Truly Exist, dependently exist, dependently ceased, truly not existing

When we go looking for true arising or true cessation we can’t find it. That lack of essence in conditioned arising or conditioned cessation is unconditioned. It is not caused, does not arise, does not cease, but it is dependent. :pray:

I think that’s a stretch. Because I can define Not-truly-arising and not-truly-ceasing processes that are different from truly-arising and truly-ceasing processes.

An example (assuming you haven’t actually killed anyone in your life) is saying “All the people Yeshe has killed”. This is a not-truly-existing process; it’s imaginary, fake, unreal, when entered into a computer, it bugs out.

All the flowers I’ve smelled today; they are truly arising processes.

Things not [truly] existing/not existing is not the same as Processes [truly] arising/not ceasing.

Ah! I thought we were so close to unanimity. I ruined it. :joy: :pray:

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As long as this doesn’t mean after parinibbāna, at 3, there can be arising to 2 again. I think you’re just saying no such thing as 1 and 4 in all instances, but for many of us, it really sounds like you’re saying after parinibbāna, illusionary arising can arise to 2 again.

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Nothing ever arises again. :pray:

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Then misunderstanding has been cleared. If other people in the future have misunderstandings with you, do point them out to this framework and explain within the framework with them.

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Nothing never arises again? :melting_face:

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“Rid of craving before the breakup,”
said the Buddha,
“not dependent on the past,
unfathomable in the middle,
they are not governed by anything.

They have no dependencies, understanding the teaching, they are independent. No craving is found in them to continue existence or to end it.

That by which one might describe
an ordinary person or ascetics and brahmins
has no importance to them,
which is why they’re unaffected by words.

One not prone to creation
does not return to creation. …”
Snp 4.10
:pray:

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  1. It is not the case that, “All the people that Yeshe has killed”
  2. All the people that Yeshe has killed are truly non-existent

Jokes aside, #1 and #2 are different, right?

#1 is saying I haven’t killed anyone. It affirms nothing in its place.

#2 is saying I haven’t killed anyone and it affirms that it is impossible that I ever could kill anyone ever and that this has always been the case and will always be the case and that nothing could ever change this because of the true non-existence of all those people I haven’t killed.

As for how you define truly existing processes versus truly existing things… I’m all ears. Not literally. I’m not literally all ears. I also have a nose for instance. :pray:

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Well I’m happy that this discussion seems friendly and cheerful! :smiling_face:

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Permanence/Impermanence is the key factor here, as explained by Buddha. For something to truly exist as a thing, it would have to be permanent, at least in it’s conception, having become without cause. Since permanent things don’t exist, their hypothetical speculations are also weird; perhaps they could be destroyed (annihilationist) perhaps there’s no way to destroy them (eternalists). Either way:

Bhikkhus, you may well acquire that possession that is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and that might endure as long as eternity. MN22

However, there is no such thing. There are only impermanent proceses.

So, something can be truly permanent or truly impermanent. Processes are either subject to cessation or not. If their impermanence is not truly so, then they’re permanent, self. This is one instance of trueness: If they don’t cease truly, then they’re permanent things, substantial.

Another defining factor of truly arising is dukkha. A torrent of unicorns, not truly arising, can’t kill me. An ocean, however, truly arising, can suffocate me. There is a difference between real and unreal.

I can find things that are dukkha. I can also find their absence. This is what makes them truly ceasing - and so, they had truly arisen.

Truly here doesn’t imply a substantial existence, characterized by permanence. Furthermore, only insubstantial processes can be said to be truly arising, because permanent things could never have arisen, they should always have been since time immemorial.

In short, truly just is a designation for processes that do have a contact with six-sense base and are dukkha. It might be a useful tool to see world as illusory to cultivate dispassion; however, there are levels of illusions that are fantastic even beyond the crude reality which you posit doesn’t truly arise/cease; that’s my main argument. :smiley:

Just so we are clear, this is just semantics since we already agreed on the framework.

We need to distinguish between fictions and ontological realities.

Unicorns are fictitious. They literally don’t exist. As far as we can tell, at least! But they could exist in a possible world! :unicorn: There’s no inherent ontological commitment involved whether unicorns exist or don’t exist.

That’s different from ontological views. Ontological views aren’t just possibilities that make no difference. Asking if eternalism or annihilationism are true is different from asking if it’s true that unicorns exist.

You also seem to think that a self can only be eternal, not annihilated. Annihilationists believe in an independently existing thing which is annihilated. One way they might arrive at this conclusion is by assuming things exist, but then seeing those things cease, so they assume that what once truly existed now does not exist.

