Ven. Ñāṇananda, Nibbana and Phenomenological Existentialism

Yes and I agree - we should not impose our opinions on the Suttas. But the difficulty is that with the Buddha not around to clarify things for us we are always at the mercy of some one else’s opinion or interpretation of the Sutta. For clarification I always try to go to the Sutta description as I think this is the most authentic of the Buddha’s word. But some Suttas are not easy to interpret without deep insights from the practice of meditation. In these situations we ask monks or people who practice for their opinion what the Buddha must have meant by certain language. But until you realize for yourself these are just going to be opinions that tend to shape your own views - or ‘ditthi’ . We should not cling to these views but use it as a tool for further insight if possible.

2 Likes

Yes, you have a point. But if you start off with the simpler suttas, you can still learn a lot. An example is the definition of jāti, which in the context of dependent origination is as follows:

And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being born, descent into the womb, production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth.

3 Likes

Does SN 22.95 support this?

My impression of what I have read from Ven. Ñāṇavīra is his ideas derived solely from his personal readings of the suttas. Given Ven. Ñāṇavīra actually believed in reincarnation would support the assumption that Ven. Ñāṇavīra was sincere & objective rather than ‘Western’. Ven. Ñāṇavīra lived decades ago, at the same time as similar ideas arose in Thailand. My impression is these ideas are unrelated to anything ‘Western’ given Buddhism was not prominent in the West at that time & the standard Western scholarly interpretations of Buddhism would have followed the Asian traditions. In other words, the momentary (‘one-life’) interpretation of Dependent Origination has Asian roots. I personally find Stephen Batchelor to not be a convincing Pali scholar nor would regard him as representative of this school of thinking (given Batchelor rejects so much, including the Buddha uprooting the mental defilements). Generally, Westerners have learned the momentary interpretation from Asian monks such as Buddhadasa & Nanananda.

To me, ‘void, hollow and unsubstantial’ is not the same as ‘illusory, not real’, especially when you think how rich the Indian tradition is with terms for ‘illusion’. The similes used by the Buddha refer both to real and illusory thinks, like a bubble or mirage, so you can interpret it in both ways: either ‘unreality’ or ‘null and void’. Besides, since the Sutta is about the five aggregates, it may be it is merely about anatta. This is indirectly supported by the use of Pali ‘sāra’ for ‘substance’, which originally meant among other things ‘the innermost, hardest part of anything, the heart or pith of a tree’

He extensively quotes from European existential philosophers such as Sartre or Heidegger and in fact was very enthusiastic about them. He may have derived his ideas from reading the Suttas, but at some point in time he definitely gave them a look through the lense of the existentialist tradition. Besides, I don’t think we can easily dismiss any influence of a cultural background on the person’s perception of Dhamma. As an example of it, I would suggest reading a biographical sketch about Ven. Nyanatiloka here.

This is debatable, since I read exactly the opposite :slight_smile: I think the best way would be to ask Ven. Nanananda about his sources for inspiration himself, but considering he was initially ordained at the Island Hermitage, there could be some significant influence on him from Western monks. I also vaguely remember hearing someone saying that Ven. Buddhadasa could also have knowledge ov Ven. Nanavira’s work. Besides, I don’t know about a fully fledged DO interpretation found in any pre-Nanavira book or teaching method at the time. If you heard something about it, feel free to share you knowledge :slight_smile: Both versions are pretty hard to prove, both are plausible, so think we can agree we can easily ignore the problem :slight_smile:

1 Like

The sutta sounds like Nanananda’s Magic of the Mind to me:

Suppose, bhikkhus, that a magician or a magician’s apprentice would display a magical illusion at a crossroads. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a magical illusion? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in consciousness?

I would suggest to read Nanavira’s writings, here: A Note on Paṭiccasamuppāda - Ñāṇavīra Thera Dhamma Page

Yes, but then what are we supposed to make of the tree and bubble and foam that are examples of ‘real’ things and not something ‘illusory’? Why should we focus on one simile that quite possibly can just illustrate the concept of anatta?

