See the below sutta to understand where @Mat is coming from. I think you guys are kind of just arguing over the semantic range of a Pali term rather than having some deeper disagreement in terms of doctrine.
But the Buddha has also said:
Vuttaṃ kho panetaṃ bhagavatā:
‘Suffering includes whatever is felt.’
‘yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin’ti.
What was the Buddha referring to when he said this?”
Kiṃ nu kho etaṃ bhagavatā sandhāya bhāsitaṃ:
‘yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin’”ti?
“Good, good, mendicant!
“Sādhu sādhu, bhikkhu.
I have spoken of these three feelings.
Tisso imā, bhikkhu, vedanā vuttā mayā.
These are the three feelings I have spoken of.
imā tisso vedanā vuttā mayā.
But I have also said:
Vuttaṃ kho panetaṃ, bhikkhu, mayā:
‘Suffering includes whatever is felt.’ > ‘yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ, taṃ dukkhasmin’ti.
When I said this I was referring to the impermanence of conditions, to the fact that conditions are
Taṃ kho panetaṃ, bhikkhu, mayā saṅkhārānaṃyeva aniccataṃ sandhāya bhāsitaṃ:
‘yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin’ti.
liable to end,
Taṃ kho panetaṃ, bhikkhu, mayā saṅkhārānaṃyeva khayadhammataṃ … pe …
“Mendicants, there are these three forms of suffering.
“Tisso imā, bhikkhave, dukkhatā.
What three?
Katamā tisso?
The suffering inherent in painful feeling; the suffering inherent in conditions; and the suffering inherent in perishing.
Dukkhadukkhatā, saṅkhāradukkhatā, vipariṇāmadukkhatā—
These are the three forms of suffering.
imā kho, bhikkhave, tisso dukkhatā.
The noble eightfold path should be developed for the direct knowledge, complete understanding, finishing, and giving up of these three forms of suffering.”
Imāsaṃ kho, bhikkhave, tissannaṃ dukkhatānaṃ abhiññāya pariññāya parikkhayāya pahānāya … pe … ayaṃ ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo bhāvetabbo”ti. - SuttaCentral
In the same way, when an educated noble disciple experiences painful physical feelings they don’t sorrow or pine or lament, beating their breast and falling into confusion.
Evameva kho, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno na socati, na kilamati, na paridevati, na urattāḷiṃ kandati, na sammohaṃ āpajjati.
They experience one feeling:
So ekaṃ vedanaṃ vedayati—
physical, not mental.
kāyikaṃ, na cetasikaṃ.
When they’re touched by painful feeling, they don’t resist it.
Tassāyeva kho pana dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno paṭighavā na hoti.
There’s no underlying tendency for repulsion towards painful feeling underlying that.
Tamenaṃ dukkhāya vedanāya appaṭighavantaṃ, yo dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo, so nānuseti.
When touched by painful feeling they don’t look forward to enjoying sensual pleasures.
So dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno kāmasukhaṃ nābhinandati.
Why is that?
Taṃ kissa hetu?
Because an educated noble disciple understands an escape from painful feeling apart from sensual pleasures.
Pajānāti hi so, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako aññatra kāmasukhā dukkhāya vedanāya nissaraṇaṃ.
Since they don’t look forward to enjoying sensual pleasures, there’s no underlying tendency to greed for pleasant feeling underlying that.
Tassa kāmasukhaṃ nābhinandato yo sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo, so nānuseti.
They truly understand feelings’ origin, ending, gratification, drawback, and escape.
So tāsaṃ vedanānaṃ samudayañca atthaṅgamañca assādañca ādīnavaṃ ca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti.
There’s no underlying tendency to ignorance about neutral feeling underlying that.
Tassa tāsaṃ vedanānaṃ samudayañca atthaṅgamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṃ pajānato, yo adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo, so nānuseti.
If they feel a pleasant feeling, they feel it detached.
So sukhañce vedanaṃ vedayati, visaññutto naṃ vedayati.
If they feel a painful feeling, they feel it detached.
Dukkhañce vedanaṃ vedayati, visaññutto naṃ vedayati.
If they feel a neutral feeling, they feel it detached.
