SuttaCentral
For years I was struggling to find a more accurate definition of Yoniso Manasikara. These two important documents clarify how Yoniso Manasikara is fundamental to progress in the Dhamma:
Peripheral-Awareness-By-Ajahn-Nyanamoli-Thero-.pdf (128.0 KB)
The-Meaning-of-Yoniso-Manasikara-Bhikkhu-Anigha.pdf (240.1 KB)
I offer with respect and humility.
Hi Venerable. 
Thanks for sharing.
In my view, these are not very good arguments by Ven Anigha, linguistically speaking.
Arguments of the type “the Buddha could have used terms [X instead of Y]”, therefore X means something fundamentally different from Y: I don’t know if they have an official name, but these are effectively arguments from silence. As a rule these are weak, and by some even considered fallacious. There can be many reasons why the Buddha chose certain terms over others. Pali being a dead and ancient language, it is generally impossible to know these reasons.
The Buddha may well have used the word yoniso because it actually was a standard term meaning something like “wise” or “appropriate”. The word is used with such meanings in other contexts. For example, monastics should use their robes “yoniso” or “appropriately” (Kd21). This doesn’t mean they use their robes “in terms of the origin/womb”.
They are also instructed to reflect “yoniso” on their almsfood and other requisites. I chant it every day before eating: Paṭisankhā yoniso piṇḍapātaṁ paṭisevāmi, "reflecting yoniso I use almsfood” (MN2). Monastics should also bear cold and heat reflecting “yoniso”. In such cases, I struggle to incorporate a clear idea of “in terms of the origin/womb” as well.
(We may force such a meaning, but it seems to read more naturally with a less weighty meaning.)
That doesn’t necessarily mean there isn’t something to this idea when it comes to Dependent Origination. But we should be wary of arguments based on etymology. Literal meanings are rarely more accurate! And when they are more accurate, it is never because of etymology or because the Buddha could have used other words to convey a certain idea.
The grammatical case of yoniso is unclear. It could even be an indeclinable (adverb), hence having no case at all. So Ven. Anigha may be too definite when he writes it must be read as “in terms of”, “by way of” or “from the origin/womb”. He argues there is no grammatical justification for reading it as “to”, but I think the Digital Pali Dictionary isn’t indisputably wrong when it suggests this as the literal meaning (but note again that literality tell us little about what the word actually means):
yoniso (ind.) properly; prudently; thoroughly; carefully; intelligently; lit. to the source
I’ll leave aside the pragmatic implications of the (overly) literal readings of yoniso.
However, I do want to note that Dependent Origination is not itself the “noble method”. It is reflecting on Dependent Origination which is this method. See AN10.92:
And what is the noble method that they have clearly seen and comprehended with wisdom? It’s when a noble disciple reflects: Only when there is this, will there be that.. Etc.
Hence, Dependent Origination is not “what meditation (i.e. yoniso manasikāra) is”. In my view, the “popular belief” Ven Anigha argues against is actually correct: knowledge of Dependent Origination is an insight. It is not itself a meditation but comes from meditation—based upon which one does further meditation. See also SN12.41:
And what is the noble method that he has clearly seen and thoroughly penetrated with wisdom? Here, householder, the noble disciple attends closely and carefully to dependent origination itself thus: […] (tr. Bodhi)
The word “to” is key. It is the attending to Dependent Origination that is the noble method, not Dependent Origination itself. (Let alone it being awkward to call the origin of suffering itself a noble method!)
Note also, the phrase here is sādhukaṁ yoniso manasi karoti. Here sādhukaṃ and yoniso are most likely (near) synonyms, contrary to what Ven. Anigha argues at the start of his essay. Hence Ven. Bodhi translating “closely and carefully” instead of something like “closely carefully” (or “closely in terms of the origin/womb” or whatever).
