Following the same logic, should we also conclude that the word kāyaṃ used in the items exposed just after the fourth jhana in DN 2 also refers to the same meaning of the word?
Hi silence
Is an anaphoric pronoun used with body in those passages after the 4th Jhana passage?
Apparently not. Good point. Thank you.
I was looking on SC’s AN 9 page in general to see what agama parallels existed for those suttas, and was surprised to see it shows almost none at all for the cluster of 30 suttas or so near the AN 9.35 that all have to do with 9 meditative attainments. Do they really not exist, or is SC’s mapping just under supported (for AN 9) at this time?
I have made a quick research and it seems that either it does not refer to the previous occurence of kaya or if that must be the case, then the context of other suttas make it clear that the physical body is meant in this case.
At AN 5.28, the expression ‘imameva kāyaṃ’ occurs right at the beginning of the sutta, without previous mention of the word kāya, which tends to disprove the above assumption.
At MN 39, the previous mention of the word is in the context of somebody who was sick and then regained bodily strength (atthi ca me kāye balamattā)
At MN 119, the word would refer to the previous use of kaya in the context of the items of kayanupassana i.e. breath awareness, awareness of bodily posture, 32 parts of the physical body, 4 elements and charnel ground observation.
At MN 77, the previous mention of the word ‘kāya’ is in a satipatthana formula (bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati), so referring to the same sets as above in MN 119.
The last 3 examples provide sufficient ground to assume that if the expression does refer anaphorically to the previous occurrence of the word kaya, then it must mean the physical body.
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Very good. I would not fret too much over AN 5.28. Redaction being what it is, there’s a high chance that pericopes were simply copied from suttas with the full context into those without. My view is that the anaphoric pronoun likely originated in a discourse that had the awakening factors precede the jhanas.
Take a look at @Gabriel s essay for a compelling suggestion of an older meaning of the “body” (kāya).
Hi Frank
Until the scholarship solidifies on the Ekottara Āgama, I prefer not to speculate on its affiliation. The older assessment that it was Sarvastivadin or Mahasanghika seems to have given way to a Dharmagupta assessment.
This plus the presence of Mahayana material in the EA might suggest that its not a truly complete Āgama. There is also the problem of the situation of its translation. That was done in a time of great civil strife that was so bad that the first translation of the MA done concurrently was lost. We really cannot assume that the manuscript was even complete.
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But is it necessarily an anaphoric pronoun? A quick research shows that “ayameva” and its friends are often times used anaphorically, but not always. Is it not possible that it could also be used simply as an emphatic form of the demonstrative pronoun, as it seems to be sometimes the case?
Examples:
- SN 6.9:
“appamattako ayaṃ kali,
yo akkhesu dhanaparājayo.
sabbassāpi sahāpi attanā,
ayameva mahantataro kali.
yo sugatesu manaṃ padosaye.“Trifling is the unlucky throw
That brings the loss of wealth at dice,
[The loss] of all, oneself included;
Worse by far—this unlucky throw
Of harbouring hate against the fortunate ones.
- SN 35.235
‘tiṭṭhatu tāva tattāya ayosalākāya ādittāya sampajjalitāya sajotibhūtāya cakkhundriyaṃ sampalimaṭṭhaṃ. handāhaṃ idameva manasi karomi — iti cakkhu aniccaṃ, rūpā aniccā
‘Leave off lacerating the eye faculty with a red-hot iron pin
burning, blazing, and glowing. Let me attend only to this: So the eye
is impermanent, forms are impermanent
There is a number of cases including ‘ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo’ where it does not appear evident how to make a clear cut choice between anaphoric and demonstrative pronoun.
To wit, at MN 121, the expression ‘imameva kāyaṃ’ is used without a previous occurrence of the word kaya, and not in a pericope.
I believe Warder provides that the anaphora is a general tendency, rather than an inevitable one. Where it is not anaphoric, it is likely emphatic (p.29).
It appears that the SN 35.235 example does not admit of anaphora, because it is lacking the substantive noun after the pronoun.
How did you vote on the poll, and why did you choose as such?
I first voted that I agreed because I saw no reason to disagree, though without having gone into the details of the issue. I just changed my vote because of the various example in which imameva kayam appears without previous mention of kaya, among which MN 121 tends to show it is not merely a pericope inconsistency problem.
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Hi Sylvester,
I don’t understand your response. Maybe you’re answering someone else’s question? Let me ask again more specifically: In looking up to see what parallels for AN 9.35 on SC might exist, I noticed the range of suttas from AN Nines, from AN 9.31 to AN 9.61, approximately 30 suttas all discussing the 9 meditative attainments, none have chinese Agama parallels, except for AN 9.37. That is astounding to me, I’m guessing there are parallels but SC doesn’t have them mapped yet? If your answer above was referring to all of these 30 suttas, do you mean that only EA has parallels where all 9 meditative attainments are discussed like that together, and don’t exist in MA or SA?
Sorry for being so obtuse, Frank.
I think underlying your question is the nagging doubt - are the 9 Attainment tropes authentic, if it is only attested only in the AN.
