What do you think about Ven Thanissaro's view on Anatta?

I can proove this. Maybe not direct but indirect. suppose you have a child. Your claim is: this child does not exist in an objective way. Well, please leave th child and come back after a month. I assure you…you will find a death child. It all the times existed totally apart from your observation. It is reasonably prooven.

So say all realists :slight_smile: Apart from appearing “reasonable”, is there any other reason to believe so?

But again, note that I’m not claiming what you assign to me (which seems to be idealism): my position is that the Dhamma is silent on the supposed objective reality of ‘things out there’, and is entirely about the subjective experience of the individual—which is the only ‘existence’ one can have direct awareness of (though, ultimately, that too turns out to be a perversion of perception — saññā-vipallāsa).

All this has told me is that no element of my subjective experience (including the child) is under my control—anattā.

1 Like

But this is all about me and not about the nature of the cloud. That there is dukkha for me, i am sure, but you say that dukkha is a characteristic of a cloud (lit. all conditioned things). Why?

Yes and maybe No :grinning:

The cessation of the body in this life, for example, is not literally the cessation of your body but it disappears from your awareness, i.e. the tactile sensations etc. Others still see a body in meditation posture. I think it is the same with the cessation of the world in this body. It refers to the cessation of the six sense domains. As i understood Buddha named this the All. I do not think the Buddha meant that the world really ceases because other beings, ofcourse, do not cease, stars, planets etc.

Oke, but the example also shows the child exist independend of you seeing her.

I’d rather take the Buddha at his word, and explore why he called the six sense spheres ‘the all’ instead of speculating what might still remain when they cease—which the very same sutta declares to be a futile investigation.

The kind of ‘appeal to the stone’ with stars and planets or the (more emotionally charged) child examples fails to question the fundamental dependence of these things on experience for their existence—when they are said to exist, they always exist for someone, and the only someone who’s experience you can ever get to know is yourself. This is the mūlapariyāya of everything.

I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.

Sounds like an existentialist talking, but that was actually Max Planck—the originator of quantum theory—in an interview with The Observer (25 January 1931, p. 17). Here too, note that Planck is not claiming that matter arises out of consciousness, but that it is not possible to designate matter without also invoking the need for consciousness, which can only be known subjectively.

Reminds one of:

“This is the extent to which there are means of designation, expression, and delineation, the extent to which the sphere of discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the discernibility of this world — i.e., name-and-form together with consciousness.”
DN 15

2 Likes

@prabhath

I am a simple person with simple thinking but i am not trying to deceive you. Maybe i am childish and do not meet your standard. Oke, sorry.

I do really not understand why you think the existence of a black swan, for exampe, depends on experience. If you see them they exist? And when you do not see them they do not exist?
That last is very strange, right?

1 Like

Neither of these things is what I’m saying—or to be more precise, what I understand the Buddha to be saying. This seems to be similar to the old Kaccānagotta duality, which the Buddha avoided.

I’m not sure if this is still on topic, so will refrain from adding more.

1 Like

Great! When thoughts end, for example, you can see that you do not end. Then it is not a metaphyiscal claim that thoughts are not Me, mine, my self, right? You can see that direct. It is not a claim you cannot judge for yourself.

This is the same for tendencies, passions, emotions, longings, views, conceit, visual vinnana, intentions, nose-vinnana etc etc. All those things arise and end all the time while you do not.
So those are not fit to be regarded as me, mine, my self. That is what a sutta says. Not fit. That is reasonable if find.

But this is very important because if you think/belief your existence depends on thoughts, emotions, longings, plans etc. then you feed them all the time. Then you are certaintly afraid of letting go, becoming still and ceasing of formations. I feel there is the real delusion. We cannot let go because our sense of I am, I exist is so dependend on formations. There we must start to see.

The greatest value you can give something is that of Me, mine, my self. Ofcourse one protects that intensely and holds on to that.

