.
Things are never quite this straightforward. The words dukkata and dubbhāsita, for instance, are found throughout the Vinaya, and indeed the suttas, in the simple meaning of “bad act” and “bad speech.” I would suggest that what was originally just called a bad act later on came to be regarded as an actual offence. In other words, we are not necessarily seeing the invention of anything, just the editing and formalising of what was already there.
Moreover, there seems to be little compunction in the tradition about creating new offences, at last outside of the pātimokkha. The commentaries are full of instances of making up new dukkata offences. It seems likely to me that this was already happening in the Canon, and that this formed a precedent for the commentaries. Indeed, some of the pācittya rules for bhikkhunīs would have arisen even during the sectarian period, at least a couple centuries after the Buddha. My impression is that editors where quite happy to make “reasonable” innovations, as long as they did not change the pre-existing word of the Buddha.
That’s not our experience in Perth. We have more support from the Thai community, or any ethnic community, than we have ever had. Some of these people are in fact very keen supporters of the bhikkhunīs.
I didn’t know that. Which ones are you refering to? Are there any studies on this topic?
Is any Pacittiya that is not found in all the Patimokkhas considered a later addition?
I agree, even though our discussion didn’t start out on the topic of the lateness of single rules, but on the topic of the alleged lateness of entire classes of offence.
This may well be the case, but can’t this development already have taken place during the Buddha’s time and the gradual formalization of procedures during that period?
I am not aware of any evidence that points (not merely allows for such an interpretation) to the theory that those classes came to be formally confessed only in the period after the Buddha’s passing away, but before the 3rd council (Theravāda-reckoning).
In fact, there is textual evidence that points to the opposite. In the context of the 1st council the CV and its parallels report that Ven. Ananda was made to confess several of his wrongdoings as dukkaṭa-offences.
e.g. having dropped the Buddha’s robes to the ground; not having asked the Buddha which are the heavy offences; repeatedly begging the Buddha to allow the going forth of women, even though the Buddha initially refused to do so…)
This is indeed unusual, since there weren’t any prior rules that would legislate against such behaviour, yet Ven. Ananada was made to formally confess them as dukkaṭa offences. This was done in the midst of a sangha of early disciples, all of them supposedly Arahants. Their agreement to this procedure suggests that wrongdoings were indeed confessed as offences (āpatti) already at the Buddha’s time (or at least straight afterwards).
Furthermore this gives an early precedent for the commentarial practice of inventing new dukkaṭas, whenever it thinks that a certain behavior goes against the spirit of the Vinaya.
There is a principle stated in the Vinaya-commentaries, that whatever the Buddha prohibited by saying “na …”, if one goes ahead anyway, this action constitutes a dukkata-offence. This applies even to passages where a dukkata-apatti is not explicitly mentioned.
Commentary 3:259: Ito paṭṭhāya ca pana yattha yattha nakārena paṭisedho kariyati, sabbattha dukkaṭāpatti veditabbā. Ayañhi khandhakadhammatā.
The case of Ananda being made to confess a dukkata for going against something that the Buddha told him no to do (e.g. ask a favour of which the Buddha previously said: “Ananda, now you should not ask for …”), would be in line with the principles of above passage from the commentary.
Considering that several parallel-versions agree that Ven. Ananda was made to confess a number of dukkaṭa-offences at the 1st council, the practice of confessing dukkaṭa offences stands a good chance of being considerably early.
However, I certainly share your reservations concerning the commentarial practice of introducing new rules, and also think that for male and female monastics ordained in the Theravāda/Pāli-tradition, it is sufficient to stick to the wrongdoings that are explicitly mentioned in our canonical literature.
Considering that AN 4.244 omits not only the dukkaṭa class of offences, but also the thullaccaya class, the theory that AN 4.244 points to a stage of development that predates the inclusion of the other classes, which did not need to be confessed during the Buddha’s own lifetime, seems rather speculative to me. If one agrees that the thullaccaya-class is not an invention that arose only after the Buddha’s parinibbāna, and further considering that the thullaccaya-class is a rather heavy class of offence, which certainly would warrant formal confession, the argument of AN 4.244 is rather speculative (at best).
