Vitakka vicāra (Jhana-factors)

That would explain how a number of iddhis work.

what do you think about the reframing of the jhāna issue as one that concerns the question of whether the mind-made self-acquisition takes up space or not?

Why not?

Perhaps, with the expression niramisa vedana.
If we understand the five “strings” (doesn’t it mean actually “fivefold” by the way?) as being limited to those objects that induce raga etc. (perhaps an umbrella term for dosa also, which could refer to sense objects that trigger raga or dosa but not those that trigger only moha) then yes there would be anatomical pleasure that is not part of those five “strings”.

Frank: you can put it to the test right now. reflect on virtuous deeds you’ve done, or metta bhavana, or how the efforts of your practice is preventing so much dukkha that would otherwise arise for you, and experience that pleasure fully. can you do that without the mental pleasure spilling into bodily pleasure, maybe goosebumps, waves of energy running and massaging you pleasurably from the inside? that’s the blameless anatomical pleasure of the jhanas. there’s nothing to fear.

[quote=“Sylvester, post:198, topic:2589”]
I would say that the conclusion you draw from this thought experiment would violate an important doctrinal limitation laid out in MN 43, ie each of the 5 faculties are limited to only contacting their respective external fields.[/quote]

I am not sure to understand how you justify this conclusion from what Frank said. It seems to me that what you describe in the context of the HPA axis would not be in contradiction with it, but rather a converging explanation. Perhaps I am missing something in your reasoning.

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Could you explain your thoughts on this? Am I understanding you correctly that the iddhis are part of one’s Form Aggregate? As far as i can tell, the Form Aggregate is tied to that whirlpool around the 6 contacts. When one contacts a memory, that also carries the Form of the memory. It doesn’t strike me that the Form Aggregate from mental contact is limited to the iddhis.

In any event, the iddhis are temporally divorced from the jhana’s Form Aggregate. It happens after arising from jhana. That much is clear from AN 9.35 . It is also clear from every iddhi pericope - they use the locative absolute formed from past participles , which you would doubtless know is presented in all Grammars as meaning that the jhanas occur before the iddhis. How then is a jhana’s Form Aggregate related to iddhis?

In any event, I look forward to your explanation.

As for my point about MN 43, it looks pretty explicit that the body faculty can only contact tactility. That sutta bars the 5 senses from contacting any sense field beyond its specific range. If so, the body cannot contact pleasure arisen at the mind.

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I will come back later to answer but in the mean time can I trouble you to explain how the following

comes as a necessary result of Frank’s statement? It isn’t clear at all for me

It seems to be what he’s saying here-

can you do that without the mental pleasure spilling into bodily pleasure

Isn’t that “spilling” though precisely what happens in the hypothalamus, an hormonal response to neural (nervous?) stimuli?

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pali word by word translation into english.

in the section i labeled 2.1 and 2.2, is the part of most interest. 2.1 is the worldly sukha, 2.2 the jhana sukha (jhanas 1, 2, 3 are explicitly stated).

the worldly sukha includes “sukha and somanassa”, which i translated as “pleasure and good mental states”.

yaṃ kho, bhikkhave,
Whatever ***, *********, (of)
ime pañca kāmaguṇe
these five sensuality-strings,
paṭicca uppajjati
on-account-of (that) arises
sukhaṃ so-manassaṃ,
pleasure (and) good-mental-states,
idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave,
that (is) called, ***********,
s’-āmisaṃ sukhaṃ.
of-the-flesh pleasure.

Since the Buddha goes through the trouble of mentioning somanassa, I take that to contrast the physical aspect of sukha. From other suttas, sukha vedana has been defined to include both a physical and mental component.

from 2.1, it makes it seem clear that in section 2.2, where the 3 standard jhana formulas are stated, that sukha in those jhanas also has a physical component.

especially since in section 3.1 and 3.2 where worldly and unworldly equanimity is contrasted, 3rd jhana (which as upekkha also) is excluded.

so this just reinforces the physical aspect of dukkha in samadhi and jhana. 3rd jhana’s “sukhana kayena patisamvedi” is Buddha telling us that samadhi hasn’t transcended bodily pleasure and pain. 4th jhana, then the “sukkhassa dukkhassa pahana” you could make the case.