There is probably a difference in emphasis in yoniso versus sādhukaṃ. But in all, I think Ven. Anigha makes too much out of this. Ven. Anālayo’s more nuanced article on yoniso manasikāra may be illuminating. He concludes: “In sum, then, yoniso in its early canonical usage conveys a sense of doing something ‘thoroughly’, in an ‘appropriate’ manner, and ‘wisely’.” I think we cannot convincingly dispute this, certainly not based on the literal meaning of yoniso.
In general, it can be dangerous to derive a lot from singular words, especially when they are ambiguous. And especially when it concerns our practice! In hermeneutics, it is best to apply the principle of least impactful meaning—what Joos calls “Semantic Axiom Number One” (Language vol.48.2 pp.257–265): “the best guess [to meaning] is that one which maximizes the redundancy of word and environment together”. I feel Ven. Anigha does the opposite of this with yoniso, placing it center stage in interpreting the practice.
I think the claim that Ven. Anālayo’s article is somehow
is quite unjustified. In that article Ven. Anālayo simply lists out his personal interpretations of the Pāli words in question without ever justifying them beyond discussing their context and how that context has led him to feel that his interpretations in each of those respective contexts are the “natural” ones. Your own discussion of the requisite reflections
would be an example of this as well, of assuming an interpretation to be correct because it feels intuitive and is supported by traditional authorities, whereas a new, contrary interpretation does not feel intuitive and is not supported by authority. Lack of such present intuition or authoritative approval does nothing to demonstrate the interpretation to be necessarily incorrect, and vice versa.
But I do fully agree with your final paragraph:
But, again, the philological and, more importantly, spiritual danger of Ven. Anīgha’s interpretation says nothing with respect to whether that interpretation is ultimately the correct one. Best guesses as defined by Joos may still ultimately prove to be wrong despite the prudence with which they are made.
Ultimately, the usage of yonisomanasikāra in the Canon is so sparse and ambiguous (yet so central to the Dhamma by virtue of being the most important internal factor for the arising of the Right View) that I do not believe the term’s meaning could ever be definitively resolved one way or the other by philological methods. I am mostly writing this to contest the claim that Ven. Anālayo or Ven. Bodhi’s hermeneutics are somehow more sophisticated or reliable or better supported by the text in any way. If we are speaking from a purely scholarly perspective I would say that the authoritative opinions are not any less legitimate than Ven. Anīgha’s, but also that they are not any more legitimate either.
Ven. Anīgha’s glossary entry for yonisomanasikāra is also relevant here, though it may not necessarily add much on top of what is present in the OP essay.
It seems improbable to me that the Buddha would subsume such a complex idea into the sparsely used term yonisomanasikāra and expect his audience to understand it without him having explicitly outlined it in detail elsewhere. It is even less probable if the term is as critical to the entire path as the authors suggest. If the term did have such a technical meaning, it would effectively render the suttas esoteric - which would run counter to the Buddhas statement in DN16. So it strikes me that this is a case of reading too much into a phrase - the opposite of following Ajahn @Brahmali’s principle of least meaning or the rule of plain meaning in legislative interpretation.
However, setting aside the specific translation issue, that does not necessarily mean the broad concept/ approach discussed is invalid. It (at least by my reading) appears to align with modern phenomenology and cognitive science, and share some features with a number of Mahayana schools (e.g. Kagyu, Nyingma, East Asian Yogācāra) that draw upon the frameworks outlined in the Sandinirmocana Sutra and the works attributed to Acariya Asaṅga.
But, again, attributing all that to a single term is a stretch.
I would quite haphazardly suggest that, in English, we say “to the bottom” when meaning, thoroughly, as in “We need to get to the bottom of this case”.
Or, we likewise say “From the ground up”, like “We’ve had to learn a new system from the ground up”.
So, I would offer a middle ground (pun intended !!) in this, that yoniso might just mean “completely, to the bottom / from ground up”, as that’s a common way we conceptualise the idea of “thoroughly”.
And “the bottom of things” IS the DO, the mechanism we’re most concerned with, the bottom of suffering, so to speak.
