Vitakka vicāra (Jhana-factors)

Thanks Sylvester.

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You’re welcome. As a baby demo on how SC will always grow its list of parallels, see below.

Hi Bhante @sujato. For AN 9.31, might this have a correspondence with or partial parallel in DA 10 at -

云何九證法?謂九盡: 若入初禪,則聲 刺 滅。入第二禪,則覺觀 刺 滅。入第三禪,則喜刺滅。入第四禪,則出入 息刺滅。入空處,則色想刺滅。入識處,則空 想刺滅。入不用處,則識想刺滅。入有想無 想處,則不用想刺滅。入滅盡定,則想受刺 滅。

from T0001_.01.0056c28 to T0001_.01.0057a05.

Ditto for a similar list with a different label in DA 11 -

云何九證法? 謂九盡:若入初禪,則聲刺滅。入第二禪,則 覺觀刺滅。入第三禪,則喜刺滅。入第四 禪,則出入息刺滅。入空處,則色想刺滅。入 識處,則空想刺滅。入不用處,則識想 刺 滅。 入有想無想處,則不用想 刺 滅。入滅盡定, 則想受 刺 滅。

from T0001_.01.0059a06 to T0001_.01.0059a12

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Hi again!

I think the interpretation in bold is implied with what the other passages says. Let’s take the vitakka example -

Then Ananda, it occurred to me" 'With the subsiding of thought and examination, let me enter and dwell in the second jhana. … Yet my mind did not launch out upon the absence of thought and become placid, settled, and liberated in it. … Then it occurred to me: 'I have not seen the danger in thoughts and have not cultivated that; I have not achieved the benefit in the absence of thought and have not pursued it…

This passage occurs before the attainment of the second jhana and the intrusion of vitakka into that attainment. Since the negation in the bolded part points to a privative sense, it strikes me that the same privative sense must have been intended for the first jhana and its relationship to the kāmā which it transcends.

This also suggests that the more natural translation for sahagata in the passage should be “accompanied by”, rather than “dealing with”. The contrast between the desire for a privative state and the affliction brought about by the intrusion of the element supposed to be left behind, points more to the incompatibility of intrusion with the attainment, rather than the intrusion being a mere difficulty. It is clear from this passage, that what is desired is the absence of a particular element, and not merely the absence of difficulties posed by that said element.

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Hi Sylvester,

If I follow you well, then sound would automatically disrupt the first jhana, just as any kind of vitakka would automatically disrupt the second jhana.

Can you help me reconcile this with the fact that people are sometimes even instructed to practice the “first jhana” in noisy places to test their attainment?

Or is it that only certain sounds can disrupt the attainment, or only for people whose attainment is weak? But then we lose the parallel suggested with the second jhana where any vitakka would disrupt the attainment, which leads us to your earlier question:

Can anyone think of any sutta series where the Buddha conveniently cut the thread unifying the series, to interject a totally irrelevant proposition?

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Another that should not be ignored is the following:

… dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharāmi. tassa mayhaṃ, ānanda, iminā vihārena viharato vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā samudācaranti.

According to Duroiselle:

The Present Participle may generally be translated by “while, whilst,” which sense is inherent in it; this participle always expresses contemporaneity of action: attano gāmaṃ gacchanto corāṭaviṃ patvā, while going to his village he came upon a forest inhabited by thieves; tattha gantvā mātaraṃ paṭijagganto vāsaṃ kappesi, he went and, taking care of his mother, took up his abode there.

Therefore it seems that the incursion of vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā occurs while one is in the second jhana. So it would not necessarily “destroy” the attainment.

We can compare with other instances where it is made really clear that the attainment has been lost:

MN128
accāraddhavīriyaṃ kho me udapādi, accāraddhavīriyādhikaraṇañca pana me samādhi cavi.
Excess of energy arose in me, and because of excess of energy my concentration fell away.

Hi silence

Let me see if I can frame your argument into a proper syllogistic form. If I’m not mistaken, the part bolded above would be this premise 1 :

Premise 1 - If sound is presented to a First Jhana-attainer, he would fall out of the First Jhana.
Premise 2 - Sound is presented to a First Jhana-attainer.
Conclusion - Therefore, the First Jhana-attainer falls out of the First Jhana.

The same syllogistic structure would also apply to your argument re “any kind of vitakka would automatically disrupt the second jhana”.