In fact, i feel it is exactly like Thanissaro says.

it’s much better if we refer to mn2

mn2
When they attend improperly in this way, one of the following six views arises in them and is taken as a genuine fact.
Tassa evaṁ ayoniso manasikaroto channaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati.
The view: ‘My self exists in an absolute sense.’
‘Atthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘My self does not exist in an absolute sense.’
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

so here the Buddha want us to not bother at all with self conception, do you disagree with mn2 ?

I totally agree with MN2. However, I don’t see that MN2 contradicts with the quote I gave.
Maybe you want to explain in more details?

do you disagree that the view “My self does not exist in an absolute sense.” is called a misconception, the thicket of views, the desert of views, the trick of views, the evasiveness of views, the fetter of views. ?

@Alaray You are quoting without context. Please consult the whole sutta MN2 to see the context of that sentence.

This is the context of that sentence you quoted, starts with:

Because of paying attention to what they should not and not paying attention to what they should, unarisen defilements arise and arisen defilements grow.

This is how they attend improperly: ‘Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? After being what, what did I become in the past? Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? What will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? After being what, what will I become in the future?’ Or they are undecided about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This sentient being—where did it come from? And where will it go?’

When they attend improperly in this way, one of the following six views arises in them and is taken as a genuine fact. The view: ‘My self exists in an absolute sense.’ The view: ‘My self does not exist in an absolute sense.’ The view: ‘I perceive the self with the self.’ The view: ‘I perceive what is not-self with the self.’ The view: ‘I perceive the self with what is not-self.’ Or they have such a view: ‘This self of mine is he who speaks and feels and experiences the results of good and bad deeds in all the different realms. This self is permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable, and will last forever and ever.’ This is called a misconception, the thicket of views, the desert of views, the trick of views, the evasiveness of views, the fetter of views. An uneducated ordinary person who is fettered by views is not freed from rebirth, old age, and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress. They’re not freed from suffering, I say.

Now look at the quote I gave,

I see no contradiction here with MN2.

1 Like

Maybe it is not the literal meaning of anatta, but i think it comes down to:

if there is no conceiving and ‘things’ are directly known or seen as they are, rupa is just rupa, vedana is just vedana, sanna is just sanna, sankhara is just sankhara, vinnana is just vinnana…or…anger is just anger, greed is just greed, longing is just longing, the body is just the body…the unconditioned element is just the unconditioned element, Nibbana.

It is not-self and not not-self. Everything is just what it is.

But seeing things as not-self helps to overcome the delusion to see all this as Me, my self. It helps to overcome this obstacle.

Hi @Sunyo , if I may just seperate a few things out here - first of all let us put aside what Thanissarro’s position is, I haven’t read enough to know what it is, Some on here are saying that he asserts that enlightenment is a state of consciousness and if that is so then I disagree with his position, but independent of his position I have always understood the canonical position on the question of existence vs non existence to be:

How is right view defined?”
Kittāvatā nu kho, bhante, sammādiṭṭhi hotī”ti?

“Kaccāna, this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence. “Dvayanissito khvāyaṁ, kaccāna, loko yebhuyyena­—­atthita­ñ­ceva natthitañca.

But when you truly see the arising of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of non-existence regarding the world.
Lokasamudayaṁ kho, kaccāna, yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā sā na hoti.

And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of existence regarding the world.
Lokanirodhaṁ kho, kaccāna, yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti.

(I should note that in the above I have changed “origin” to “arising” as I prefer the latter)

SN12.15

The alternative to asserting the existence or non existence of a concept/phenomena is to see how it is dependently arisen. I have always understood this to be more or less the whole point of Buddhism as a middle path between the eternalists and annihilationists, and it is this brilliant philosophical resolution of the mind body problem that has converted me to Buddhism.

I do see some some contemporary Buddhists glossing this whole issue by saying “the self doesn’t exist” but I always just assumed that this was a sort of TLDR explanation for beginners before the real complexity was revealed - have I got this wrong and stumbled unknowingly onto another “controversy”?

