Viññāṇaṁ means consciousness (and anidassanaṃ means nibbāna)

Thought this deserved a new topic:

My thought precisely, venerable. Sometimes there are precise letter constraints in verse - I’m not knowledgeable of the exact details - but my understanding is that even these can be overridden on occasion. And in a case of such import they surely should and would be. If it were such a heretical error to conceive of nibbāna as a surfaceless consciousness I’d hope & imagine the Buddha would have taken the pain of an errant consonant to clarify beyond doubt that it is not.

Implausible, I’m afraid. It’s obviously about nibbāna, that much the Commentary is certainly right about. If

viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ’…sabbassa sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ".

“‘Surfaceless consciousness, endless and radiant all-around’… isn’t partaken of through the Allness of the All.”
MN 49

isn’t enough for you - and I’m assuming that for some reason it isn’t, even though it clarifies that neither manāyatana or viññāṇakkhandha are involved in this experience - then hopefully SN 27 will be:

kuto sarā nivattanti,
kattha vaṭṭaṃ na vattati,
kattha nāmañca rūpañca,
asesaṃ uparujjhatī"ti.

From where do the arrows [streams?] turn back?
Where does the cycle not spin?
Where do name and form
Cease without trace?

yattha āpo ca pathavī,
tejo vāyo na gādhati,
ato sarā nivattanti,
ettha vaṭṭaṃ na vattati,
ettha nāmañca rūpañca,
asesaṃ uparujjhatī"ti.

Where water and earth,
Fire and wind find no footing,
From there the arrows turn back,
There the cycle stops spinning,
There name and form
Cease without trace.

It makes clear that when the Buddha refers to “where water, earth, wind & fire find no footing” he’s talking about nibbāna, not formless concentration.

The “two separate answers” theory was already one of those explanations that require viewing the Buddha as breathtakingly careless in expressing himself, in more ways than one, regarding a matter of utmost importance (the Commentary’s theory - as traditionally interpreted - is likely another, as Ven. Dhammanando has shown, though I’ll come to that). The existence of SN 27 compounds that problem.

Interesting you should say that, venerable. I’ve recently come across the Commentaries doing almost exactly this, but in reverse. It shows that you could actually read the Commentary as supporting the reading of viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ as “surfaceless consciousness,” even - at a stretch - the Sub-Commentary. I’m not naive enough, however, to expect much approval of such a reading, but it still makes an important point. If you’re interested here’s a copy-paste from some research I’m doing:

Firstly, let’s look at Ven. Sāriputta’s analysis of viññāṇaṃ in MN 42:

vijānāti vijānātī’ti kho, āvuso, tasmā viññāṇanti vuccati.
“‘(It) cognises’, friend, thus it’s called consciousness.”

The following long compound then appears in MN 102: diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabbasaṅkhāramattena

HoL: “a modicum of fabrication with regard to what is seen, heard, sensed, or cognized” (MLDB essentially the same)

Without us going into detail on the meaning of the compound, the Commentaries give their analysis of the component in question:

A: ettha ca vijānātīti viññātabbaṃ
“Here, viññātabbaṁ means ‘cognises’.”

So just this much shows clearly that the A holds it possible for viññātabbaṃ to mean “cognises” and not necessarily “should be cognised”.

Thus,

“viññātabbanti viññāṇaṃ (nibbānassetaṃ nāmaṃ.)”

could very well be identical - in Commentarial Pali - to saying

vijānātī’ti viññāṇaṃ

which is consistent with V. Sāriputta’s analysis of the word.

The t completes this by fully circling back to viññāṇaṃ: consciousness.

t: vijānātīti viññātabba"nti, vijānanaṃ viññāṇanti attho.
" ‘viññātabbaṁ means ‘cognises’.’ The meaning of this is cognisance, i.e. consciousness."

And, as many who have formally studied Pali grammar will know, using a -tabbaṁ gerund is in fact one way to form an active noun in a word analysis. Meaning that the Commentary could very well be read as saying “consciousness means cognisance, it is a name for nibbāna.”

So, assuming that it’s possible the t might have misinterpreted the A, it remains a possibility that the A is not in fact suggesting a completely unprecedented use of the word viññāṇaṃ, simply giving a slightly unorthodox analysis of it but still intending it to mean consciousness. This would in fact be the more generous way in which to understand the A’s exegesis, the one that doesn’t paint it as contriving to make the Buddha appear to be saying something he’s obviously not.

