This is not true. Subtle forms of consciousness and perception remain in these conditional states. Thatâs how theyâre known and experienced at all.
SN40.7: ââItâs when a mendicant, going totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness, aware that âthere is nothing at allâ, enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.
âidha bhikkhu sabbaso viññÄáčañcÄyatanaáč samatikkamma natthi kiñcÄ«ti ÄkiñcaññÄyatanaáč upasampajja viharati.â
Itâs letting go of consciousness as the focus of attention that allows one to proceed to the dimension of nothingness.
Of course, only the Buddha could truly say no annihilation is actually taking place and they will decay, perish and have rebirth not even those above the annihilationists the advocates of the purity of spirit would know that they are also mortal just like annihilationists. There is a good reason we are told not to think about the powers of a Buddha.
Iâm was just trying to put myself in the annihilationists shoes and how laypeople and ordained in their dhamma could have had conversations just like that.
That is one way to see it
I would say they are also convinced NibbÄna equals
âannihilationâ since with the final cessation of the khandhas and being certain of âI have no self.â
plus rejecting eternalism but embracing annihilationism it canât be any other way.
Essentially these buddhists have a preconceived idea of what NibbÄna must be, based more on their views of saying âthere is no selfâ and rejecting eternalism.
When the physical body eventually dies there is final NibbÄna. Before the death of the body they only get glimpses.
But in reality the physical body needs food, to defecate/urinate etc. so that is the true reason one canât stay in what the Buddha called the highest bliss (without feelings) - the physical body hampers one with all its various needs, when it is gone the arahant is of course much better off.
Remember the eternalists are no better, they also do not see the khandhas as self so to them the âtrueâ self is only revealed to them via NibbÄna - this is also a view the Buddha tells us to give up.
In discussions between laypeople and ordained in the dhamma of the annihilationists, they would not bring up buddhist suttas (an outside sect) as evidence to refute their entire own sect and views.
But if you insist and refuse to see what I actually wrote and more importantly why I wrote it that way, thatâs ok.
So why did the annihilationists claim to be annihilated then? End of existence and all of that talk?
Explain this without any suttas and buddhism.
Pretty hard right?
Frankly, Iâm having some trouble following exactly what your primary points are.
If youâre mainly raising this point:
the answer offered is that in final cessation there indeed would not be any awareness that there is nothing at all. In fact, no awareness at all.
This again differs from the doctrines of the annhilationists who proclaimed a self (any âIâ or some âthingâ) that is annihilated at death (as opposed to the cessation of particular configurations of ever-changing selfless aggregates/processes) â and/or a denial of rebirth, as in DN2. This latter point is important, as it is in direct contradiction to the Buddhaâs teachings.
And the buddhists in SN 22.81 who say there is no self at all as in:
and who also reject eternalism would come to exactly the same conclusion about NibbÄna as you just did right now. So do you now understand why I see your view as identical to the group in SN 22.81?
That is what is Iâm trying to make you see, how would you refute that the annihilationists actually never became annihilated without the Buddhaâs insights/teachings or any suttas? Even if you did it with the help of the advocates of the purity of spirit youâd still no nothing about anicca, dukkha, anatta. Right?
And if NibbÄna is truly no awareness itâs also impossible to say anicca, dukkha & anatta from no awareness.
So what is anicca, dukkha & anatta even based on?
Your view of NibbÄna is identical to those in SN 22.81 who also reject eternalism and is based on a certain logic and held on to dearly as a preconcieved notion about NibbÄna due to being 100% certain âThere is no selfâ.
And Iâm sorry, sabbe dhammÄ anattÄ will not help you here:
@Jasudho Do you care to understand my perspective of following the Buddhaâs advice and rejecting ALL concepts of self, ALL concepts of eternalism, ALL concepts of annihilation and also getting rid of doubts about the Buddhaâs teaching?
Because that is what he was asking from anyone following him.
No one is arguing for holding onto any views or concepts.
SN22.81 is not about nibbÄna, but about the holding on to various views of self, eternalism, and annihilation â which specifically employs:
"âI might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.â
âno cassaáč no ca me siyÄ nÄbhavissaáč na me bhavissatÄ«âti.
So itâs not at all about my view of final nibbÄna being the same as those in this sutta.
