Yes itās wonderful to understand impermanence experientially but the impermanence itself is dukkha.
Not from a point of stillness, which is what sati creates.
Itās different from say watching a fruit fall from a tree. Iām talking about incessant arising and passing away to the level that revulsion arises, whatever your state of stillness. This then susbsides and a state without any craving follows. This in turn leads to cessation.
Do you think that arahants find pleasant sensory experiences fulfilling or satisfying?
I donāt think they care. It would be like me noticing some ice-cream and thinking āMmmm, niceā but not plotting how to get a large portion. By large portion I mean at least a litre.
Well, you didnāt directly answer my question so Iāll just have to get to the point. And my point is that arahants know that experiences are fleeting and therefore canāt bring lasting satisfaction. So theyāve abandoned craving for them. It isnāt that fleeting experiences are unpleasant because they are fleeting but rather simply that they are not ultimately fulfilling, this is the dukkha of impermanence and the dukkha in the three characteristics. I think that is a plain reading of the suttas.
If Iām not worried about ice-cream melting, then whatās the problem?
There is no problem for you, but it is still the case that ice cream wonāt bring you lasting satisfsaction, being impermanent and all.
Gombrich has this to say:
āThe Upanisads taught a soteriology of this type. Oneās aim in life was to realize oneās essential identity with brahman; once realized, that identity became a more literal reality at death. In exactly the same way, nirvana for the Buddhists was a realization attained during life, and having attained it guaranteed that at death one would experience something which was also known as nirvana, though it could be differentiated from the first nirvana by adjectives.I5ā
Note 15:
āThere is a misconception abroad that the nirvana at death is differentiated by being called parinirvana. This is wrong. Either form of nirvana can be called parinirvana (P: parinibbÄna; S: parinirvÄį¹a) with no change in meaning.ā
Are you unsure that the Buddha taught that nibbÄna in the present life means that there is no more dukkha?
Yes, that seems the standard way.
Can you give me any example from any EBT which claims that arahants do not experience the end of dukkha until their death? On what basis do you claim that there is a valid view based on the EBTās that there is no end of dukkha until death? I do hope you have more reasoning than merely the fact that death of arahants was sometimes referred to by the term parinibbÄna.
The view that arahants only experience the end of dukkha at death is contradictory to the view that the attainment of arahantship is the end of dukkha.
This reasoning can be given for anything. For example, āAn umbrella is what it is and not what we insistā. I find this quite unhelpful. Itās similar to saying āthere is no point in duscussing anything at allā.
Subjectivity is critical here. I say we cannot take this statement literally. Form is not ādukkhaā. Not literally. Why? Well letās think, is a stone ādukkhaā? No. You need a sentient being for there to be dukkha. Dukkha is an experience. So an object cannot be dukkha. Only ones experience in relation to an object can be dukkha. And the Buddha was concerned with rearranging our way of relating to objects, in order to prevent the mental creation of dukkha in relation to any object.
So the more accurate statement might be:
āForm is impermanent. What is impermanent, when related to in an ordinary way, causes suffering.ā
If that is genuinely crystal clear, then you would expect EBTās to make that clear by directly giving examples or discussion of arahants experiencing dukkha, would you not? And so can you find any such examples? If not, then do you still say itās crystal clear? If so, why?
See below. Arahanths havenāt become blind or deaf:
And what, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering? It should be said: the six internal sense bases. What six? The eye base ā¦ the mind base. This is called the noble truth of suffering.ā
KatamaƱca, bhikkhave, dukkhaį¹ ariyasaccaį¹?
āCha ajjhattikÄni ÄyatanÄnÄ«ātissa vacanÄ«yaį¹.
KatamÄni cha?
CakkhÄyatanaį¹ ā¦ pe ā¦ manÄyatanaį¹
SuttaCentral
Dukkha seems to have broad range of meanings. I ask you to find EBTs supporting the idea that arahanths have ended all dukkha including their aggregates being impermanent and the function of the senses.
Iāll try to illustrate my argument with a simile. Imagine a person winning the world tennis championship.
You could talk about winning from the perspective of the psychology of the winner; winning is feeling bliss, happiness, no more pre-game anxiety etc.
Or you could talk about winning from the perspective of the award ceremony; when the winner grabs the trophy in their hands, this is winning!
Are these two things contradictory accounts of what winning is? Shouldnāt winning be either feeling bliss, happiness etc or grabbing the trophy at the award ceremony?
I think that depends on the assumptions one has about text and language. If you imagine a person trying to explain what winning is to other people, using natural language, this is clearly not a contradictory way of speaking IMO.
But if you expect a text with the terms that have rigorously defined meanings (more like analytic philosophy?) then maybe that will look like a contradiction to you.
What do you think?
