Hi silence
Let me see if I can frame your argument into a proper syllogistic form. If I’m not mistaken, the part bolded above would be this premise 1 :
Premise 1 - If sound is presented to a First Jhana-attainer, he would fall out of the First Jhana.
Premise 2 - Sound is presented to a First Jhana-attainer.
Conclusion - Therefore, the First Jhana-attainer falls out of the First Jhana.
The same syllogistic structure would also apply to your argument re “any kind of vitakka would automatically disrupt the second jhana”.
As a Modus Ponens argument, your reasoning is perfectly logical. However, is it sound? The criterion of soundness is satisfied if and only if -
- the argument is valid (ie logical); and
- all the premises are true.
And this is where your Premise 1 fails the soundness criterion.
Firstly, it ignores a very important doctrinal assertion found in MN 28 and its MA parallel, ie -
If, friends, internally the ear is intact but no external sounds come into its range, and there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the ear is intact and external sounds come into its range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the ear is intact and external sounds come into its range and there is the corresponding engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.
According to the Commentary and the Chinese parallel, “corresponding engagement” = attention.
Secondly, Premise 1 is framed in a manner that ignores how the affliction is couched in AN 9.41. It is not kāmā per se, but “kāmasahagata saññāmanasikāra”. Judging by the absolute necessity for manasikāra in giving rise to consciousness of any kind, can you see why sound is not the problem but the attention directed to the sound? That attention is what gives rise to consciousness of sound.
If we wish to construct a sound Modus Ponens argument, this would be how I would do it -
Premise 1- If a First Jhana-attainer has attention directed at sound, he would fall out of the First Jhana.
Premise 2 - The First Jhana-attainer attends to sound.
Conclusion - Therefore the First Jhana-attainer falls out of the First Jhana.
Let’s test to see if Premise 1 is true, by reference to your subsequent post -
I have no disagreement with Duroiselle’s characterisation of the matter. But how did you infer from that that the the arising of vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā within the Second Jhana does not destroy the attainment?
If you look very carefully at Duroiselle’s point, the temporal issue lies in the contemporaneity of the action in the main clause (in this case samudācaranti) with the action in the subordinate clause (viharato). The problem with viharato is that it is a continuation of viharami from the preceding sentence. Do note that viharami is not an independent verb here, but is part of the periphrastic construction “upasampajja viharāmi”. It’s merely an auxillary verb used to convey a durative sense to the periphrasis.
All one can legitimately say about the present participle married to the instrumental of time above is that the affliction arose when one was in the attainment; there is no basis to assert that thereafter, the attainment persisted. In fact, if you look at the 1st example from Duroiselle cited above, would you insist that on chancing upon the thieves, he necessarily continued going to his village?
In fact, one can infer the contrary. If the Second Jhana is supposed to be empty of vitakka, but that attainment is now afflicted by vitakka, is it still the Second Jhana? On the basis of this, I would offer that Premise 1 as revised is true (at least as measured against the texts).