There may be any number of reasons why SC does not list parallels for every sutta.
-
SC is confined so far to working with published material. For example, if Hartmann does not publish the Sarvastivadin Dirgha, you will probably not find a link to its parallel to DN 9 listed here.
-
Even on the basis of published materials, I’m not sure if the SC contributors can work on just finding parallels. The academics probably have other areas of work, while the monastics also have monastic duties. Parallels continued to be found, and added, but this could be a project that takes lifetimes, more so, if the team decides to embark on the next ambitious phase, ie locate parallel pericopes/doctrinal statements nestled within non-parallel sutras.
This is not to suggest that parallels to AN 9.31 to AN 9.36 will ever be found. 2 possibilities present themselves -
- These suttas are peculiar to the AN and never formed part of the depository of the other schools;
- Parallels have existed in the other collections which are now lost.
I was trying to allude to the 2nd possibility in my earlier post.
I think we can take a tentative step in discounting possibility #1, given that the term “nava anupubbavihārasamāpatti” from AN 9.33 is attested in 2 EBT texts found here under “九次第定”. It also makes an appearance in a Yogacara text under T1579_.30.0588b26.
While we do not have a Nine Cessations series in the form of “九次第滅” in the Chinese, DA 28 does have “次第滅” when speaking of the step-by-step cessation of perception.
Some loss appears to have occurred, but it seems to me that enough of the trope has survived in the Mahisasaka and Dharmagupta of these 2 series.
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Thanks Sylvester.
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You’re welcome. As a baby demo on how SC will always grow its list of parallels, see below.
Hi Bhante @sujato. For AN 9.31, might this have a correspondence with or partial parallel in DA 10 at -
云何九證法？謂九盡： 若入初禪，則聲 刺 滅。入第二禪，則覺觀 刺 滅。入第三禪，則喜刺滅。入第四禪，則出入 息刺滅。入空處，則色想刺滅。入識處，則空 想刺滅。入不用處，則識想刺滅。入有想無 想處，則不用想刺滅。入滅盡定，則想受刺 滅。
from T0001_.01.0056c28 to T0001_.01.0057a05.
Ditto for a similar list with a different label in DA 11 -
云何九證法？ 謂九盡：若入初禪，則聲刺滅。入第二禪，則 覺觀刺滅。入第三禪，則喜刺滅。入第四 禪，則出入息刺滅。入空處，則色想刺滅。入 識處，則空想刺滅。入不用處，則識想 刺 滅。 入有想無想處，則不用想 刺 滅。入滅盡定， 則想受 刺 滅。
from T0001_.01.0059a06 to T0001_.01.0059a12
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Hi again!
I think the interpretation in bold is implied with what the other passages says. Let’s take the vitakka example -
Then Ananda, it occurred to me" 'With the subsiding of thought and examination, let me enter and dwell in the second jhana. … Yet my mind did not launch out upon the absence of thought and become placid, settled, and liberated in it. … Then it occurred to me: 'I have not seen the danger in thoughts and have not cultivated that; I have not achieved the benefit in the absence of thought and have not pursued it…
This passage occurs before the attainment of the second jhana and the intrusion of vitakka into that attainment. Since the negation in the bolded part points to a privative sense, it strikes me that the same privative sense must have been intended for the first jhana and its relationship to the kāmā which it transcends.
This also suggests that the more natural translation for sahagata in the passage should be “accompanied by”, rather than “dealing with”. The contrast between the desire for a privative state and the affliction brought about by the intrusion of the element supposed to be left behind, points more to the incompatibility of intrusion with the attainment, rather than the intrusion being a mere difficulty. It is clear from this passage, that what is desired is the absence of a particular element, and not merely the absence of difficulties posed by that said element.
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Hi Sylvester,
If I follow you well, then sound would automatically disrupt the first jhana, just as any kind of vitakka would automatically disrupt the second jhana.
Can you help me reconcile this with the fact that people are sometimes even instructed to practice the “first jhana” in noisy places to test their attainment?
Or is it that only certain sounds can disrupt the attainment, or only for people whose attainment is weak? But then we lose the parallel suggested with the second jhana where any vitakka would disrupt the attainment, which leads us to your earlier question:
Can anyone think of any sutta series where the Buddha conveniently cut the thread unifying the series, to interject a totally irrelevant proposition?
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Another that should not be ignored is the following:
… dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharāmi. tassa mayhaṃ, ānanda, iminā vihārena viharato vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā samudācaranti.
According to Duroiselle:
The Present Participle may generally be translated by “while, whilst,” which sense is inherent in it; this participle always expresses contemporaneity of action: attano gāmaṃ gacchanto corāṭaviṃ patvā, while going to his village he came upon a forest inhabited by thieves; tattha gantvā mātaraṃ paṭijagganto vāsaṃ kappesi, he went and, taking care of his mother, took up his abode there.
Therefore it seems that the incursion of vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā occurs while one is in the second jhana. So it would not necessarily “destroy” the attainment.
We can compare with other instances where it is made really clear that the attainment has been lost:
MN128
accāraddhavīriyaṃ kho me udapādi, accāraddhavīriyādhikaraṇañca pana me samādhi cavi.