The inability of a rock to provide lasting satisfaction to either arahants or ordinary folk does not necessitate that an arahant experiences dukkha. But the inability of a rock to provide such satisfaction is the dukkha-nature of the rock. Dukkha is used in different ways. The statement, āwhat is anicca is dukkhaā states the fact that impermanent things and experiences canāt provide lasting satisfaction to anyone, be they arahants or ordinary folk, because the object is impermanent the satisfsction it can provide is as well. This doesnāt matter to the arahant though because they are detached from all phenomena and so donāt suffer when impermanent things change.
So things and experiences are dukkha, but arahants donāt suffer on that account because they are detached from all.
Iāve been repeating myself now too many times, and you didnāt seem to understand earlier what I said since you keep assuming that dukkha only means psychological suffering, so this is my last post on the subject. Good luck in your studies.
It seems this is not a new debate! Here itās about whether dukkha applies to non-sentient things, or just to sentient beings
Are we actually looking at two different types of dukkha here?
Type 1. The inability of the aggregates to provide lasting satisfaction.
Type 2. The āpsychologicalā suffering which results from ignorance of Type 1?
And does this relate to the three types of dukkha in SN44. 165?
Giving a quote which is entirely lacking in any example of arahants experiencing dukkha, and accompanying that with a statement that they have not become blind or deaf, would seem to me illogical in response to the quote of mine you provided. Since it does not address the quote.
Why is it that examples of arahants simply ending all dukkha, is not enough to establish that they end all dukkha? I see no need at all for your added qualification. Because if they have ended all dukkha, this does not mean that they have not ended all dukkha, according to standard logic. Lacking that qualification does not logically mean that the statement that they have ended all dukkha is false. Do you agree with this? If not, then do you take such statements in the EBTās to be false statements?
Fine! But now let us apply this analogy to the case of the arahant:
- winning from the perspective of the psychology of the winner; winning is feeling bliss, happiness, no more pre-game anxiety etc.
This can refer to the experience after becoming an arahant. Bliss, happiness, no more dukkha. As it is said:
For the monk who is perfectly liberated,
His mind at peace,
Thereās nothing to add to what has been done;
And nothing further to be done.
(Thag 13.1)
- winning from the perspective of the award ceremony; when the winner grabs the trophy in their hands, this is winning!
This can refer to the moment of the attainment of arahantship itself. It is said that some people would make a vocal declaration at such a time, which we may compare to the āaward ceremonyā. Such as the Buddha declaring:
I am an arahant in the world
(Ariyapariyesana Sutta)
We also have from the same sutta:
being myself subject to birth, aging, sickness, and death, I attained the unborn, ageless, sickness-free, deathless, supreme security from bondage, NibbÄna
You may remember that the Buddha made the same declaration about his first 5 disciples, in the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta.
Hereās one example of someone declaring their attainment in the Theragatha, where you will also find many others:
Iāve attended on the teacher
And fulfilled the Buddhaās instructions.
The heavy burden is laid down,
Iāve undone the attachment to being reborn in any state of existence.Iāve attained the goal
For the sake of which I went forth
From home life into homelessnessā
The ending of all fetters.
(Thag 14.1)
And hereās another example of the Buddha declaring someone elseās enlightenment:
I was the one the Buddha brought up before the Saį¹ gha of mendicants, saying:
Ahaį¹ kho, Ävuso, bhagavato sammukhÄ bhikkhusaį¹ ghe upanÄ«to:āI have realized the undefiled freedom of heart and freedom by wisdom in this very life. And I live having realized it with my own insight due to the ending of defilements.
āahaį¹, bhikkhave, ÄsavÄnaį¹ khayÄ anÄsavaį¹ cetovimuttiį¹ paƱƱÄvimuttiį¹ diį¹į¹heva dhamme sayaį¹ abhiĆ±Ć±Ä sacchikatvÄ upasampajja viharÄmi.And so does Kassapa.ā
Kassapopi, bhikkhave, ÄsavÄnaį¹ khayÄ anÄsavaį¹ cetovimuttiį¹ paƱƱÄvimuttiį¹ diį¹į¹heva dhamme sayaį¹ abhiĆ±Ć±Ä sacchikatvÄ upasampajja viharatÄ«āti.
(SN 16.10)
You, rather, seem to be considering death as the award ceremony, which seems to be the cause of the contradiction between your two views, giving you have two opposing times for the ending of dukkha, which is a contradiction which I cannot see anywhere in the EBTās. So far still no-one has provided even a single example of any arahant being recorded as having any dukkha.
I agree entirely.
Strange way to conceptualise it but perhaps I can bare with this line of reasoning. My natural inclination would be to accept the conceptual explanation that the rockās nature is one of being unable to cause lasting happiness. But since dukkha seems to me to be an experience (perhaps of specifically negative emotional affect), and thus requiring a sentient being, I canāt say that the rockās nature is dukkha. Rather Iād have to language it something likeā¦ that the nature of the relationship (via the senses) we can have with a rock is of the nature of being unable to cause lasting happiness. And since that is so, then any attitude or enterprise of depending on any impermanent object for lasting happiness, will result in dukkha (which is an experience).