Adukkhamasukhañce vedanaṃ vedayati, visaññutto naṃ vedayati.
They’re called an educated noble disciple who is detached from rebirth, old age, and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress, I say.
Ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, ‘sutavā ariyasāvako visaññutto jātiyā jarāya maraṇena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi domanassehi upāyāsehi, visaññutto dukkhasmā’ti vadāmi.
This is the difference between an educated noble disciple and an uneducated ordinary person.
Ayaṃ kho, bhikkhave, viseso, ayaṃ adhippayāso, idaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ sutavato ariyasāvakassa assutavatā puthujjanenāti. - SuttaCentral
But I think much of the EBT content is describing the “default” position for the unenlightened ordinary person - it simply doesn’t apply to the Arahant. It’s analogous to diplomatic immunity, where none of the host country’s laws apply - the diplomat is “detached” from them. Note that the Dukkhata Sutta you referenced above describes the 3 types of dukkha as being completely given up and finished. So the Arahant still experiences feeling, but craving and suffering no longer apply - as per the second Noble Truth.
I agree that through dispassion, non-identification and detachment the arahant is no longer subject to dukkha. I’m gonna bow out with that because I feel like this is just a terminological argument and the suttas themselves are not entirely consistent in the use of terms so it’s pointless to debate. Everybody’s right, good night.
I agree about inconsistency in the suttas. Probably some of it is translation issues, but there is also stuff which just looks contradictory. It gives the impression of suttas being written by different people at different times?
The consistency can be found in meaning, if not in the word.
Sankhara dukkha still persists (‘Is that which is impermanent dukkha or sukkha, dukkha, sir’) though felt detached. And this is emphasised here: Sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe sankhara dukkha. All fabrications are impermanent, …unsatisfactory. This means some unsatisfactoriness persists however subtle and this level of understanding is possible for someone who has developed mindfulness of the arising and passing away of the sense bases, in an extensive manner in a retreat setting. Until then the concept that suffering should be ‘fully understood’ doesn’t mean much and they will only understand emotional suffering, existential suffering or the suffering of painful sensations which most people without any particular training in the dhamma can understand.
Well yes, for me it is very interesting to understand Pāli terms, and it seems significant to define their semantic range, in order to understand the doctrine.
In the quest for understanding the semantic range of a word, it also seems important to me to see how the word is applied. @Mat seemed to be applying dukkha to the experience of arahants even though he could apparently produce no single example of any EBT appling the term dukkha to the experience of arahants, and to me this makes the case for applying dukkha to the experience of arahants very weak.
That is to say, I felt an investigation of the term dukkha and whether it applies to arahants required two main things:
investigation of the semantic range of dukkha as used in the EBT’s in context.
investigation of whether arahants are said to have dukkha, or to be free from dukkha.
This is great - finally an argument about dukkha which actually refers to a text discussing dukkha! Thanks.
I have to say I’m surprised by this. It implies that to overcome dukkha, we have to have no vedanā at all. This seems to be quite a different doctrine to that found in the Noble Eightfold Path. Can anyone shed light on this? Is this quote from a sutta known to be later? Is there understanding on this matter, such as a known conflict in the EBT’s? What does standard Theravada doctrine say - does it say all vedanā is dukkha?
Also please note that later in this sutta we have:
For someone who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling have ceased.
Saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ
samāpannassa saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti.
If we take the first part literally, that ‘Suffering includes whatever is felt’, then it follows that the way to end dukkha is through the immaterial absorption ‘the cessation of perception and feeling’. If this is so, then how do you explain why ‘the cessation of perception and feeling’ is not part of the Noble Eightfold Path, that very path that is the path to the end of dukkha? This would seem to be a most critical question.
Perhaps there were two opposing views int he early community:
That the 4 jhānas were necessary for overcoming dukkha.
That the immaterial attainments were, in addition to jhāna, necessary for overcoming dukkha.
If this is the case, then the idea of vedanā being dukkha could come from the second camp. This would be a very good reason why to label immaterial practice as necessary. And conversely, if vedanā is not inherently dukkha, then that could be part of the reasoning as to why it is not necessary to attain a state where there is no vedanā.