This is the same process as described in DN 1 for people who believe in spontaneous existence, but in reverse. At DN 1, it basically says people see things pop into existence, and so they assume that they truly did not exist before, and that now they truly do exist. I.e. they assume what once was nothingness is now a somethingness. Annihilationists simply reverse this process, as above.

Believing that things are permanent is eternalism. Believing that things are impermanent is annihilationism. Crazy? The Buddha taught impermanence? Yes. He did. But he didn’t teach an enduring thing which is impermanent. Impermanence negates such an enduring thing. The difference is whether we assume X and then apply attributes to it (impermanent, etc.), or whether we observe X and find impermanence and conditionality in its place.

The soul that is anatta which was believed to have existed since time immemorial, being subject to destruction is annihilationism. A substance without beginning but with an end.

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yes, of course it exists.

Really I don’t have interest to defend philosophies about nibbana/parinibbana but my concern is in the message of annihilation after death

As you sure knows, the Buddha rejected all annihilation notions except annihilation of dukkha, ignorance and fetters. Also he taught that all beings fear death, precisely because all beings fear their own annihilation. Even those beings wishing annihilation in a very strong way, they will experience moments of fear of annihilation at death. And also we can read Suttas in where the Buddha comforts people who fear annihilation at death, advising them to avoid that type of thought.

It is clear the Buddha rejected and he never pushed annihilation thoughts in the minds of people. Besides this is wrong view, also because that fear can cause an immediate search for the security of the attachment to a -self. In that way, the mind-images of annihilation after death can become a powerful ingredient to block nibbana at those moments to go for the search of a new rebirth. Also in life the mind-images about nibbana like any destruction of Reality can block awakening. Therefore, I wrote about the annihilation preaching is a Mara preaching.

Probably you are not aware of the possible effects in other minds. Maybe what you says is the final conclusion of previous reflections, and that annihilation after death sounds to yours like the logical answer. However, I believe that you could review those previous steps. Hope what I write can be useful in some way, because I believe you are bypassing some thing and still not considering others

You have asked about some different option regarding “why being existing, happy, and permanent, it is still not a self.”

Do you think the Buddha was not happy while he was in this world?. Do you think the Buddha had
a -self or maybe he used a -self?

This is relevant because nibbana and parinibbana are the same nature. IMHO I can write some things that I believe you are bypassing in the construction of that parinibbana-annhilation after death.

–Note how every time you writes “things arise, things cease” you are meaning “exists, no exists”.
In the conventional sense that’s right; a thought arise and a thought cease. However, in the Buddha teaching “things arise, things cease” also means “things are atta, things are anatta” when this applied to the delusion of Reality.

– In many places the word “cease” in the Buddha teaching is referred to the cease of atta. I suppose we agree in this point. The anatta characteristic of the Reality cannot be destroyed. Because anatta is the result from the Cease. Therefore, one should understand “the cease” of atta is followed by the manifestation of its anatta nature. No annihilation. The only exceptions are those things which are not dhammas: dukkha, -self delusion, hindrances, ignorance, and so on. These can be annihilated because are delusions and mind products produced by ourselves. In the rest there is no annihilation.

– No aggregates can be destroyed but their cease is the cease of the atta delusions caused by our clinging. Aggregates cannot be destroyed but these are missed like the source of atta realities when there is non-clinging to atta delusion.
Aggregate of form is cohesion, solidity, heat and movement. These are no things but something closer to the notion of energy. And this cannot be destroyed. Note that nobody can know an energy but only through its manifestations. When the manifestation is missed also the source is missed. If you turn off the bulb you cannot know if still there is electric energy. Because this reason the Suttas explain how in nibbana the aggregates “have no footing”, “cannot be found” and etcetera. It doesn’t mean the aggregates are destroyed. It is the atta experience caused by the clinging to the aggregates what is destroyed.

– The Buddha and the arhants eradicated all attachment, ignorance, birth, and the wish for any new existence. And you can check how in that same point, with all already accomplished, they leaved their bodies to go to other worlds and realms. To teach the Dhamma and interact with other beings.
This issue can be very interesting for your notion of some parinibbana-annhilation after death. Because from those episodes arise many questions:

  • Why do you think that activity of the arhants must be stopped at death after leaving the physical body?. It wouldn’t be just one more time in where they leaved their physical bodies?. Where is the difference?.

  • Do you think the Buddha and arhants had a wish for existence when leaved their physical bodies to do that activity?. Do you agree that they used a -self and appearance in those realms, without falling into birth and existence?

  • Is there any pause in the 3 possible acquisition of -self?. When death is not any stop for these acquisitions, What are the consequences of nibbana/parinibbana arising at any moment (alive or death) among that constant production of the Realities associated to those -self acquisitions?.

