Understanding Sakkāyaditthi

Everyone’s entitled to there own translation whether it be substance etc, because I translate it as corporeality. satkaya or sakkaya is referring to a wrong view that everything, the body, speech and mind are all corporeal. There is no formless mind etc. It’s all just rupa form.

whereas the Buddha makes a clear distinction when describing the 6 sense faculties in the context of a namarupa. A physical sensation from the eye, etc are of the form rupa. A sensation of the mind sense is of the nama. In this context nama can be considered as formless mentality.

Hope this helps :folded_hands:

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It doesn’t help much, since regarding my understanding of sakkāyaditthi I don’t see it as requiring additional help, neither it helped me to understand your understanding of attavada and sakkāyaditthi. So in order to understand it better, how is your understanding related to question “Who are you?” Why actually any one who gives positive answer to such question fallas into corporeality view, and do you actually know someone who sees himself as corporeality?

Yes. Humanists have a corporeal view of life and themselves. This is a literal philological translation of the compound sakkayaditthi. Corporeal is the adjective of corporality.

I’m sorry I couldn’t be of help. I hope you find the answers your wanting.

What about devas, who are as much victims of sakkāyaditthi but cannot be classified as humanists?

That is a very fair point, and you are completely correct to bring up the Devas. Looking back at my initial phrasing, by calling it ‘a wrong view’ rather than isolating its exact mechanism, I left the definition too loose.

When I use ‘corporeal view’ for satkāya-dṛṣṭi, your Deva example actually highlights exactly what I mean. I am using ‘corporeal’ not in the sense of physical human flesh and bone, but in the psychological sense of reification—treating something fluid and formless as if it were a solid, bounded, substantial body or entity (kāya).

A Formless Deva has no physical meat, but when trapped in satkāya-dṛṣṭi, they take a fluid mental stream (feeling or perception) and cognitively reify it into a permanent soul-substance. They treat the formless as a ‘body.’ So you’re spot on—Devas are just as much victims of this substantializing trap as a physical humanist is on earth. Thanks for the correction, it helps sharpen the boundaries of the translation!

My point is that sakkāyaditthi can be seen as a rationalisation from asmimana. Now asmimana is the most fundamental aspect of experience, you don’t have to explain to atheist, Muslim, Christian what asmimana means. “I am” is used by everyone and exept arahats experienced by everyone.

I too use sometimes embodiment for sakkāya and embodiment view for sakkāyaditthi, but only to illustrate that “I am” apart pointing to the state of being is itself empty of context, only after one makes determination of “what I am” it becomes embedded or personalised.

So puggala who is no arahant and no sekha, does not see himself as a composite individual- which “he” actually is- but as somebody, someone or person and sees the question “Who are you” as quite justified and legitimate.

And this seeing oneself is quite universal, it is all the same in the case of atheist, Muslim or puthujjana Buddhist. And since sakkāyaditthi is universal (minus ariyasāvakas) it requires the term which is also universal, understood by anyone (of course on verbal level, since by very definition puthujjana does not understand what it means to be or to be person), he doesn’t understand suffering. But at least, by rendering sakkāya as person, he receives clear message. And now is up to him, to understand the truth peron=suffering.

Embodiment sounds quite abstract, it is not universally used term, by these who are victims of sakkāyaditthi. That’s why on the end I prefer person for sakkāya. “Personality is the burden” is understood on verbal level and immediately introduces important dialectic individual (puggala) and person (sakkaya).

What does it mean “corporeality is suffering or burden”, for puthujjana who doesn’t use such term when he reflects on his own experience?

With metta

Dear Bhante, thanks for your attempt. If you are right I am not only far away from understanding of the Four Noble Truths, but also have no hopes to understand them in this life, since while I understand your approach and stance, my understanding of Buddha’s message to puthujjana is: “You are not a person (sakkaya) living in the world”. So abandoning of sakkāyaditthi is precisely to stop seeing oneself as a person.

That’s much easier to say than do, nevertheless I do see the practice of not treating experience personally as a core of the Buddha’s Teaching.