At the very least it further confirms how likely it was that the average, even above-average, Pali speaker would have understood the Buddha - and indeed the commentary itself - to mean that nibbāna is a transcendent consciousness, and thus highlights how irresponsible and careless it would have been for the Buddha to choose the term viññāṇaṃ if he had not intended for it to mean what it always means everywhere else in his teaching - consciousness.

2 Likes

Venerable @Sunyo elaborated on this topic here:

A lot of your points are addressed in this article. Perhaps you’d like to respond to them here if they’re not satisfactory to you. :slight_smile:

But most simply on the topic:

Where elements find no footing, is essentially where sense realms have no footing. In first ayatana, there’s still a bleed through, but they disappear completely in second ayatana, hence they are said to find no footing in the base of infinite consciousness. :slight_smile:

Why there are two different questions, is also elaborated. It’d be like copy pasting the entire article, so it’s best to go at it, I believe. :slight_smile:

3 Likes

As for anidassanaṃ, it’s an epithet for nibbāna in the asaṅkhatasaṁyutta:

yo, bhikkhave, rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo – idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, asaṅkhataṃ.
SN 43 14-43

Compounding further still one of the problems of reading the term as meaning “infinite consciousness” - it implies the Buddha was highly misleading and inconsistent in his choice of words.

I’m aware of it, thank you. I’ve also addressed why it’s mistaken.

Edit: I admit, I’m not quite sure what your point here is. How should the poem be read, then?

Do you mean VA means Nibbāna or not? If you think yes, VA mean Nibbāna, then my post here should stand. If not, I’ve wasted time. :slight_smile:

Summary

Do you have any theories why if viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ was such an exalted topic, it only appears a handful of times, while rest of the suttas speak of all forms of viññāṇa (what khanda really means - collection, meaning all forms of viññāṇa, whether subtle, gross, etc etc.) are said to cease with Nibbāna?

To me, the overwhelming evidence that says “All forms of viññāṇa are covered under the aggregation of viññāṇa, which cease without trace”. means that, anything poetical that is found only in verse, should be taken with a grain of salt. :slight_smile:

I should perhaps add - I’m not a cessationalist as most people here are. :slight_smile: I just see an overwhelming evidence in the canon that all forms of viññāṇa is repeatedly covered under the aggregate, and thus anything that resembles viññāṇa is a burden, something to be let go off.

I have no problems not clinging to any concepts or ideas regarding nibbāna - except as an extinguishment of such proliferations. Therefore I don’t think it’s anything that I can put a name on, elaborate (except for poetically).

Any kind of consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; solid or subtle; inferior or superior; far or near: this is called the aggregate of consciousness. SN22.48

Or:

In the same way, a mendicant sees and contemplates any kind of consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; near or far—examining it carefully. And it appears to them as completely vacuous, hollow, and insubstantial. For what core could there be in consciousness?

Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness. Being disillusioned, desire fades away. When desire fades away they’re freed. When they’re freed, they know they’re freed. They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place. SN22.95

Why would Buddha say all consciousness repeatedly, is to be abandoned?

If nibbāna is a type of consciousness, why should we grow disillusioned with nibbāna? It doesn’t quite make any sense. I would expect Buddha to say something like “Hold onto to the Nibbāna consciousness, and discard the rest”. But he doesn’t say that, interestingly. He says all sorts of consciousness is to be abandoned. Isn’t that interesting?

Like in SN 26.10:

The cessation, settling, and ending of feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness is the cessation of suffering, the settling of diseases, and the ending of old age and death.

Doesn’t seem to make an exception to viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ. If Nibbāna is implied with viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ why is Nibbāna’s cessation, settling and ending is the settling of diseases, and the ending of old age and death?

And why do verses that mention viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ also speak about the cessation of viññāṇa, if we were to understand Nibbāna with viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ?

I don’t think any grammar or commenterial explanation resolves these issues for me. :pray:

3 Likes

Not sure where to put this but the Tassuddānaṁ to SN43.44 lends support to @PiorFeyt :

Asaṅkhataṁ anataṁ anāsavaṁ,
Saccañca pāraṁ nipuṇaṁ sududdasaṁ;
Ajajjaraṁ dhuvaṁ apalokitaṁ,
Anidassanaṁ nippapañca santaṁ.

