Ven. Anālayo has a new book out in July about the Prajnaparamita and the Agamas
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Thanks for posting. I messed with the post title to make it more descriptive and a little more “timeless”. I always cringe when I see “new book!” post titles on years old posts.
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Ah it is still 6 months wait!
It is now available to purchase online on Wisdom Publications website. It’s quite interesting although, it is preferable to read the perfection of wisdom in 8000 lines beforehand.
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Fantastic, thanks! Reading it, finally!!!
BTW, another important book is being published:
- Facets of Mindfulness: Collected Studies, New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2025 (forthcoming).
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I have read the first, crucial chapter, where Ven. Anālayo spells out his understanding of the essence of prajñāpāramitā and śūnyatā, and find his argumentation, surprisingly, to be prone to serious criticism. Here are my thoughts in a sketch format (because I don’t have time for a serious essay 
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Ven. Anālayo is an astonishingly gifted scholar, and I fully subscribe to most of his remarkable results (in other works, not in this one). His strongest points are, of course, philology and textual criticism.
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He notes that he is not an expert in the areas of Mahāyāna and early Mahāyāna, and his goal in this work is to examine the early prajñāpāramitā through an early Buddhist lens, something that has not been done yet in a systematic manner.
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In the first chapter, he takes up and tries to expose weaknesses of the two crucial standpoints on the prajñāpāramitā: 1) that prajñāpāramitā is based on the “fearless acceptance” of logical contradiction, paradox, and, therefore, it does say something about reality (or, rather, absence of true reality); 2) that there is a rift and sharp contrast between the early Buddhist and early Mahāyāna teachings. In both cases, his (counter)arguments are obviously insufficient and, at best, just provide an alternative and not clearly articulated and well-substantiated point of view.
3.1. Regarding 1), he first says that this was likely Conze’s “personal predilection”, quoting… Jayarava; secondly, he refers to Bastian (1979, p. 102), who states that Haribhadra and later commentators do not perceive a contradiction in the PP texts. But why would we be interested in the medieval Buddhist scholastics, while dealing with the earliest PP? Of course, the former say that the PP is about the absence of svabhāva and are for using the PP for the practical overcoming of the affects and views. But the absence of svabhāva in all dharmas actually means that they do not truly exist, exactly the contradiction he (Anālayo) tries to explain away: everything looks real, but in reality, it does not exist in a foundational manner: ontological claim. Thirdly, he refers to Huifeng 2014, who says that PP is not ontological, but subjective, meditative and epistemological. But the work of Orsborn (formerly Ven. Huifeng), whom Ven. Anālayo quotes often, has been sharply criticized, e.g.:
The main shortcoming of the book is that the narrative of suññatā/śūnyatā that
Huifeng claims is “paradigmatic within the sphere of modern Buddhist studies”
(p. 56) is largely that of mid-twentieth-century scholarship and no longer regarded as
reliable, let alone paradigmatic, among specialists today. Although Huifeng does cite
many recent publications, his critique is primarily aimed at figures such as
Stcherbatsky, Lamotte, Murti, Conze, and Ramanan (cf. pp. 8–9); it neglects to address
the philosophically sophisticated and historically astute elaborations of Madhyamaka
undertaken over the last two decades by scholars such as Dan Arnold, Jay Garfield,
C.W. Huntington, Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, and Jan Westerhoff. In a work pub-
lished in 2016 and centrally concerned with overturning “the academic narrative of
śūnyatā [which] itself appears to have Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as its telos”
(p. 296), this near-complete absence of twenty-first century scholarship on
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is a serious deficiency. Huifeng’s claim that he has “consciously
not covered” either Madhyamaka or Prajñāpāramitā in the book in order to “overcome”
this narrative (p. 296) cannot mask the fact that his “corrective to the methodology of the
dominant narrative of śūnyatā” (p. 304) is a “corrective” to sources that are outdated and/
or peripheral to, rather than constitutive of, contemporary Madhyamaka scholarship.