As a Modus Ponens argument, your reasoning is perfectly logical. However, is it sound? The criterion of soundness is satisfied if and only if -

  1. the argument is valid (ie logical); and
  2. all the premises are true.

And this is where your Premise 1 fails the soundness criterion.

Firstly, it ignores a very important doctrinal assertion found in MN 28 and its MA parallel, ie -

If, friends, internally the ear is intact but no external sounds come into its range, and there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the ear is intact and external sounds come into its range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the ear is intact and external sounds come into its range and there is the corresponding engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.

According to the Commentary and the Chinese parallel, “corresponding engagement” = attention.

Secondly, Premise 1 is framed in a manner that ignores how the affliction is couched in AN 9.41. It is not kāmā per se, but “kāmasahagata sañ­ñāmana­sikāra”. Judging by the absolute necessity for mana­sikāra in giving rise to consciousness of any kind, can you see why sound is not the problem but the attention directed to the sound? That attention is what gives rise to consciousness of sound.

If we wish to construct a sound Modus Ponens argument, this would be how I would do it -

Premise 1- If a First Jhana-attainer has attention directed at sound, he would fall out of the First Jhana.
Premise 2 - The First Jhana-attainer attends to sound.
Conclusion - Therefore the First Jhana-attainer falls out of the First Jhana.

Let’s test to see if Premise 1 is true, by reference to your subsequent post -

I have no disagreement with Duroiselle’s characterisation of the matter. But how did you infer from that that the the arising of vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā within the Second Jhana does not destroy the attainment?

If you look very carefully at Duroiselle’s point, the temporal issue lies in the contemporaneity of the action in the main clause (in this case samudācaranti) with the action in the subordinate clause (viharato). The problem with viharato is that it is a continuation of viharami from the preceding sentence. Do note that viharami is not an independent verb here, but is part of the periphrastic construction “upasampajja viharāmi”. It’s merely an auxillary verb used to convey a durative sense to the periphrasis.

All one can legitimately say about the present participle married to the instrumental of time above is that the affliction arose when one was in the attainment; there is no basis to assert that thereafter, the attainment persisted. In fact, if you look at the 1st example from Duroiselle cited above, would you insist that on chancing upon the thieves, he necessarily continued going to his village?

In fact, one can infer the contrary. If the Second Jhana is supposed to be empty of vitakka, but that attainment is now afflicted by vitakka, is it still the Second Jhana? On the basis of this, I would offer that Premise 1 as revised is true (at least as measured against the texts).

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Hi Sylvester,
I am not sure my argument has been really captured by your description.
It would rather go like this (please correct me if I fail to capture your argument):

a. Sylvester says that a “privative sense” prevails regarding disruptive forces in the first and the second jhana both in AN 9.41 and AN 10.72:

Sylvester about AN 9.41: This passage occurs before the attainment of the second jhana and the intrusion of vitakka into that attainment. Since the negation in the bolded part points to a privative sense, it strikes me that the same privative sense must have been intended for the first jhana and its relationship to the kāmā which it transcends.

and:

Sylvester about AN 10.72 8 of the states have been shown to be viewed as “thorns”, simply because they cannot co-exist with their opposing state… The most natural reading of sound’s place in this series is that it cannot be (or at least should not be) perceived in the First Jhana.

b. Silence says that if that is the case, then a strict “privative sense” does not apply in the case of sounds and the first jhana

Since we seem to agree on this last point (I see no reason to disagree with MN 28, but I was not aware of it, so thank you for pointing that one out), then the problem of your interpretation is that it does not provide a fully consistent link between tenor and vehicle in the similes of AN 10.72. This was actually my argument.

Well it would be interesting to see if there are other cases where the present participle is used in such situations where the action is dropped immediately after. It is certainly the case in English, so this argument seems now indeed much less conclusive than I first thought.

Is it though, as you argued earlier in the case of kāmā, “afflicted by vitakka” per se? If it was not full fledged kāmā that the text was referring to, there should be no reason why it should be full-fledged vitakka it is referring to by using the same expression in the following paragraph.

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@Sylvester -does this make sense:

Venerable Mahāmoggallāna said to the monks: “After attaining an imperturbable stillness on the banks of the river Sappinikā, I heard the noise of elephants plunging in, emerging, and trumpeting.”

The monks complained and criticized him: “How can Venerable Mahāmoggallāna say such a thing? He’s claiming a super-human ability.” They informed the Master.