This actually is commonplace knowledge in spirutuality, there are such books as"Ego is your enemy ". Most likely they are written by puthujjanas, but generally they point out the right direction. But such message may suggest that after ego is removed, some kind of Noble person will remain. While after eradication of asmimana, entire subject is removed from experience, and all what remains is impersoonal sequences of sankharas.

So translation sakkaya as person includes message to puthujjana: your very being = suffering.

What he can do with the message substance = suffering?

With respect and metta

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The idea of nibbāna as the ultimate goal of human endeavour will no doubt strike the common man, innocently enjoying the pleasures of his senses, as a singularly discouraging notion if he is told that it is no more than ‘cessation of being’. Without actually going so far (overtly, at least) as to hope for Bradley’s Absolute (‘It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss.’ [Op. cit. (A.&R.), Ch. XV]),—without perhaps going quite so far as this, even a thoughtful man may like to expect something a little more positive than ‘mere extinction’ as the summum bonum. We shrink before the idea that our existence, with its anguishes and its extasies, is wholly gratuitous, and we are repelled by the suggestion that we should be better off without it; and it is only natural that the puthujjana should look for a formula to save something from (as he imagines) the shipwreck.[c]
(…)

But if, in our stewing minds, we still cannot help feeling that nibbāna really ought, somehow, to be an eternity of positive enjoyment, or at least of experience, we may ponder these two Sutta passages:

Tisso imā bhikkhu vedanā vuttā mayā, sukhā vedanā dukkhā vedanā adukkhamasukhā vedanā, imā tisso vedanā vuttā mayā. Vuttam kho pan’ etam bhikkhu mayā, Yam kiñci vedayitam tam dukkhasmin ti. Tam kho pan’etam bhikkhu mayā sankhārānam yeva aniccatam sandhāya bhāsitam… (‘There are, monk, these three feelings stated by me: pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling—these three feelings have been stated by me. But this, monk, has been stated by me: ‘Whatever is felt counts as unpleasure (suffering)’. That, however, monk, was said by me concerning the impermanence of determinations…’ (See Vedanā Samy. i,9, quoted at A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §17.)) Vedanā Samy. ii,1 <S.iv,216>

Āyasmā Sāriputto etad avoca. Sukham idam āvuso nibbānam, sukham idam āvuso nibbānan ti. Evam vutte āyasmā Udāyi āyasmantam Sāriputtam etad avoca. Kim pan’ettha āvuso Sāriputta sukham, yad ettha n’atthi vedayitan ti. Etad eva khv ettha āvuso sukham, yad ettha n’atthi vedayitam. (‘The venerable Sāriputta said this:—It is extinction, friends, that is pleasant! It is extinction, friends, that is pleasant! When this was said, the venerable Udāyi said to the venerable Sāriputta,—But what herein is pleasant, friend Sāriputta, since herein there is nothing felt?—Just this is pleasant, friend, that herein there is nothing felt.’) Anguttara IX,iv,3 <A.iv,414>

I think our metaphysical background is also important, one who believes in evolution and one who based on Suttas believes in devolution, most likely will have quite a different ideas on the most aspects of Dhamma, not only nibbana.

Taking that our bondage in samsāra is infinite, as far as past lives go, and will continue to infinity as long as avijja remains present in experience, metaphysical background that we are part of something which is infinite seems to be justified. It is in fact either or situation, either infinite samsara, or eternal peace of the heart.

We may start from basic attitude “I am”. It itself, while still connected with avijja, is a noble experience. Sakkāyaditthi may be seen as limiting ourselves. “Know yourself” in Dhamma can be seen as knowing what I am not, and rejecting it as not-self.

Ajahn Amaro speak about becoming kind of spiritual Sherlock Holmes:

There is no place in the teachings on not-self where the Buddha says, ‘The real self is this. What you really are is that’; interestingly there is also no place where he states categorically that, ‘There is no self’ either. Instead, he offers a way of analysis based on observing how we identify with experience, using a process of elimination based on inarguable knowledge, encouraging us to be like a spiritual Sherlock Holmes: ‘When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains … must be the truth.’28

Most significantly, he teaches, if we stop identifying with what we are not, then what is real will become apparent. When the mind awakens to the Dhamma, the ultimate reality, it is liberated – it is Dhamma knowing its own nature.