For instance, Jan Westerhoff actually very convincingly demonstrates that PP and Madhyamaka do involve “ontological”/“metaphysical” claims/positions – namely, that things, or reality, have no foundation whatsoever. He even wrote The Non-Existence of the Real World
https://academic.oup.com/book/42022
Fourthly, Ven. Anālayo quotes Paul Harrison approvingly:
In an introduction to his translation of a version of the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Harrison (2006, 137) explains: “When a word (X) is negated by the a- or an- prefix, one can translate it either as a karmadhāraya (not X, no X, non-X) or as a bahuvrīhi (X-less, lacking X, having no X).” Although in the case of Prajñāpāramitā literature in principle both readings are grammatically possible, “in my view the bahuvrīhi reading is more cogent philosophically” (138).
It is not wrong per se, of course, but this is 1) specific to the Vajracchedikā, 2) does not really prove the PP does not contradict logic and, then, does not make ontological claims, as the PP texts not only use a- or an-, but consistently negate the propositions in all possible ways, starting with the negation particle na.
Then follows a long bit about tetralemma, saying that in Ancient India, “contrastive statements are not necessarily intended or perceived as contradictions”. But, I maintain, they do. This is the very essence of the tetralemma.
Then follows the quote from Zachetti, saying that the PP “steers a middle course between absolute affirmation and absolute negation.” The PP texts are very clear that everything should be seen as (and is) an illusion, so I am not sure at all…
After that, Ven. Anālayo writes: “In sum, there do seem to be cogent reasons for going beyond the assumption of a hermeneutic of self-contradiction when reading the rhetoric of emptiness.”
I would argue that if there are those “cogent reasons”, he has not presented them at all. In particular, Mäll’s important contributions have not been assessed properly (although one of his books is in the Bibliography), and contradiction is a key premise in them.
Ven. Anālayo ends this portion with a long quote from McMahan 2002, calling it a “particularly helpful examination”. I haven’t learnt anything new from it, and I don’t see how it contradicts Conze or Mäll.
Actually, McMahan admits that PP consists of contradiction, paradox and a transformative effect:
[This can have a] vertiginous effect on the reader of constantly having the rug pulled out from under one’s feet. This, in effect, is part of the ‘performative’ aspect of the text, in that what it is supposed to do is more than just convey propositional meaning; it is designed to have a specific effect on the reader . . ..
The unique dialectical form put forth in the Perfection of Wisdom leaves the contradicting elements in tension, rather than resolving them in a final synthesis.
…
Insofar as the dialectic resists any final closure or coming to rest in an unqualified statement of truth, it evokes the truth of what it cannot say by outlining the limits of propositional language, its paradoxes standing in sharp relief against the background of what is left unsaid and unsayable.
Nothing of that is new, and it, in fact, substantiates, rather than removes, the cornerstone role of paradox in the PP.
Besides, this book by McMahan was received with sharp criticism, e.g.:
In summary, if Ven. Anālayo intended to somehow remove paradox and contradiction from the PP, with these few references, he has not succeeded. I am not convinced at all. I still think that logical contradiction, paradox, mysticism and the absence of the true existence, reality of everything is the core message of the PP. Much more is needed to overthrow or at least destabilize this still central and dominant view.
3.2. In the next subchapter, he tries to show that there is no sharp contrast between Āgamas and early PP in their understanding of emptiness (whether there is emptiness of all dharmas in the Āgamas). Suffice it to say that to do that, he quotes those very few instances in the Āgamas where illusion and unreality of world/experience are invoked. Of course, he quotes the Pheṇapiṇḍa-sutta, saying that in it, something close to the insight of the PP is already evident. What he does not mention at all is that these few bits scattered throughout the EBTs are in sharp contrast with the rest, “realistic” teachings. Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi says that the Pheṇa-sutta is the most radical statement on the transience of conditioned experience in the EBTs. In my opinion, it is not enough to mention the verse about Mogharāja (or the Pheṇa-sutta) to conclude that Mahāyāna and early Buddhism are the same, at all. What is needed is a detailed examination of the uniqueness of that sutta and other few anti-realist statements and how they do not contradict but continue the EBT stance. This has not been provided, neither in this nor in other publications.
