What is the meaning of Nama in Nama Rupa?

Q & A
82

Actually, if you look at what is not said in DN 15, you might notice that this not-said makes allowance for name to be present without form.

It was said: ‘With mentality-materiality as condition there is contact.’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of the mental body were all absent, would designation-contact be discerned in the material body?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of the material body were all absent, would impingement-contact be discerned in the mental body?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of the mental body and the material body were all absent, would either designation-contact or impingement-contact be discerned?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of mentality-materiality were all absent, would contact be discerned?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for contact, namely, mentality-materiality.

(using BB’s translation, but I would advocate changing everything to “name” for his “mentality” and “form” for his "materiality, as in his more recent translations of the SN and AN)

Can you spot what is not said? The text does not discuss this -

If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of the form-group were all absent, would designation-contact be discerned in the name-group?

This clearly suggests that designation-contact with reference to the name-group is possible even in the total absence of form. How else can the formless attainments be accounted for?

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83

The way I understand formless attainments are a projection of forth Jhana.
Perhaps you may be right.
It depend on what Rupa means.
Does Rupa include space and consciousness?
The next reply is related to this issue.
According to Dependent Origination the six elements required for the birth to take place.

84

In dependence on the six elements the descent of a future embryo occurs. When the descent takes place, there is name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, there are the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, there is contact; with contact as condition, there is feeling.

There are these six elements: the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the air element, the space element, and the consciousness element.

85

Hi

Isn’t the sequence of the 2 paragraphs you present reversed from the sutta’s? In the sutta, the 6 elements analysis precedes the 4 Noble Truth analysis containing the descent of the embryo (or descent into the womb?.

In any event, could you elaborate on the inference you are drawing from this? How does this bear upon the issue of whether “form” implies materiality as suggested in the Abhidhamma? (Note the creeping evolution of how “name” is understood first by subsuming contact and attention into the formations aggregate, followed by the inclusion of consciousness in name).

The 2 paragraphs read like the DN 15 exposition on rebirth, and I am not sure why you cite this process as being pertinent to the nature of “form” as understood by Iron-Age Indians.

86

Thanks Sylvester
In your opinion how does Dependent Origination apply to Arupavacara beings?
Is it "Vinnana paccaya Passo"
Ie: Nama-rupa and Salayatana do not apply to Formless beings?

87

See SN 14.11.

88

DN 15:

Straining the information supplied in the Vinaya Cullavagga we can proceed so far no doubt, that the first volume of the Digha Nikaya was mainly in the view of its compilers. Comparing the Suttas comprised in the remaining two volumes and marking the differences in theme and tone, it seems that these two volumes were later additions…
BORI

In the case that this sutta is an EBT, and that the following paragraph can be found as an exact parallel in other texts and fragments - and that the Chinese translators have not made the same interpretation error (from Sanskrit to Chinese,) than Bikkhu Bodhi did from Pali to English - then, once someone has plainly understood the mechanism of the establishment of conciousness, one can amend the latter as such:

‘If, Ananda, you are asked: “Has ageing-and-death a condition for its existence?״ you should answer: “Yes.” If asked: “What conditions ageing-and-death?” you should answer: “Ageing-and-death is conditioned by birth.”… “What conditions birth?”… “Becoming conditions birth.”… “Clinging conditions becoming.”… “Craving conditions clinging.”… “Feeling conditions craving.”…“Contact conditions feeling.” … “Mind-and-body conditions contact.” … ”Consciousness conditions mind-and-body.”…If asked: “Has consciousness a condition for its existence?” you should answer: “Yes.” If asked: “What conditions consciousness?” you should answer: “Mind-and-body conditions consciousness.”

to:

‘If, Ananda, you are asked: “Has ageing-and-death a condition for its existence?״ you should answer: “Yes.” If asked: “What conditions ageing-and-death?” you should answer: “Ageing-and-death is conditioned by birth.”… “What conditions birth?”… “Becoming conditions birth.”… “Clinging conditions becoming.”… “Craving conditions clinging.”… “Feeling conditions craving.”…“Contact conditions feeling.” … “Mind-and-body conditions contact.” … ”Consciousness conditions mind-and-body.”…If asked: “Has consciousness a condition for its existence?” you should answer: “Yes.” If asked: “What conditions consciousness?” you should answer: “Name-and-form conditions consciousness.”