I agree, but “sometimes a cigar is just a cigar”. (Siegmund Freud)
On the contrary, as Brahmali said, this is just treated as a “bad act”, not as a formal offence. There is no word for offence in the rule, no suggestion that these broke any pre-existing rules, and no suggestion that they act as precedent. Mahakassapa is accusing Ananda of having done something wrong, not of breaking a rule.
The entire category of dukkata is absent from the Mahasanghika lineages, so far as I have been able to determine. They use the term vinayatikkrama in a similar sense. This strongly suggests that the formalization of this category happened after the first schism, i.e. post-Ashoka.
I wasn’t referring to anything specific, but just the general variation in the bhikkhunīpācittiyas between the different schools. The situation is not very different from that in the sekhiya rules. The contrast to the bhikkhupācittiyas is instructive. For the monks, these rules have almost no variation across all extant pātimokkhas. The number of pācittiyas vary slightly, from 90 to 92, but even this discrepancy is really just a matter of very similar rules being merged/divided. For the monks pātimokkhas, there is hardly any variation in the rules except for the sekhiyas, and it is precisely here that the dukkata offences are introduced.
Confession of offences only refers to the pātimokkha offences. For instance, if you hear a rule being recited and you realise you have forgotten to confess a corresponding offence, you should tell the person sitting next to you. The Vinaya says nothing about remembering offences outside the pātimokkha. Bhikkhu pācittiyas 72 and 73 lead one to a similar conclusion. The fact that none of the non-pātimokkha rules were confessable, at least in the earliest period, suggests that they were not seen as proper offences.
One of the last things the Buddha says before passing away is that the monastics should not lay down new rules.
The Vinaya makes it clear that only the pārājikas and saṅghādisesas are heavy offences. All other offences are light, including the thullaccayas. The name of this class means “serious fault”, but it is not classed as a heavy offence. Even if the Buddha laid down some of the thullaccaya rules, it is far from clear that they were considered offences to be confessed in the earliest period.
I see. I somehow always assumed that the variations in the Bhikkhuni pacittiyas occurred because the Bhikkhus, who compiled the texts, were a bit more careless about them and didn’t know them that well, since they never practiced them themselves. So they naturally diverged in the course of time. I thought if the nuns had had the opportunity to compile their own canonical material, things would be better preserved.
But I didn’t think that the monks intentionally came up with new pacittiyas / changed the patimokkha. In this case, it wouldn’t be exactly comparable to the introduction of new classes of offences, since that would have to be done intentionally.
It also wouldn’t imply that all pacittiyas that are not found in every patimokkha would necessarily be later additions. Some of them could still be early, and could have been forgotten or accidentally changed by “careless” monks in some traditions.
If this was the explanation, I think you would find greater discrepancies also between the pārājikas and the saṅghādisesas of the different schools. But these rules are quite consistent across the traditions.
I believe that there are in fact discrepancies between the sanghadisesas, for example between the infamous sanghadisesa 3. Bhante Sujato has studied it in detail in his Bhikkhuni Vinaya Studies.
Anyway, thanks for your patience with all my questions.
Thanks Bhante(s) for your comments. Here some further thoughts along the line.
You mentioned:
Below is the passage that you referred to. It only says that the person remembers an offence while the pātimokkha is being recited, but it does not say that this covers only offences of rules that are found in the pātimokkha.
Mv.II.27.4: "Now at that time a certain monk remembered an offence while the Pātimokkha was being recited. Then it occurred to this monk: “It is laid down by the Lord that the Observance should not be carried out by an offender, and I have fallen into an offence. Now what line of conduct should be followed by me?” They told this matter to the Lord. He said: “This is a case, monks, where a monk remembers an offence while the Pātimokkha is being recited. Monks, this monk should speak thus to the monk next to him: ‘I, your reverence, have fallen into such and such an offence. Having gotten up from here I will make amends for that offence’. When he has spoken thus, the Observance may be carried out, the Pātimokkha may be heard, and no obstacle should be put in the way of the Observance from such a cause.