Amataṁ paṇītañca sivañca khemaṁ,
Taṇhākkhayo acchariyañca abbhutaṁ;
Anītikaṁ anītikadhammaṁ,
Nibbānametaṁ sugatena desitaṁ.

Abyābajjho virāgo ca,
suddhi mutti anālayo;
Dīpo leṇañca tāṇañca,
saraṇañca parāyananti.

Color me unconvinced, but for me that is more about not really believing there is such a thing as “Nibanna” in EBT other than where it is a late reification.

Metta

In that thread you said:

Now… what if your issue lies in this very simple fact?

Suttacentral dictionary says that viññāṇaṃ
awareness; consciousness; mind; fifth of the five aggregates; lit. knowing [vi + √ñā + aṇa]
knowing; understanding; lit. divided knowing [vi + √ñā + aṇa]

Afaic, in English the usage and definition of knowing is very different from consciousness. No one in English would interchange them as synonymous, they point to two different things.

If the dictionary says that viññana literally means knowing, why would they use awareness, consciousness, or mind?

Further, “divided knowing” is very different from “knowing”. One would expect this vi to add some flavor to ñaṇa, otherwise, why use the term viññāṇa at all?

In my mind interpreting viññana as how we understand the English word conscious makes no sense, for several reason.
Whereas if you just regard viññana as knowing, or a kind of knowing, or a divided knowing, or a rooted-ignorance knowing (thinking in DO terms), then things make sense.

If viññana was to be translated into English as the term consciousness, does it makes sense this definition in the suttas sn22.79?

And why do you call it consciousness? It cognizes; that’s why it’s called ‘consciousness’. And what does it cognize? It cognizes sour, bitter, pungent, sweet, hot, mild, salty, and bland. It cognizes; that’s why it’s called ‘consciousness’

One would expect a pearless teacher to define the concept the english term conscioussness refers to in some other (better and more clear) way.

If you were to keep things as simple as possible

And why do you call it viññana? It knowns, that’s why it’s called viññana. And what does it knowns? It knowns sour, bitter, pungent, sweet, hot, mild, salty, and bland. It knowns; that’s why it’s called viññana.

Trying to use plain English… would you translate viññana as “knowing” or “consciousness”?

This is an important point, especially to me right now since lately I’ve been reading about all the documented errors in transmission in Ven Anālayo’s Early Buddhist Oral Tradition. The Teacher knew all about the unreliability of transmission: that’s one reason why the teachings are so repetitive.

So if something only gets mentioned a few times, usually in verse, how could it possibly be a big deal?

I am pretty much a newbie in Buddhism, but I didn’t expect to come across anything that would remind me of, say, the 4th c. Western controversies between the homoousians and homoiousians (yes, just one iota of difference!) until I started trying to understand these discussions of viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ

Sure, right view is indispensable, but I thought the teaching was supposed to be about practice, not about notions. Right view is only one of the eight path factors.

1 Like

In the Dharmaguptaka version this consciousness is said to cease, so its not nibbāna there

“What causes the four elements to not exist,
Ceasing earth, water, fire, and air?
What causes what’s coarse and fine to not exist,
What’s long, short, beautiful, and ugly?
What causes name and form to not exist,
To be forever ceased without remainder?

The answer is that consciousness is formless,
Measureless, and has its own radiance.
When it ceases, the four elements cease;
What’s coarse, fine, beautiful, and ugly ceases.
When these names and forms cease,
Consciousness ceases, and the rest ceases, too.”

https://suttacentral.net/da24/en/patton?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false

3 Likes

Oh, my friend.

Welcome to the 2500 years of debates! :joy:

“Right View” vs “No View” has been a tension in Buddhist exegesis since as far as I can read. Some say right doctrine is indispensable, some say right view is no view. There’s probably no end to these discussions. :wink:

2 Likes

Also Nanavira Thera, from letter:

"I recently received from Mr. Samaratunga your carefully prepared comments on my Notes on Dhamma. I read them with great interest and sent a reply to Mr. Samaratunga. I now hear from him that he has sent it on to you, so no doubt it will reach you in due course. Unfortunately, I find that I have made a slip that needs correcting. In my discussion of viññānam anidassanam anantam sabbatopaham, I said (as I remember) that ‘the arahat’s consciousness neither indicates nor originates a “self” or “subject”.’ This should be: ‘neither indicates a “self” or a “subject” nor originates from a “self” or “subject”’. Actually, the meaning of anidassanam and sabbato-apaham is the same: it is simply that, since there is no more Ahan ti vā Maman ti vā Asmi ti vā[1] with the arahat, consciousness is no longer ‘mine’. And anantam may be taken in the same sense—for the arahat consciousness is no longer limited by being ‘my’ consciousness (a determination is always a limiting, being a negation; and consciousness is now, in this respect, asankhata or non-determined). In the Asankhata Samyutta (iv,359-73) you will see that asankhata, anidassana, and nibbāna are all synonyms, and are all defined as rāgakkhaya dosakkhaya mohakkhaya, which, in the Itivuttaka (v,5: 38) is said to be saupādisesā nibbānadhātu.[2]