The conceiver of this sutta were desperately trying to fit - in Satta only - a process that involves also the khandhas in nāmarūpa nidāna.
This is the usual attempt to force everything into an all comprehensive anthropomorphic entity. Which, later on, drives the latter, to even more extreme positions.

Also, the following would mean that “locally” (aka satta,) nāma and kāya cannot be conceived separately:

By whatever properties, features, signs or indications the mind-factor (namakaya) is conceived of, would there, in the absence of such properties… pertaining to the mind-factor, be manifest any grasping at the idea of the body-factor?׳ ‘No, Lord.’
‘Or in the absence of any such properties pertaining to the body-factor (rupakaya), would there be any grasping at sensory reaction on the part of the mind-factor?’ ‘No, Lord.’

However, in nāma-ṛupa nidāna, the issue is quite else.
But then again, one has to understand the “establishment of consciousness” properly. Which for some, is an absolute impossibility, while in the framework they are encased in.

Note on nāmakāya

Note that these nāmakāya and rūpakāya, as such, do not appear in the EBT, but only in DN 15.
Just in Snp 5.7 is there an occurence of nāmakāya:

“As a flame overthrown by the force of the wind, Upasīva,”
“goes to rest and can no longer be discerned,
just so the Sage free from the mental body
goes to rest and can no longer be discerned.”
“Accī yathā vātavegena khittā,
Atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ;
Evaṃ munī nāmakāyā vimutto,
Atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ”.

Kāya at this level, is the organ that corresponds somewhat to mahat or bodhi. Viz. the unmanifested immaterial body.

Also, it is interesting to note that Thanissaro did translate nāmakāya as “naming activity”.
I think both interpretations denote the same underlying concept; namely that there is not much of a concretism involved in the naming process anymore.
Saṅkhaṃ has been translated as “discerned”, when it conveys more the meaning of “called”.
Namakāya should really be called “named body” at this level; in the sense that the concretism of vicāra has totally disappeared; and that only few remnants of vitakka are involved in the vaci (~naming~) process.

No rūpakāya whatsoever in the EBT, apart from DN15.

Dubious DN 15. Too much beating around the issue involved there.

89

Perhaps you are right and it is supported in KV8.8.
But it is as per Abhidhamma not EBT.
:slight_smile:

https://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=29214&p=419914#p419941

90

The classic Nagarjuna criticism is that the notion of sabhāva/svabhāva is inherently incoherent. It is intended to explain the occurrence of conditioned phenomena, yet the notion of something being “self-existent” is the very opposite of this. Either they exist because of conditions, or they exist in and of themselves: you can’t have it both ways.

So while, yes, they are said to be impermanent, the objection is that there is no coherent explanation of what impermanence means in this context.

This is orthogonal to the problematic notion of “mind moments”. This reduces time to a fundamental substrata in the same way that sabhāva reduces dhammas to a fundamental ontological substrata.

Historically, both of these appear to arise from the same fallacy, which we might call the “scholastic fallacy”. You follow your scholastic methodology to its end point, and when you can go no further, you assume that this is what the world is made of. It is what we see in physics, where whatever the latest force or particle is is assumed to be fundamental—until the next one is found.

The most dire criticism of all such theories is not that they are incoherent, nor that they contradict the suttas, but that they don’t explain anything. They simply create the illusion of an explanation, while shifting the unknown behind a layer of abstraction. It’s like saying we can explain what a person is by postulating that they have a soul. The problem is, we know even less about souls than we do about people. Again, the point is not to make a genuine explanation, but to create the illusion of explanation.

The question you raise about identity is indeed a problem: if things are defined by the sabhava, does that not mean that everything with the same sabhava is actually the same thing? Again, there have been parallel theories in physics, arguing that there is only one proton, but it moves really really fast.

As to the connection with platonic idealism, I think there is a connection, but I think they approach the matter from different angles. If I recall correctly, the idea of Platonic forms was derived from the notion that behind each “thing” there was a template if you like, which is the ideal form of that thing. So the world as we see it is a pale imitation of the real world. (Fun fact: This was later adopted by the Catholics, and lies behind the idea of the real Narnia revealed at the end CS Lewis’ series.)