It was my impression that the majority of the canon expressed the firt view, that immaterial practice is an optional extra.
Now another thing to consider:
I offer a possible resolution. It may be that usually, vedanā gives rise to dukkha (as emotional suffering) due to vedanā being impermanent. Usually that emotionally disturbs people. Of course not all the time - the impermanance of negative feelings can actually lead to happiness, such as:
Suppose there was a lotus pond with clear, sweet, cool water, clean, with smooth banks, delightful.
Seyyathāpi, bho, pokkharaṇī acchodakā sātodakā sītodakā setakā supatitthā ramaṇīyā.
Then along comes a person struggling in the oppressive heat, weary, thirsty, and parched .
Atha puriso āgaccheyya ghammābhitatto ghammapareto kilanto tasito pipāsito.
They’d plunge into the lotus pond to bathe and drink. And all their stress, weariness, and heat exhaustion would die down.
So taṃ pokkharaṇiṃ ogāhetvā nhātvā ca pivitvā ca sabbadarathakilamathapariḷāhaṃ paṭippassambheyya.
In the same way, when you hear the ascetic Gotama’s teaching—
Evamevaṃ kho, bho, yato yato tassa bhoto gotamassa dhammaṃ suṇāti—
whatever it may be, whether statements, songs, discussions, or amazing stories—
yadi suttaso, yadi geyyaso, yadi veyyākaraṇaso, yadi abbhutadhammaso—
then all your stress, weariness, and exhaustion die down.”
tato tato sabbadarathakilamathapariḷāhā paṭippassambhantī”ti.
This is a good example of the happiness we can get from the fading away of negative feelings, unpleasant vedanā.
So, the impermanent nature of vedanā sometimes causes sukha. But yes, generally speaking, the impermanent nature of vedanā can cause us dukkha.
However, I would suggest that it doesn’t have to. That an arahant can experience vedanā and not be tripped out by its impermanence.
If we examine a moment of vedana, while that vedana is existing, then what is the revelevance of its impermanence? Well, its impermanence only exists relative to extended time. Only when we examine a timeline, do we see arising and passing away. That is to say, it requires a time sequence.
If you have a nice feeling, you can be tripped out by knowing it will end. You can also be tripped out the moment it ends. And you can still be tripping out about it after it ended.
But what if you stop all mental profileration? Well, you won’t be tripping out about the fact that it will end in the future, if you are not thinking about the future. Similarly, you will not be tripping out about ones that have ended, if you are not thinking about the past! So we are left only with the present. So supposing right now a nice vedana is ending. Well, that will only be experienced as negative if there is comparison going on. And for that, you have to leave the present moment, or at least refer to the past in order to compare.
So you see, if you stay only in the present moment, then even the impermanent nature of vedana should not be any problem at all.
And so consider the Buddha’s teachings, or being present, of disengaging from thoughts of the past and future. While walking, just walk. While sitting, just sit, and so on.
So then, suppose that this teaching is refering to the normal situation. And suppose also that it is a teaching pointing us to observe our minds at a fine resolution. Not at the gross level of missing friends, wanting to do this and that in future and so on. Rather the fine level moment to moment arising of vedana, which is a process that occurs far far before any of those far more complex processes of the mind such as memory, decision making and so on. It’s right there at the moment to moment level of vedana, that we react. We react to the vedana. Including our reaction to the impermanence of vedana. And we make so much suffering for ourselves in that process.
Perhaps the state of ‘the cessation of perception and feeling’ is useful to give us a new perspective on our experience of vedana. Perhaps it can help rearrange our relationship to the experience of having vedana. Perhaps take them less personally, for example. Anyhow, if we say do take the meaning against which I have just argued, namely that literally all experience of vedanā is dukkha, then we have to say that the Buddha’s life was permeated by dukkha - how comfortable do you feel with such a statement? The only other alternative for holders of that view would seem to be that the Buddha experienced no vedanā, which would seem quite absurd.
Wonderful, thank you for another example that actually includes the term dukkha! Interesting.
Now, you have given Sujato’s translation. Here is Thanissaro’s:
the stressfulness of pain, the stressfulness of fabrication, the stressfulness of change.