You say “the whole tradition” understands anatta to be simply a notion of non-existence of atta- Is there a good “classical” Theravada source for the “self doesn’t exist” position that addresses the “notion of non-existence doesn’t arise” issue?

Metta!

1 Like

Right, but then that strategy works because it is actually based on reality.

If I put a pure strategy for anatta into the phrase of SN22.59 it becomes “because form is seen strategically as not self, it leads to suffering”. Which doesn’t make a lot of sense to me. The strategy is supposed to lead away from suffering.

I think it is mostly a translation issue. “Non-existence” really refers to annihilation. It does not mean non-existence of a self, it means annihilation of a self.

The dual notions are better explained in Iti49. Some belief “this self is annihilated and destroyed” which stands for “non-existence”. Others have “love, delight, and enjoyment of existence”, which stands for eternal existence of a self.

So both dual notions are views of a Self. The way around those views is when you "you don’t get attracted, grasp, and commit to the notion to have a self " (SN12.15), in other words, when you see anatta.

:smiling_face_with_three_hearts:

3 Likes

Hello Bhante! You brought up very good points, and I’d like to adress each one by what I’ve read of Thanissaro’s work. My intention is not to defend his view (even because I don’t fully agree with it), but just to show how he adresses each objection and to contribute to the discussion.

About the Anattalakkhana Sutta, here is a passage from Selves & Not-self wherein he discusses it:

“The self strategy that the Buddha recommends using along the path derives from the question at the basis of discernment: “What, when I do it, will lead to my long-term welfare and happiness?” This question contains two ideas of self. The first is the idea of the self as agent, the producer of happiness; the second is the idea of the self as the consumer of happiness. When the question says, “What, when I do it”, the “I” here in “I do it” is the self as producer. The “my” in “my long-term welfare and happiness” is the self as consumer of happiness.

The idea of the self as agent also introduces the element of control, which the Buddha says is essential to any idea of self [SN 22:59]. This was the point he made at the very beginning of his first discussion of not-self: If you have no real control over something, how can you say that it’s you or yours? It’s only through the relative element of control you have over some of the aggregates that you can identify with them to begin with.”

Even though I don’t remember whether he speaks about this specifically, I guess he would say that they are anatta in the sense that they are not worth being regarded as self. I’ve never seen him translating anatta as literally meaning “the perception of non-self.” Instead, he talks about something being anatta as “not worth taking as your self.” He seems to deal with anatta more as a value judgment, rather than a mere perception. Furthermore, I think this would be the answer to the following objection as well:

To perceive self in what should be seen as non-self would be the wrong view in Thanissaro’s viewpoint, I think.

Thanissaro treats all three marks of existence as perceptions. As he says in First Things First:

“That’s the teaching popularly known as the three characteristics, and that the Buddha himself called, not “characteristics,” but “perceptions”: the perception of inconstancy, the perception of suffering/stress, and the perception of not-self. When explaining these perceptions, he taught that if you perceive fabricated things—all things conditioned by acts of intention—as inconstant, you’ll also see that they’re stressful and thus not worthy identifying as you or yours.

His purpose in teaching these perceptions was for them to be applied to suffering and its cause as a way of fostering dispassion for the objects of clinging and craving, and for the acts of clinging and craving themselves. In this way, these perceptions were aids in carrying out the duties appropriate to the four noble truths: to comprehend suffering, to abandon its cause, to realize its cessation by developing the path. In other words, the four noble truths and their duties supplied the context for the three perceptions and determined their role in the practice.

However, over the centuries, as the three perceptions were renamed the three characteristics, they morphed in two other ways as well. First, they turned into a metaphysical teaching, as the characteristics of what things are: All are devoid of essence because they’re impermanent and, since nothing has any essence, there is no self. Second, because these three characteristics were now metaphysical truths, they became the context within which the four noble truths were true.”