One problem with this is what we mean by “thing”. Is a chair a thing? A person? An atom? I’m not sure that this was ever solved satisfactorily. But in any case, I don’t think Plato relied explicitly on an ontological substrata of atomic elements. So while there is an affinity between this and the sabhava, they’re not identical.

There’s also an epistemological difference. The abhidhamma works by absrtacting the teachings of the suttas, which themselves are closely based on observed experience. Plato, on the other hand, explicitly distrusted experience and preferred pure reason. This is, I think, why his “forms” tend to be more abstract, as opposed to the elemental sabhavas.

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91

Well, I’m not even sure if the Kv is relevant here, since the Abhidhamma understanding of name and form is being disputed here.

While it may have disposed of the proposition that the formless contains form, it does not resolve the issue of whether form implies “materiality” or if it should be given its plain meaning of “appearance”.

92

Hi Bhante

I don’t have my soft-copy of Karunadasa handy right now, but he does make a convincing case that in the case of the Theravada ahbidhammikas, they managed to avoid the excesses of Sarvastivadin notions of svabhāva. Apparently, they were aware of the very same objections you raised above, and came up with a work-around to avoid the notion of self-existence -

paccayehī dhārīyantīti dhammā

pp.26 - 38 for the Theravadin POV of their provisional and non-provisional definitions of dhamma in “The Theravada Abhidhamma”.

Ultimately, sabhāva of any dhamma was, for the Theravada, “conditionedness”.

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93

The suttas are quite clear what form refers to. They explain it is internal form - bones, joints, blood etc. And external form - rivers, mountains etc.

This is because the DO is explaining things in the human plane. There indeed exists a plane where beings do not have a physical body. But even in these realms maybe external form can exist. In any case, it is irrelevant.

94

Could you explain your point? I want to make sure I understand you properly before I discuss Sue Hamilton’s discussion of the 4 elements that seems to underpin your citation.

95

I don’t believe it. The whole tendency of the Abhidhamma was towards an ontological reification, and you find this mentioned constantly in modern books on Abhidhamma. Sure, they may have worded some things more carefully to avoid the most obvious criticisms, but it’s lipstick on a pig. The whole idea is bunkum and needs to be tossed out.

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96

Could you explain your point? I want to make sure I understand you properly before I discuss Sue Hamilton’s discussion of the 4 elements that seems to underpin your citation.

I’m trying to say that form in the context of DO refers to material form. Internal material form - the body and external material form - matter around us. And it is meant in the most mundane way possible, no need to read too much into it. This is clearly stated in suttas dealing with “an what is internal form ? … and what is external form ?”

The fact that material form is like a bubble, like a mirage should not be understood in a philosophical idealist way. I have better explained my point about how matter should be looked at in page 41 of this topic.

97

I tried look for p.41. Perhaps you’re referring to post 42/96? I’m not sure how your objection to idealism should inform the discussion of whether form means materiality.

Can I enquire if your model of form as materiality is informed by MN 28, and if so, whose translation you are working with?

98

Yes, that message. The suttas where this is clearly stated are in SN. There are suttas dealing with “and what is internal form ?.. and what is external form?”.

It does not matter if you translate “internal material form” like B.Bodhi or just use “internal form” as I have done. The sutta says the same thing: bones, organs, fluids, etc. present in the body. Or rivers, mountains etc. when speaking about external material form. Focus on what suttas say about form, not on the translation of the word “form” itself in a void. You can not understand how to translate a word if you do not know the context in witch it is used. That was what those suttas about “and what is internal form?” were meant to accomplish : to help you understand what form is.

Really there is no need to read too much into it. I am familiar with Nanananda and other philosophical existentialist ideas. That’s not how things are described in the suttas in my opinion.

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99

Well, I am not informed by Ven Nanananda on this, so rest assured on this score.

Have you read the passages in Pali? The nuance that comes through in Pali is somewhat missing in the English.

100

No, can you detail what you mean ? I don’t know pali.

101

It appears two discussion on two diferrent topics going here.