I did a few months ago, let me give you just a few examples from here:

A present intention (or action) is certainly determined, but it is determined by a superior (or more reflexive) intention that also is present: it is, therefore, not pre-determined. (To be future is essentially to be under-determined. See FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.) Every voluntary (or reflexive) intention (i.e. every volition or act of will) is perpetually revocable, and every involuntary (or immediate) intention (i.e. every inclination or tendency) is voluntarily modifiable. (There is a mistaken idea, common [and convenient] enough, that our inclinations are in the nature of impulsions to which we can only submit, rather as a stone passively suffers the pressure that moves it. But, far from being an imposition that must be passively suffered, an inclination is an active seeking of a still only possible state of affairs. Cf. ‘D’ailleurs, si l’acte n’est pas pur mouvement, il doit se définir par une intention. De quelque manière que l’on considère cette intention, elle ne peut être qu’un dépassement du donné vers un résultat à obtenir. …Lorsque les psychologues, par exemple, font de la tendance un état de fait, ils ne voient pas qu’ils lui ôtent tout caractère d’appétit [ad-petitio].’ — J.-P. Sartre, L’Être et le Néant, Gallimard, Paris 1943, p. 556. [‘Besides, if the act is not pure movement, it must be defined by an intention. In whatever way we may consider this intention, it can only be a passing beyond the given towards a result to be obtained. …When the psychologists, for example, turn tendency into a state of fact, they fail to see that they are taking away from it all character of appetite .’]) Cf. CETANĀ [e].


While maintaining the necessary reservations (see Preface) about his views, we may observe that Heidegger, in his Sein und Zeit (Halle 1927, p. 374), subordinates the ideas of birth and death to that of being, within the unity of our existential structure. I exist, I am, as born; and, as born, I am as liable at every moment to die. (This book, in English translation [by J. Macquarrie & E. S. Robinson, Being and Time, SCM Press, London 1962], has only lately [1965] become available to me: I find that, where they disagree, Heidegger, as against Sartre, is generally in the right.)


On the charge of ‘circularity’ that common sense may like to bring here, see Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 314-6.

Nanavira obviously obtained his ideas from the suttas. Start here: A Note on Paṭiccasamuppāda - Ñāṇavīra Thera Dhamma Page

10. Upādānapaccayā bhavo; bhavapaccayā jāti; jātipaccayā jarāmaranam… (‘With holding as condition, being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing-&-death…’) The fundamental upādāna or ‘holding’ is attavāda (see Majjhima ii,1 <M.i,67>), which is holding a belief in ‘self’. The puthujjana takes what appears to be his ‘self’ at its face value; and so long as this goes on he continues to be a ‘self’, at least in his own eyes (and in those of others like him). This is bhava or ‘being’. The puthujjana knows that people are born and die; and since he thinks ‘my self exists’ so he also thinks ‘my self was born’ and ‘my self will die’. The puthujjana sees a ‘self’ to whom the words birth and death apply.[d] In contrast to the puthujjana, the arahat has altogether got rid of asmimāna (not to speak of attavāda—see MAMA), and does not even think ‘I am’. This is bhavanirodha, cessation of being. And since he does not think ‘I am’ he also does not think ‘I was born’ or ‘I shall die’. In other words, he sees no ‘self’ or even ‘I’ for the words birth and death to apply to. This is jātinirodha and jarāmarananirodha. (See, in Kosala Samy. i,3 <S.i,71>, how the words birth and death are avoided when the arahat is spoken of. Atthi nu kho bhante jātassa aññatra jarāmaranā ti. N’atthi kho mahārāja jātassa aññatra jarāmaranā. Ye pi te mahārāja khattiyamahāsālā… brāhmanamahāsālā… gahapatimahāsālā…, tesam pi jātānam n’atthi aññatra jarāmaranā. Ye pi te mahārāja bhikkhu arahanto khīnāsavā…, tesam pāyam kāyo bhedanadhammo nikkhepanadhammo ti. ('—For one who is born, lord, is there anything other than ageing-&-death?