Perhaps?
I should add, thoroughly means “to the end”. Fundamentally means, related to foundation. Basically as well (from base root), but it means “simple” in colloquial usage. Profoundly also means “from the depths”.
For “ayoniso”, B. Bodhi has “carelessly attending”, B. @Sujato has “Apply the mind irrationally”. I would argue perhaps what Buddha is critising is “not getting to the bottom of things”.
So, for both positive and negative, I would argue “Thorough” is a fine concession that’s both aligned with etymology and the “exhaustive” sense of the word?
The example given by Venerable @Sunyo also fits here:
King Udena thought, “These Sakyan monastics are clever at putting things to use; nothing is wasted,”
Atha kho rājā udeno—“sabbevime samaṇā sakyaputtiyā yoniso upanenti, na kulavaṁ gamentī”ti
“Nothing is wasted” is aligned with “completely, exhaustively” sense of the word here.
I actually spoke to Ven. Anīgha recently about this topic of how little disambiguation there is in the Suttas about topics of such monumental importance (yonisomanasikāra being to foremost among them) and his response (to paraphrase) was that definitions are often actually inappropriate and unnecessary because any definitions of such Dhamma-technical terms (including those given by HH) will always necessarily be misunderstood by someone who has not at minimum been deeply virtuous and sense restrained for many years. The Gradual Training thus functions—in a sense—as the crucial definition sought, the only definition that would be truly effective or, in some cases, even truly necessary. No esotericism, just simple but highly evocative language and the lifestyle training necessary to understand what that language is pointing to.
As for the “least” or “simple” meaning, I would argue that other translations do not so much aim for the least meaning so much as they simply eliminate the word from the text altogether with vacuous translations that have basically no meaning at all.
Also, from ‘Making Sense Of Dhamma’ by Ven. Akincano:
… yoniso manasikāra is often translated as‘wise attention’, ‘proper attention’ or ‘careful attention’. The first two of these are acceptable but they don’t tell us much. What is it that constitutes the wisdom/properness of wise/proper attention? The third is very misleading, for it suggests that all one has to do is listen carefully. The phenomenon that is being described is not quite so straightforward. The Pāli word yoni means ‘womb’. It can also, because of what wombs are and do, mean ‘source’ or ‘origin’. Yoniso is the ablative case, so it can be rendered ‘from the origin’. Yoniso manasikāra is not about what you attend to; it is about how you attend to things. It is about attending to things in such a way that you consider their origin. It is about attending to things in terms of, or from the perspective of, their origination: what it is that makes it possible for these things to be there in your experience. We might call this originary attention.
MN 2 (i,8)
He attends in a non-originary way like this—‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past?
Will I be in the future? Will I not be in the future? What will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? Having been what, what will I be in the future?’ Or now, he is uncertain right here about the present: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I?
Where did this creature come from?so evaṃ ayoniso manasi karoti—‘ahosiṃ nu kho ahaṃ atītamaddhānaṃ? na nu kho ahosiṃ atītamaddhānaṃ? kiṃ nu kho ahosiṃ atītamaddhānaṃ? kathaṃ nu kho ahosiṃ atītamaddhānaṃ? kiṃ hutvā kiṃ ahosiṃ nu kho ahaṃ atītamaddhānaṃ? bhavissāmi nu kho ahaṃ anāgatamaddhānaṃ? na nu kho bhavissāmi anāgatamaddhānaṃ? kiṃ nu kho bhavissāmi anāgatamaddhānaṃ? kathaṃ nu kho bhavissāmi anāgatamaddhānaṃ? kiṃ hutvā kiṃ bhavissāmi nu kho ahaṃ anāgatamaddhāna’nti? etarahi vā paccuppannamaddhānaṃ ajjhattaṃ kathaṃkathī hoti
—‘ahaṃ nu khosmi? no nu khosmi? kiṃ nu khosmi? kathaṃ
nu khosmi? ayaṃ nu kho satto kuto āgato? so kuhiṃ gāmīWhere will it go?
bhavissatī’ti?For as long as you’re thinking in terms of your existence in this temporal way—as an entity (a ‘me’) that travels through the past, into the present, and then off into the future—you’ll miss what’s important: your suffering and its origin. Why? Because these are not to be found within this domain of temporal existence. Suffering and the cause of suffering are not in the past. And freedom from suffering is not in the future. It’s all right here, right now.