also, in SN 46.3 sandwiched in between passadhi bojjhanga and samadhi, we see sukha make an appearance

(b.bodhi) 7“For one whose body is tranquil and who is happy the mind becomes concentrated.64 “” Whenever, bhikkhus, the mind becomes concentrated in a bhikkhu whose body is tranquil and who is happy, on that occasion the enlightenment factor of concentration is aroused by the bhikkhu; on that occasion the bhikkhu develops the enlightenment factor of concentration; on that occasion the enlightenment factor of concentration comes to fulfilment by development in the bhikkhu.

b.bodhi translated that as body is tranquil and who is happy, i don’t know pali well enough to know if sukha in that instance could be a modifier of kaya. but in any case, the buddha does seem to go out of the way several times in a samadhi context to emphasize there’s a kaya there. And when it’s in a dichotomy with mind, then it makes it really clear to me it’s talking about anatomical happiness.

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the MN 15 and MN 61 quotes were just to illustrate what piti bojjhanga is., which is also the same piti in the first 3 jhanas. The broader question being people naturally wonder is piti and sukha mental, physical, or both?

i actually started to do a DPR search on “piiti” and am looking at every single reference, slowly working my through, probably won’t be done for a few more weeks. the MN 15 and 61 quotes are representative of about 15 instances, maybe more, where piiti and pamojja are in a compound, and emphasizing the mental development aspect of taking joy and pleasure from seeing unwholesome qualities, understanding their cause, eliminating it, and feeling joy at seeing that improvement, moment by moment. Similarly for seeing wholesome qualities, what their causes are, and reprogramming our behavior, both in daily life and in samatha training.

So what i’ve found is that the buddha seems to emphasize the mental and wisdom training aspects with Piiti. With sukha, he seems to make a point, such as in 3rd jhana to reminded the body hasn’t disappeared yet.

What would you do if you were the buddha, as you were composing the standard 4 jhanas? Think about it, if the body had completely disappeared in first jhana already, he would first of all not mention it in 3rd jhana, as there would be no need, and second, he’d probably go out of his way in the standard first jhana to emphasize the body’s absence there.

i would guess most of the disciples are uneducated, and kaya means anatomical body to them. They didn’t read critical pali dictionary. In a sense, i’m a great test case for that, because i’m learning pali like a child would. i hear it, memorize it, and intuit meanings from words based on how they’re used. When I keep hearing sukha next to kaaya, i’m going to suspect they’re working together for some purpose. The buddha wants the sassana to last long, he’s not going to throw out a word like kaaya in such an important piece of teaching (3rd jhana) that would easily confuse uneducated pali speakers.

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it will take me some time to look over the relevant passages in MN 43 carefully before i have anything to say. i am appreciating your contributions, as well as Chan’s, in looking into the details of sense organs and sense objects. i will probably have to read all of your messages 3 or 4 more times before i fully comprehend what you’re saying though.

If that is so, the dualist model of mind and physiology used in MN 43 has to be chucked out of the window. Are you therefore saying that ALL mental states are mere epiphenomena of physiology (be it neurology or immunology)?

I’ve not followed PNI closely in the past few years, but the material I had previously read did not see any attempt to reduce the psychological bits to being ultimately explicable by N or I. There is an observable causal connection between all 3, but the “mind” component simply is not amenable to being physically measured by the tools (then) existing.

Perhaps it is the temperament of the US and UK scientific establishments that stick rigorously to their domain being governed by the synthetic a posteriori. Even if one suspects, on the basis of a million replicated observations, that the “mind” is nothing more than brain systems, that suspicion cannot be true a priori (unless one were a Kantian fan).

The most well-known modern Dualist I can think of would be Penrose. While he does not say so explicitly (that mind is other than the body), he clearly rejects the monist model. That seems to be the reason why he posits that the interface between the body and “mind” happens at the quantum level (at least for those “events” that require a quantum wave collapse). Not sure if his quantum-sized apparatus have been found since.