There have always been a few, however, who have not drawn back, and some of them have described what they saw. Amongst these, today, are the people known as existentialist philosophers, and an acquaintance with their mode of thinking, far from being a disadvantage, may well serve to restore the individual point of view, without which nothing can be understood.

That#s from the Preface.

I don’t argue the bulk of his ideas was picked up from Suttas, I merely say he was influenced by existential philosophers and didn’t shun from picking his ideas from them or at least tried to find corroborations between their philosophies and his thinking. Moreover, he recommended reading them ‘to restore the individual point of view, without which nothing can be understood’, which is a very telling phrase as well.

Nanavira was ordained in 1950 and passed away in 1965. Buddhadasa was representing Thailand at the Sixth Buddhist Council in 1954. Buddhadasa did not base his views on Nanavira.

[quote=“Vstakan, post:31, topic:2990”]
I don’t argue the bulk of his ideas was picked up from Suttas, I merely say he was influenced by existential philosophers[/quote]

In India today, the word ‘jati’ (‘caste’) does not refer to physical birth and Indian scholars, being largely ignorant of Buddhism, are often not aware of its origins (google ‘sudra’ and ‘jati’).

The Visuddhimagga contains an interesting discussion about the multiple uses & meanings of ‘jati’.

What does the word ‘jati’ mean in the following verses:

Angulimala, go to that woman and on arrival say to her, ‘Sister, since I was born I do not recall intentionally killing a living being. Through this truth may there be wellbeing for you, wellbeing for your fetus.’"

“But, lord, wouldn’t that be a lie for me? For I have intentionally killed many living beings.”

“Then in that case, Angulimala, go to that woman and on arrival say to her, ‘Sister, since I was born in the noble birth, I do not recall intentionally killing a living being. Through this truth may there be wellbeing for you, wellbeing for your fetus.’”

MN 86

~

There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes form to be the self. That assumption is a fabrication. Now what is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person, touched by that which is felt born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that. And that fabrication is inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen. That craving… That feeling… That contact… That ignorance is inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen.

SN 22.81

That is perfectly possible, why not? The question is not who was ordained when, the question is when Ven. Buddhadasa started espousing the one-life DO interpretation and, if it happened later in his monastic career, whether he developed thsi theory on his own or was influenced by someone. I am afraid the chronology of ordination is of no help here.

In English you can say someone is ‘of noble birth’ or ‘of low birth’. Something similar possibly happened in the Indo-Aryan languages as well, which is why the physical birth came to refer to the caste.

‘Noble birth’ means the moral purification of Ven. Angulmala or his ordination as a monk.

Could you please clarify what does it have to do with Ven. Nanavira’s intellectual relationship with the existential philosophers? Just in case, I should repeat I do think Ven. Nanavira picked up ideas he thought he found in the Suttas. However, he also had a close intellectual connection with existentialism, something that he himself explicitly stated in the preface to his opus magnum. Just think about so many cases where he refers the reader to existentialists, not Suttas, and mentions existentialist very positively.


As for your second Sutta quote, I could also provide another quote that could be helpful. We may ignore DN 15 since you think it may be a Brahmanist fabrication, an assumption that could possibly be correct. Let us look at SN 12.2 or DN 22:

And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being born, descent into the womb, production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth.

That looks pretty much like a definition of a technical term to me, whereas in the example you provided the word ‘birth’ as in ‘kiṃjātiko’ can be easily thought of as a metaphorical usage in a regular sequence of synonyms, employed to facilitate the memorizaton by reciters.

Buddhadasa started studying the suttas intensely from around 1932 and by the late 1940s was being accused as a heretic. I personally recall Buddhadasa embarrassingly stating somewhere he only once taught the 3 lifetimes version when he was a young monk.