Edward Conze’s translation as ‘invisible infinite consciousness which shines everywhere’ is quite wild (no doubt he has taken it without considering the Pali at all), and one is tempted to ask how consciousness can be ‘invisible’ if it ‘shines everywhere’. But what, precisely, it is that Mahāyānists understand by nibbāna is very difficult to make out." L 107
**
(‘That consciousness by which the Tathāgata might be manifested has been eliminated by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, dug up, made non-existent, it is incapable of future arising; the Tathāgata, great king, is free from reckoning as consciousness…’) (Avyākata Samy. 1 <S.iv,379>). There is no longer any consciousness pointing (with feeling and the rest) to an existing ‘self’ and with which that ‘self’ might be identified. And in the Kevaddhasutta (Dīgha i,11 <D.i,223>), viññānam anidassanam,[*] which is the arahat’s ‘non-indicative consciousness’, is also viññānassa nirodho. While the arahat yet lives, his consciousness is niruddha, or ‘ceased’, for the reason that it is ananuruddha-appativiruddha (Majjhima ii,1 <M.i,65>). In the same way, when there is no longer any apparent ‘self’ to be contacted, contact (phassa) is said to have ceased: Phusanti phassā upadhim paticca / Nirūpadhim kena phuseyyum phassā. (‘Contacts contact dependent on ground – How should contacts contact a groundless one?’) (Udāna ii,4 <Ud.12>

  • In the line Viññānam anidassanam anantam sabbatopaham, (‘Non-indicative consciousness, limitless, wholly non-originating.’) the compound sabbatopaham (in Majjhima v,9 <M.i,329>, sabbatopabham) is probably sabbato + apaham (or apabham) from apahoti, a + pahoti (or apabhavati [apabhoti]). (Note that in the Majjhima passage preceding this line there is a Burmese v.l., nāpahosi for nāhosi.)
1 Like

It’s interesting to note though that this term appears in the texts of the other early schools. As far as I’m aware none of them took it to mean nibbana is a special type of consciousness.

2 Likes

Oh, this doesn’t even go as far as touching the right view vs no view stuff! But yes, that’s another one. (You can tell from what I already said where I am in that one.)

1 Like

I think he’s being a bit unfair to Conze here.

In rendering anidassanaṃ as “invisible” Conze is probably taking the word in the sense that it has in Indian Abhidharma texts, where it does mean exactly that. In these texts the object of eye-consciousness is sanidassana; all other āyatanas are anidassana. See, for example, the Duka-atthuddhāra chapter of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī.

“Infinite” for anantaṃ seems to differ only in phrasing, not in meaning, from Ñānavīra’s own preference.

“Shining everywhere” likely comes from Conze’s preferring the sabbatopabhaṃ reading.

“No doubt”? :thinking:

I think Ñānavīra’s allegation is highly doubtful, given that Conze’s works are full of footnotes along the lines of, “The Pali here is obscure in the extreme and the translator cannot be at all confident as to the correctness of his rendering.”

It’s curious to see the professedly phenomenological Ñānavīra talking like a logical positivist.

:smile:

As it happens, the world’s mystical literature is replete with invisible things that shine everywhere. The two seemingly contradictory attributes are usually harmonised simply by taking one of them (most often the “shining”) figuratively.

4 Likes

Yes, as I said in the OP.

Since it means nibbāna it’s mentioned more than just a handful of times, just with different names and in different ways. It’s just one name the Buddha gave to the released mind, which he says quite clearly in many places is the goal of the practice, i.e the Deathless, which he defines as “the mind’s liberation through non-clinging”:

etaṃ amataṃ yadidaṃ anupādā cittassa vimokkho MN 107

Elsewhere he calls it unrestricted awareness - it’s the fruit of arahantship. Now in MN 111 this term is also used to describe V.Sāriputta’s awareness while on the path to arahantship - it shows how his mind moves beyond each state of concentration, keeping his mind unattached to/ unrestricted by ever more refined states until he moves beyond all restrictions entirely to attain the fruit of arahantship: the mind’s release through non-clinging, the ending of the effluents, a totally unrestricted awareness. As he realises: there’s nothing higher than that.

