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AESTHETIC RAPTURE


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DECCAN COLLEGE
Postgraduate and Research Institute
POONA
1970

AESTHETIC RAPTURE

THE RASADHYAYA OF THE NATYASAstra
In Two Volumes
VOL. I : TEXT

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PART I
EARLY INDIAN IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF
BEAUTY IN LITERATURE

I—THE NĀṬYAŚĀSTRA

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata is the oldest known Indian work on the theory of literature. Several editions of it exist¹ and there is a complete translation into English.² While an exact date seems out of the question,³ we are inclined to date the text to within two or three hundred years of the third century A.D.. The influence of this book on both drama and literary criticism cannot be exaggerated.⁴ There is good reason to believe that of all the chapters in this enormous work,⁵ the most important is the sixth chapter on *rasa*, "aesthetic or imaginative experience". This is so because throughout the whole of the *Nṣ* Bharata subordinates other elements in the drama to *rasa*,⁶ and explicitly states: "Without *rasa* no dramatic device is of any importance".⁷ It is clear that Bharata drew on earlier works which dealt with the theme of *rasa*, though we seriously doubt whether these were ever available to any later writer.⁸ (Let us remember that until the first known commentary on the *Nṣ*, that of Udbhata,⁹ there is a gap of at least five hundred years, and that the first work imitating Bharata, the *Daśarūpaka*¹⁰ was not written until the tenth century).

Clearly the author of the *Nṣ* must have had before him a large repertoire of plays,¹¹ though no drama earlier than the *Nṣ* has come down to us.¹² The *Bhāsa* plays seem to date from about the same time as the *Nṣ*,¹³ but the fact that they do not invariably follow the rules laid down by the *Nṣ*¹⁴ might mean no more than that they follow a different tradition¹⁵ or that we exaggerate when we say that later writers followed the *Nṣ* in all details.¹⁶ The work seems to have been meant primarily for the poet and the director,¹⁷ though obviously many passages are intended for the actor as well.¹⁸ "Literary criticism" such as we know it today, or indeed, even as Ānandavardhana knew it in the ninth century, was not the intention of Bharata.¹⁹ Still, a close acquaintance with the actual verses and the technical terms of the sixth *adhyaṃya* is an absolute necessity for any

student of classical Sanskrit literature, and in fact for anybody who wishes to understand one of the most sensitive and profound theories of drama ever created. Thus we felt that a new and more exact translation of this chapter in addition to the passages from the *Abhinavabhāratī*, never previously translated, was a need long overdue.

The text of the NS while fairly well established,²⁰ is not always as clear as many have assumed, and there are a considerable number of passages where it is not exactly certain what Bharata meant.²¹ In a number of places it is obvious that even Abhinava was not always sure of his interpretation,²² thus making it likely that there has been a break in the teaching tradition. His commentary is the only one that has come down to us and while it is brilliant, it is also unlike any other commentary in that we cannot depend on it to give us the literal meaning of the verses in the original. Abhinava despised the idea of writing a *Tīkā* which he considered fit only for children.²³ Since information on the NS in general is not hard to come by,²⁴ let us now turn to the commentary of Abhinavagupta on which information is extremely scarce.

II—THE ABHINAVABHARATĪ²⁵

The difficulty of Abhinavagupta's writings is proverbial. But the difficulty of the text of the *Dharmavāloka*, Abhinava's commentary on the *Dharmavāloka* of Ānandavardhana²⁶ is of a very different order from the difficulty of the text of the *Abhinavabhāratī*. It is true that the *Locana* cannot be read the way one reads the D.ĀI., with immediate comprehension. But if one persists long enough and becomes thoroughly acquainted with Abhinava's own particular use of language, most of the *Locana* becomes intelligible. Very different, however, is the case with the A.Bh. To us, most of the four volumes remain a sealed book. While we have gone through them searching for passages that would be of interest to the reader concerned with Abhinava's theory of beauty, we found that most of the possible passages we chose for translation had to be abandoned in despair as being too obscure to derive any good sense from them. There are several reasons for this

