Ven. Ñāṇananda, Nibbana and Phenomenological Existentialism

But they do. That’s exactly what they do. They refer to this existence in the ontological sense not the sense of sense-sphare existence, form-sphere existence etc. And then you get “assuming” instead of clinging, grasping. And from this you are told the problem is the postmodernist process of assumption, and that things exist because they are assumed not because they really exist. Only perceptions exist not elements. The fact that elements exist is because of assuming them to be real, because of confusing perceptions for elements when there are no elements in reality. We get to radical solipsism and the idea that other beings are philosophical zombies.

This is what the existentialist interpretation is saying. It’s twisting both the clinging/grasping to mean “assuming” and then twisting sense-sphere existence, form sphere existence etc. to mean ontological existence.

And any pali scholar or course disagrees with such mistranslations and interpretations. And then the postmodernist go and claim that everybody else is an indoctrinated traditionalist, that they are misunderstood artist. That they are the ones who actually got it right and all others are simply too traditionalist to agree with their interpretation.

They claim every scholar or normal buddhist got things wrong before somebody came along and figured it out this should be combined with “the insight of western thinkers” such as Heidegger, Satre, etc. and that’s how the true meaning of Buddha teachings was re-discovered recently.

Postmodernism is known for having tried to use every field of objective science to confirm their postmodernist beliefs. They often spin discoveries in very diverse fields from quantum physics to music and try to show how these fields confirm their postmodernist beliefs. That is also what the Sokall affair was meant to satirize. So I am not surprised postmodernism has infiltrated buddhism too and is trying to make a case for Buddha teachings confirming postmodernism.

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Sorry, I’ve no idea what you’re talking about now. The translations you were objecting to were mostly these used by Bhikkhu Bodhi. If you’re not interested in discussing these particular points, but just want to keep writing generalisations, I have nothing to add.

-As long as consciousness ‘works’, sounds, sights, sensations, smells etc. can be felt.

-Where there is no consciousness, there are no sounds, sights, sensations, etc.

-Therefore sounds, sights, sensations etc. are a ‘co-product’ of the conscious mind.

-Hence, they are not self-extant. We are ‘seeing’ from inside of this mind- we are not ‘out there’ in the world- the world has been (re)created inside the mind and that is where we exist (in a manner of speaking).

-oh… and there is no ‘we’. There’s only recreated sounds, sights, sensations, etc. They aren’t the real thing, hence they act as an illusion.

-‘we’ behave towards the illusion as if it were real and crave it or be averse to it, not knowing it is an illusion created in our own mind -like puppet master reacting to her own puppet.

-the dance between consciousness and name-form is likened to that of whirlpool, creating an imaginary ‘Self’.

-dissolution of the whirlpool is the dissolution of the consciousness-name and form interplay. This happens with the death of an arahanth (parinibbana) when these fade away, never to arise.

with metta

Ps- I requested ordination from Ven Nananda twice- he turned me down -I think he was too unwell and not taking any more students. Looking back, I think it was probably the right decision by Ven Nanananda!

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-Hence, they are not self-extant. We are ‘seeing’ from inside of this mind- we are not ‘out there’ in the world- the world has been (re)created inside the mind and that is where we exist (in a manner of speaking).

-oh… and there is no ‘we’. There’s only recreated sounds, sights, sensations, etc. They aren’t the real thing, hence they act as an illusion.

Solipsism, philosophical zombies. Contradicted by SN 22:94

-dissolution of the whirlpool is the dissolution of the consciousness-name and form interplay. This happens with the death of an arahanth (parinibbana) when these fade away, never to arise.

So an arahat still has ignorance until death ? I taught there is no more ignorance left after attaining arahantship.

If ignorance ceases tomorrow at 22:45, then in the 1-life interpretation consciousness also ceases at 22:45 not a decade or 2 later.

Sorry, I’ve no idea what you’re talking about now. The translations you were objecting to were mostly these used by Bhikkhu Bodhi. If you’re not interested in discussing these particular points, but just want to keep writing generalisations, I have nothing to add.

The translation I object to is clinging/grasping meaning “assuming”, “existence” meaning ontological existence not sense-sphere existence, formless-sphere existence etc. To say nothing about “birth”, “namarupa”, “aging and death” etc.

Others more knowledgeable in pali (B.Bodhi, B.Sujato, etc.) have already shown how such translations as those used by existentialist have nothing to do with how those words are used in the suttas.