About the objection concerning the Dhp 62, I couldn’t find the “There is no self (for him)” quote. What I found was “The fool worries, thinking, ‘I have sons, I have wealth.’ Indeed, when he himself is not his own, whence are sons, whence is wealth?” I’m really sorry if this was my mistake.

About MN22, I didn’t find any Thanissaro’s comment on that part in particular.

About the quote “It is, Ananda, because it is empty of self and of what belongs to self that it is said, ‘Empty is the world,’” Thanissaro discussed it in a passage that I have quoted before in this thread. It’s taken from his book Purity of Heart:

“The Buddha describes this kind of emptiness [Emptiness as an Attribute of the Senses and their Objects] in a short discourse (SN 35:85). Again, Ananda is his interlocutor, opening the discourse with a question: In what way is the world empty? The Buddha answers that each of the six senses and their objects are empty of one’s self or anything pertaining to one’s self.

The discourse gives no further explanation, but related discourses show that this insight can be put into practice in one of two ways. The first is to reflect on what the Buddha says about “self” and how ideas of self can be understood as forms of mental activity. The second way, which we will discuss in the next section, is to develop the perception of all things being empty of one’s self as a basis for a state of refined concentration. However, as we shall see, both of these tactics ultimately lead back to using the first form of emptiness, as an approach to meditation, to complete the path to awakening.

When talking about “self,” the Buddha refused to say whether it exists or not, but he gave a detailed description of how the mind develops the idea of self as a strategy based on craving. In our desire for happiness, we repeatedly engage in what the Buddha calls “I-making” and “my-making” as ways of trying to exercise control over pleasure and pain. Because I-making and my-making are actions, they fall under the purview of the Buddha’s instructions to Rahula. Whenever you engage in them, you should check to see whether they lead to affliction; if they do, you should abandon them.

If you learn to approach your I-making and my-making in the light of the Rahula instructions, you greatly refine this aspect of your education, as you find yourself forced to be more honest, discerning, and compassionate in seeing where an “I” is a liability, and where it’s a asset. On a blatant level, you discover that while there are many areas where “I” and “mine” lead only to useless conflicts, there are others where they’re beneficial. The sense of “I” that leads you to be generous and principled in your actions is an “I” worth making, worth mastering as a skill. So, too, is the sense of “I” that can assume responsibility for your actions, and can be willing to sacrifice a small pleasure in the present for a greater happiness in the future. This kind of “I,” with practice, leads away from affliction and toward increasing levels of happiness. This is the “I” that will eventually lead you to practice meditation, for you see the long-term benefits that come from training your powers of mindfulness, concentration, and discernment.

However, as meditation refines your sensitivity, you begin to notice the subtle levels of affliction and disturbance that I-making and my-making can create in the mind. They can get you attached to a state of calm, so that you resent any intrusions on “my” calm. They can get you attached to your insights, so that you develop pride around “my” insights. This can block further progress, for the sense of “I” and “mine” can blind you to the subtle stress on which the calm and insights are based. If you’ve had training in following the Rahula instructions, though, you’ll come to appreciate the advantages of learning to see even the calm and the insights as empty of self or anything pertaining to self. That is the essence of this second type of emptiness. When you remove labels of “I” or “mine” even from your own insights and mental states, how do you see them? Simply as instances of stress arising and passing away—disturbance arising and passing away—with nothing else added or taken away. As you pursue this mode of perception, you’re adopting the first form of emptiness, as an approach to meditation.”

About the quote “Everything is without a self,” (sabbe dhammā anattā), Thanissaro discusses it in Selves and Not-self:

“Still, if possible, the Buddha does encourage you to try to go beyond the level of non-return and gain full awakening. This is where he brings in another teaching, another perception. In Pāli, the phrase is, “Sabbe dhammā anattā,” which means, “All phenomena are not-self [Dhp 277-279].” This applies both to fabricated phenomena and unfabricated phenomena. And it’s important to note here that this perception is part of the path, not the goal. In other words, it’s not the conclusion you come to when you arrive at awakening; it’s a perception you use to get beyond your last attachments.