MN 2 (i,9)
He attends in an originary way: ‘This is suffering’. He attends in an originary way: ‘This is the origination of suffering’. He attends in an originary way: ‘This is the cessation of suffering’. He attends in an originary way: ‘This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering’.so ‘idaṃ dukkha’nti yoniso manasi karoti, ‘ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo’ti yoniso manasi karoti, ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodho’ti yoniso manasi karoti, ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti yoniso manasi karoti.
When there is this right kind of attention, one is attending to something while simultaneously considering what it is (that’s also there in this experience) that makes this thing possible. For example, one is aware not only of one’s suffering, but of what it is that makes suffering possible (i.e. “the origination of suffering”). And what is it that makes suffering possble? Craving, says the Buddha. That doesn’t mean craving in the past; it means the craving that’s present right here and now that provides the basis for this suffering. Remove this craving and there will be no suffering (i.e. “the cessation of suffering”). Yoniso manasikāra involves being able to see two things at the same time: (1) what one is attending to and (2) something else that one knows is the reason why the first thing is there.
For as long as one is attending to one’s experience in a wrong, non-originary, ayoniso way, one is responsible for providing the basis for the wrong, self-centred view of a puthujjana.
MN 2 (i,8)
While he is attending in an non-originary way like this, one of six views arises. The view ‘My self exists’ arises for him as true and established; or the view ‘My self doesn’t exist’ arises for him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive self with self’ arises for him as true and established, or the view ‘I perceive not-self with self’ arises for him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive self with not-self’ arises for him as true and established; or else there is the following view: ‘It is this self of mine that speaks, feels, experiences here and there the results of good and bad actions, and this self of mine is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not of the nature to change, and it will remain right there forever and ever’.tassa evaṃ ayoniso manasikaroto channaṃ diṭṭhīnaṃ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati. ‘atthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati; ‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi
uppajjati; ‘attanāva attānaṃ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati; ‘attanāva anattānaṃ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati; ‘anattanāva attānaṃ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati; atha vā panassa evaṃ diṭṭhi hoti—‘yo me ayaṃ attā vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti so kho pana me ayaṃ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṃ tatheva ṭhassatī’ti.
We can attempt to find sutta verses where yoniso and yoniso manasikara is used, and based on those verses try to understand the given meaning.
But first let’s see the dictionary entry and see if the given translation fits with the verses we find:
yoniso
New Concise Pali English Dictionary
- wisely; properly; judiciously (adverb)
Digital Pāḷi Dictionary
- ind. properly; prudently; thoroughly; carefully; intelligently; lit. according to the source [√yu + *ni + so]
For example, one of such suttas is An3.5 called Ayonisosutta
An astute person is known by three things.
What three?
They ask a question yoniso. They answer a question yoniso. And when someone else answers a question yoniso—with well-rounded, coherent, and relevant words and phrases—they agree with it.
In the sutta An3.5 yoniso seems to be used as an adverb applicable to asking and answering questions.
Translation by Sujato uses “rationally” (a synonym to intelligently which is found in the dictionary entry) and by Bodhi “carefully”.
Personally I think the meaning rationally, intelligently makes sense and currently can’t think of an alternative translation for this sutta.
What about you? Do you too think this is translated well or have a way to provide a meaningful alternative?
The second example is An1.15 An1.20 which state that ayonisomanasikāra is the number one thing for growth of vicikicchā and yonisomanasikāra is the number one thing for giving up vicikicchā.
