Hi, thanks for your detailed reply. I always enjoy these in depth discussions. Obviously its a difficult and subtle topic in which there is much disagreement. I acknowledge that anything said about nibbana could easily be mistaken, given that we are talking about something transcendent.
I see where you’re coming from, and I can understand that it seems unsatisfying to you. It’s a “feeling” matter to you rather than intellectual
Well I don’t want to say that my concerns are merely emotional, since I have philosophical and rational concerns as well that I’ve laid out.
The noble ones came to their insight not through philosophical debate but through deep meditation, and I think it’s only that kind of meditation which can change your mind.
I agree of course! But the positivist view about nibbana can agree to this idea and say that the blissful experiences that are free of all suffering that are experienced by liberated beings point to the possibility of a way of being that is free of suffering.
I’m happy to call your view ‘continuitism’, but to me that is just a different word for eternalism. Because there either exists something after parinibbana or not. If there is a type of “subtle being” or consciousness still there, it is a type of existence. Saying that such a “being” counts as neither existence or non-existence just seems equivocative to me.
I’m kind of preferring “positivism” now because continuitism just sounds too strange lol. But anyways, I don’t see my view as equivocation because I see the “existence” that the Buddha rejects as the existence of a self or an absolutist kind of existence (as is taught in Brahamanical religions which posit unchanging substances or essences, selves, eternal unchanging consciousnesses, etc). I kind of follow how Sujato understands “existence” in these threads as a term being infused with absolutist implications - Existence, eternity, and the gods and On not-self, existence, and ontological strategies
Thus, I understand the Kaccana sutta as saying the middle way is between an essentialist or absolutist mode of existence, and non-existence simpliciter.
But the two opposing views are eternalism (something will exist) and annihilationism (something (a self) will no longer exist).
The way I understand this (very controversial and difficult passage that has been interpreted in different ways by different people!) is eternalism = an essentialist or absolute type of existence and annihilationism = any process leading to the total non-existence of anything.
The middle view between eternalism (some thing will exist, atthitā) and annihilationism (some thing will no longer exist, natthitā) is exactly cessationism. Because this view does agree that things come to an end (so it isn’t eternal) but what comes to an end is not an entity (so it is not annihilation). Nibbana is even explicitly called “the cessation of existence” in some suttas. And the Kaccanagotta Sutta also explains the middle view as encompassing cessation; not as a “continuity” of any sorts…
Well that is just what we disagree on isn’t it? I think that something can exist, but since it does not exist as a self or as an absolute existence - but as a dependent, dynamic, non absolute kind of being - it counts as the middle way. Indeed, this is exactly what dependent arising is. We exist as dependently arisen streams / processes, but this is not an absolute kind of existence.
Another indication that the wrong views in the Kaccanagotta sutta are annihilation and eternalism is that they are said to be held by “most of the world”, i.e. by all but the noble ones. In Iti49 it is further explained what this means…
Yes but this sutta is talking about dependent arising coming to an end, it doesn’t say that the outcome of this is a kind of non-existence or non-being. This is precisely what we disagree on. Of course I agree that views of a self, and all the samsaric process of dependent arising must come to an end, but where I disagree is that this entails complete non existence i.e. cessationalism.
In my opinion, and I hope you don’t take this the wrong way, but “they do not become enthusiastic” seems to apply to you. And I only say this because I get the sense that you can understand how this may apply. The Buddha didn’t teach these matters to people who weren’t developed enough.
Haha, I don’t mind, I believe this discussion a good faith discussion between people who honestly disagree on a very difficult issue. Also, I understand why this understanding would follow from within your framework. Though a more charitable reading is just that I disagree honestly because its a difficult philosophical issue, not because “I am not developed enough” (not to say I am super spiritually developed either, its just a better way to have a philosophical discussion to assume your discussion partner is your intellectual peer.)
But anyways, of course I disagree with this, since my framework on this is different. I see these people (those who ‘go too far’) as those who cling to the view of a self. But my view does not say that a self continues into nibbana (since there are no selves at all). Likewise, I think that you go to far in promoting a kind of non-existence which strays from the middle way.
