

states (dhammā) to be known (veditabbā) by belief, or preference, or hearsay, or methodological argument, or reflection on theory?

Surely not, venerable sir.

Are not these states to be known by seeing (disvā) with wisdom (paññāya).

Surely, venerable sir.

Again, as to hearing a sound with the ear ...

The corresponding SA 313 differs in detail of wording but has similar content.<sup>119</sup> This practice of fully knowing, with regard to the sense faculties, the presence or absence of unskilful mental states such as desire, hatred, and delusion is again very similar to the practice of guarding the sense-doors. The two versions state in common that this practice yields knowing and seeing through direct experience, without dependence on belief, hearsay, argumentation, and so on.

This section, having presented examples of teachings on various practices, particularly guarding the sense-doors, has revealed no significant differences between the two versions; and it has demonstrated the importance attached to such practices in both traditions.

## 5. Sectarian and later components

Some unshared, possibly sectarian, components have been identified in previous sections, in particular the emphasis on emptiness in SA discourses. This section will present further evidence of possible sectarian and other developments.

(1) In SA 320, which has no SN counterpart, a brahmin named Jānuḥṣiṇī (生聞) comes to ask a question of the Buddha:<sup>120</sup>

Gautama! It is said “All exists” (一切有). But in what regard is it said that all exists?

119 T 2, p. 90b-c (CSA i, p. 402).

120 T 2, p. 91b (CSA i, pp. 405, 406 note 2).

The Buddha says: I will now question you. Answer as you see fit. Brahmin! What do you think, does eye exist?

Yes, it exists, śramaṇa Gautama.

Do visible forms exist?

Yes, they exist, śramaṇa Gautama.

Brahmin! Do there exist visible forms, eye consciousness, eye contact, feelings unpleasant or pleasant or neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant that arise conditioned by eye contact?

Yes, they exist, śramaṇa Gautama.

The same saying applies to ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.

After hearing this discourse from the Buddha, the brahmin Jānuḥṣiṇī was delighted, rose from his seat and departed.

Yin Shun maintains that this discourse is presenting the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of “all exists” (*sarvam asti*), which asserts “the existence of the three times” (past, present, and future).<sup>121</sup>

Teachings about “existence” do occur in discourses shared by both versions. For example, in SN 35. 195-196 (counterpart SA 1166) the Buddha says:<sup>122</sup>

Just so, bhiksus, where eye *exists* (*sati*), there, conditioned (*paccayā*) by eye contact, arises internally the pleasant or the unpleasant. ... [And similarly for the remaining sense spheres]

The text is saying that the eye and the rest exist. The corresponding SA 1166 has similar content.<sup>123</sup> Other discourses concerning “existence” are SN 35. 133, 193 and their respective counterparts SA 253, 248.<sup>124</sup> However, these are not saying “All exists”; they are merely asserting the existence of

121 CSA i, p. 406 note 2, and “RESA”, p. 57.

122 SN iv, pp. 171-172.

123 T 2, p. 311b-c (CSA i, p. 322).

124 SN iv, pp. 123-124, 166-167. T 2, pp. 62a-b, 59b-c, (CSA i, pp. 307, 297).

something in present time. Teachings that could be construed as affirming the existence of all three times are not found in SN.

(2) SA 306 (no SN counterpart) states that the sense spheres and derived phenomena are:<sup>125</sup> “impermanent 無常, compounded 有爲,<sup>126</sup> arising conditioned by thought 思願緣生”.<sup>127</sup> In SA 214, 241, and 1169 the wording is not significantly different. There the phenomena in question are:<sup>128</sup> “impermanent 無常, compounded 有爲, arising conditioned by mind 心緣生”<sup>129</sup> (SA 214); or “phenomena arising conditioned by mind 心緣生法” (SA 241); or “arising caused and conditioned by mind 心因緣生” (SA 1169).

However, the SN counterparts of these three have quite different wording. SN 35. 93 (counterpart of SA 214) has “impermanent (anicca), changing (vipariṇāmi), becoming otherwise (aññathā-bhāvi)”,<sup>130</sup> SN 194 (counterpart of SA 241) has only “impermanent” (anicca),<sup>131</sup> and SN 205 (counterpart of SA 1169) has: “whatever there is of “I”, or “I am”, or “mine”, none of that exists for him” (Ahan ti vā Maman ti vā Asmīti vā tam pi tassa na hoṭīti).<sup>132</sup>

Thus, the expressions “arising conditioned by thought”, “arising conditioned by mind” and so on of the SA versions are lacking in SN; and, as noted in Chapter 2, these expressions suggest a connection with the teaching of conditioned arising by “mind-only” (vijñapti-mātratā or citta-mātra), associated with the Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) school.<sup>133</sup> The difference in wording may, therefore, reflect sectarian influence.

(3) A suspicious example of unshared content is the protective verse and mantra present in SA 252<sup>134</sup> but not in its counterpart SN 35. 69.<sup>135</sup>

Both versions give an account of a bhikṣu being bitten by a poisonous snake while meditating in a cave. The bhikṣu is able to maintain his composure because he has seen the non-selfhood of the six internal sense

125 T 2, p. 88 (CSA i, p. 390).

126 Skt. saṃskṛta?

127 Skt. sañcetayīta-pratītya-samutpanna?

128 T 2, pp. 54a, 58b, 312c (CSA i, pp. 263, 290, 328).

129 Skt. citta-pratītya-samutpanna?

130 SN iv, pp. 67-68.

131 SN iv, pp. 170-171.

132 SN iv, p. 198.

133 See Chapter 2, pp. 70-71.

134 T 2, pp. 60c-61b (CSA i, pp. 302-304). The fragmentary Sanskrit text of SA 252 has been reconstructed by Ernst WALDSCHMIDT in “Das Upasenasūtra, ein Zauber gegen Schlangenbiß aus dem Saṃyuktāgama” *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* (Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 1957), pp. 37-42.

135 SN iv, pp. 40-41.