  • Do you think the acquisition of -self arising after death and its associated experienced reality at those moments, both would be destroyed if there is nibbana there?. In such case, Why the Reality and the world was not destroyed at the moment of the Buddha Enlightenment?. Where is the difference?

  • What’s the real meaning of phrases like “end of existences” or “not falling into existence”?.
    Maybe is this referred to what the Suttas shows in the life of the Buddha and arhants while being in this world and also other worlds?.

  • Do you accept that such activity was carried with a perpetual freedom of dukkha, and freedom from the Wheel without falling into birth and existence, and without requesting the annihilation of the Wheel?. Or maybe do you think that they had ignorance because they were not abiding in a perpetual mystical state named “nibbana-nothingness”?. Note they were able to do that, although they also were interacting with other beings in other realms and worlds.
    What is your explanation for their apparent rejection to be “extinguished” into a nibbana-nothingness?

– Finally, Can you quote the Sutta in where Parinibbana is explained like the destruction of the aggregates and annihilation of Reality?

Hope it helps to think in alternatives to annihilation

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Ah, yes. It wasn’t clear to me that was your point. I would just add though that annihilationists can also think things have a beginning and be annihilated. Because if you believe that somethingness and nothingness can be freely exchanged, there’s no reason it can’t do so several times. One-life annihilationists, for example, don’t believe in beginninglessness.

I’m not sure that’s a relevant point vis-a-vis the way atta and annihilation is used in DN1 and in early buddhist literature: Atman is the manifestation of Brahma, supposedly the eternal divine reality. Divorcing it from the historical usage for an abstract western self is problematic, I think.

I’m not sure where you got a “western self” from what I said? What’s historically problematic to my mind is assuming ancient people couldn’t distrust in mystical ontological realities or hold to one-life materialism. This is a view we know existed in India from Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts, and it’s the first example of ucchedavāda at DN 1. It’s not a Western concept. Materialism isn’t unique to the West.

“This person is made up of the four primary elements. When they die, the earth in their body merges and coalesces with the substance of earth. The water in their body merges and coalesces with the substance of water. The fire in their body merges and coalesces with the substance of fire. The air in their body merges and coalesces with the substance of air. The faculties are transferred to space. Four men with a bier carry away the corpse. Their footprints show the way to the cemetery. The bones become bleached. Offerings dedicated to the gods end in ashes. Giving is a doctrine of morons. When anyone affirms a doctrine of an afterlife it’s just hollow, false nonsense. Both the foolish and the wise are annihilated and destroyed when their body breaks up, and don’t exist after death.”
Ajita Kesakambali, DN 2

Sounds to me that the aggregates cannot be destroyed is akin to putting them into 1. And just the perception that they are not 1 is removed.

So your framework is that the 5 aggregates, starting from 2, goes into 1 or maybe 5 which is basically the same, just that 5 denies that it is a self, despite being permanent and existing. So any apparent death of arahants is just 2 finally disappearing and they all goes into 5. Never changing, but still can go to other worlds to teach? Totally contradictory already.

Only 2 has the characteristics of change by switching to 3 and 2 back and forth. Only in change can we say arahants can teach.

After dependent cessation link of ignorance, craving, clinging ends at arahanthood, the consciousness and name and form mutually support each other for the arahant to not go poof disappear after enlightenment while alive. This mutual support only ends at death. After which there being no other links in dependent origination anymore, no causes, all dependent cessation links happens and no more process to cease. The end.

To posit there’s an arahant which can leave the physical body is to posit a soul. There being no more mind or matter. Arahants have ended rebirth. If there’s another existence or something after parinibbāna for the arahant, it’s yet another rebirth and that just means that being is not an arahant.

No idea what this is about. No soul to speak of for Buddhas and arahants to leave their body, no mind also.

I think it’s explained by the 2 step process of how dependent cessation happens. Also you didn’t say what are the 3 acquisition of self.

Explained by the 2 step dependent cessation as above.

Oh do you mean -self to be no self?

There’s never been any self. So no self is not acquired. It’s realized.

After death of arahants, 2 goes to 3, and doesn’t arise ever again.

I think you’re asking confusing questions because you refuse to acknowledge that there’s a difference between nibbāna with remainder with Nibbāna without remainder. The remainder is the 5 aggregates for the arahant while still alive. That remainder is dukkha (but dukka without mental suffering). You don’t accept this despite so many people telling you so, in here and in other forum. If you wish to debate this, please make another new topic for it. Your conception of dukkha is always with mental suffering, so you’re stuck there until you’re willing to see beyond this.

AN4.173, 6 sense contact ceases without anything leftover.

I disagree. This is sloppy language. Not self is always been the case. What you mean to cease is the delusion of self (ignorance, conceit, self view). All of them are also not self. Not self is the basic character of all dhammas, it is not a resultant of anything.

