So is your expectation that there would be at the cessation of consciousness a merely seen and a merely heard?
The usual Chinese translation means “awareness,” or more specifically “knowing” in the sense of being familiar with someone. I’ve seen a couple times when Chinese translators have interpreted it to mean “distinguishing,” by breaking the word into two, e.g. as vi- (別) -jñā- (知). Lit. 別知 means something like “divided knowing.” This happens in SA 1.158 (~ SN 22.79), which goes on to say that it cognizes the six senses. It was often said in Abhidharma that consciousness can only cognize one thing at a time, so I think that would likely be the intended meaning in a Sarvastivada sutra.
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Hi, firstly I find it’s best when studying to let go of any expectations, biases and discriminations. This helps to leave the mind open to the meaning of the teaching to reveal itself. Remember the teaching of the 3 water pots.
Secondly, over two decades ago I asked a Dharma teacher if he could explain the 12 links of dependant origination to me, to which he replied, ‘The only way to understand dependant origination is in the language it was originally spoken (or written down in)’. This has been a main part of my quest since then and I took it to mean that whatever translation we read, we are only reading someone else’s interpretation, no matter how accurate or unembellished it maybe.
However in answer to your question I would suggest you study MN44, I have made my own study and translation of this, but at this link on SuttaCentral there are various English translations for you to compare.
Hope this helps, kind regards Orgyen
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For me ‘vi-’ is more of a intensifier (if that is the right way to say it) in this context.
If we say knowing in general , it is that quality of intelligence that knowing has, which is referred as vinnana. Vinnana is the king. In this sense, it is closer in meaning to ‘understanding’.
Anyway, that is the best I can do, at expressing my understanding in english.
If I may attempt something further,
Regarding sanna, it is that ‘akara gahana’ quality that knowing has or endowed with.
Regarding vedana, it is that quality of ‘drinking it in’ or experiencing.
As I said, you are eliding the fact that Ud 1.10 refers to two things. The Buddha exhorts Bahiya to train in a certain manner, and then describes the state of a person who has trained in that manner. The statements with respect to the latter (which seems fairly clearly to be nibbāna) do not mention consciousness either explicitly or implicitly.
You haven’t given a reason to suppose that the statements with respect to the manner in which Bahiya is exhorted to train are also a description of nibbāna—that ‘the end of suffering’ experienced by one who has trained in the specified manner also contains ‘the seen’, etc.
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I’ve probably joined this discussion a bit late, but I just thought I’d point out a couple of things since they have not been addressed here, so far as I’ve read, and if they have, well feel free to ignore this.
- a search of ‘DN11’.
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In particular, the thread with the red arrow.
Whose consciousness is invisible, infinite, and all-radiant? - #6 by Mat -
And in particular, this post from above thread.
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To make it easy, here is the link from Bhante Sujato’s old blog which I believe somewhat provides an answer to your original question. I haven’t read it in it’s entirety but I believe it’s relevant.
Edit:
Okay I’ve read it and yes I do believe it is relevant to the question. Also there’s a bit in the end which summarises what Bhante wrote.
And Bhante confirming:
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I think the issue here is that the translation by Bhante @sujato hides what makes this obvious in order to avoid redundancy.
Here is the quote with the Pali. Note the two sections of bolded italicized text. They are the same, but the translation hides that.
Here is a different translation that makes it clearer.
Here we see the connection more clearly. If you don’t see the connections being made here you will have to explain where the connection are lost.
I found this in Sue Hamilton’s book “Early Buddhism: A New Approach”. I have bolded the important part.
This division between internal and external/subject and object is interesting. I have definitely seen references in the sutta to the internal and external. The loss of any sense of internal and external would appear to be the cessation of divided knowing and the subject-object divide. The internal and external are mentioned in both the Atthakavagga and Parayanavagga as well. I think that interpreting consciousness in this way has the benefit of increasing the harmony of the two.
Added later: Ud 1:10 also makes sense with this interpretation.
Sorry, no.
The statements “in the seen will be merely the seen” etc. are as Eddy says the way to train, i.e. the practice, i.e. the path, which is most definitely not Nibbana.
The text makes this clear by using yato … tato … constructions, i.e. “when this … then that”. The end of suffering arises from the practice. Perhaps this should be more explicit in the translation, but it is slightly clumsy English:
When you’re not ‘by that’, then you won’t be ‘in that’. When you’re not ‘in that’, then you won’t be in this world or the world beyond or between the two. Just this is the end of suffering.
The final sentence refers solely to the preceding clause, i.e. not being born in any world. My translation is fine, if anything the contracted form helps avoid this mistake.
Unrelated, something about Suddhaso’s construction here makes me uneasy. It shifts the emphasis to “there is” statements, which are not in the text, as there is no verb “to be”. This isn’t unusual for Pali, but, when “there is” is emphasized, it is present (atthi, bhikkhave …).