As the above passage states, what keeps a non-returner from gaining total awakening is a type of passion and delight: passion for the deathless and delight in the deathless. “Passion-and-delight” is another term for clinging. Even when the mind lets go of its clinging and passion for the aggregates, there still is something it may cling to: the experience of the deathless that follows after letting go of the aggregates. The mind can regard its experience of the deathless as a phenomenon, as an object of the mind. Where there is an object, there is a subject—the knowing self, the sense of “I am” [SN 22:89]—and this provides a foothold for passion and delight to arise: You instinctively want to control whatever you like, and so you try to control the experience of the deathless, even though the idea of “control” here is superfluous—the deathless isn’t going to change on you—and counterproductive: The self created around this desire for control actually gets in the way of total freedom. To counter this tendency toward control, the Buddha here has you apply the perception that all phenomena are not-self, even to the experience of the deathless. This is what gets rid of the “I” in “I am.””

About SN22.96 (“Bhikkhu, there is not even this much individual existence that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself.”), Thanissaro actually does confirm that the Buddha denied the existence of a permanent self. In the same book, he says:

“The Buddha says that each of these four varieties of self-theory comes in three different modes as to when and how the self is that way. One is that the self already is that way. Another is that the self naturally changes to be that way—for example, when you fall asleep or when you die. The third is that the self is changeable through the will. In other words, through meditation and other practices you can change the nature of your self—for example, from being finite to being infinite.

Multiply the four varieties of self by their three modes, and you have twelve types of theories about the self. All of these theories the Buddha rejects. He doesn’t agree with any of them, because they all involve clinging, which is something you have to comprehend and let go. This means that his not-self teaching is not just negating specific types of self—such as a cosmic self, a permanent self, or an ordinary individual self. It negates every imaginable way of defining the self.”

I totally agree, and Thanissaro would probably agree too since this seems to be one of his favorite criticisms against secular Buddhism: it often assumes that all Buddhist tradition got everything wrong and that modern Westerns are finally rediscovering the true dhamma.

I tried to depict Thanissaro’s viewpoint the most accurately as I can, but I’m sorry if I misinterpreted any of his ideas.

3 Likes

even your body can be your self if you assume it, so definitely self can exists if we want it otherwise Buddha wouldn’t say

mn22
“Bhikkhus, what do you think? Is material form permanent or impermanent?”
—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”
—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”
—“Suffering, venerable sir.”
—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”
—“No, venerable sir.”

so Buddha want us to not regard form as self of course we could regard form as self but we would suffer the aftermath, the very moment we regard form as self at that very moment self arises and we suffer

of course you are right that self doesn’t exist objectively but subjectively it could exists and suffering exists because self exists

that’s my current understanding

2 Likes

The world. But not the beyond?? :thinking:

It’s like saying your not of the world but your power is beyond it

This is how they attend improperly:
So evaṁ ayoniso manasi karoti:

… they are undecided about the present thus:
Etarahi vā paccuppannamaddhānaṁ ajjhattaṁ kathaṅkathī hoti:

‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This sentient being—where did it come from? And where will it go?’
‘ahaṁ nu khosmi? No nu khosmi? Kiṁ nu khosmi? Kathaṁ nu khosmi? Ayaṁ nu kho satto kuto āgato? So kuhiṁ gāmī bhavissatī’ti?

When they attend improperly in this way, one of the following six views arises in them and is taken as a genuine fact.
Tassa evaṁ ayoniso manasikaroto channaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati.

The view: ‘My self does not exist.’ arises as true and established
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

This is called a misconception, the thicket of views, the desert of views, the trick of views, the evasiveness of views, the fetter of views.
Idaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, diṭṭhigataṁ diṭṭhigahanaṁ diṭṭhikantāraṁ diṭṭhivisūkaṁ diṭṭhivipphanditaṁ diṭṭhisaṁyojanaṁ.