Likewise in Mv.II.27.2, which deals with arisen doubts with regard having committed an offence:
‘I, your reverence, am doubtful as to such and such an offence. When I come to be without doubt, then will I make amends for that offence’.
“ahaṁ, āvuso, itthannāmāya āpattiyā vematiko; yadā nibbematiko bhavissāmi, tadā taṁ āpattiṁ paṭikarissāmī”ti
There is no indication that this refers only to offences found within the pātimokkha-rules. One could as well remember offences from the Khandhakas, while the pātimokkha is being recited. I think that the above passages can’t be used to support either interpretation, since they are too vague to allow for such conclusions.
The same applies to the nidāna section of the pātimokkha, which simply states “saramānena bhikkhunā āpannena visuddhāpekkhena santī āpatti āvikātabbā”, without going into detail whether the remembered offence originates from one of the pātimokkha-rules, or from elsewhere in the Vinaya.
Thanks for bringing these two rules to my attention. Let’s look at them separately:
Pācittiya 73 deals with the case that a monk claims never to have heard a certain Pātimokkha rule before, despite it being recited every fortnight. The Pāli says: ayampi kira dhammo suttāgato suttapariyāpanno
From the use of the term “sutta”, it is clear that this rule refers only to rules that are included in the pātimokkha-recitation, wherefore it is said suttāgato suttapariyāpanno.
Side note: In Vinaya-literature the term “sutta” refers to the pātimokkha-rules, not to the discourses of the Buddha, which would rather be called “suttanta”.
In contrast, pācittiya 72, the rule dealing with criticizing the Vinaya in the presence of another bhikkhu, is formulated differently and the word “sutta” is not found at all. Instead it speaks about criticising the “Vinaya”, which is a much broader term.
Considering that a different term is used for both rules, it follows that pācittiya 72 is intended for criticism of any rule or regulation found in the Vinaya, which includes not only the rules of the pātimokkha (sutta), but also rules and regulations found in the Khandhakas (Mv+Cv) and the numerous dukkaṭa offences contained therein.
Based on the Vibhaṅga, BMC I explains: “There is a pācittiya for criticizing the discipline (Vinaya) in the presence of a bhikkhu; and a dukkaṭa for criticizing any other Dhamma in his presence, or criticizing either the discipline or any other Dhamma in the presence of an unordained person.”
The fact that pācittiya 72 uses a different terminology from pācittiya 73 (Vinaya vs. sutta) appears to show that pācittiya 72 includes also criticism of rules that are not found in the pātimokkha.
To be accurate, he didn’t say that they should not do it, but only pointed to the consequences that would follow from doing so:
“For as long, monks, as the monks do not establish new laws that were not established, or cut off old laws that were established, and they carry on with such training-rules as have been accepted, surely growth, monks, is to be expected for the monks, not decline.”
But as I said in my previous post “I certainly share your reservations concerning the commentarial practice of introducing new rules, and also think that for male and female monastics ordained in the Theravāda/Pāli-tradition, it is sufficient to stick to the wrongdoings that are explicitly mentioned in our canonical literature.”
Right, that’s why I said that the thullaccayas are a “rather heavy” offence (i.e. when compared to pācittiya, pāṭidesanīya, dukkaṭa, dubbhāsita). I used the word “rather” in order not to invoke the formal categories heavy/light offence (garuka/lahuka āpatti), which place the thullaccayas at the beginning of the light offences, as you rightly pointed out. Thanks for making that clear, because my original statement may indeed have been too vague and potentially misleading in this regard.
Right, it is a bad act (dukkaṭa) that Ven. Ānanda was asked to confess (desehi):
Then the monks who were elders spoke thus to the venerable Ānanda: “This, reverend Ānanda, is an offence of wrong-doing for you, in that you did not ask the Lord, saying: ‘But which, Lord, are the lesser and minor rules of training?’ Confess (desehi) that offence of wrong-doing.”