“You” is singular nominative, i.e. it is the subject of the sentence. Translating “you are not ‘in that’”, as most translators have done, keeps the emphasis on the (present) subject rather than on the (absent) verb.
I think the demonstrative pronouns here are deliberately ambiguous, as in such places they can convey a wide range of nuances. “By that” can mean “because of that”, (i.e. you are not created by that), it can mean “along with that”, “from that”, or “by means of that”, or something like Suddhaso’s “in terms of that”. Sometimes it is a good idea to narrow down the meaning in a particular context, but here I think the breadth is deliberate. It is saying that, no matter how you construe the these sense experiences, you cannot find yourself in any relation to them.
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I think I see your point
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It’s something that becomes important when ignorance became the root of existence. Then, the problem shifts from one of entanglements with desire and dislike to a problem of knowledge. The awakening experience becomes a realization of special or direct knowledge rather than freedom from attachment. I believe, if I remember it right, that Yogacara thought identifies the subject-object bifurcation as the source of ignorance. When a practitioner experiences a unified state of consciousness, then they gain access to reality, and then a spiritual revolution takes place. Sarvastivadins had already taken a step in that direction, (i.e., defining awakening as a resolution of ignorance), by defining it as a realization of the four noble truths in a series of epiphanies.
This direction of thinking was either caused or supported by adoption of the twelve-step dependent origination chain that placed ignorance at the start, which I think is a later development. Before that, the root was name-and-form or craving. It’s a chicken or the egg question, I suppose, but it makes sense of what I see in the later Abhidharma traditions compared to the early sutras.
However! In early Buddhist sutras, we generally see liberation from the problem of desire and contamination of the mind as being the primary goal. Regarding Ud 1.10, I would consider SN 35.95 and SA 312 as a direct commentary that’s more in line with early Buddhist thinking. Sensory experience is a problem because it instigates desire, dislike, attachment, and all the dysfunctional behaviors that they motivate. So, mindfulness serves to maintain detachment, which was basically keeping desire or dislike from arising when experiencing things. It’s basically an analogue to Greek Stoicism.
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The concern being attachment does explain why anatta is not really a theme of the Atthakavagga.
That indeed still remains the same in Theravada.
So do I, but then I don’t see it at all! It’s always good to be prompted to go back and check things.
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Does that lead you to conclude that the 3 knowledges (rebirth, kamma and dependent origination) are also later? Sounds like early Buddhism in your view is what we see in secular Buddhism today.
Those are clearly early Buddhist ideas. I’m not entirely sure what “secular Buddhism” is exactly. I just have the impression that it’s a catchall for modernists who discard mythology, storytelling, and spiritualism in favor of a kind of scientific or psychological religion. So, I’m not sure how that could ever be equated with early Buddhism. There’s a gaping chasm between modernism and the mindset of ancient people. Even between classical Greek philosophers and ancient people, there is quite a gap that has opened as logic and ideas crowd out morality and nature.
If they are early then wouldn’t it make sense that ignorance, as the root problem, is also early? We do see the 12-links across all traditions, and in all early texts, so if they are late would you say they appear still quite early in Buddhism? What is late here?
I think the function of consciousness is unifying rather than dividing, hence it leans against name & form in what appears to be a continuum of experience. Death marks the a separation between the unifying effect of consciousness and name and form, hence triggers the disintegration of the body.
More generally, whatever is associated with a cohesive or unifying effect in the teaching is bad. From seeking solitude, to likening samsara to net, to the contemplation of death, to describing the aggregates as subject to clinging, (clinging, attachments, grasping, persistence …they are all bad!). As such, for the cessation of vinnana to be praiseworthy, it has to have a unifying rather than a divisive effect. Probably, seeking to end divisions as a solution to suffering is Brahmanism rather than Buddhism.
Yes, that’s true. This is only a working hypothesis, to which I’m not sure that there is a way to convincingly prove it one way or the other. However, what makes me believe ignorance was added later is precisely because it’s in early Buddhist sutras that we see other versions of dependent origination that don’t begin with ignorance. On the other hand, every Abhidharma and Mahayana text I have seen thus far always has ignorance at the start of a twelve-link chain. If I never looked at a Nikaya or Agama collection, I would have never known there was an alternative to it. Thus, I suspect that it was something that happened during the early Abhidharma period.
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Do you have some quote(s) that demonstrate this? I would think that bare sense data would be in parallel being dependent on different organs, but could see sanna being serial. I am curious what the ahbidharma says the bottleneck is exactly.
Added later: I could see naming being serial. Language by its nature is serial. Recognition without naming might be serial. I recognize my house at a glance and son in front of it even if I have not verbalized anything. It feels like it happens at once, but maybe it is a fast sequence.