I already put into the 4 framework out there, so if you really still insist on saying I means 1 and 4 when I say 2 and 3, that is on you.

The form is left as a corpse, unless you wish to identify the relics itself is still the arahant remaining, then you should agree that there’s no form left for the arahant. As the relics is also impermanent, but parinibbāna is not impermanent, we couldn’t identify the relics as the arahant himself.

The mind is not subjected to mass energy conservation law, or else you’re just pulling in physicalism onto the mind. The mind completely ceases at parinibbāna. 2 to become 3. And never arises again. Impossible to arise again. No causes to arise again. So it might as well be 4.

@yeshe.tenley this is an example of real disagreement.

So how could The Buddha himself visit any monastics he felt like with the mind-made body?

The Blessed One knew with his own mind the course of thought in the Venerable Anuruddha’s mind. Then, just as a strong man might extend his drawn-in arm or draw in his extended arm, the Blessed One disappeared from among the Bhaggas at Suṁsumāragira, in the deer park at Bhesakalā Grove, and reappeared before the Venerable Anuruddha among the Cetis in the eastern bamboo park.

Really? So what is the mind-made body Manomaya Kāya then?

Furthermore, Udāyi, the practice of the disciples instructed by me, is such that practised, my disciples magically create from their body, another body, having form, made by the mind, with a complete set of limbs and functioning senses.

But the sutta in question doesn’t say 5 aggregates, it says:

Here a bhikkhu is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, the holy life fulfilled, who has done what had to be done, laid down the burden, attained the goal, destroyed the fetters of being, completely released through final knowledge. However, his five sense faculties remain - Their five sense faculties still remain. So long as their senses have not gone they continue to experience the agreeable and disagreeable, to feel pleasure and pain.

Why doesn’t it say the six bases for contact Āyatana or the 5 aggregates?

It says the ”five sense faculties still remain” - The mind/citta is liberated, maybe that is why it it not included? You know, the mind as the 6th sense.

But you add the extra ”nothing else exist” to this, so you are only proliferating the unproliferated.

Funny how you wrote no one could refute your view in another thread and when I did refute it, using AN 4.174 you simply ignored everything, never replied and now post it here instead.

  • No matter how proficient in Pali, the fact remains:

“Kaccāna, this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence.

“Dvayanissito khvāyaṁ, kaccāna, loko yebhuyyena—atthitañceva natthitañca.

atthitā vs natthitā

‘All exists’: this is one extreme.

Sabbamatthī’ti kho, kaccāna, ayameko anto.

‘All does not exist’: this is the second extreme.

Sabbaṁ natthī’ti ayaṁ dutiyo anto.

And if we now look at the pali in AN 4.174:

“Reverend, when these six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does something else exist?”

“Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā atthaññaṁ kiñcī”ti?

“Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā natthaññaṁ kiñcī”ti?

This second question is now rendered as:
“Does something else no longer exist?”

But this was changed, it used to say: ”Does nothing else exist?”

So there is no real contrast here, rather this translation now instead postulates a theory, a sidestory of how the asker assumes as self, even though a self is never actually brought up in the sutta and it is Ananda asking the questions … (But maybe since Ananda wasn’t an Arahant he naturally lacked the superior insight that only ”mere cessationists” have, I dunno.)

“Atthaññaṁ” (atthi + aññaṁ):

  • atthi: “there is” or “exists.”
  • aññaṁ: “else,” “other,” “different.”
  • Atthaññaṁ: “there is something else,”

“Natthaññaṁ” (na + atthi + aññaṁ):

  • na: negation, “not.”
  • atthi: “there is” or “exists.”
  • aññaṁ: “else,” “other,” “different.”
  • Natthaññaṁ: “there is nothing else,”

Something/Anything:

  • “kiñcī” primarily means “anything”, often with an emphasis, and is suitable in both positive and negative contexts.

  • For “something,” “kiñci”, “kiñcana,” or “kiñcid” can be used depending on the specific context and nuance required.

  • In translations, the choice between “something” and “anything” depends on the intended nuance and the construction of the Pali sentence.

  • For absolute statements like those in the sutta, “anything” (from “kiñcī”) is typically the most accurate choice.

But we are not getting any absolute statements thanks to this new translation, that initially had ”nothing else exists” as we see here:

It is not that ”nothing else exists” was wrong in anyway, very consistent with the tetralemma.

It is just that this sutta clashed 100% with ”mere cessation” so it had to be altered to better fit the view of ”mere cessation” but in the process also made the sutta make less sense.

To such a extreme point that you can now claim these suttas are proof that ”Parinibbana is explained like the destruction of the aggregates and annihilation of Reality”

  • How exactly?