An uneducated ordinary person who is fettered by views is not freed from rebirth, old age, and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress.
Diṭṭhi­saṁ­yojana­saṁyutto­, bhikkhave, assutavā puthujjano na parimuccati jātiyā jarāya maraṇena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi domanassehi upāyāsehi;

They’re not freed from suffering, I say.
‘na parimuccati dukkhasmā’ti vadāmi.

MN2

I am not sure how MN2 can be read that way in the passages I quote above, the belief that becomes established is a belief about the present, not about annihilation in the future.

From what your saying I suppose I am to take passages like;

“Master Gotama, is this your view: ‘The cosmos is eternal. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘sassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti—
evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?

“That’s not my view, Vaccha.”
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi:
‘sassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.

“Then is this your view: ‘The cosmos is not eternal. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly’?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, ‘asassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti—
evaṁdiṭṭhi bhavaṁ gotamo”ti?

“That’s not my view, Vaccha."
“Na kho ahaṁ, vaccha, evaṁdiṭṭhi:
‘asassato loko, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’”ti.

MN72

And interpret them not as transcending reification of the cosmos by eternalism or anhillationism through conditionality but simply as saying that there IS no cosmos and so no questions arise? Or is it ONLY in the case of talk about selves that this applies, whereas the temporal and spatial cosmos, mind/body, action/consequence we can interpret the other way?

He said:
Evaṁ vutte, bhante, ajito kesakambalo maṁ etadavoca:

‘Great king, there is no meaning in giving, sacrifice, or offerings. There’s no fruit or result of good and bad deeds. There’s no afterlife. There’s no obligation to mother and father. No beings are reborn spontaneously. And there’s no ascetic or brahmin who is well attained and practiced, and who describes the afterlife after realizing it with their own insight.
‘natthi, mahārāja, dinnaṁ, natthi yiṭṭhaṁ, natthi hutaṁ, natthi sukatadukkaṭānaṁ kammānaṁ phalaṁ vipāko, natthi ayaṁ loko, natthi paro loko, natthi mātā, natthi pitā, natthi sattā opapātikā, natthi loke samaṇabrāhmaṇā sammaggatā sammāpaṭipannā, ye imañca lokaṁ parañca lokaṁ sayaṁ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedenti.

This person is made up of the four primary elements. When they die, the earth in their body merges and coalesces with the main mass of earth. The water in their body merges and coalesces with the main mass of water. The fire in their body merges and coalesces with the main mass of fire. The air in their body merges and coalesces with the main mass of air. The faculties are transferred to space.
Cātumahābhūtiko ayaṁ puriso, yadā kālaṁ karoti, pathavī pathavikāyaṁ anupeti anupagacchati, āpo āpokāyaṁ anupeti anupagacchati, tejo tejokāyaṁ anupeti anupagacchati, vāyo vāyokāyaṁ anupeti anupagacchati, ākāsaṁ indriyāni saṅkamanti.

Four men with a bier carry away the corpse.
Āsandipañcamā purisā mataṁ ādāya gacchanti.

Their footprints show the way to the cemetery.
Yāvāḷāhanā padāni paññāyanti.

The bones become bleached. Offerings dedicated to the gods end in ashes.
Kāpotakāni aṭṭhīni bhavanti, bhassantā āhutiyo.

Giving is a doctrine of morons.
Dattupaññattaṁ yadidaṁ dānaṁ.

When anyone affirms a positive teaching it’s just hollow, false nonsense.
Tesaṁ tucchaṁ musā vilāpo ye keci atthikavādaṁ vadanti.

Both the foolish and the astute are annihilated and destroyed when their body breaks up, and don’t exist after death.’
Bāle ca paṇḍite ca kāyassa bhedā ucchijjanti vinassanti, na honti paraṁ maraṇā’ti.