The Buddha says he dwells with this awareness but disconnected from the consciousness aggregate, as well as all the other aggregates. In other words both he and the released awareness are disconnected from the aggregates and freed from death. So this awareness is obviously not the consciousness aggregate. It’s also quite clearly not subject to death.

I’m sure you’re familiar, too, with the common description of arahantship: the mind released from the āsavas (“āsavehi cittāni vimucciṁsūti”). One of those āsavas is ignorance, which in turn is, as you know, the root of all the factors of dependent coarising. So this is the same as saying that the arahant’s mind is freed from all the factors of dependent coarising. And what’s the last? Jarāmaraṇa… Again, whichever way you look at it, the awakened mind is a deathless mind.

You also have to remember how the Buddha uses the word “all.” In the Fire Discourse he says all is on fire with passion, including the entire consciousness aggregate. Now an arahant’s mind is freed from passion, and it’s disconnected from everything that the Buddha lists under the banner of “all.” Similarly, viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ doesn’t partake of the Allness of the All. So it’s not part of it, and therefore lies outside the definition of “all consciousness” as the Buddha describes it.

I assume that’s a polite term for annihilationist… I hope you’re a cessationalist, because as I understand it viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ is cessation, is the highest form of letting go - only those who let go completely of their attachments to every property in the cosmos have the chance to experience it.

Because all consciousness is to be abandoned. It needs to be if you’re going to realise the kind of consciousness that’s totally unlike all the consciousnesses that you’ve ever known.

I think he doesn’t because if you try to hold on to the nibbāna consciousness you won’t experience it, at least not fully - that’s what the Buddha seems to be talking about when he mentions the possibility of a monk either attaining arahantship or, if he’s got “Dhamma-passion” on experiencing the Deathless, non-return. Even though nibbāna isn’t stressful, clinging in and of itself very much is, even when directed at a state that’s constant and totally free from stress. As I say, my understanding is that VA is the complete cessation of holding on: the Deathless liberation of awareness through non-clinging.

I think there are a couple of things at play. One important point, again, is that viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ is where viññāṇa ceases, i.e. stops the activity that makes it a fabricated aggregate. Where there’s no more of that activity mentioned by Ven. Sāriputta in MN 42: cognising pleasure, cognising pain. Instead all it knows is release, total freedom from suffering (how could that kind of knowing be a burden? how would you let go of it when it’s only realised by totally letting go?). Hence another term for the final goal of the practice: “knowledge and vision of release.” Notice there’s knowing and seeing there, not just a total blackout of awareness - it’s just (and again this is simply my personal understanding) a knowing that’s totally freed from activity, perfectly stable. This, of course, is something we - who’ve only ever known forms of knowing that are constantly on the move - find difficult to conceive of. And so it’s understandably not easily described, even by an awakened being, due to the limitations both of unawakened understanding and of language - hence evocative terms and similes like Ajaan Chah’s “Still flowing water” or “stillness flowing.” Language by its nature puts limitations on things, and we can only usefully use the words that are already at our disposal, even when it means using them to describe something that they could never have been purposed for.

Connected to that point is the possibility that there could in fact be a metri causa at work here in another sense than that imagined by Ven.Dhammanando. Namely that the Buddha needed a word to mean a form of knowing, mind or awareness, and none of them fit the meter in this case other than viññāṇa. This (I think) stands up to the test that Ven. D’s failed, in that in this case there really isn’t another alternative that has the same meter: the Buddha usually uses citta or cetasa, and even ñāṇa & dassana are metrically different to viññāṇa.

More importantly, though, it shouldn’t matter - his use of them elsewhere establishes that the terms can be substituted for each other, especially when he talks about unestablished consciousness in relation to the arahant’s awareness. (The Milindapañhā confirms “unestablished” in this sense was understood as equivalent to “free from clinging”:

yoginā yogāvacarena kule gaṇe lābhe āvāse palibodhe paccaye sabbakilesesu ca sabbattha alaggena bhavitabbaṃ, anāsattena appatiṭṭhitena apalibuddhena bhavitabbaṃ.)