Mind Is What Matters

Practice of Dhamma can be seen as transformation of experience from separate person living in the space and time to asanhata dhatu. In a sense the Buddha has to massage to us, good one: we cannot die and the bad one, we cannot die. The only thing we can do is to transform our immortality of endless samsaric bondage to eternity of what arising, disapearance and no change while it is present is not evident.

Anyway, no need to be anxious about someone else Immortality, specially if he himself isn’t interested in it.

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The sense of self, ‘I’, is a thought that the mind, in relation to body, fabricates in order to 1) create a mental image of itself 2) filter sensory data input that arrives through the 5 senses 3) because of the evolved evolutionary capacity of human beings to be aware of their own awareness, or aliveness.

The worldling, lacking insight, takes the ‘I’ to be the entirety of what they are. This creates a rigid and fixed identity view which is the first fetter.

The sense of ‘I, me, myself’ is an evolutionary function. The catch is that we are not just a single thought, ‘I’.

The Buddha still used the word ‘I’.

“‘I am the owner of my actions (kamma), heir to my actions, born of my actions, related through my actions, and have my actions as my arbitrator. Whatever I do, for good or for evil, to that will I fall heir’…”

A fixed, rigid identify view, that does not accord with changingness or align with the dhamma is the error. A relative identity, I, the Tathagata, is one that moves in accord with the dhamma. It is a ‘what’ which suffers of which the ‘who’ is only its social function, the ‘what’ subsequently suffering due to an entanglement with a fixed, rigid identity view, which does not accord with dhamma (alongside the multitudinous and dreaded thickets of views). It is the what which seeks the path to freedom from suffering. It is the what that finds itself entangled in views, and experiences release from the entanglement of views.

Even the idea of ‘being a person in the world’ is not problematic if you are not misled by this little string of language being the entirety of what ‘you’ are.

Enough of a what for the Buddha to call himself a me…

“Whoever sees the Dhamma sees me; whoever sees me sees the Dhamma.”

What, ignorance -according to you- has in common with evolution? Do you mean that without ignorance one ceases to be interested in “struggle for existence”? Quite true, but I don’t see any need to introduce "evolution ", whatever it means, to the Buddha’s Teaching.

Ignorance is the base which clouds the mind from yathābhūtadassana. Ignorance is the initial starting point for all beings and serves as the basis for us to illuminate in order to acquire knowledge of the way things are. Think of cave men: were they as refined mentally as we are today? Did they have the faculties for deep contemplation and to develop insight into the four noble truths?

Yes to your second question. There is a non-cleaving to material, immaterial and non-existences. The struggle drops entirely.

Evolution here is another word for development. Like the aspiring wordling beginning to recognise the path, there is mental development occurring - a transformation of ignorance towards wisdom.

Mentality and materiality, nama-rupa, build on top of each other. Development of the mental faculty can impress on the body. Development of the body can impress onto the mental faculty.

Take this for example: when an individual first decides to meditate, they may experience aches in the body. Whilst the timer is counting down, they may experience the urge to abandon practice because of the preoccupation with these pains. If one can mentally exude themselves, return to the object, and makes it to the end of the timer, one has taken one step of developing strength in the body.

Mental resilience, determination and grit has in turn strengthened the body. If one returns to practice, overtime, through mental determination, the body becomes strong enough to sit upright and the mind can concentrate with one less concern - aches and nags in the body.

This is an example of mentality and physicality mutually conditioning each other. Evolution, in this context, is the mind moving towards a direction in line with development and the resultant emergence of certain qualities through applied attention, which if otherwise not applied, such beneficial qualities would not have arisen.

A fortunate animal finding birth in the human realm would be evidence of the animals developed mental prowess which is a form of evolution. That mental evolution has led to the aquiring of a human form.

I haven’t discussed with them, so I don’t know, but I haven’t observed any mental refinement in modern man, which would make his position privileged in compassion, for example with ancient Greek. Contrary. But even if so, it doesn’t justify such statement as “ignorance is function of devolution”.