situation : first of all naturally are our own limitations. But more important is the fact that the text of the A.Bh. has been far less well preserved than the text of the *Locana*. This becomes obvious if we compare the commentary on the sixth *adhyaṃya* to the commentaries on later chapters : it is in relatively better shape than later passages primarily because it was considered of such importance by subsequent writers that most of them made attempts to preserve the ideas and even the language of this section and undoubtedly they had access to more correct manuscripts than we now possess.²⁷ In particular, the long section on the *rasasūtra*, edited by Gnoli²⁸ and preserved *in toto* by Hemacandra,²⁹ is, while still a very difficult text, more intelligible than the rest of the chapter. The first editor of the text, Ramakrishna Kavi, remarked³⁰ : "... even if Abhinavagupta descended from Heaven and saw the MSS. he would not easily restore his original reading."

The only other works on literary criticism that have been preserved of Abhinava are his commentary on the D.ĀI., and also a short commentary on the *Chaitanyaparakāya*³¹ of little importance. He wrote a commentary on an original work by his teacher Bhaṭṭatauta, the *Kāvyakautuka*, but neither work has survived.³² It is also possible that he wrote a commentary on Ānanda's lost *Tattvavāloka*³³ though there is no positive evidence that he did so.

There can be little doubt that Abhinava is the greatest name in Sanskrit literary criticism, along with Ānandavardhana. If De³⁴ and Kane³⁵ (who calls him "One of the most remarkable personalities of medieval India") give only a page or two to his actual doctrines, this must be explained by the impenetrability of his language and the enormous difficulties that beset the reader of either the *Locana* or the A.Bh. For later writers on Sanskrit aesthetics, there is no more important name than Abhinava. Mammata is indebted to Abhinava on almost every page of his *Kāvyaprakāśa*, and Hemacandra openly says that all his doctrines derive ultimately from Abhinavagupta.³⁶ A few more examples will not be out of place : the rich *Bhāva*prakāśana of Śāradātanaya admits its

Abhinava freely.³⁷ Kṣemendra the prolific critic and poet was Abhinava's disciple.³⁸ The famous *Śaṅketa* commentary of Maṇikyacandra on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* speaks of Abhinava as the guru par excellence³⁹ and one would be hard put to find a later writer who did not agree. It seems to us that the whole of the Bengal Vaiṣṇava school of poetics (and not only poetics, but philosophy as well) was heavily influenced by the teachings of Abhinavagupta and the tradition he follows, though nobody writing on the Bengal school has noticed this fact or tried to follow its lead. It is true that the Goṣāmins do not quote Abhinava directly, but we think his influence is quite clear.⁴⁰ The *Alaṅkāraśaṣṭī* of Kaviṛāṇapūra⁴¹ which is the primary source for the Bengal Vaiṣṇava school of poetics, is much indebted to Ānanda and Abhinava.⁴² The editor of this text, the late Sreemadrasa Bhattacharya, one of the great *ālaṅkārikas* of this century, saw this fact very well as is clear from his Sanskrit commentary.⁴³ Abhinava was the first author to look in a complex and serious manner, religion and poetics, and later authors all followed his lead.⁴⁴ His very phrases were copied, even in contexts where his views are not being pronounced.⁴⁵ His terminology became standard to the point where it is not possible to pick up any book on literary criticism after the twelfth century and not come across expressions like : *hydosomavāda* (sympathetic imagination, rapport), *tanmayibhāve* (complete identification), *cervanū* (aesthetic relish), *abakṣeravaiṭkāra* (extraordinary artistic beauty), *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (universality) and so forth, all of which are for the first time carefully elaborated by Abhinavagupta. What is even more interesting is that later philosophers, especially in the school of Kashmir Śaivism, began to use these same terms in their works on philosophy. One has only to look at a work like Maheśvarānanda's *Mahāsthānamāñjarī*⁴⁶ to see Abhinava's influence. Not only are his own students, like the brilliant Kṣemarāja for example (in his commentary on the *Vijñānabhairava*;⁴⁷) won over, but even orthodox Advaitins from the South, such as Madhusūdanarasvati, many years later, use his terminology.⁴⁸

III ABHINAVA'S TEACHERS AND HIS DEBT TO EARLIER WRITERS.

