Many Pāli discourses on sīla are quite obviously not about either morality or ethics. For example, though it’s title is unironically translated as “Virtue” by Bodhi and “Ethics” by Sujato, the text of the Sīla Sutta (SN 46.3) is quite obviously not concerned with either virtues or ethics.
This text is concerned with preparation for meditation (sīla), meditation (samādhi), and the special knowledge that constitutes the fruit of meditation (paññā). That is to say, it’s an elaboration on the 3-fold path (and as such it is related to the Spiral Path or Lokuttara-paṭiccasamuppāda texts such as AN 10.1, AN 10.2, AN 10.3 etc).
Incidentally, I haven’t written it up yet, but I’ve come around to thinking that this kind of description of meditation is a distinct alternative to jhāna or suññatā descriptions of mediation. Perhaps a distinct sect dimly remembered?
The only part of the Sīla Sutta that is not concerned with samādhi and paññā—which must therefore be the part concerned with sīla (and additionally occurs at the beginning of the text prior to samādhi)—is the injunction to pursue vūpakāsa (vi-ava-√kṛṣ) “withdrawal, separation, isolation” of both body and mind. For comparison: Skt. vyavakarṣati “to draw down or drag down, to drag away from, tear away, alienate.”
I take vūpakāsa to be synonymous with Pāli amanasikāra and Skt. anupalambha; i.e. concerned with dragging one’s attention away from sensory experience, with a view to making it stop.
Morality is concerned how we govern our behaviour towards other people. In general, morality takes the form of simple rules: “do this behaviour” and “don’t do that behaviour”. The five precepts and the dasakusalakamma are classic sets of moral rules. Don’t kill, don’t lie, don’t steal, etc. And, moreover, these kinds of moral rules tend to be universal in human cultures. Ingroup killing and ingroup dishonesty are universally despised. We have to know we can rely on group members since we are an obligate social primate. But in the Sīla Sutta there are no such rules.
Moreover, generally speaking, Buddhist morality operates through karma. Good actions (punyakamma) lead to rebirth in a good place (sujāto); and bad actions (pāpakamma) lead to rebirth in a band place (duggato); although, of course, the summum bonum is to stop making karma, by eliminating cetenā. In SN 46.3 there is no mention of kamma at all.
The stated purpose of pursuing vūpakāsa is not moral per se—i.e. it is not concerned with governing behaviour—rather dragging your attention away from other people is explicitly stated to facilitate the arising of the various “enlightenment factors” (sambojjhaṅga) such as mindfulness, investigation of phenomena, and so.
Seen in this light, isolating from other people in body and mind cannot really be considered a “moral action” or a “virtuous action” because it is not orientated towards other people. It is oriented towards internally stimulating the enlightenment factors.
An injunction not to interact with other people or even to think about them, seems to be the antipode of morality. Moreover, the instructions here are not phrased as specific moral rules.
So, to my way of thinking to reduction of sīla to “ethics” or “virtue”, not only broadly ignores the moral/ethical distinction, it also ignores one of the most important ways that the term is used in Pāli. And as Wittegenstein said
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
—Wittgenstein. 1967. Philosophical Investigations. Sect. 43
This example, yet again, highlights the downside of approaching this literature in translation, especially where the translator is religious. The sectarian predilections of the translator play an inordinate role in how we understand the message of the literature. All too often, the message of the translator supervenes.