In any event, coming back to Frank’s thought experiment, once the “spillage” of “mental” pleasure has occurred, the body does not feel that “mental” pleasure. The pleasurable tremors etc are tactility-born pleasure. Isn’t any form of tactility-born pleasure a kāmasukha?

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Hey guys, congratulations, this thread has smashed all previous records to become by far the longest discussion on here.

If we keep going long enough, we’ll figure out what vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā really means.

Joke! Carry on!

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Please take your time Frank. I’m grateful for your effort put into the other bits revolving around Pali (especially for rendering of SN 36.31) and I would be interested to hear what you think about doctrinal issues as well.

But, moving on now to your responses one the Pali bits, my response will have to roam into doctrine as well.

Yup. This is what I meant by BB and Ven T under-translating. BB renders sukha as “happiness”, when “happiness” is furnished by the other word somanassa. On the other hand, Ven T omits happiness/somanassa.

Did you notice that nirāmisa sukha does not include somanassa/happiness? See how that ties in with MN 44 disallowing a certain type of anusaya anuseti-ing the pleasure of the First Jhana.

I suspect BB treats sukha in nirāmisa sukha as happiness, as he probably felt that “pleasure” in the context of the jhanas is too “hedonic”, too “physical”. I will deal with his scruples later and show that it is again an Abhidhamma artefact.

Why would you parse somanassa as “good mental states”? That would imply that “domanassa” is a bad mental state. But, clearly that would contradict MN 137’s ringing endorsement of certain types of domanassa, ie renunciation grief (nekkham­ma­ domanassā : notice the plural).

Now, this is the part we need to be extremely, extremely careful with our terminology. Please confirm if your understanding of “physical” stems from eg SN 36.6’s bifurcation of feelings into kāyika vedana (bodily feeling) and cetasika vedana (mental feeling). I need to be clear about your source for this “physical and mental component” to continue the discussion.

Actually, it seems quite the opposite. In the nirāmisa sukha section, no mention is made of somanassa whatsoever (as to which, see my point about MN 44 above). The first 3 jhanas contain only sukha (pleasure). If sukha is taken to mean only physical pleasure (ie arisen from the 5 senses, since somanassa is interpreted to mean the mental part), then it would appear that the pleasure of the first 3 jhanas is of the sāmisa variety. I know you are not reading it this way, but we need to be very clear about the nature of the sukha/pleasure in the jhanas. The physical/mental dichotomy of feelings as proposed in some translations are poor substitutes for how other suttas actually explain the dichotomy. But I would really need to trouble you to cite your source for this physical/mental dichotomy and whether it is related to the SN 36.6 dichotomy.

Indeed it speaks of kāya. Can we park this aside for now? I think our discussion may take a different trajectory, once we solve the mystery of the physical/mental dichotomy.

I think the issue of understandability of a MIA idiom favours the interpretation of kāya functioning pronominally/adverbially (by himself/personally), rather than adnominally (the physical body). Take a look at this standard description -

Further, great king, with the fading away of rapture, the bhikkhu dwells in equanimity, mindful and clearly comprehending, and experiences happiness (sukha) with the body (kāyena) .

Everywhere else, that kāyena is undubitably an idiom for “personally”, since it occurs in the context of Nibbana and the formless attainments. Why should it suddenly change its meaning here to mean the “physical body”?

Edit - I think I should supplement Ajahn @Brahmali 's prior notes on this idiom “kāyena + verb” such as we encounter in -

kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti - 3rd jhana perciope
kāyena phusati - touching all the jhanas and formless attainments and Cessation
kāyena paramasaccaṃ sacchikaroti : realising the highest reality
aṭṭha vimokkhā kāyena sacchikaraṇīyā : the eight emancipations are to be realised

If you look at Wijesekara’s explanation of the instrumental, although the word inflected is a substantive noun, in the vast majority of the instrumentals, they are functioning adverbially, not adnominally. In other words, the instrumental is functioning as an adverb, not a noun, in modifying or predicating the verb. It is only is restricted cases (agency and comparison) that instrumentals retain any adnominal role at all.