[A thought: this might be a translation issue. Perhaps my interpretation is in line with the PÄli (any PÄli readers like to comment, welcome to refute! I am not familiar enough with the PÄli of this statement we are discussing), but that it has become too rigid in English and caused to imply that the actual object is dukkha - I wonder if the PÄli might not actually mean that, when understood by the original PÄli speakers?]
And this is why it would seem that arahants can still experience impermanent phenomena via the senses, but not experience any dukkha. Because they are not making any mistake of relying on those things for lasting happiness. And furthermore, they have already attained lasting happiness in non-dependence of impermanent phenomena. So they can still experience pain (such as the BUddha with his chronic bad back and painful death), but not have any āsecond arrowā - no negative emotional affect at all. They have overcome dukkha, attained the 3rd Noble Truth.
How fascinating! Thanks so much for finding this!
I would like to suggest a proposition for what occured:
1) The language was originally clear, and meant what I said above, i.e. that when it says:
rÅ«paį¹ niccaį¹ vÄ aniccaį¹ vÄāti?
āAniccaį¹, bhanteā.āYaį¹ panÄniccaį¹ dukkhaį¹ vÄ taį¹ sukhaį¹ vÄāti?
It meant:
"Is form permanent or impermanent?ā
āImpermanent, sir.āāBut if itās impermanent, is [the nature of the relationship we can have with form, depending on form for how we feel, going to result in our] suffering or happiness?ā
The answer:
āSuffering, sir.ā
āDukkhaį¹, bhanteā.
(SN 22.59)
Then, the language evolved, or moved. The language of the suttas became more distant from the language of the Sangha maintaining the suttas, such that the words were no longer understood in the same way (just as Shakespearean English can be misunderstood today, or even an English person can misundertand an American or South African person in some statements, since the English dialects are slightly different now). And so, some of the later people came to make an over-literal analysis of the grammar, and ended up with the odd idea that non-sentient beings can have or be dukkha, which would be logically the same as claiming a rock is sukha, dukkhaās antonym!
Or:
2) Itās also possible that the original really did mean that form itself is dukkha, and the later Sangha found this to be so illogical that they challenged that teaching. Bare in mind that for the Sangha to be openly challenging the teachings, or most probably actually teaching that opposing view as standard (it would seem so from the text you linked to), then they have to have a really good reason - they have to think what hey are opposing is really seriously wrong! And there must have been a lot of them, for that debate to be recorded in the texts!
Those are the two most logical explanations I can find for the recording of that debate. Very interesting!
Interesting. May I offer an interpretation which would be in line with what Iāve been saying?
āBhikkhus, there are these three kinds of suffering. What three? Suffering due to pain, suffering due to formations, suffering due to change. These are the three kinds of suffering.
If dukkha is negative emotional affect, then this still makes sense - our emotional suffering is triggered by those three things. Unless of course we eliminate the second arrow, in which case it would seem we have those 3 things but no dukkha. But so far as our dukkha goes, it comes associated with those three things, so we can class dukkha into those 3 kinds of dukkha.
I asked for a quote that all dukkha ended at the point of attaining, but you resort to your assumption as being adequate proof.
I will withdraw as the discussion has become absurd. We can discuss more when you are more amenable and not simply trying to āwinā, and contributing more in the spirit of inquiry.
I think we can all agree that ice-cream has āanicca-natureā, the question is whether it also has ādukkha-natureā. If some ice-cream melted in the forest and nobody saw it, would there be any suffering?
If it was an analogy, grabbing the trophy would be the breakup of the aggregates.
But the point of what I wrote was to show how you can speak about something from two different perspectives, even using some of the same words, without there being a contradiction.
Are you questioning my interpretation of a simile I made up to explain my own argument?
But friend, from my point of view there is no contradiction, this is what I am trying to explain
And that is why I pointed out how your analogy can work, and how it apparenly cannot work.
Yes, absolutely. Because we are talking about the end of dukkha. And if the end of dukkha occurs at the attainment of arahantship (which seems to me to be the standard and unrefuted doctrine of the EBTās), then it cannot been seen āfrom another perspectiveā to end at an entirely different time (in your idea, at the point of death), without that perspective being wrong.
Your simile has someone winning, which you and I both see at the end of dukkha apparently. Your award ceremony, which is the public announcement of that win after the actual win, might make sense to be equivelent to the public announcement of attaining the end of dukkha. But death is not any sort of public announcement at all, and neither the moment at which dukkha ends, right? So it seems that your analogy actually highlights why your idea of there being two separate moments for one ending, doesnāt seem to make any sense.
You believe that one event occurs at two separate times? You believe that something can cease, which already previously ceased and never since arose? I cannot grasp why you would hold such a belief.
Would you believe that it is possible to extinguish a light in a room which has no light at all, is already in total darkness?