Thus we are given a relation between ayonisomanasikāra and vicikicchā. If we can understand vicikicchā we might learn about yonisomanasikāra too through this relation.
Mendicants, I do not see a single thing that gives rise to vicikicchā, or, when it has arisen, makes it increase and grow like ayonisomanasikāro.
Ayoniso, monks, manasi karoto, unarisen vicikicchā arises, arisen vicikicchā increases and grows.
Mendicants, I do not see a single thing that prevents vicikicchā from arising, or, when it has arisen, gives it up like yonisomanasikāro.
Yoniso, monks, manasi karoto, unarisen vicikicchā does not arise, arisen vicikicchā is given up.
Okay, so now we have the meaning of yoniso tied to vicikicchā if we consider this sutta, but what is vicikicchā?
Vicikicchā is presented in the suttas as one of five hindrances - hindrances that weaken wisdom. Let’s check the dictionary entry:
Digital Pāḷi Dictionary
vicikicchā
- adj. with doubt; having uncertainty; being indecisive (about) [vi + √cit + sa + ā + a]
- fem. doubt; uncertainty; indecisiveness (about) [vi + √cit + sa + ā]
- aor. doubted, hesitated [vi + √cit]
Suppose we take it to mean “1. adj. with doubt; having uncertainty; being indecisive (about)”. But the meaning is not nuanced enough. Why? Remember that vicikicchā is a hindrance that weakens wisdom. Thus I do not think it will apply to any doubt: for example being indecisive about what to have for lunch, or doubting the explanation of physics - would that weaken the wisdom of heart and be a hindrance? Hardly so. Thus, what is vicikicchā about? Let’s refer to the suttas:
MN23 gives a similie of forked path for vicikicchā. Thus by referring to the dictionary, being indecisive about which path to take, having a doubt about which path to take - could be a more nuanced meaning. But is still does not tell us about what exactly.
‘A forked path’ is a term for vicikicchā.
‘Throw out the forked path’ means ‘give up vicikicchā’
MN27 seems to finally tell us about what: that one is without doubt about skillful mental phenomena (kusalesu dhammesu). Thus taking the forked path analogy: if one is presented with a choice that has a moral(skillful/unskillful) consequence - one has no doubt as to which one is skillful and which one is not - if one has this moral doubt - that seems to be vicikicchā. While suttas teach to question whether what we are about to do is skillful or unskillful - that does not mean that our heart should be under such hindrance of doubt, anxiety or dread fearing we might pick the unskillful choice.
Giving up vicikicchā, they meditate having gone beyond vicikicchā, “not confused”|“without doubt”(akathaṅkathī) about skillful mental phenomena (kusalesu dhammesu), cleansing the heart of vicikicchā.
Digital Pāḷi Dictionary
akathaṅkathī
- adj. not confused (about); without doubt (about); lit. not asking how [na + kathaṃ + kathī]
Finally, since yonisomanasikāra is the number one thing for giving up vicikicchā. Does rational|intelligent application of mind solve doubt about what is skillful? I think it does and currently can’t think of an alternative translation.
What about you? Do you too think this is translated well or have a way to provide a meaningful alternative?
This suggests that the Buddha would have accepted that the term (without further disambiguation) would be meaningless to, or at least misleading for, many of the people he taught, which strikes me as exceedingly problematic - particularly given yonisomanasikāra’s relatively early placement in the training. It does not align with the picture the suttas paint of the Buddha going to great lengths to carefully explain teachings to even the dullest and most recalcitrant interlocutors.
This seems somewhat of a logical double standard. On one hand, you are prepared to accept that any definition would be “necessarily misunderstood by someone who has not at a minimum been deeply virtuous and sense restrained for many years” - meaning that the term itself would remain either meaningless or misleading to anyone else - but then criticize translations that eliminate it or give it no meaning.
Yes, I agree. It seems very unlikely that the Buddha would be giving coded, hermetic teachings.