So we have ‘of’ vs. ‘inherent in’. Let’s look at the PED entry for dukkhatā:
state of pain, painfulness, discomfort, pain
So basically, the state of dukkha. Perhaps more useful to leave dukkha untranslated just now.
I am not sure how justified ‘inherent in’ is. Does any Pāli reader have an opinion on this? Is it not just a standard tappurisa compound, which would be taken to mean, in the case of dukkhadukkhatā, basically ‘dukkhatā of dukkha’? For this reason Thanissaro’s translation seems more in line with my understanding of the Pāli.
So if we follow Thanissaro and my understanding of the grammar and the PED’s take on ‘state of’, it looks to me that we have basically:
The state of dukka… let’s say the ‘dukkha-ness’ of dukka
The dukkha-ness of saṅkhāra
The dukkha-ness of vipariṇāma
Now, this is a difference from saying that dukkha-ness is inherent in those three things, do you see? No I don’t know if they actually are inherent or not. But my reading allows for the potential that this is referring to 3 types of dukkha, but not necessarily saying that those three things cannot be experienced without dukkha arising. It may be that those are the three usual sources which trigger our dukkha. But, through the training of the Noble EIghtfold Path, it’s possible to eliminate all dukkha, even without eliminating all saṅkhāras and so on.
What do you think?
This is a great quote. I wonder if he is languaging it like that because everyone around him was not realising that dukkha is separate from phenomena experienced in the world. Everyone feels emotional pain in conjuction with negative sensory affects, or hearing abusive words aimed at them etc. So perhaps they think that, for example, painful physical feelings are inherently causing emotional suffering.
But the Buddha carefully separated those out. He gave the arrow teaching for example, to show how the emotional suffering actually occurs after the physical pain.
And here he seems to be pointing out that same thing - that it’s a two step process, and we are able to actually remove the second step:
I suggest this may be saying that they experience the sensory affect of the vedana (or we might even define vedana as that), but there is no emotional affect.
[Oh, I just looked up the source and found that this actually is the sutta about the two arrows!]
If we consider the Four Noble Truths and the various other teachings on the subject to mean that the Noble Eightfold Path does in fact lead to the end of dukkha in this life, then this sutta above may be telling us dukkha, as negative emotional affect, is overcome; but negative sensory affect is not overcome. Because the chain has been broken, which usually makes negative sensory affect (kāyikaṃ) lead to negative emotional affect (cetasikaṃ).
One thing this seems to tell me is that there are (at least) two meanings for the term dukkha. This is implied by the term dukkhadukkhatā - and what this suggests to me is that there is a common term, and a specialised technical term.
MN 141 tells us:
And what is pain?
Katamañcāvuso, dukkhaṃ?
Physical pain, physical displeasure, the painful, unpleasant feeling that’s born from physical contact.
Yaṃ kho, āvuso, kāyikaṃ dukkhaṃ kāyikaṃ asātaṃ kāyasamphassajaṃ dukkhaṃ asātaṃ vedayitaṃ,
This is called pain.
idaṃ vuccatāvuso: ‘dukkhaṃ’.
Please note that this description is actually entirely devoid of emotoinal content, and is referring to negative sensory affect.
Now, we know that the Noble Eightfold Path leads to the end of dukkha, by way of eliminating taṇha. We also know that eliminating taṇha is possible while alive. AN 3.33:
When a mendicant has no ego, possessiveness, or underlying tendency to conceit for this conscious body; and no ego, possessiveness, or underlying tendency to conceit for all external stimuli; and they live having attained the freedom of heart and freedom by wisdom where ego, possessiveness, and underlying tendency to conceit are no more—
Yato ca kho,
sāriputta, bhikkhuno imasmiñca saviññāṇake kāye ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayā na honti, bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayā na honti, yañca cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ upasampajja viharato ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayā na honti tañca cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ upasampajja viharati;
they’re called
ayaṃ vuccati, sāriputta:
a mendicant who has cut off craving, untied the fetters, and by rightly comprehending conceit has made an end of suffering.
‘bhikkhu acchecchi taṇhaṃ, vivattayi saṃyojanaṃ, sammā mānābhisamayā antamakāsi dukkhassa’.