Now, there is one other class of nouns that are well-known for their adverbial guise, namely reflexive pronouns. Take a look at Warder’s listing as such, where the pronoun is reflexively predicating the verb. Is it surprising that attan has also be declined into the instrumental attanā for this reflexive pronoun?

This is why I have been arguing that -

  1. the kāyena in the 3rd jhana pericope is adverbial and functioning reflexively; and
  2. the kāya in the jhana similes must be drawn from the kāyena and sharing the same reflexive function.

I believe this is where it becomes very difficult to argue for an adnominal reading of kāyena in kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti. Certainly, it is counter-intuitive to our 20th/21st Century English sensibilities, but when dealing with Middle Indo Aryan texts, can we afford to carry our modern limitations into reading such texts?

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Thank you for the thorough clarification on the grammar. (Wijesekara is a new name for me atleast)

I’d agree with the first premise, that in the third jhana one experiences pleasure directly. That is to say that in the lower two one remains having attained a pleasure mediated by joy (pītisukha as instrumental/genitive tappurisa), but in the third, “with the fading of joy” (pītiyā virāgā) the pleasure derived in that dwelling is direct and raw.

I think for the second premise, we could test whether each of the verbs “abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati” are ever intransitive without taking a patient. If it’s the case that they’re never intransitive, however, this would necessitate taking “imameva kāyaṃ” as adnominal patient, right?

(A collation of the four excerpts in question from DN 2 below for reference):

So imameva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

So imameva kāyaṃ samādhijena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa samādhijena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

So imameva kāyaṃ nippītikena sukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa nippītikena sukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

So imameva kāyaṃ parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena pharitvā nisinno hoti, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

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I would agree! Perhaps you could labour over the weekend on this?

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Yes, sir! :innocent:

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As a leg-up, I note from Ven Analayo’s analysis of the “kāya” in the jhana similes , he distinguishes it from the adverbial sense carried by kāyena. This was from one of his lectures on the MA.

He interprets it adnominally. I wonder if he would entertain the reflexive pronominal sense I suggest, ie "he saturates etc himself with the…"
or the more heretical alternative of the nominal “acquisition of self”.

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Looking at my own experience, for example when doing metta, the mental and physical pleasures are distinct; there is the mental pleasure from metta, and the physical pleasure of relaxation that seems to be an effect of the metta practice.

And besides, how is it possible to let go of the body if one relies on it for pleasure? That just don’t make sense to me.[quote=“frankk, post:197, topic:2589”]
SN 36.31 gives a good idea of how sukha vedana and piti in jhana breaks down in mental or physical type of pleasure.
[/quote]
If you assume that the pleasure of jhana is physical first, and then read SN 36.31, you can say that “the physical pleasure of jhana is spiritual rapture.”

But if you look at the text:

[…] tactile objects cognizable by the body that are desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing, tantalizing. These are the five cords of sensual pleasure. The rapture that arises in dependence on these five cords of sensual pleasure: this is called carnal rapture.

A simpler reading is just that a pleasure that is “cognizable by the body” is carnal pleasure. When you have descriptions like “full body orgasm”, doesn’t that seem carnal rather than spiritual?

Anyway, let’s not make any assumptions about what type of pleasure the pleasure in jhana is, and just look at the suttas.

[AN 6.63] And what is the cause by which sensuality comes into play? Contact is the cause by which sensuality comes into play. And what is the diversity in sensuality? […] sensuality with regard to tactile sensations […] And what is the cessation of sensuality? From the cessation of contact is the cessation of sensuality […]

What is this contact?

[MN 148] Dependent on the body & tactile sensations there arises consciousness at the body. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition there is feeling.

So, when the meeting of the body, tactile sensations and bodily consciousness ceases (= cessation of contact) this leads to the cessation of sensuality.

If you are feeling a feeling in the body, you have to have contact. If you have contact (with any of the five senses), sensuality - whatever it is - has not ceased.

Please note that this line of reasoning does not depend on the meaning of sensuality at all. So whether you take sensuality to mean the five senses, or the lust/desire for the five senses, or something else, that has only ceased if there is no coming together of the sense base, the sense object and the sense consciousness (not including mind).