Nor is it
Beyond this, our discussion has probably run its course.
And because the Buddha phrases it in first person like those having the this view, hence the âIâ and with you being 100% certain there is no self whatsoever (despite the Buddha saying this view is wrong) we truly are going around in circlesâŠ(???)
Ending the defilements leads to nibbÄna. The sutta does not directly deal in an ontological or âdescriptiveâ sense with nibbÄna, as some other suttas do. It deals with obstructing views of self, eternalism and annihilationism.
Not that nibbÄna can be pinned down. But see Iti44,
AN6.101: "Itâs quite possible for a mendicant who regards extinguishment as pleasurable to accept views that agree with the teaching. âŠâ âSo vata, bhikkhave, bhikkhu nibbÄnaáč sukhato samanupassanto anulomikÄya khantiyÄ samannÄgato bhavissatÄ«âti áčhÄnametaáč vijjati."
AN9.34, AN9.49, and many others.
Frankly, I have no idea what youâre getting at here. There is no specific phrase in the suttas âThere is no selfâ and yet the Buddhaâs teachings on anattÄ are foundational.
Again, Iâll be leaving this thread and thanks for the convo.
This is without doubt the worst argument in Buddhism. It is made once, in a poem, by a nun, talking to Mara, and is made nowhere else in the ebt.
âCartâ is NOT the name for a collection of cart parts. That would be âcart partsâ. âCartâ is the name for a cart. Similarly if i wish to refer to âthe collection of things that constitute the parts of a personâ i cannot simply say âpersonâ because that is not what âpersonâ means.
If i have a pile of cart-parts, even if i have ALL the cart parts, i do not have a cart. Cart is the word we use for the whole, intact, actuall cart.
If the word for anything that is made of parts is âonly a nameâ for something that does not in fact exist then NOTHING in fact exists, since EVERYTHING (sans perhaps some sort of Spinoza-esqe God-Substance) is made of parts.
If the argument applies to everything, then it cant pick out a self to be unreal and an âimpersonal aggregateâ to be real.
Also, aggregate LITERALLY means âmade of partsâ, so if there is anything not real by the niave nominalism of the âjust a nameâ crowd it would BE the aggregates!!
I agree with your take in general about this issue, but to play maraâs advocate, here is how I would respond to this argument:
The person is merely a collection of aggregates and so not real in any significant sense. Furthermore, the aggregates already mean âmade of parts,â so the person is merely âmade of partsâ which are themselves âmade of parts,â and so the person is doubly unreal!
Sure, but by the argumnet as given the âsuffering of old age AND deathâ isnt real, certainly the â8foldâ path isnt real, the â12 linksâ arnt real⊠I just do not understand what possible reason anyone would ever have, again, unless your Spinoza or Parmenides, for thinking that things that have parts arenât real?
Watches arent real
Telephones arnt real
Pyramids arent realâŠ
Sentences arent real because thier made of words, words arent real because thier made of lettersâŠ
Because, as you said, to do so would be to encourage either an annihilationist view, if we were to imply the existence of the self, or a nihilist view, if we were to deny the existence of the self, for example by saying that in the absolute sense everything is just causes and effects, or dhammas, or kalapas, or atoms and nerve impulses, and so on. To say that âin the absolute sense there is no selfâ is exactly that - an attempt to deny annihilation with nihilism, to deny one extreme wrong view with another extreme wrong view - it is a fallacy of reasoning.
More than that, it is an unresolvable philosophical paradox: it is impossible to deny oneâs own existence, because for that one must exist in the first place. Or, from the attaâs point of view, it is impossible to deny the existence of the atta, because to do so you have to have control over yourself in order to carry out that denial, and that control over yourself is nothing other than the atta.
To say in any way that the Buddha taught the absence of self, that anatta means âno selfâ, is to make him a fool and his teaching an incoherent, self-contradictory mess.
Thatâs why he didnât encourage all these views.
The crucial point here is to understand that the teaching is not about the existence or non-existence of the self, the teaching is only about dukkha and the elimination of dukkha. And the only way to understand dukkha and uproot dukkha is to do skillful actions and not to do unskillful actions. In other words, the teaching is to answer the single question, âWhat must I do to eliminate my suffering once and for all?â And to achieve this goal there is no need for insoluble delusional speculations about the existence of the self.