You can start here #1: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2304034/2304041 and here #2: Buddhadasa - Paticcasamuppada | PDF | Karma | Gautama Buddha

From link #1 In this year (1930), Indapanno wrote his first two articles. The first was a long article entitled “The Worldlings Level of Buddhism” published on the occasion of the opening of a Nak tham school at Chaiya. It was rather daring for the clergy of that time. Its content gave a critical look at Buddhism, explaining the benefits and advantages of Buddhism in contemporary meanings. Indapanno commented on attaining Nibbanna as the ultimate goal of Buddhism in the present, not as some distant ideal. This was quite innovative, for most Thai Buddhists, both monks and laymen, believed firmly that the attainment of Nibbana was virtually impossible in the present life. However, both articles have some traces of influence of the traditional concepts such as the belief in the next life

Since 1940, Buddhadasa’s work of propagating Buddhist exegesis took another big
step. He accepted an invitation from the Buddhist Association of Thailand, a most important venue for Buddhist intellectuals, to give a lecture in Bangkok. It was the first time of what was to become many appearances. “The Way to Reaching Buddha-Dhamma”, Buddhadasa explained a high level interpretation dhamma principles which he compared to their scientific counterparts. It was innovative and greatly enhanced public awareness at that time…

He was opposed by conservative monks and laymen such as those from the Abhidhamma Foundation and Anan Senakhan who strongly disagreed with his interpretation of Buddhism to the point of accusing that Buddhadasa devalues Buddhism by explaining it simply and that tried to match the ultimate truth of Buddhism with the ideas of modern man. Buddhadasa was even accused of being a heretic and communist. By 1947…

From link #1 - In 1937, Buddhadasa’s translation of the Buddha’s Life in His Own Words was
accepted as a textbook by the Mahamakut Buddhist University of Thammayut Order. It was
a highly successful book, becoming more popular than other translations of the Buddha’s Life,
namely, that by Wachirayan (Vajiranana), a former Supreme Patriarch of Thai Sangha
(1900-1910). The important point of this book is, Buddhadasa illustrated dhamma principles
existing in Buddha’s life, how he existed in real life and how he was successful in transcending
suffering. Certainly, Buddhadasa intended to make a history of Buddha’s life as a realistic
model for the contemporary man.

From link#2 - Somdet Sangkharaj Krom Phra Vachirayanawong of Wat Bowoniwet was of the opinion that the incorrect explanation began 1,000 years ago. He didn’t accept that version of Dependent Origination that spans three births and he taught that it spans only one birth, but he was not sure and so did not go into details, and it was left at that. He did assert, however, that it was his understanding that Dependent Origination had been incorrectly explained for the past 1,000 years. I agree with him on this point. But I would like to add that the misunderstanding goes back even further, to 1,500 years ago, when the Visuddhimagga was first written.

From link #2 - Nowadays, in Thailand, Burma and Sri Lanka, Paticca-samuppada is taught according to the way it is explained in the Visuddhimagga. The explanation of Paticcasamuppada that one turn of its wheel spans three births has even beenaccepted by Western scholars lock, stock and barrel. To put is simply, everywhere there are Buddhists, Dependent Origination is understood to span three births. What I am saying now may cause a reaction from all over the world because I am trying to point out that there is no way for Dependent Origination to span three births.

[quote=“Vstakan, post:34, topic:2990”]
Let us look at SN 12.2:

Katamā ca bhikkhave, jāti? Yā tesaṃ tesaṃ sattānaṃ tamhi tamhi sattanikāye jāti sañjāti okkanti nibbatti abhinibbatti, khandhānaṃ pātubhāvo āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave, jāti.

And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being born, descent into the womb, production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth. [/quote]

This translation from SN 12.2 in itself does not support a position different from Nanananda, Brahmali, Nanavira, Buddhadasa or anyone else since I assume each of them have examined this verse and provided their own interpretation. For example, from the only Buddhadasa book translated into English:

What is birth? It is being born, arising, coming to be among the various groups of sentient beings, the appearance of the various aggregates, the arising of a particular sense door. This is birth. Birth conditions the arising of old age and death.