But it is still suffering, that’s the thing. Life is suffering whether or not you are enlightened.
I just don’t think that the enlightened suffer…that just kind of seems obvious. When I read the descriptions of arahants or the Buddha it seems to me they have gone beyond suffering in this life.
Also, you paint a very black-and-white picture of enlightenment versus cessation, but that loses so much perspective. May I suggest you forget your views for a moment, and just imagine that there are only two options available: eternal suffering in samsara or cessation of existence. That to continue forever in some sort of timeless state of neither existent nor non-existent consciousness (whatever that is) just isn’t an option in our universe. Then suddenly it makes a lot of sense why the Buddha praised the cessation of existence, why it’s the only real “shelter” from suffering.
From my perspective, it is your view which is somewhat black and white (or even an “either - or” fallacy), since it literally only gives us two choices lol! There are literally only two options in your view, non existence or suffering. But if that’s the case then how do you explain the nibbana experienced by awakened beings? This is a state of no suffering but yet there is a living being in that state.
Also, if the Buddha taught continuitism, then why would he be mistaken for an annihilationist? (MN22) The two ideas are quite far apart. He would have been called an eternalist instead.
Oh this seems obvious to me. He would be mistaken for an annihilationist precisely because most people have the view of a self, and thus would fear that their self would come to an end. But my view does not accept that atmans exist.
And how does the Buddha respond to the accusations? By saying “all that I declare there is, is just suffering and a cessation of suffering”. In other words, there is cessation but not a self that ceases.
This is interesting to me because when I read this I don’t see it as promoting a non-existence. He is simply saying only suffering comes to an end so whatever kind of reality nibbana is has no suffering, but he’s not outright saying that nibbana is a total non existence here where there is nothing. That’s because the part of him that knows nibbana, that subtle awareness or being, is not suffering, and does not cease. However since this is a very subtle reality that transcends the aggregates and is difficult to understand and explain, he only taught it via a negative neti neti type method and never came right out and said “there is something that exists in nibbana” because then people would cling to that as a self, but whatever that reality is is nothing like anything we can imagine, so he only explained it apophatically. But he also told people it was not non-existence, and that is was an ontological middle way.
To soothe the accusations he doesn’t say “there is an everlasting consciousness” or whatever, which would have been a much clearer way to do so. But he doesn’t, because that’s not what he taught.
To be clear, I am not arguing for an eternal vijñana either. Rather, I am arguing for a subtle kind of existence which is not absolute existence nor a self. Vijñana is clearly samsaric in the EBTs and that I agree (so my view is slightly different than Thanissaro I guess? I don’t know I haven’t read that much Thanissaro really). However, I think there is room for a kind of being that is not vijñana but neither non-existence. It is an indescribable reality, and cannot be explained as any of the five aggregates.
Well, it’s also called an island, as you said. Obviously that is just an evocative term, not to be taken literally. Those terms are emotionally positive, but nibbana is ontologically always described in the negative.
Well, I think that these descriptions point to some kind of existence and show that it is not a kind of non-existence. I don’t think we can draw a clear cut line between the psychological and the ontological when it comes to early Buddhist descriptions. This division seems artificial to me. Indeed, when I read EBTs, the descriptions of reality always seem to include psychological and ontological connotations, without any clear cut separation (this seems like a more modern thing, separating psychology from metaphysics).
Furthermore, if the Buddha meant nibbana was a non existence, he would always have used negative terms and not terms which also have positive metaphysical connotations.
Anyways, I think these kinds of debates are interesting, but ultimately I am not sure if they can be fully resolved. Nibbana is a very subtle thing and I think the Buddha was intentionally vague in explaining what it was. Perhaps he would not mind that there are different views about it since different people have different understandings. Whatever the case, this debate is quite ancient and has been going on for a long time, so we’re just doing what Buddhists have been doing for two thousand years. Perhaps any attempt to discuss what nibbana is using language is going to lead to difficult conceptual choices that sound extreme to someone.