We have suttas about “and what does birth mean?” or “and what does aging and death mean?” etc. It’s not difficult to figure out what they mean if one reads more than just the DO sutta out of 10.000 pag of suta pitaka. But…

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Thanks for your nice answer, it did clarify a lot of things to me! Yes, this looks much more like a position I would not oppose, even though there are certainly some suggestions of alternative translations by the Venerable and the whole 1-life theory that I find somewhat dubious. Yet, on the whole, it makes sense. Thanks a lot!

I am still having a couple of questions if you don’t mind, and I mean them as questions, not as criticism:

What is consciousness, especially if we take into account that there is no ‘pure consciousness’, the consciousness is always consciousness of something?

It sounds a lot like radical constructivism to me (cf. with the works by Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, who was a Tibetan Buddhist by the way, Ernst von Glaserfeld, or Heinz von Foerster). Do you think these two positions are comparable and / or compatible with each other?

Erm… Could you clarify this part a little bit? Do you mean that a sensation is an illusion because it is not a real object but tries to ‘look’ like one? Because one can differentiate between phenomenon and noumenon quite well at least since Kant. And the phenomenon in and of itself is as real as it gets. I just don’t see why it is acting as an illusion (not criticism, I am actually wondering :slight_smile:)

And a couple more question. Even if we accept that the phenomena are in some sense ‘illusions’, what about the noumena? Is the world out there real? Is rupa the world out there? Is there something in the rupa or the world that corresponds our phenomenal experience? Can the world (rupa?) exist without consciousness? How does rupa interact with consciousness?

Thanks again for your answer, and the very best to you and Ven. Nanananda! :anjal:

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In dependence on the eye element there arises eye-contact; the
eye element does not arise in dependence on eye-contact…. In
dependence on the mind element there arises mind-contact; the
mind element does not arise in dependence on mind-contact.
It is in this way, bhikkhus, that in dependence on the diversity of
elements there arises the diversity of contacts; that the diversity
of elements does not arise in dependence on the diversity of
contacts.”

:anjal:

This is a sutta especially refuting solipsism/existentialism.

Well, OK, that’s different to what you said up here:

Which was a statement perfectly consistent with SN 12.1

with upādāna as condition, bhava ;

Purely from my experience, consciousness is what arises from nama and rupa impinging on the sense bases I.e. It is causally arisen. These three then give rise to contact (phassa). It arises at that point and dies just as quickly. As it is causally arisen it is not self-extant.

There is no lasting consciousness- it’s arising and passing away is rapid so that it could be made sense of as being more like a waterfall (water drops appearing and falling away quickly so it has the appearance of a singular object from a distance), than a pond (where the water persists).

With metta

Mat

I have used the idea of a mind (and a being) as a ‘relative truth’ to convey what I wanted to say - the Buddhist truths go deeper than this. I don’t know a lot about radical constructivism, but it seems to reflect the idea that some degree of reality is constructed within the mind. Modern psychology would agree with this, as would Buddhism. However we know that Not-Self is not mentioned in radical constructivism.

With metta

I do not know if solipsism is a generally accepted world-view in the field of psychology. But even if it would one day become the general view, that would only show how people investigating the mind end up thinking all is mind-made. Just as scientist who investigate form, believe everything is made by form and are generally materialist.

consciousness is what arises from nama and rupa impinging on the sense bases

And on what do sense bases depend ? Why do sense bases arise ?

There is no lasting consciousness- it’s arising and passing away is rapid so that it could be made sense of as being more like a waterfall (water drops appearing and falling away quickly so it has the appearance of a singular object from a distance), than a pond (where the water persists).

I agree and this is the problem explained by Buddha to the fisherman son who believed it is the same consciousness transmigrating from one body to the other. I’ve tried explaining it in a drawing here: Consciousness and no-self (explained in drawings)

Thanks for your answers! :anjal:

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I’d also be interested to know how rebirth happens in the existentialist buddhist view. I know that unlike other proponents of 1-life interpretation, existentialist do believe in rebirth. I’ve asked long term existentialist in the past how do existentialist explain rebirth and they said they take it on faith and on “categorical intuition”. They said re-birth is not explained in the suttas.

Is this the official view of Nanananda ? That rebirth is not explained but just taken on faith and “categorical intuition” ?