DN2

And your saying that you interpret Ajita Kesakambala above as saying there is a real existent self that is destroyed at death, rather than a nihilistic position that the person is illusory and therefore what they do or think doesn’t matter?

Still interested in any readings you might recommend, have made a start on the Kathāvatthu after reading your posts but am finding it slow going so far and not sure it’s helping elucidate my questions thus far.

Metta

1 Like

“sabbe dhammā anattā” occurs only four times in the Nikayas, at MN35, SN22.90, SN44.10 and AN3.136

I would like to make some observations about them, taking them in sequence;

in MN35 “sabbe dhammā anattā” is first spoken by Venerable Assaji, in a debate with Saccaka, the son of Jain parents, the sutta then has it that Saccaka and 500 Lichivis, wanting to confirm that Assaji has spoken truly, go to see the Buddha. The Buddha is said to be “plunged into the deep wood” so they go into the deep woods, where the Buddha is said to repeat the words that Assaji said.

SN22.90 is a conversation between Channa and Ananda, where again, Channa tells Ananada that “senior monks” have told him that “sabbe dhammā anattā” and it has made him anxious! Ananda says, referring to the Buddhas talks with Kacchagotta:

“All exists”: this is one extreme.
Sabbamatthīti kho, kaccāna, ayameko anto.

“All doesn’t exist”: this is the second extreme.
Sabbaṁ natthīti ayaṁ dutiyo anto.

And Channa understands.

In SN44.10 we have:

“Ānanda, when Vacchagotta asked me whether the self exists , if I had answered that ‘the self exists ’ I would have been siding with the ascetics and brahmins who are eternalists.
“Ahañcānanda, vacchagottassa paribbājakassa ‘atthattā’ti puṭṭho samāno ‘atthattā’ti byākareyyaṁ, ye te, ānanda, samaṇabrāhmaṇā sassatavādā tesametaṁ saddhiṁ abhavissa.

When Vacchagotta asked me whether the self does not exist, if I had answered that ‘the self does not exist ’ I would have been siding with the ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists.
Ahañcānanda, vacchagottassa paribbājakassa ‘natthattā’ti puṭṭho samāno ‘natthattā’ti byākareyyaṁ, ye te, ānanda, samaṇabrāhmaṇā ucchedavādā tesametaṁ saddhiṁ abhavissa.

This first pair of answers seems to be often mimnimised or overlooked by people who draw attention to the subsequent:

When Vacchagotta asked me whether the self exists, if I had answered that ‘the self exists’ would that have helped give rise to the knowledge that all things are not-self?”
Ahañcānanda, vacchagottassa paribbājakassa ‘atthattā’ti puṭṭho samāno ‘atthattā’ti byākareyyaṁ, api nu me taṁ, ānanda, anulomaṁ abhavissa ñāṇassa uppādāya: ‘sabbe dhammā anattā’”ti?

finally AN3.136 has;

Whether Realized Ones arise or not, this law of nature persists, this regularity of natural principles, this invariance of natural principles:
Uppādā vā, bhikkhave, tathāgatānaṁ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṁ ṭhitāva sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā.

all things are not-self.
Sabbe dhammā anattā.

A Realized One understands this and comprehends it,
Taṁ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti.

then he explains, teaches, asserts, establishes, clarifies, analyzes, and reveals it:
Abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivarati vibhajati uttānīkaroti:
‘All things are not-self.’”
‘sabbe dhammā anattā’”ti.

So in conclusion, for something that is "explained, taught, clarified and revealed by the Buddha, “Sabbe dhammā anattā” is only mentioned 3 other times, once in a sutta that itself appears to betray anxiety about its authenticity, once spoken only by “senior monks” and once in a sutta where in that very same sutta the Buddha has refused to say “the self does not exist”.

So I think that it is risky to rely on this poorly attested sentence as a validation of the “the self doesn’t exist” interpretation of anatta.

Metta.

1 Like