Now there is a problem which makes all of this difficult to understand. The problem is in the use of the word “to be born,” which is a common everyday word with an uncommon meaning. It means the birth of the “I” concept which is only a feeling and not the physical birth from a mother’s womb.

Your translation of ‘womb’ would have to be identified in the Pali. Apart from that, the other words translated from SN 12.2 should ideally be examined word & word, including considering their other uses & definitions found in the suttas, particularly words such as sattānaṃ, sattanikāye, okkanti, pātubhāvo and paṭilābho.

I can suggest in respect to your search for answers is Buddha-Dhamma follows the principle of study (pariyatti), practice (patipatti) & realisation (pativeda). My understanding is Buddhism is not a religion of blind faith such as Christianity. On such important matters (since the Buddha said: ‘He who sees Dependent Origination sees the Dhamma’), it is your personal duty to do the primary work of examining the meaning of words found in the suttas rather than take a firm stand (as you appear to be doing) based on mere superficial translation from one language to another language.

While I noticed this thread previously, I came across it again yesterday after researching SN 12.19. In SN 12.19, the word ‘kayo’ has been translated as ‘physical body’ but, in SN 12.2, the word ‘kaye’ is translated as ‘groups’. These two words appear to be essentially the same yet they are given different meanings via translations, which may not be entirely accurate or representative.

[quote=“Vstakan, post:34, topic:2990”]
…the various orders of beings…[/quote]

DN 15 may be used to assist here. Or, alternately, MN 98/Snp 3.9.

[quote=“Vstakan, post:34, topic:2990”]
…beings…[/quote]

Possibly SN 5.10 and SN 23.2

[quote=“Vstakan, post:34, topic:2990”]
…obtaining …[/quote]

AN 4.171

[quote=“Vstakan, post:34, topic:2990”]
…manifestation …[/quote]

This is something more tangible. This may suggest that he indeed developed his one-lif DO interpretation independently.

True words. You are right about the word, it is absent in the Pali text, just as various aggregates and particular sense door (despite the Pali noun being in plural) from the Venerable Buddhadasa’s translation. Let us look at the other words.

There is no questions about ‘satta’ and ‘sattakayo’, these are pretty straightforward. How should we translate ‘jati’? It is said in MN 12 when speaking about the four types of ‘wombs’:

Ye kho te … sattā aṇḍakosaṃ abhinibbhijja jāyanti

Jāyanti means ‘to be born’ (notice how it literally refers to physical birth in that context), so given that ‘jāti’ is a noun derived from ‘jāyati’, we may securely translate it as ‘birth’ (birth as an ‘I’, or physical birth, it doesn’t matter).

A short searh here on SC showed that ‘sañjāti’ occurs in this stock phrase only. It would make sense to translate it as ‘generation’ or ‘being begotten’ (cf. with sañjitar).

How should we understand okkanti, ‘descent’? Let us look at AN 3.61:

Channaṃ, bhikkhave, dhātūnaṃ upādāya gabbhassāvakkanti hoti;
okkantiyā sati nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ …

Gabbha is umabiguously translated in the context as ‘foetus’, i.e. ‘descent of a foetus’. ‘Conception’? Maybe. But since we are not sure, let us leave it at ‘descent’. Notice how the words comes up in the context of physical conception and embryonal development. Notice also how this passage describes a fragment of DO from namarupa to feeling. The full DO chain comes up some time later
in the Sutta. You may argue that ‘gabbha’ doesn’t mean ‘embryo’: in that case feel free to provide an alternative interpretation. In other contexts in the Suttas ‘okkanti’ and grammatically related words can be rendered as ‘entering’ (AN 5.158, SN 25 - notice the refrain that a person who ‘descended into the plane of righteous people’ cannot do anything that will make him be reborn in a lower world’), however we can’t ignore it was used in talking about embryonal development.