There’s also DN 9 and AN 9.31 which says the perception of sensuality has stopped in the first jhana. According to AN 6.63 again, there are six types of perception, where the perception of tactile sensations are one them.

Whatever a perception of sensuality is, the cause for it being gone must be due to a lack of contact:

[AN 6.63] And what is the cessation of perception? From the cessation of contact is the cessation of perception

So to me, it seems like the cause for the things that happen in first jhana is this lack of contact with the five senses.

The things we don’t have contact with, basically don’t exist experientially, as far as I know. And of course, you cannot have any lust or desire for something you cannot feel or perceive.

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The crux of the issue indeed! (Notwithstanding the report on “imameva kāyaṃ” as adverbial or adnominal.)

I’d posit that the Dhātu chapter of the Saṃyutta (SN 14) sheds light on this.

Namely, I suggest that the sequences in SN 14 lend us an opportunity for greater precision here.

First let’s look at how the chapter begins by looking at the culmination of the sequence in the first of two pentads that comprise the first of four subchapters:

[SN 14.4 Vedanā­-nānat­ta]

In dependence on the eye element (cakkhudhātu) there arises eye-contact (cakkhusamphassa);
in dependence on eye-contact there arises feeling born of eye-contact. (cak­khu­samphas­sajā v.)

In dependence on the mind element there arises mind-contact;
in dependence on mind-contact there arises feeling born of mind-contact.

Compare this with the culmination of the much longer sequence in the second pentad:

[SN 14.9 Bāhira-phassa-nānatta]

In dependence on the form element (rūpadhātu) there arises perception of form (rūpasaññā);
in dependence on perception of form there arises intention regarding form (rūpasaṅkappa);
in dependence on intention regarding form there arises contact with form (rūpasamphassa);
in dependence on contact with form there arises feeling born of c. w. f. (rūpa­samphas­sa­ja v.);
in dependence on feeling born of contact with form there arises desire for form; (rūpacchanda)
in dependence on desire for form there arises passion for form; (rūpapariḷāha)
in dependence on passion for form there arises the quest for form; (rūpapariyesana)
in dependence on the quest for form there arises the gain of form (rūpalābha) ….

in dependence on the quest for mental phenomena there arises the gain of mental phenomena.

I’ve bolded contact in the two sequences to show how the second sequence appears to be an expansion of the first sequence before and after contact.

Now here is where I beg the question: what is the difference between the two terms “feeling born of body-contact” (kāyasamphassajā vedanā) and “feeling born of contact with tactility” (phoṭṭhab­basamphassaja vedanā)?

Holding the question I’d point to a couple more interesting selections coming now from the second subchapter:

[SN 14.12 Sa-nidāna]

Bhikkhus, sensual thought (vitakka) arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of ill will arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of harming arises with a source, not without a source.

And how is this so?

In dependence on the sensuality element (kāmadhātu) there arises sensual perception;
in dependence on sensual perception (kāmasaññā) there arises sensual intention;
in dependence on sensual intention (kāmasaṅkappa) there arises sensual desire;
in dependence on sensual desire (kāmachanda) there arises sensual passion;
in dependence on sensual passion (kāmapariḷāha) there arises a sensual quest.

Engaged in a sensual quest, the uninstructed worldling conducts himself wrongly in three ways—with body, speech, and mind.


Bhikkhus, thought of renunciation arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of non-ill will arises with a source, not without a source;
thought of harmlessness arises with a source, not without a source.

And how is this so?

In dependence on the renunciation element there arises perception of renunciation;
in dependence on perception of renunciation there arises intention of renunciation;
in dependence on intention of renunciation there arises desire for renunciation;
in dependence on desire for renunciation there arises passion for renunciation;
in dependence on passion for renunciation there arises a quest for renunciation.

Engaged in a quest for renunciation, the instructed noble disciple conducts himself rightly in three ways—with body, speech, and mind.

Now, the translation of pariḷāha here as “passion” obfuscates the potential connection between the sequence there and the sequence in the oft-overlooked Bhikkhunupassaya Sutta where the same word is rendered as “fever”.