I am using a biological model here to convey the meaning (which Kant possibly didn’t know about in the 1700’s). This model is again a relative truth, but a truth nevertheless. The eyes pick up images from the ‘external world’ and convey it to the brain where it recreates a 3 dimensional world. How accurate it is we cannot tell. It is not possible for us to sense the world without these organs functioning properly. So our experience is recreated or created (e.g.: hallucinations) inside our brains. It is not the actual external object that we can sense. Some of it’s unreality can be sensed when mindfulness and samadhi is at a high level. The sense impressions can be seen through these heightened faculties to be insubstantial (see Phena sutta). Another reason why they do not seem to be very real is that as soon as they arise they pass away (in deep vipassana) when if they were real, they should persist. The Buddha said however since phenomena do arise, the external world could not be said not to exist.

https://suttacentral.net/en/sn12.15

The practitioner can switch between conventional and ultimate truth, without confusion when they have seen it through vipassana for themselves.

As for things which cannot be sensed (noumena) there are many in Buddhism. The range of the Buddhas, the range of the jhanas, the range of kamma are all said to be unknown.

We might add wifi to that list!

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when if they were real, they should persist.

Logical mistake. Also contradicted by SN 22.94

At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.

“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.

“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.

Because there is a body and a mind (-for the mind sense base).

Thanks, this is a very important thing to say :slight_smile:

Well, yeah, I understand they are not identical to the external object (I think Kant was well aware of that :slight_smile:). I mean, why should a real object persist? The so-called virtual particles are fully real but they exist for just a tiny bit of time, you can’t even say they persist. My phenomenal experience, my mental image of a chair or my visual impression of a chair - mind you, not the chair itself - are real as a mental image. Yet, let me try to sum up the idea as I understood it. While the phenomenal experiences is absolutely real as phenomenal experience, it is illusionary because ‘my’ careless attention _thinks it to be the external object itself._For example, I see a chair and I think that ‘my’ visual impression of the chair, present in the consciousness, is the chair itself. In this moment, ‘my’ interpretation of the visual impression is incorrect and to a certain extent illusory. Since ‘my’ interpretation is always so closely connected with the initial impression and papanca starts right away after perceving the chair, I can say that not only ‘my’ interpretation, but also ‘my’ entire visual impression is illusionary, so to say. However, if I direct my wise attention (yoniso manasikara) to this visual impression, I see it for what it is: my visual impression of an external object. Whether this object (chair in our case) really exists, is largely irrelevant, but okay, it seems to be real. When I see my perception of the chair as perception, it ‘becomes real’, there is no more confusion that it is the chair itself.

I don’t know whether my comment sums it up correctly, maybe I am wrong, maybe I am right, but you answers have been most helpful :slight_smile: Thanks a lot! :anjal:

Perhaps you could study his Nibbana Sermons a little, and participate in Ven Analayo’s course:

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Solipsism is impossible to refute. It is impossible to confirm and also impossible to really refute. But weather Buddha was a solipsist or not, that is easy to find out. Suttas dealing with this:

  • SN 22.94 - explaining things do exist and that any “wise man in the world” agrees on that.
  • SN 14.7 - explaining the diversity of perceptions depends on the diversity of elements. In Triple N’s view only diversity of perceptions exist and the diversity of elements is just an illusion created through the internal process of assumption
  • SN 24.1 - calls solipsism a wrong view. Solipsism is listed as the first wrong view and the sutta is repeated 4 times throughout the “wrong view” section.
  • AN 6.41 - Explains how there is a wood-pile and how one can attend to different proprieties of this wood pile (such as the eath property, water property etc)
  • DN 5 - Explains what external material form is
  • MN 28 - Explains what external elements are

And to make sure things are clear, we even have this sutta that I’ve recently quoted:

In dependence on the eye element there arises eye-contact; the
eye element does not arise in dependence on eye-contact…. In
dependence on the mind element there arises mind-contact; the
mind element does not arise in dependence on mind-contact.
It is in this way, bhikkhus, that in dependence on the diversity of
elements there arises the diversity of contacts; that the diversity
of elements does not arise in dependence on the diversity of
contacts.”

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You understood what I meant to convey. -just to be clear though; it is the external world which was the reason for the ‘internal world’ (vinnana, phassa, sanna and sankhara) to arise. Most people don’t consider their bodies to be themselves but consider their minds to be themselves. Here we can see that the mind arises anew with every arising of ‘external’ rupa. It is like a flame arising moment by moment with successive particles of candle wax bursting into flames. Something so fleeting -existing only a moment, not just changing- is not suitable to be considered as a separate person or as a Self.

With metta

Mat

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