Certainly, one’s understanding of the Dhamma deepens with practice. When the Buddha tells us that we need to see things ‘as they really are’, we might not know what this is but at least we can understand that we’re looking at things in the wrong way.
“wise attention” does give us an inkling of what we should aim to be doing, and tells us that people tend to attend to things without wisdom. It points us in the right direction.
To say that, “definitions are often actually inappropriate and unnecessary” strikes me as arrogant and elitist. Can we really imagine the Buddha going around during his decades long teaching career saying something like, ‘well, you wouldn’t understand…’??
In the same conversation I previously mentioned Ven. Anīgha also talked about how the intentions the Buddha may have had for the Suttas (how he intended them to be consumed) as well as obviously the extent to which they reflect the full breadth of the teachings he would have given in person are not things we can ever know with any certainty. So he may have discussed yonisomanasikāra on some occasions in more detail, just detail that either never made it into any oral or written records or was otherwise eventually flattened into stock formulas, and what he did go out of his way to make sure got into the oral tradition may have been intended as scaffolding for noble disciples to elaborate on during teaching rather than standalone text. Regardless, Ven. Anīgha’s primary point mentioned before still stands—that from the HH point of view “more detail” is factually present in the Suttas, just not necessarily in the form that most people would recognize (or find palatable). And just because the Buddha went into detail during arguments against other sectarians on certain topics does not mean that every topic is worthy of the same treatment or strategy.
Ultimately I think it would be best if mainstream translations just stuck to as literal and mechanical of a Pāli-English mapping as possible on passages that are obviously of central doctrinal importance but also dubious in meaning due to low canonical usage volume. It is better for a person who does not have any lifestyle basis to understand the meaning of the Suttas to get further signals (however superficial) from the translations that “This text is not for you” (yet) than to be inadvertently led to a place of believing that the Dhamma is much easier to understand and much more platitudinous than it actually is. Eliminating the word as opposed to translating it as a strange and difficult to understand linguistic artifact turns down an opportunity to include an important signal that most Buddhists frankly need more than almost any other: “This is not something you currently understand.”
This seems to conflate two very different things- the job of a translator and the role of a teacher.
The job of a translator is to render the source text into the target language in as clear and faithful way as possible, not to decide which words or sentences need to be eliminated or censored. What would the translator substitute for the redacted passages? black bars or ellipses with a note - ‘one day you’ll be ready for this’? Who decides when one receives access to the full text?
The role of a teacher, and in fact the mark of a great teacher, is to understand what will currently benefit and further the understanding of a student. The somewhat paradoxical downside of the entire Canon now instantly available to anyone is that many of the teachings students will find are not currently the best for them. But it’s really up to the student to figure out how to best further their understanding and practice.
So, if we acknowledge the limits of any language to express profound thoughts, and understand that the words are there to point us in the right direction, reading “wise attention” tells us a lot about what needs to be done.
So, if to understand what yonisomanasikara is one needs to be virtuous and restrained, then how come that nobody outside of HH understands yonisomanasikara the way HH understand it? Would you contend that all other monastics are not virtuous or sense-restrained? Otherwise, what would be the reason that explains this fact?
Well, HH standards for virtue are very high, to the point that even almost all bhikkhus would not meet them. Their perspective is that it isn’t virtue until it has been taken on as the core value of one’s life, without qualifications or exceptions, with the intention of it being permanent. So, for example, if someone was forced by an authoritarian state to disrobe, if that person would immediately revert to incelibacy simply on account of the fact that celibacy is no longer part of their “job description” then they were never truly virtuous to begin with by HH standards. That is not to say that a virtuous person could not lapse in their virtue, but that they would never be keeping it purely as a professional obligation, keeping it “at arms length.” Keeping virtue in such a way, as a superficial and often superstitious observance, is unfortunately the norm.
After virtue—I have not heard an HH teacher put it exactly this way—but I would offer that all mainstream meditation techniques are breaches of mental sense restraint by HH standards, which would realistically cut off basically every non-HH Buddhist from eligibility to be considered sense-restrained, even those very rare Buddhists who would satisfy their virtue criteria.