“Monks, there is such a stillness, but it’s not wholly purified. Moggallāna spoke truthfully.

with metta

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Ah yes! Now I see it. You’re right. In fact, AN 9.41 is careful to furnish only 3 privatives, ie avitakka, nippītika and adukkhamasukha. There is no privative of kāmā, since the First Jhana does not require kāmā to be absent, merely that kāmasaññā must cease.

Thanks for pointing this out. In light of this, do you have any issue with the revised Premise 1 -

I am of the view that AN 10.72 does not employ similes, but metaphors (seyyathāpi is not used in AN 10.72). But small matter. As far as tenor and vehicles go, do Pali similes or metaphors need to have each set of tenor and vehicle be bound by the same relationship that binds all the other tenor and vehicles in that series? Even if the answer is Yes, I would propose that AN 10.72 needs to be read in light of AN 9.41 and DN 9, ie the common thread of what is afflictive is perception of the thing that is supposed to be left behind.

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Hi Mat

Ven Analayo seems to believe so, given the evidence he had canvassed across several Vinayas.

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OK. For me, practically and in terms of the teachings, there is no discussion to be had. Jhanas vary in degree of ‘purity’ (see my post above), and if it is not fully purified sounds can come through.

Sound would also be a thorn to jhana, only if someone could hear sound in a jhana, otherwise if they couldn’t, it wouldn’t be a thorn to it. The concept is circular, but makes sense in this context I think.

with metta,

I have tried to find an example that would support your claim, but I was not able to. So contrary to what I initially said above when I decided to give the benefit of the doubt, I will now consider that the path of least assumption is to assume by default that, in fact, the attainment is likely to persist, until someone can at least show me an example proving the claim you made above (that is, that we can’t assume the attainment persists) has a more solid ground than the need to dismiss facts that are in discordance with a cherished theory.

For the grammatical treatment of the distinctions between the Instrumental of Duration (your reading) versus the Instrumental of Time When (my reading), pls see Wijesekara, s.76 - 79. Especially s.78, where the latter functions as the Locative of Time.

Now, let’s do a very simple experiment to determine if the Temporal Instrumental in -

tassa mayhaṃ, ānanda, iminā vihārena viharato vitakkasahagatā saññāmanasikārā samudācaranti.

entails your Instrumental of Duration reading (ie 2nd Jhana persists) or the Instrumental of Time When (no persistence of 2nd Jhana implied).

The standard 2nd Jhana pericope provides that from the fading away of vitak­ka­vicāra, one abides in the 2nd Jhana.

Likewise, if we go up the chain, we see that in the 3rd Jhana, rapture is supposed to have disappeared, and in the 4th Jhana pleasure is supposed to have disappeared. Yet, in AN 9.41, we see the presence of rapture and pleasure being viewed as afflictions to these 2 attainments.

Very simply, if rapture intrudes into the 3rd Jhana, is one still in the 3rd Jhana?

If pleasure intrudes into the 4th Jhana, is one still in the 4th Jhana? Bear in mind the doctrinal axiom, that only one feeling can be felt at any time (MN 74 & DN 15). You simply cannot have both pleasure and neutral feelings co-existing in the 4th Jhana.

My answer would therefore be NO, since these states are simply not present in the respective attainments (at least the purified ones).

Likewise, taking up the common thread that unifies the affliction scheme in AN 9.41, vitakka is not supposed to be in the 2nd Jhana. Once it intrudes into the attainment, bye-bye 2nd Jhana.

Can you now see why you cannot read the passage as entailing an Instrumental of Duration?

So, is Duroiselle’s example from the Jataka an Instrumental of Duration or of Time When?

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hi Sylvester,

I don’t have this work with me so I won’t be able to see anything there, but I understand it may function as in English. I reformulate my question: can you show me an example from the EBTs where this grammatical form occurs and the action that was going on is so completely disrupted so as to cease altogether, so that we have proof that the early Pali language actually works as you assume it does?

I thought you had already argued yourself that what is referred to is not piti per se, but perception and attention linked to piti? Like the concept or impression of piti rather than piti itself?

[quote=“Sylvester, post:380, topic:2589”]
Premise 1 is framed in a manner that ignores how the affliction is couched in AN 9.41. It is not kāmā per se, but “kāmasahagata sañ­ñāmana­sikāra”.[/quote]

I know we could argue about this forever, that is why I would like to focus on the one question I asked you above, which has a clear cut yes or no answer.

Hi silence

The most common example I can think of is the accayena idiom cited by Wijesekara.

