At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.
Well, yeah, I understand they are not identical to the external object (I think Kant was well aware of that ). I mean, why should a real object persist? The so-called virtual particles are fully real but they exist for just a tiny bit of time, you can’t even say they persist. My phenomenal experience, my mental image of a chair or my visual impression of a chair - mind you, not the chair itself - are real as a mental image. Yet, let me try to sum up the idea as I understood it. While the phenomenal experiences is absolutely real as phenomenal experience, it is illusionary because ‘my’ careless attention _thinks it to be the external object itself._For example, I see a chair and I think that ‘my’ visual impression of the chair, present in the consciousness, is the chair itself. In this moment, ‘my’ interpretation of the visual impression is incorrect and to a certain extent illusory. Since ‘my’ interpretation is always so closely connected with the initial impression and papanca starts right away after perceving the chair, I can say that not only ‘my’ interpretation, but also ‘my’ entire visual impression is illusionary, so to say. However, if I direct my wise attention (yoniso manasikara) to this visual impression, I see it for what it is: my visual impression of an external object. Whether this object (chair in our case) really exists, is largely irrelevant, but okay, it seems to be real. When I see my perception of the chair as perception, it ‘becomes real’, there is no more confusion that it is the chair itself.
I don’t know whether my comment sums it up correctly, maybe I am wrong, maybe I am right, but you answers have been most helpful Thanks a lot!
Solipsism is impossible to refute. It is impossible to confirm and also impossible to really refute. But weather Buddha was a solipsist or not, that is easy to find out. Suttas dealing with this:
SN 22.94 - explaining things do exist and that any “wise man in the world” agrees on that.
SN 14.7 - explaining the diversity of perceptions depends on the diversity of elements. In Triple N’s view only diversity of perceptions exist and the diversity of elements is just an illusion created through the internal process of assumption
SN 24.1 - calls solipsism a wrong view. Solipsism is listed as the first wrong view and the sutta is repeated 4 times throughout the “wrong view” section.
AN 6.41 - Explains how there is a wood-pile and how one can attend to different proprieties of this wood pile (such as the eath property, water property etc)
DN 5 - Explains what external material form is
MN 28 - Explains what external elements are
And to make sure things are clear, we even have this sutta that I’ve recently quoted:
In dependence on the eye element there arises eye-contact; the
eye element does not arise in dependence on eye-contact…. In
dependence on the mind element there arises mind-contact; the
mind element does not arise in dependence on mind-contact.
It is in this way, bhikkhus, that in dependence on the diversity of
elements there arises the diversity of contacts; that the diversity of elements does not arise in dependence on the diversity of contacts.”
You understood what I meant to convey. -just to be clear though; it is the external world which was the reason for the ‘internal world’ (vinnana, phassa, sanna and sankhara) to arise. Most people don’t consider their bodies to be themselves but consider their minds to be themselves. Here we can see that the mind arises anew with every arising of ‘external’ rupa. It is like a flame arising moment by moment with successive particles of candle wax bursting into flames. Something so fleeting -existing only a moment, not just changing- is not suitable to be considered as a separate person or as a Self.
