In the four noble truths, the first truth describes suffering. The second, its cause. The third is cessation of suffering. But here we don’t find the cessation of those things described in the first truth, but the cessation of the cause of suffering, taṇhā. How can the cessation of taṇhā rightly be described as the cessation of suffering? Wouldn’t this rather be the cessation of the cause of suffering?
When the causes are gone. The results will be gone in due time.
Parinibbāna is only at the death of arahants. That is automatic given arahanthood.
But the task is not to commit suicide after arahanthood, but just to attained to the destruction of the cause of suffering.
Just like ignorance depends on ignorance, suffering has in Dhamma many meanings, in this particular case, being ( bhava) which manifests itself as conceit “I am” depends on craving for being. Both are aspects of suffering.
Not only is there craving, but there is craving for craving as a condition for craving: indifference to craving destroys it. (Tanhā, be it noted, is not the coarse hankering after what we do not have [which is abhijjhā or covetousness], but the subtle craving for more of what we have. In particular, I am because I crave to be, and with cessation of craving-for-being [bhavatanhā, which is itself dependent on avijjā and, like it, without first beginning—Anguttara X,vii,2 <A.v,116>], ‘I am’ ceases. Bhavatanhā, in fact, is the craving for more craving on which craving depends.
Bhante,
Yes I think this makes sense. If the cessation of suffering was defined as the cessation of aggregates as per the first truth, it would give the wrong impression that the task is to deal with the symptoms rather than the underlying cause.
Wouldn’t that type of logic eventually lead to something more akin to the “Jaina” way?: gauze over the mouth, painful austerities, inaction, and then, finally, death by suicide. It’s close, but not quite the buddhadhamma: like mis-apprehending a snake.
I think the Buddhist mission was to replace that one-to-one correspondence type of thinking with something a bit more nuanced.
Bhante,
True, but my qualm is we don’t find conceit or craving mentioned in the first truth, but the second. So it seems like the solution doesn’t match the problem.
For ñānavira, the dukkha of the first truth is psychological, based on taking birth and death as “my birth and death” correct?
I think this does solve the problem, but I’m not sure I buy this is what the Buddha meant. I will read more on this.
Thanks
In MN141, The Analysis of the Truths, I quote:
And what is the noble truth of suffering?
Rebirth is suffering; old age is suffering; death is suffering; sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress are suffering; not getting what you wish for is suffering. In brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering.
I think “not getting what you wish for is suffering” is very much a case of conceit.
And “the five grasping aggregates are suffering” is describing craving here.
As I said above, a psychological interpretation of the problem is a solution.
But I don’t think this fits everything we find in the suttas. I will read more and perhaps start a discussion later.
You are right that birth and death of the body doesn’t constitute dukkha as such, when the body is seen as “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”. But Nanavira or not, according Dhamma conceit “I am” is the core of dukkha, and cessation of it is described as the highest pleasure:
Pleasurable is dispassion in the world,
The getting beyond sensuality.
But the putting away of the conceit ‘I am’
– this is the highest pleasure.
Udana 11
Puthujjana very being (bhava) is suffering no matter how much his existence seems to be happy one to him.
In other words the Four Noble Truths can be stated as follows:
Conceit “I am” = suffering
Conceit “I am” is dependently arisen
There is the cessation of the conceit “I am”
And the is the way leadingthe cessation of the conceit “I am”.
The Arahant continues to experience sights and so on, are these dukkha? If not doesn’t this contradict the second sermon?
Another problem I have is if the Arahant immediately transcends dukkha why does he not continue being born in the literal sense, since it is not dukkha?
Here are some thoughts of mine that may be helpful (or not). 