Tatrāpissa kāṇo kacchapo. So vassasatassa vassasatassa accayena sakiṃ sakiṃ ummujjeyya.

And suppose a blind sea-turtle were there. It would come to the surface once every one hundred years. (per Ven T)

It would appear that the counting of a new century begins after the turtle pops up.

Another idiom cited by W involves -

Itiha tena khaṇena tena muhuttena yāva brahmalokā saddo abbhuggacchati.

Thus, at that moment, at that instant, at that second, the cry spreads as far as the brahma world.
AN 7.69 per BB

W spends some time arguing against Speyer’s proposition that this Instrumental idiom fundamentally resolves to the sense of concomitancy; W gives all these other different temporal senses as evidence of other usages.

Yes indeed. But do see my subsequent post where I alluded to how the attainments above the 1st Jhana are described vide privatives, while the 1st Jhana does not have a privative of kāmā -

Ah yes! Now I see it. You’re right. In fact, AN 9.41 is careful to furnish only 3 privatives, ie avitakka, nippītika and adukkhamasukha. There is no privative of kāmā, since the First Jhana does not require kāmā to be absent, merely that kāmasaññā must cease.

Given that AN 9.41 uses these privatives to define the respective jhanas, is there any reason to suggest that eg a proper 2nd Jhana (defined as nippītika) can be pītisahagatā without being nippītika?

This conversation keeps running into dead ends.

Could you explain how your post above resolves the issue under discussion? Because as I see it, you have provided examples of instrumentals of time, and proven that those exist. But this was not under question and it is not what this conversation is about.

What I have yet to see is whether the construction:

temporal instrumental + present participle + the first action does not persist after the second “contemporaneous” action occurs

ever appears anywhere else in the EBTs as you claim it does in AN 9.41.

This question seems legitimate to me because

  1. as you said yourself, viharati is…
  1. according to your understanding, contemporaneity is impossible, yet the grammar suggests it. While this does not seem to be a problem in English, there is no reason to believe it wouldn’t be one in Pali, which is why finding an example of that in the EBTs would at least prove it is not impossible.

Because as I see it so far, I can provide dozens if not hundreds of examples of the above threefold structure where the first action persists after the second occurs, while we are yet to find even one example that supports your interpretation. And that being so, anyone who follows the rule of least assumptions would favor my interpretation, that is until we can prove your interpretation is mirrored by at least one example in the EBTs.

Is there any reason to suggest that it is the 2nd jhana that is pītisahagatā rather than saññāmanasikārā?

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Did i suggest that the Instrumental of Duration is grammatically impossible? I don’t think so, since I cited W’s listing of the various temporal instrumentals.

I suggested that the Instrumental of Duration is not possible here, for being inconsistent with the privatives used in AN 9.41. Or have you elected to treat the privatives as having no significance?

To reframe the issue, is there a Jhana where one is continuously afflicted with perception and attention accompanied by rapture, and yet be raptureless?

Incidentally, wasn’t my point about viharati being durative made in relation to the point about the periphrasis in the preceding sentence?

I don’t think you did. But what you have done is to show that the instrumental of time exists in general, however not that it does exist in this particular context where the presence of viharati suggests to the contrary the connotation of duration, as you noted yourself a few posts back.

I think we have already addressed this, so maybe we can just agree to disagree. Actually I agree with one of your earlier remarks showing that piti does not necessarily arise in the 3rd jhana when “iminā vihārena viharato pītisahagatā saññāmanasikārā samudācaranti”, but rather it is saññāmanasikārā related to piti that arise. Like an internal state that is usually present when piti is present, without being piti per se, like the habit of feeling piti and perhaps some kind of feeling of missing it.

Yes, but you also said two sentences earlier in the same paragraph:

Hi silence

Did you not think it significant that I also said -

Do note that viharami is not an independent verb here, but is part of the periphrastic construction “upasampajja viharāmi”. It’s merely an auxillary verb used to convey a durative sense to the periphrasis.

While the periphrasis may acquire a durative sense from the auxiliary verb, is there a grammatical injunction that the durative aspect may not terminate or be terminated at any time? This goes right to the heart of what I was alluding to previously - even if the periphrasis is given a durative aspect, it is not necessary to say that subsequent actions share in that periphrasis. Take a look at Warder for the Pali idiom used if double-periphrasis is intended to be communicated.