The Buddha uses the term “unestablished” to describe both Vens Godhika and Vakkali’s consciousness after their parinibbāna. If he was referring to the consciousness aggregate he could have just said it had totally ceased, but he didn’t:

appatiṭṭhitena ca, bhikkhave, viññāṇena godhiko kulaputto parinibbuto

He uses this same term to describe nibbāna in Ud 71; in the opening sutta to the Saṁyutta Nikāya to describe the paradoxical, effortless effort of “not standing still (apatiṭṭhaṁ - not being established), not pushing forward” that’s apparently required at the tipping point into awakening; and in several suttas intricately describing the process of how consciousness gets liberated:

tadappatiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ avirūḷhaṃ anabhisaṅkhaccavimuttaṃ.
That unestablished consciousness, not increasing, is liberated due to non-fabrication.
SN 22.53

In these sequences, consciousness subsequently “parinibbānas” (most translators change the subject to “the monk” but there’s not always such an indication in the Pali) and even then there’s still knowledge that follows: “birth is ended…”. So obviously parinibbāna-ing doesn’t mean going into unconscious oblivion where you know nothing at all.

He also uses the term in a simile for the consciousness of the awakened being, using light as his example. In it, without having any surface anywhere to become established on, the light is described as “unestablished” - he doesn’t say it becomes extinguished and, of course, why would it. Instead, it would be “radiant all around.” Consciousness, he then says, is comparable when it stops landing on/having passion for any of the four nutriments that it usually depends on.

So really, if we are familiar with the language of the suttas as a whole - and aren’t hell-bent on insisting that nibbāna is total unconscious annihilation - there’s no real issue to take with the Buddha’s description of nibbāna as a form of consciousness.

Anyway Ven. Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu has written much more eloquently on this than I could, and - I believe - with infinitely more experience of the matter at hand, in this essay:

3 Likes

Even the relevant Commentary explains it as meaning invisible to the eye:

anidassananti cakkhuviññāṇassa āpāthaṃ anupagamanato anidassanaṃ nāma

Just doesn’t make much sense in describing a transcendent consciousness, or any consciousness. Obviously you can’t see consciousness with your eyes…

Consciousness. It’s a form of knowing, but “Knowing” in English carries connotations of intelligence, and consciousness is not necessarily smart - most often not.

Conceptually but for our words, we’re aiming at similar things; but for these very reasons I don’t call the result any type of consciousness.

And perhaps it helps some people to idealise the final goal as a type of consciousness, but as even Ajahn Thanissaro says, all of these are concepts and fail to describe Nibbāna. And he urges that all these concepts should be abandoned on the way to Nibbāna. Considering Nibbāna as a type of consiousness, to me, that only furthers clinging.

And likewise, I think the very handful & deeply poetic instances of such consciousness being described in the canon, I think it would be mistaken to take them as Nibbāna. It makes more sense, considering how almost every single mention of consciousness in the canon likens it to a tumor, something to be abandoned, a disease, etc. If %99 of all instances of consciousness in the canon is terrible, and there’s a couple interesting ways, it makes more sense to consider something lost on the way, a translation error, a scripture curiosity, something poetic lost, etc. Ergo, I take my view of consciousness by the %99 of the canon, not the %1. :slight_smile:

That’s my argument for what might be the spirit of the text in my opinion. Again, if someone wants to render it differently because they find it skillful or useful, more power to them. :slight_smile:

I hope your views bring your path to fruition. :pray: :lotus:

1 Like

But did the Buddha and his disciples have any problems describing Nibbana in the Suttas? - No. There are numerous different descriptions of it. What is more, hearing and learning the right view from another is nothing more than learning the right concepts, and is an essential necessary step in arriving at a personal understanding of those concepts - arriving at the right view.

Babies and animals don’t have concepts, or even the ability to have concepts - and they are as far from the right view as one can possibly be.

1 Like

This is a weak argument - for example Buddha calls Nibbāna “an island”. Do we think that Nibbāna is a body of earth, surrounded by all sides with water? :slight_smile:

Such concepts and poetic descriptions can be useful for a while, but I’ll repeat what I’ve edited in the last part:

When all principles are struck down altogether,
All modes of speech are altogether struck down as well. Snp 5.7

We might need to use words to describe what lies beyond words for a while, but our words will not reflect the Nibbāna, just like it literally isn’t an island. :pray:

2 Likes