“I, honoured sirs, out of unmindfulness, did not ask the Lord, saying: ‘But which, Lord, are the lesser and minor rules of training?’ I do not see that as an offence of wrong-doing, yet even out of faith in the venerable ones I confess (desemi) that as an offence of wrong-doing (dukkaṭa).”
…
“This too is an offence of wrong-doing for you, reverend Ānanda, in that you made an effort for the going forth of women in the dhamma and discipline proclaimed by the Truth-finder. Confess this offence of wrong-doing.”
“But I, honoured sirs, made an effort for the going forth of women in the dhamma and discipline proclaimed by the Truth-finder, thinking: ‘This Gotamid, Pajāpatī the Great, is the Lord’s aunt, foster-mother, nurse, giver of milk, for when the Lord’s mother passed away, she suckled him.’ I do not see that as an offence of wrong-doing, but even out of faith in the venerable ones I confess that as an offence of wrong-doing.” https://suttacentral.net/en/pi-tv-kd21/62
Here is the Sarvāstivāda parallel, that explicitly used the word offence in this context:
Mahākāśyapa again said to Ānanda: “The Buddha did not permit women to go forth. You requested it up to three times, causing women to go forth. Because of this matter you have incurred an offence of wrongdoing (突吉羅). Confess this as an offence (罪) according to the teaching!”
This is also reflected by the Mulasarvastivada parallel, which has: “Look at the suffering [caused by] your seeking to get the Buddha’s permission. This is your first offence (是汝初過).”
Here the corresponding part from the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya:
[Upāli said]: “The Blessed One up to three times laid down that he would not permit women to go forth and leave home, yet you asked for it three times. This is a transgressionagainst the Vinaya (是越比尼罪).”
Above translations of parallel-versions were taken from Ven. Anālayo’s “The Foundation History of the Nuns’ Order”, (Hamburg Buddhist Studies 6), Bochum: Projektverlag, 2016. (PDF)
By the way, according to p. 68 of Shayne Clarke’s entry on Vinaya in Brill’s Encyclopedia of Buddhism ed J Silk, the Sekhiyas also appear in a manuscript of the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravāda pratimokṣa, and therewith also the dukkaṭa offences contained therein.
Respected Bhante(s), while I enjoy our investigation, I am also a bit busy these days and may therefore not be able to engage further on the topic of early/lateness of different classes of offence.
I also think it is a bit off-topic here and it may actually warrant a separate thread elsewhere in the forum.
Anyway, please feel free to point out any misunderstandings on my part, even though I may not be free to respond.
[quote=“Parinibbana, post:80, topic:5489”]
The same applies to the nidāna section of the pātimokkha, which simply states “saramānena bhikkhunā āpannena visuddhāpekkhena santī āpatti āvikātabbā”, without going into detail whether the remembered offence originates from one of the pātimokkha-rules, or from elsewhere in the Vinaya.[/quote]
I think the relevant part of the Nidāna is actually the statement about the three announcements that immediately precedes what you have quoted.
The announcements comprise the question put three times by the Pātimokkha-reciter at the end of each section of rules: “Are you pure herein?”
The ‘herein’ (ettha) refers back to the section of rules that has just been recited. It is purity (or otherwise) with respect to these that the reciter’s enquiry is concerned with. So if he has just recited, say, the pārājikas and some bhikkhu in the assemby suddenly remembers that he hid another bhikkhu’s almsbowl, it wouldn’t be a relevant or appropriate response to the question for him to announce this fact until the reciter has come the end of the pācittiya section. Still less would it be appropriate for him to make an announcement if he suddenly remembers entering his kuṭi with muddy feet or eating a meal of snake-flesh bouillabaisse. He hasn’t been asked about these and he isn’t going to be asked.
I agree that the passage you have cited refers only to the pātimokkha rules that have just been recited, not to pātimokkha rules that will be recited afterwards, or have been recited earlier, nor to rules outside of the pātimokkha.
(Siegmund Freud)