The “noble truth” (I prefer ‘Noble One’s truth’ for ariya-sacca) about the cessation of suffering is explained in more detail in the cessation sequence of Dependent Arising. See AN3.61:
And what is the Noble One’s truth about the cessation of suffering? If ignorance completely fades away and ceases, willful actions will cease. If willful actions cease, consciousness will cease. If consciousness ceases, the individual’s immaterial aspects and body will cease. If the individual’s immaterial aspects and body cease, the six senses will cease. If the six senses cease, sense impressions will cease. If sense impressions cease, sensations will cease. If sensations cease, craving will cease. If craving ceases, fuel/taking up will cease. If fuel/taking up ceases, existence will cease. If existence ceases, birth will cease. And if birth ceases, old age and death, and sorrow, grief, pain, sadness, and distress, will cease. That is how this whole mass of suffering ceases.
This includes the cessation of the causes of suffering (primarily, ignorance and craving). But it also includes the cessation of the results (the aggregates, like consciousness, “name-and-form”, existence) and also the cessation of those very things that are said to be suffering in the first truth of the Noble One: birth, old age, and death.
In AN6.63 this is said in short, in the same form as the statements on dependent cessation:
And what is the cessation of suffering? If craving ceases, suffering will cease. (Or literally, "due to the cessation of craving, the cessation of suffering, Taṇhānirodhā, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodho.)
Note that this uses the ablative case to indicate a causality. It doesn’t mean that suffering ceases the same moment craving ceases, but that the cessation of craving leads to the cessation of suffering.
The more common version of the third noble truth seems to say the cessation of craving itself is the cessation of suffering. However, that is not exactly true.
In some cases the cessation of suffering is said to be the cessation of the aggregates; e.g. SN22.30. (Also, not seeing things as self is not itself the end of suffering; it is “a way of regarding things that leads to the cessation of suffering”; e.g. SN22.44).
So how to reconcile these seeming contradictions?
First of all, I think there is no sutta that directly says that the cessation of craving (or ignorance) itself is the cessation of suffering. What is said instead is that the Noble One’s truth about the cessation of suffering is the cessation of craving. The grammar in such cases is a bit awkward, and I don’t think that the Buddha intends to say that the cessation of craving itself is the cessation of suffering.
I think this can be explained in multiple ways. First, the cessation of craving is so close to the cessation of all suffering, that it is equal to it for all practical purposes.
Second, cessation is a process. It doesn’t happen instantly. When craving ceases, suffering will inevitably cease, but it doesn’t happen at the very same moment.
Also, as already said, the focus on the cessation of craving points our practice in the right direction. Instead of trying to end birth and death directly, we are supposed to end their causes.
Bhante,
Thank you for your thoughts they are helpful. I wonder how you would interpret suttas such as the Bāhiya sutta which seem to suggest dukkha is ended immediately on realising anattā. I think there are many others with a similar refrain.
Many thanks
I’m not Bhante, but here’s my suggestion: think about the context of unusual suttas. Often, if I find myself puzzled about a sutta, I re-read it, contemplate it, read translators’ notes, look for commentary about it, etc. Usually, the answer reveals itself. If it doesn’t, I set it aside or ask around. 
In the case of Venerable Bahiya, he had very well-developed spiritual faculties and perfections. Those qualities were cultivated strongly in his last life and previous lives. All he needed was a single teaching to attain arahantship. Others who quickly attain enlightenment must have developed spiritual faculties and perfections to a sufficient degree.
There are few aspects of dukkha, but cessation of conceit “I am” neutralises dukkha as such, when mind is liberated from upadana, the most painful physical experience is not able to provoke mental pain.
I am interested here in the most fundamental dukkha, namely the state of being, bhava, and here again, in the case of arahat, nobody is there to experience sights and so on.
So teachings that arahat must die, so we could talk about the true end of suffering contradicts MN 140, unborn by definition cannot die. Whem mind is liberated from upadana, presence o absence of the body doesn’t mattar much.
But we are dealing here with dependent arising and it is very unlikely to come to agreement between people who understand Dhamma differently.
According to Dhamma, continuation of experience is only possible with the presence of the conceit “I am”. When arahat cannot be found even here and now, there is nobody there to be born.
saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā.
In brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering.