- These are, to my mind, the most important theses Ven. Anālayo puts forth in this first chapter. Both are problematic and unconvincing, I am afraid…
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Hey Sphrairos. 
Is it in the sense of sui generis (distinguishable) or autopoietic (self-perpetuating) should absence of svabhāva be read - neither, both? 
In the former case, it shouldn’t lead to an ontological conclusion, I think, thinking of Nagarjuna saying “There is no distinction for Nirvana and Samsara” (paraphrasing) for example:
na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam
Although of course, he does criticise the idea of something being autopoietic, in his conditions chapters iirc.
Still, it would be good to know exactly what is svabhāva that is being denied specifically in PP - seeing how even Theravadin and Sarvastivadin idea of it differed, yeah?
Thanks for the interesting read though.
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The quoted lines do not directly say that. They mean:
When compared against nirvāṇa (nirvāṇāt) saṃsāra has (saṃsārasya) no definitive distinction (na kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam)
When compared against saṃsāra (saṃsārāt) nirvāṇa has (nirvāṇasya) no definitive distinction (na kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam)
Whereby Nāgārjuna seeks to probably teach the Mahāyāna wisdom that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are simply conventional conceptual labels having no underlying/deeper reality behind them, and should be dealt with only as mental concepts. There is nothing definitive or conclusive about either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa that can make a person objectively claim that they have escaped saṃsāra or attained nirvāṇa in a way that it would be unambiguously clear for another person to understand it objectively.
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Here, I’m parsing some descriptions that include the term svabhāva.
My “translations” are offered as rough paraphrasings, not exact, just trying to parse what the text is trying to convey.
atha khalvāyuṣmān śāriputra āyuṣmantaṃ subhūtimetadavocat - kiṃ kāraṇamāyuṣman subhūte avirahito bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitayā veditavyaḥ? yadā rūpameva virahitaṃ rūpasvabhāvena, evaṃ yadā vedanaiva saṃjñaiva saṃskārā eva, yadā vijñānameva virahitaṃ vijñānasvabhāvena, yadā prajñāpāramitaiva virahitā prajñāpāramitāsvabhāvena, yadā sarvajñataiva virahitā sarvajñatāsvabhāvena //
Paraphrasing, it explains how rūpa is devoid of rūpasvabhāva, likewise with rest of khandas, and prajñāpāramitā. Even so far going on the next paragraph:
svabhāva-lakṣaṇenā api svabhāvaḥ virahitaḥ.
Then we have this:
evam asvabhāvānāṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ katamat tadrūpaṃ yad agrāhyam anabhinirvṛttam?
agrāhyam: Sounds like “ungraspable”. Something beyond measuring, reckoning, mentally appropirating.
“Ungraspable” gives me clear epistemic vibes.
anabhinirvṛttam: Something along the lines of unactualised.
Let me give a simple example: I have an idea of “Apple” in my head. The dharma of apple in my head never actually comes into being, because it fails to capture the process, it approximates, it’s always lacking.
Verdict: My perception and abstraction (therefore, my dharma) is flawed. I view the world through a biased, simplified lens, which fails to capture the experience field.
Therefore, I can see how absence of svabhāva points towards not an “absence of a real presence - which can be confirmed definitely”, but instead “clear mismatch between conceptualisation and the actualisation of lived experience.”
“Not even our distinctions have self-identifable distinctions” (certainly not a translation, again - just a personal rendering)
Aforementioned “svabhāva-lakṣaṇenā api svabhāvaḥ virahitaḥ.” definitely points in this direction, in my view.
Then this:
yā ca sarvadharmāṇām anabhinirvṛttiḥ, na te dharmāḥ.