[SN 47.10]

Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu dwells contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful, having removed covetousness and displeasure in regard to the world. While he is contemplating the body in the body, there arises in him, based on the body,

either a fever in the body (kāyasmiṃ pariḷāho)
or sluggishness of mind,
or the mind is distracted outwardly.

That bhikkhu should then direct his mind towards some inspiring sign.
When he directs his mind towards some inspiring sign, gladness is born.
When he is gladdened, rapture is born.
When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil.
One tranquil in body experiences happiness.
The mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated.

Moving on:

[SN 14.13]

Bhikkhus, in dependence on [this mighty] element [of ignorance (avijjādhātu)] there arises a perception, there arises a view (diṭṭhi), there arises a thought.

In dep. on an inferior/middling/superior (hīnaṃ/majjhimaṃ/paṇītaṃ) element there arises
inferior/middling/superior perception,
inferior/middling/superior view,
inferior/middling/superior thought,
inferior/middling/superior volition (cetanā),
inferior/middling/superior longing (patthanā),
inferior/middling/superior wish (paṇidhi),
inferior/middling/superior person (puggala),
inferior/middling/superior speech (vācā).

He explains, teaches, proclaims, establishes, discloses, analyses, and elucidates the inferior/middling/superior. His rebirth, I say, is inferior/middling/superior.

Here we see a classification scheme for the elements that’s quite distinct and has a bearing on the rebirth destinations of individuals. I mention it to say that the suttas overall appear to slice up the elements in a variety of ways. Given that the elements are placed at the fore of the causal sequences, I again beg the question:

Does this and the surrounding five admittedly stock doctrinal assertions really cover the elements in exhaustive manner?

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in partial answer to Erik and Sylvester, Dhatu Samyutta was what i had in mind also of the most promising suttas to help untangle whether piti, sukha, pamojja, upekkha, adukkham-asukum-vedana are mental, physical, or both.

one of the suttas in indriya samyutta is particularly helpful in clearly identifying that vedana has both physical and mental aspects.

Sylvester, that sutta you can see why i translate somanassa as I do, is not to try to capture a perfect idiomatic sense, but to clearly distinguish whether piti, sukha, etc, are mental or physical.

to everyone who directly asked me a question, i may be slow, very slow, to respond. i’ve already spent way too much time on dhamma discussion, going beyond my daily quota, and need to force myself to scale back.

edit: (addition, comment to Sylvester) i know 3rd jhana doesn’t say somanassa. but the fact that somanassa is used in the samisa sukha sets up the dichotomy there, meaning “sukha” in samisa and nira-misa take on the sukha-indriyam (physical pleasure definition) of SN 48.36.
If we take sukha in 3rd jhana definition to be “sukha vedana”, sukha vedana contains both sukhindriyam and somanass-indriyam, and then the Buddha specified “sukhan ca kayena patisamvedeti” to emphasize that he’s talking about sukha-indriyam (phsyical pleasure) that is still part of 3rd jhana.

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yes! you can distinguish the mental and physical source. and in the gradual training you have four jhanas to phase out involvement with the physical body.

if you start relying on the hedonistic pleasure of bodily sensations to sustain sukha and piti, then it changes into a 5 cord of sense pleasure fueled meditation, and becomes wrong jhana, wrong concentration.

but if you’re maintaining the metta mental source fuel, or any other nekhhamma/kusula/wholesome/renunciation based fuel, and happen to notice sounds, pleasurable bodily sensations, that’s blameless side effect physical pleasure, no problem with enjoying that in the first jhana.

that’s the buddha’s key insight, in contrast to the imperturbable attainemnts he learned from his 2 teachers, and the 6 years of austerity. there’s no reason to fear the physical pleasure of first jhana. and if merely cutting off contact from 5 sense objects was the answer, he’d already learned that from his 2 teachers. why did he reject that samadhi? blind men, deaf men, and babies through lack of contact could claim some kind of enlightenment.

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i hadn’t looked carefully at the pali for that sutta yet. what should i pay special attention to?