If I may add to the quote from MN141 by @Sumana first noble truth is closely related to craving. pañcupādānakkhandhā embeds *upādāna(*grasping). By doing so it implies the link between grasping and craving - as in dependent coarising - already in the first noble truth
taṇhā => upādāna
After the full realization of anatta “you will not be here or hereafter or in between the two” (Ud1.10). This means you will not get reborn anymore, neither in this world, nor another, nor “in between” this life and the next. However, as long as the arahant is still alive, hey are still in the “here”, in this life, this world. So their suffering hasn’t ended yet.
Many other suttas that seem to pose similar “problems” can be resolved in similar ways.
Bhava is existence or life, and it only ends at parinibbana, as Iti44 says:
with no residue, which pertains to what follows this life, where all states of existence (bhava) cease.
I think that’s not what it describes.
As commentaries already indicated, the word upadanakkhanda has multiple meanings (which is common for Pali words). It can also mean “the aggregates that result from grasping”, or, as I prefer to translate “the taken up aggregates”. The meaning is that they were taken up at the start of life.
That in context of the first noble truth upadanakkhanda doesn’t mean “grasping the aggregates” becomes clear when comparing SN56.13 and SN56.14:
And what is the noble truth of suffering? You should say: ‘The five grasping aggregates’. That is: form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
And what is the noble truth of suffering? You should say: ‘The six interior sense fields’. What six? The sense fields of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.
The latter doesn’t say that grasping to the senses is suffering, or something like that. It’s the senses themselves that are suffering. By extent, the same is true for the aggregates. So the compound upadanakkhanda here means “aggregates that were taken up/grasped” (at the start of life).
There are also plenty of discourses that directly call the aggregates suffering, without mentioning grasping. For example SN22.10: “Mendicants, form of the past and future is suffering, let alone the present.”
Perhaps you understand Dhamma better than me, but for sure quite differently, since realisation of anatta here and now I do see as experience of not being localised in space and time, here and now. So between the two covers certain aspects of experience which are neither sensory organs, nor their objects. In other words no self-identification with experience, no state of bhava.
Bhava depends here and now on ignorance, and ceases at the moment ignorance ceases, again we understand “when there is this, this is” quite differently. As I see it, you contradict unequivocal meaning of Sutta:
"He understands thus: ‘Whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of sensual desire, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of being, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of ignorance, those are not present here. There is present only this amount of disturbance, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
MN 121
But I think we have already discussed it with the same results, and since we are still both quite satisfied with our understanding, perhaps it is good to stop here, just noticing clearly our disagreement. Namely:
Me: Things are and “I am”, are two totally different statements. Things are regardless of ignorance, but if I am, I exist in space and time when there is self-identification with things in space and time.
You: No such thing as the cessation of bhava here and now, since the body exist regardless presence or absence of ignorance.
(i) To begin with, ‘I—here’ is I as identical with my senses; ‘here’, therefore refers to my sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and also mind). The counterpart of ‘here’ is ‘yonder’, which refers to the various things in the world as sense-objects. ‘Between the two’ will then refer (though Heidegger makes no mention of this) to consciousness, contact, feeling, and so on, as being dependent upon sense organ and sense object—cakkhuñca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam, tinnam sangati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, etc. (Salāyatana Samy. 107: iv,87).
(…)
And when shall we ‘not be that by which’? This, Heidegger is not able to tell us. But the Buddha tells us: it is when, for us, in the seen there shall be just the seen, and so with the heard, the sensed, and the cognized. And when in the seen is there just the seen? When the seen is no longer seen as ‘mine’ (etam mama) or as ‘I’ (eso’ham asmi) or as ‘my self’ (eso me attā): in brief, when there is no longer, in connexion with the senses, the conceit ‘I am’, by which ‘I am a conceiver of the world’.
Who has the non localised experience?
Well, as I see it “i am” is thought. So it not different from things.
It seems to me you are describing a something that gets tangled up in things and released. But what is that?