There’s a tendency to reify the dharma. But taking it at face value, this sentence could be read as a critique of “concepts” and ideas, “dharma” as being able to make correct and distinct pronouncements about the word.
The idea of apple in my head never actually captures the reality, it never comes into being - thus the idea of apple is not even an idea, even as it pretends to be one.
Finally, of course, we have to philosophise.
These two views seem difficult to reconcile:
- “We can make definite and correct assesments of the world - and the world is not real”
vs
- “We can’t make definite or correct assessments of the world - even this statement is subject to such distortions”.
Can we objectively come to a true and agreed upon definition of what is “actual” and “real” and prove without doubt that “this world”, however it is defined, is certainly not it?
Or is it the case that we’re in confusion, disagreements, demonstrating a plurality of how we use and understand designations, and having a personal experience of our concepts not being applicable to the real world, and even this observation being a tenuous, humble suggestion rather than “absolute” truth?
If there is a paradox in PP literature, I think it’s this - much like “道可道非常道。名可名非常名。”, the “perfect insight” is that the idea of a “perfect insight” is a broken, recursive suggestion - something to experience subjectively, rather than objectively prove.
“Emptiness is empty of itself” for example, which can be understood as “Concept of emptiness is just a placeholder concept, subject to misalignment much like every other concept it criticizes”, revealing that even ideas defy the descriptions we give them.
It’s not that paradox is the nature of the world - it’s that paradoxical sounding sentences are all we have when trying to gesture beyond conceptual or linguistic categories.
PLUS! It would be difficult to argue that “PP is telling this” in this framework. It would challenge the very assumption, again. 
Therefore, this is just a reading.
This has been just a quick, napkin math on the first few instances of the svabhāva. I’d be interested to hear your voices on these ideas, and if there are things I’m missing out. I’ll be going back to the text for a deeper analysis later, most definitely.
Also paging @yeshe.tenley for I’m sure you’d have a few words with me too!
Edit: Cut down substantially to make it easier to read for the two whole people that’ll read it. 
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Hey Dо̄gen,
Interesting thoughts, as usual!
I will try to reply when I manage to find some time… Currently preparing for
https://buddhiststudies.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/?p=376
But here is one small bit for you from the Pañcaviṃśati (from Lamotte’s magnum opus, English translation by Gelongma Karma Migme Chödrön)
Pañcaviṃśati, p. 136-137: Rūpaṃ virahitaṃ rūpasvabhāvena yāvad bhūtakoṭir api
virahitā bhūtakoṭisvabhāvena … / abhāvo rūpasya svabhāvaḥ yāvad abhāvo
bhūtakoṭyāḥ svabhāvaḥ. – Form is without the inherent nature of form and so on, up
to: the culmination of the real is without the inherent nature of the culmination of the
real … The inherent nature of form is a non-existence, and so on up to: the inherent
nature of the culmination of the real is a non-existence.
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I look forward to when it’s available on Amazon (official release in mid July, I guess). That way I can preview the table of contents and decide if I want to pay for this very expensive book!
I am most interested in understanding the evolution from Lokaksema’s translation – e.g., how that might account for translation issues for Taoist concepts like wu and yu? Effectively well-honed gnostic contemplations that had to be accounted for, somehow, in the earliest Chinese Buddhist translations of the PP.
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Hi Beth!
Yes, it’s strange that they have not made the ToC available…
I am most interested in understanding the evolution from Lokaksema’s translation – e.g., how that might account for translation issues for Taoist concepts like wu and yu?
Indeed, interesting question. Alas, Ven. Anālayo does not deal with such issues in the book …
In which way you mean “gnostic”? In the perennial sense of emphasis on knowledge, or somehow related to the Gnostics of the Classical world?
In the perennial sense. Demiéville mentioned this as well as, even less recently, Zurcher in The Buddhist Conquest of China. Your phrasing helps with my articulation 
.
I haven’t tapped into anything as recent as the scholars you cited except for Jayarava.
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