From the “text’s own perspective,” a puthujjana is unfortunately incapable of rendering the EBTs faithfully, but of course total abandonment of translation by scholars is both unrealistic and in some ways undesirable. I presented a suggestion for what admittedly-puthujjana translators might best do with obviously-difficult-but-obviously-important words and phrases—censorship was not part of that suggestion.
A fascinating concept, I admit to never having heard of puthujjana-level vs. ariya-level translations, and I wonder what the difference would look like. Would the target language (say, English) of an ariyan-level translation be incomprehensible to a puthujjana speaker of that language?
It also raises interesting questions about the source language of the suttas, which are typically thought to be Pali, although there is much discussion about which language the Buddha spoke and which suttas represent a verbatim transcript of what he taught.
Would this imply that the Buddha would give some teachings in a language, or groups of technical phrases, only comprehensible to ariyans, and therefore only translatable by ariyans? Can we discern, say through reading the Pali, which teachings were given to puthujjanas and which to ariyans by the choice of words?
This certainly places a very heavy burden on the power of words, and the relationship between the letter and the spirit of the text.
I’m reminded of the Kaḷara sutta in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN 12.32) when the Ven. Sāriputta roars his lions’s roar about his ability to proclaim his understanding of the Dhamma in many ways: (“aññamaññehi padehi aññamaññehi pariyāyehi”)
”‘If the Blessed One were to question me about this matter with various terms and with various methods for a whole day, for a whole day I would be able to answer him with various terms and with various methods. If he were to question me about this matter with various terms and with various methods for a whole night, for a day and night, for two days and nights, for three, four, five, six, or seven days and nights—for seven days and nights I would be able to answer him with various terms and with various methods.’”
and the Buddha approves:
”the Venerable Sāriputta has thoroughly penetrated that element of the Dhamma by the thorough penetration of which, if I were to question him about that matter with various terms and with various methods for up to seven days and nights, for up to seven days and nights he would be able to answer me with various terms and with various methods”
which would seem to celebrate diversity in expressing the Dhamma, the ability to use a possibly endless choice of expressions, and not relying on repeating back the Buddha’s exact words, or relying on a set of technical expressions.
The following is a quote on this subject taken from Ven. Sujato’s essay Notes on yoniso manasi kara:
Indeed it is. Along with yoniso manasikāra, he analyzed several other important Buddhist concepts his “Excursions” books.
Excursions Into the Thought-World of the Pali Discourses - From Craving to Liberation by Analayo Bhikkhu.pdf (1021.1 KB)
For sure. Figuring it out helps to develop wisdom, but it’s easy to get lost by yourself. That’s where having a teacher can be helpful. But if your teacher is themselves lost, then you’ll definitely get lost too. Tradeoffs. At the end of the day, each of us has to become independent in Dhamma—that’s one of the qualities of a stream-enterer.
So, in summary, if I read correctly, your claims are:
Hence, only HH monks (and followers) have access to the true meaning of the suttas.
Apart from being breathtakingly conceited (surely a failure in its own right?), as anyone who has been burned by the guru-disciple dynamic common in Tibetan Buddhist (and other) circles can attest, this strategy is remarkably similar to that which has been used many times throughout religious history: only those with the correct motivation/ understanding received the ‘higher’ teachings, which were hidden from those with ‘inferior’ capabilities. Failure to believe the teachings or instructions when they are revealed reflects - not a lack of historicity/ authenticity/ accuracy of the teachings - but a failure of character on behalf of the doubtful. This also makes it impossible to dispute or disprove, because the opposing viewpoint must be, by definition, inferior in some way (else they would not argue).
While people are obviously free to believe what they will, one of the great joys of the privileged time in which we find ourselves is the rational, transparent and intellectually rigorous approach taken by translators such as Venerables Bodhi, Thanissaro, @sujato and @Brahmali.