‘Nibbatti’ and ‘abhinibbatti’ literally mean respectively ‘ex-istence, out into happening’ and ‘over-ex-istence, upon being revealed in existence’, i.e. pretty much ‘manifestation’ or ‘arising’. In English it makes sense to translate them with one word. Notice how the Pali dictionary entry for the world notices it can be used as a synonym for ‘jati’.

Notice also that we have here a list of five close synonyms, a feature quite frequently found in Pali stock formulae for the ease of memorization: if one forgets one word, it synonym will help out. Three of these synonyms or their verbal forms are used in the contexts of physical birth or generation of a being. I wasn’t able to find examples of them used in the context of the ‘birth of an I-feeling’. Of course, these passages can still exist and I just wasn’t diligent enough. If you know them, I would really appreciate you sharing this knowledge with me.

Pātubhāvo is yet another synonym for ‘arising’. Notice how the Pali dictionary mentions its use along ‘jayati’ in Cula Niddesa. According to AN 6.96, there exist ‘arising of a Tathagata’. So, ‘arising’ seems to be a proper translation.

I wasn’t able to analyze the word 'paṭilābho, but the broad consensus translates it as ‘acquisition’.

Now for the grammar.

  • Tesaṃ tesaṃ sattānaṃ - Gen. Pl

  • Tamhi tamhi sattanikāye - Loc. Sing.

  • Jāti sañjāti okkanti nibbatti abhinibbatti… pātubhāvo … paṭilābho - Nom. Sing

  • Khandhānaṃ … āyatanānaṃ - Gen. Pl.

All of the grammar is pretty straightforward, any alternative interpretation become pretty weird and convoluted pretty fast (my favourite part is where jāti is first called a verb and the is found to be feminine, pure gold).

The literal translation: ‘Which of these these beings in this this body of beings birth, co-birth, ex-istance, upon-ex-istence, arising of bundles, acquisition of sense bases’. More polished but still very rough version: ‘Whatever is birth of these and those beings in this or that order of beings, their begetting, manifestation, arising of aggregates, acquisition of sense bases’. We have discussed every word, and most of them either appear in contexts directly connected with physical birth or or synonymous or even interchangeable with words used in such contexts. If you have any other information about these words feel free to share it, it will be much appreciated :anjal:

I presume you meant that passage:

“Jāti ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṃ sabbathā sabbaṃ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṃ— devānaṃ vā devattāya, gandhabbānaṃ vā gandhabbattāya, yakkhānaṃ vā yakkhattāya, bhūtānaṃ vā bhūtattāya, manussānaṃ vā manussattāya, catuppadānaṃ vā catuppadattāya, pakkhīnaṃ vā pakkhittāya, sarīsapānaṃ vā sarīsapattāya, tesaṃ tesañca hi, ānanda, sattānaṃ tadattāya jāti nābhavissa. Sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā api nu kho jarāmaraṇaṃ paññāyethā”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”.

I may sound dumb or dogmatic, but I really see no mention of ‘I’ or ‘self’ being born in that passage, Instead it reads like a pretty straightforward statement: ‘No birth of gods as gods’.

[quote=“Vstakan, post:38, topic:2990”]
There is no questions about ‘satta’ and ‘sattakayo’, these are pretty straightforward. How should we translate ‘jati’?[/quote]

Really? Are SN 5.10 and SN 23.2 about ‘satta’ straightforward?

How can ‘jati’ be translated when the most central word in the definition, namely, ‘satta’, is taken for granted as you have done?

You many prefer DN 15 but I refer MN 98/Snp 3.9 about the ‘various orders of beings’.

AN 4.171 might help.

yāyaṃ attabhāvapaṭilābho yasmiṃ attabhāvapaṭilābhe attasañcetanā kamati no parasañcetanā, attasañcetanāhetu tesaṃ sattānaṃ tamhā kāyā cuti hoti