Excess of energy arose in me, and because of excess of energy my concentration fell away.
Hi silence
Let me see if I can frame your argument into a proper syllogistic form. If I’m not mistaken, the part bolded above would be this premise 1 :
Premise 1 - If sound is presented to a First Jhana-attainer, he would fall out of the First Jhana.
Premise 2 - Sound is presented to a First Jhana-attainer.
Conclusion - Therefore, the First Jhana-attainer falls out of the First Jhana.
The same syllogistic structure would also apply to your argument re “any kind of vitakka would automatically disrupt the second jhana”.
As a Modus Ponens argument, your reasoning is perfectly logical. However, is it sound? The criterion of soundness is satisfied if and only if -
- the argument is valid (ie logical); and
- all the premises are true.
And this is where your Premise 1 fails the soundness criterion.
Firstly, it ignores a very important doctrinal assertion found in MN 28 and its MA parallel, ie -
If, friends, internally the ear is intact but no external sounds come into its range, and there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the ear is intact and external sounds come into its range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the ear is intact and external sounds come into its range and there is the corresponding engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.
According to the Commentary and the Chinese parallel, “corresponding engagement” = attention.
Secondly, Premise 1 is framed in a manner that ignores how the affliction is couched in AN 9.41. It is not kāmā per se, but “kāmasahagata saññāmanasikāra”. Judging by the absolute necessity for manasikāra in giving rise to consciousness of any kind, can you see why sound is not the problem but the attention directed to the sound? That attention is what gives rise to consciousness of sound.
If we wish to construct a sound Modus Ponens argument, this would be how I would do it -
Premise 1- If a First Jhana-attainer has attention directed at sound, he would fall out of the First Jhana.
Premise 2 - The First Jhana-attainer attends to sound.
Conclusion - Therefore the First Jhana-attainer falls out of the First Jhana.
Let’s test to see if Premise 1 is true, by reference to your subsequent post -
I have no disagreement with Duroiselle’s characterisation of the matter. But how did you infer from that that the the arising of vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā within the Second Jhana does not destroy the attainment?
If you look very carefully at Duroiselle’s point, the temporal issue lies in the contemporaneity of the action in the main clause (in this case samudācaranti) with the action in the subordinate clause (viharato). The problem with viharato is that it is a continuation of viharami from the preceding sentence. Do note that viharami is not an independent verb here, but is part of the periphrastic construction “upasampajja viharāmi”. It’s merely an auxillary verb used to convey a durative sense to the periphrasis.
All one can legitimately say about the present participle married to the instrumental of time above is that the affliction arose when one was in the attainment; there is no basis to assert that thereafter, the attainment persisted. In fact, if you look at the 1st example from Duroiselle cited above, would you insist that on chancing upon the thieves, he necessarily continued going to his village?
In fact, one can infer the contrary. If the Second Jhana is supposed to be empty of vitakka, but that attainment is now afflicted by vitakka, is it still the Second Jhana? On the basis of this, I would offer that Premise 1 as revised is true (at least as measured against the texts).
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Hi Sylvester,
I am not sure my argument has been really captured by your description.
It would rather go like this (please correct me if I fail to capture your argument):
a. Sylvester says that a “privative sense” prevails regarding disruptive forces in the first and the second jhana both in AN 9.41 and AN 10.72:
Sylvester about AN 9.41: This passage occurs before the attainment of the second jhana and the intrusion of vitakka into that attainment. Since the negation in the bolded part points to a privative sense, it strikes me that the same privative sense must have been intended for the first jhana and its relationship to the kāmā which it transcends.
and:
Sylvester about AN 10.72 8 of the states have been shown to be viewed as “thorns”, simply because they cannot co-exist with their opposing state… The most natural reading of sound’s place in this series is that it cannot be (or at least should not be) perceived in the First Jhana.
b. Silence says that if that is the case, then a strict “privative sense” does not apply in the case of sounds and the first jhana
Since we seem to agree on this last point (I see no reason to disagree with MN 28, but I was not aware of it, so thank you for pointing that one out), then the problem of your interpretation is that it does not provide a fully consistent link between tenor and vehicle in the similes of AN 10.72. This was actually my argument.
Well it would be interesting to see if there are other cases where the present participle is used in such situations where the action is dropped immediately after. It is certainly the case in English, so this argument seems now indeed much less conclusive than I first thought.
Is it though, as you argued earlier in the case of kāmā, “afflicted by vitakka” per se? If it was not full fledged kāmā that the text was referring to, there should be no reason why it should be full-fledged vitakka it is referring to by using the same expression in the following paragraph.
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@Sylvester -does this make sense:
Venerable Mahāmoggallāna said to the monks: “After attaining an imperturbable stillness on the banks of the river Sappinikā, I heard the noise of elephants plunging in, emerging, and trumpeting.”
The monks complained and criticized him: “How can Venerable Mahāmoggallāna say such a thing? He’s claiming a super-human ability.” They informed the Master.
“Monks, there is such a stillness, but it’s not wholly purified. Moggallāna spoke truthfully.
with metta
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