And yet, we also know well that arahants can experience pain - negative sensory affect. Now, how can that be, when dukkha was defined as “Physical pain”? How about my suggestion, based on the evidence of the term dukkhadukkhatā, that there are two meanings for this term - general, and technical?
I propose that the general meaning may be that associated normally with ‘suffering’, such as obviously ‘painful’ things. But that the point is, the Buddha is pointing out that in fact what we usually experience as ‘pain’ is a compound phenomena, with both ‘body’ (sensory affect) and ‘mind’/‘heart’ (emotional affect) elements, the latter of which actually occurs later in the time sequence. Those all naturally include negative emotional affect for ordinary people. And so they are easy images for bringing to our mind the torment of suffering. (As a side note, it was not until my first meditation retreat that I realised that, to use my simple English terms, ‘suffering’ and ‘pain’ are not synonymous! For the first time, I experienced strong physical pain in the total absense of negative emotional affect. I just saw the pain clearly, and it was interesting, but I totally let go of all resistance, and saw clearly that there was no ‘suffering’. Only pain, which was totally ok! I assume that’s what was meant in the sutta about the two arrows).
In this case, dukkhadukkhatā could mean something like: ‘the state of negative emotional affect associated with ordinarily painful things.’
So, the dukkha that he says the Four Noble Truths eliminates, is actually the mind/heart element (emotional affect), not the body element (sensory affect). This seems to be clearly laid out in the sutta about the arrows, as we discussed above. So this is I suggest is the technical meaning of dukkha. And this would seem to explain why, although arahants have pain - have daratha - (please see my post on this for more discussion about this term and the difference with dukkha: Arahants have no dukkha, but apparently have daratha - negative sensory/homeostatic affect? ), they are (apparently) never referred to as having dukkha, in the EBT’s. Since they obviously do have pain, I suggest that the reason why they are never said to have dukkha is because although that might fit for the ordinary term, their experience of dukkha in that ordinary sense is totally different to ordinary people, because it lacks the negative emotional affect that is usually included. And to save confusion that the dukkha would be taken in the technical sense of the word, as the dukkha which the Noble Eighfold Path eliminates (negative emotional affect according to my proposal), the word is never applied to them. That is to say, the EBT’s keep to the technical meaning of dukkha when discussing arahants.
@sujato I am sure that you might be too busy to want to enter this discussion, but I find this very interesting and I think you might too - I hope it’s not rude to tag you. I am not sure about this, but have been finding it very interesting to explore the discrimination between sensory and emotional affect in the EBT’s, as well as cognitive vs. affective discrimination. I would be very interested if you would wish to share you opinion on this topic! I am not sure about dukkha but this is my reasoning so far at least.
It makes perfect sense if one understands nibbana for the living arahant as the ending of greed, hatred and delusion of the mind, and final nibbana as the cycle of rebirth ending with the dissolution of the five aggregates, not returning to any state of existence (vedana ended forever).
Given the understanding above, the cessation of perception and feeling (the five khandas) is what happens when the arahant dies.
The cessation of perception and feeling as a meditation attainment (according to my own speculative understanding not backed by experience) is a “pre-taste” of final nibbana, which is why (maybe) this meditation attainment automatically makes people arahants (IIRC).
Anyway, this is one way to make sense of it, I’m sure it won’t satisfy everyone
Not unless that living arahant experiences no vedanā! Otherwise according to this logic, the arahant has not overcome dukkha. And to say they have not overcome dukkha contradicts teachings like this, in AN 3.33 as I quoted above:
they’re called
ayaṃ vuccati, sāriputta:
a mendicant who has cut off craving , untied the fetters, and by rightly comprehending conceit has made an end of suffering .
‘bhikkhu acchecchi taṇhaṃ , vivattayi saṃyojanaṃ, sammā mānābhisamayā antamakāsi dukkhassa ’.
Your argument seems to rely on dukkha only ceasing at death, which this quote, and also the whole idea of completing the Third Noble Truth being attainable while alive, directly refute.
Well, it seems you see the ‘end of dukkha’ being proposed to happen at different times, and you see a contradiction in that.