Take a look at the one place where the Temporal Instrumental+present participle+3rd party verb structure occurs outside of the context of the jhanas. That’s in MN 122 -

Ayaṃ kho panānanda, vihāro tathāgatena abhisambuddho yadidaṃ—sabba­nimittā­naṃ amanasikārā ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ upasampajja viharituṃ. Tatra ce, ānanda, tathāgataṃ iminā vihārena viharantaṃ bhavanti upasaṅkamitāro bhikkhū bhikkhuniyo upāsakā upāsikāyo rājāno rājamahāmattā titthiyā titthiyasāvakā. Tatrānanda, tathāgato viveka­ninneneva cittena vivekapoṇena viveka­pabbhā­rena vūpakaṭṭhena nekkham­mā­bhira­tena byantībhūtena sabbaso āsa­vaṭṭhā­nīyehi dhammehi aññadatthu uyyo­jani­ka­paṭi­saṃ­yuttaṃ­yeva kathaṃ kattā hoti.

Here, you have a durative periphrasis upasampajja viharituṃ, followed by the Temporal Instrumental iminā vihārena in conjunction with the pr.p. viharantaṃ, followed by the next event. Surely, it is patently clear that in order to give the talk, the Buddha arose from the dwelling-in-Emptiness? To me, this is crystal clear that the Instrumental here is not an Instrumental of Duration, but an Instrumental of Time When.

That being said, this does not prove that the Temporal Instrumental used in relation to the jhana passages is also an Instrumental of Time When. For its identity, we need to address your point arguing for an Instrumental of Duration -

OK, if I understand your point correctly, you are saying that in the 3rd Jhana which is “without rapture”, it is still possible to experience things related to rapture, perhaps as a memory. But, you’ll need to deconflict this theory with the DN 9 elaboration -

Puna caparaṃ, poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca viharati sato ca sampajāno, sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti, yaṃ taṃ ariyā ācikkhanti: ‘upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī’ti, tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. Tassa yā purimā samā­dhi­ja­pīti­su­kha­su­khuma­sacca­saññā, sā nirujjhati. Upekkhā­su­kha­su­khuma­sacca­saññā tasmiṃ samaye hoti, upekkhā­su­kha­su­khuma­sac­casaññī­yeva tasmiṃ samaye hoti. Evampi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.

And then, with the fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, & alert, and senses pleasure with the body. He enters & remains in the third jhana, of which the Noble Ones declare, ‘Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasant abiding.’ His earlier perception of a refined truth of rapture & pleasure born of concentration ceases, and on that occasion there is a perception of a refined truth of equanimity (and pleasure). On that occasion he is one who is percipient of a refined truth of equanimity (and pleasure). And thus it is that with training one perception arises and with training another perception ceases. (Per Ven T, with insertions in brackets inserted for the 2 bits he missed)

Now, how do you fit into DN 9’s model your structure of a rapture-less concentration still harbouring perception and attention related to rapture? Even if you translate the sahagata as a relational term, rather than a possessive one, I cannot see how in DN 9’s reckoning it is possible for for things connected with the 2nd Jhana to survive in the 3rd Jhana.

Which brings me to the next point, if you say that things connected with the 2nd Jhana can continue to survive/arise in the 3rd Jhana. When this pītisahagatā saññāmanasikārā pops up in the 3rd Jhana, it is described as an ābādha (affliction). A simple question - at that point, is the experience painful? Everywhere I look in the suttas, the implication is that ābādha is painful. Now, my question is not whether ābādha gives rise to sadness (an affective response), but whether it is dukkha/painful (a hedonic tone).

By now, you should realise where I’m headed. If ābādha is painful, can pain co-exist with the pleasure of the 3rd Jhana, bearing in mind MN 74 and DN 15? When this pītisahagatā saññāmanasikārā pops up in the 3rd Jhana, you do not get to stay in the 3rd Jhana, or retrograde into the 2nd Jhana even. The presence of pain immediately propels one right out of any jhana whatsoever.

hi Sylvester

Yes, we agree on this. However, your argument for why the durative aspect had to be terminated was one we disagreed on, and hinged purely on considerations of doctrinal consistency from your standpoint, which is why I wanted to limit the discussion to facts from the EBTs we can only agree on. I do not and did not say that the durative cannot be terminated (it is the case in English) but I was unwilling to accept by default that it was the case also in Pali, without at least one example.

Yes! I think we finally have that example. Thank you for the research. I now concur that your interpretation is a possibility. I’ll look into your next point when I have enough time.

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