All this confusion arises from the one false assumption that for any appropriation to exist, there must be a self, an appropriator. But in fact itâs quite the opposite: every view about the self is the result of appropriation. For there to be appropriation, there is no need for any views about the self, or even the ability to form such views, like in the case of animals or babies. Such views are nothing more than the result of attempts to rationalise this appropriation: there is âmeâ because there is already âmineâ and âfor meâ, and not otherwise. So the crucial question is not âDo I exist?â but âIs what I take to be mine and for me really mine and for me, and if it isnât, how can I see that for myself?â
Anatta is not about âno attaâ but about ânot attaâ - about lack of mastery and control over that which I take to be mine and for me. âSelf cannot be foundâ is not the same as âThere is no selfâ.
So what have aggregates of clinging got to do with all this? Aggregates of clinging are what has to be appropriated, mastery and control over what has to be assumed in order for the person to act and attend to objects as a self, as a subject. If, for example, there is action with desire out of feeling for some pleasing visible forms, then what is implicitly appropriated is not the forms, but the very feeling on account of these forms.
In addition to the Vajir Sutta, there is a similar one - SN 5.9. And in this sutta SN 12.15, the Buddha utters the same words as Vajira, that only suffering, when it arises, arises. etc. As for the cart as a name for parts and elements, everything is very simple. Indeed, a pile of parts is not a car, absolutely true. A car is a pile of necessary parts + their position and location. This is the same element of information and it is also a necessary condition. A necessary condition for what? - movement functions. A function is the effect of necessary conditions and causes, constituent elements. Parts and their location are necessary conditions. A car is an example of a combination of conditions for the occurrence of a consequence - the element of movement/driving/transportation.
Another excellent sutta, already given by the Buddha, on this topic. The sound arises not simply from the parts of the lute, but from the correct position of the parts, the efforts of the musician, etc.
SN 35.246 âSuppose, bhikkhus, there was a king or a royal minister who had never before heard the sound of a lute. He might hear the sound of a lute and say: âGood man, what is making this soundâso tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling?â They would say to him: âSire, it is a lute that is making this soundâso tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling.â He would reply: âGo, man, bring me that lute.â
âThey would bring him the lute and tell him: âSire, this is that lute, the sound of which was so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling.â The king would say: âIâve had enough with this lute, man. Bring me just that sound.â The men would reply: âThis lute, sire, consists of numerous components, of a great many components, and it gives off a sound when it is played upon with its numerous components; that is, in dependence on the parchment sounding board, the belly, the arm, the head, the strings, the plectrum, and the appropriate effort of the musician. So it is, sire, that this lute consisting of numerous components, of a great many components, gives off a sound when it is played upon with its numerous components.â
âThe king would split the lute into ten or a hundred pieces, then he would reduce these to splinters. Having reduced them to splinters, he would burn them in a fire and reduce them to ashes, and he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Then he would say: âA poor thing, indeed sir, is this so-called lute, as well as anything else called a lute. How the multitude are utterly heedless about it, utterly taken in by it!â
âSo too, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form, he investigates feeling to the extent that there is a range for feeling, he investigates perception to the extent that there is a range for perception, he investigates volitional formations to the extent that there is a range for volitional formations, he investigates consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness. As he investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form ⊠consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness, whatever notions of âIâ or âmineâ or âI amâ had occurred to him before no longer occur to him.â
Also, two sticks do not generate fire and are not a means of making fire. An element of applied effort is needed, an element of correct placement - and then there will be an effect - fire. And the sticks are already called differently, although they have not changed their essence. Likewise, the elements of the body and mind do not change their nature just because they are included in the system of the being.
The world and dhammas are empty of the self and that which belongs to the self simply means that there is no self in the world. Like a jug empty of water simply tells us that there is NO water in the jug. Sunyata is realized through anatta. In the beginning there is a subjective position âI amâ - this is mine, this is not mine. But then all positions dissolve into emptiness.
Hmm, maybe this is the essence of ending suffering. In any case, one of the suttas says that for the Arahant there is no death.
However, death is not described in personal categories in the suttas, as the destruction of a being - but in categories of phenomena and experience: disintegration of aggregates, destruction of the body. This is the phase of massive cessation of dhammas.