For me, I don’t think the language of the Pali canon (or natural language in general) has that kind of precision. I see the ending of greed, hatred and delusion in the mind and the end of the aggregates as two sides of the same coin, so when I read ‘made an end of suffering’ I understand that as it basically referring to both, you can choose which angle to look at it from.
IMO I don’t see a contradiction because I have a different view of how precise the language of the suttas is meant to be, i.e. technical terms with precise definitions vs a pragmatic teaching giving in natural language
Different times? I propose that it happens at one specific time - the moment of attaining arahantship.
The contradiction is that if you have to have ended vedanā to end dukkha, then you have to be dead. But my quote above showed that you can end dukkha while living:
Yes, one way to talk about the end of dukkha is the living arahant (nibbana), another way to talk about the end of dukkha is with the dissolution of the arahants five aggregates (final/total nibbana).
You can see these two ways of speaking as a contradiction (either the end of dukkha is with awakening OR it is with death), or you can see these as two different but closely related aspects of nibbana (one implies the other).
My argument is that it’s possible to see it from the latter view, i.e. without contradiction
The dukkha inherent in impermanent things is just to say that impermanent things won’t provide ultimate satisfsction. Only the destruction of craving leads to ultimate satisfaction because craving is the root of dissatisfaction. So arahants do not suffer from the impermanence of things but it is still the case that for an arahant impermanent things do not provide ultimate satisfaction.
Edit: In other words, the fact that impermanence prevents things from providing permanent gratification is the objective side of dukkha, I.e. unsatisfactoriness, the subjective side of dukkha is dependent on craving.
Do the EBT support this distinction between subjective and objective dukkha in relation to anicca? This seems to be contradicted by AN 4.49: “Seeing impermanence as impermanence… Taking up right View, they’ve risen above all suffering.”
At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, form is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, the mind becomes dispassionate and is liberated from the taints by nonclinging. - SuttaCentral
Because of the objective fact that an impermanent phenomena can not provide a permanent satisfaction, one must detach from and give up craving for these inherently not permanently satisfactory things in order to be free from suffering.
I’d say no. The statement, “what is anicca is dukkha” is an unqualified statement. But I’m too lazy to try to discuss any further right now. I wish you luck in your studies.
Edit: Screw it, I’ll try to explain my position succinctly.
Take an apple. That apple will not make you eternally happy. It is obvious that the apple is going to be eaten and gone or it is going to rot. Either way, whatever possible satisfaction that can be derived from that apple is limited. The apple is imperfect due to its impermanent nature, it isn’t capable of bringing lasting satisfaction. What is Anicca is Dukkha.
But you don’t have to suffer from the ultimately unsatisfactory limited nature of the apple IF you don’t crave for the apple. If you are detached and dispassionate towards the apple you won’t suffer. And the apple still is dukkha even though you aren’t suffering because it is in the nature of impermanent apples that they cannot bring lasting satisfaction. The apple has the nature of not being able to fully satisfy, and the craving mind has the nature of suffering due to attaching to such things as apples that can’t satisfy craving forever.
I don’t really understand the idea of an apple being objectively dukkha, being dukkha “from its own side”. What we crave is not “apple” in some abstract sense, what we crave are phenomena derived from “apple”, eg its sweet taste or firm texture or pleasing colour. These are examples of sensual craving, based on arisings at the sense-bases.
My point applies just as well to sweet tastes and pretty colors. My point is that it is a fact that whether one has craving or not a pleasant sensory experience is not going to provide lasting satisfaction. This is because it is impermanent. That is the unsatisfactory dukkha nature of all experiences. Of course, if you don’t have any craving for pleasant sensory experiences, then it doesn’t matter that they aren’t ultimately satisfying, because you weren’t relying on them for well-being anyway.
Looking at the sutta excerpt below:
“And what, bhikkhus, is the way that is suitable for uprooting all conceivings? What do you think, bhikkhus, is the eye permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”— “Suffering, venerable sir.” - SuttaCentral
But the second Noble Truth makes it clear that the cause of dukkha is tanha, and not anicca. So anicca is only dukkha while tanha is present. So the statement “what is impermanent is unsatisfactory” describes unenlightened experience, and doesn’t apply to the Arahant.