At the beginning of the A.Bh. Abhinava refers to a "chief of the Nāstikas".⁴⁹ From a verse in the *Tantrāloka*⁵⁰ we learn that in his passion for knowledge, Abhinava studied with almost every teacher of repute that he could find. It is clear from his works that he was intimately familiar with Buddhist doctrines⁵¹ for which he had an unusual respect. The authors who had written on poetics before the time of Abhinavagupta and whose works have come down to us, are not that many : Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhata, Rājaśekhara, Rudraṭa and Ānandavardhana. All of these authors are quoted by Abhinava.⁵² Among lost works, he knew the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* of Bhaṭṭanāyaka,⁵³ Udbhata's *Bhāṇavivaraṇa*,⁵⁴ Bhaṭṭa's autā's *Kāvyakautika*,⁵⁵ Ānandavardhana's *Tattvāloka*,⁵⁶ and a number of commentaries on the NṢ,⁵⁷ all lost today. Of these commentaries, it appears that only Śaṅkuka, Lollata, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Bhaṭṭatauta wrote on the theory of aesthetic enjoyment at any length and it seems to us precisely these four writers who had the deepest influence on Abhinava.⁵⁸

Abhinava is quite candid about the help he has taken from earlier writers. After the section in the A.Bh. where he gives the views of these earlier writers on *rasāsuvāda*, just before introducing his own position, he has four verses acknowledging his debt to earlier writers. These verses are not easy but they are of great importance. Abhinava explains that he is building his own theories on the foundations laid by others. His views only refine on what has been said earlier, they do not contradict it. The first verse⁵⁹ is corrupt, and we cannot derive any satisfactory sense from it. The second verse⁶⁰ we translate as follows :

"The fact that intellectual curiosity climbs higher and higher without getting tired and is able to see (more and more clearly) the truth, is due to the ladders of thought constructed by earlier writers".

Here is what ~~we consider~~ to be the correct translation of the third verse.⁵¹

"The first (attempts at) crossing the ocean of knowledge, since they are not supported by any (past attempts), are indeed marvellous. But ~~once~~ (the pioneers) have shown the correct path, we no longer feel ~~the need~~ to build a bridge, or even a city, is such a marvellous achievement."

All that Abhinava is saying here is that the first crossing is the really difficult one. Once that is achieved, those who follow may indeed improve by building bridges and towns, but still it is the first attempt that entrances us the most. The first half of the last verse we translate as follows :

"Therefore I have not found fault with the theories of other good men, I have only refined upon them."⁵² The last line is obscure : *jñānānugāhikāpīyājñānu mūlapratīṣṭhā-bhānam āmananti*. The idea however is clear : later opinions depend on work done earlier.

Before looking at Abhinava's debt to these writers, let us consider, briefly⁵³ how Abhinava's preoccupations differ from those of Ānandavardhana, the most obvious influence on his thought : It is a curious fact that nowhere in the D.Āl. does Ānanda provide any theory of *rasa*; he does not define *rasa*, nor does he deal with it in philosophical terms. For Abhinava, on the other hand, *rasa* provides the focal point about which the larger part of his theories on literature are arrayed. It is in dealing with *rasa* that he uses his famous terminology that will later dominate Skt. poetics : *hṛdayānu-praveśa*, *tāṭasthya*, *visṛānti*, *ātmanānanda* etc. In fact, in general, Abhinava is far more interested in philosophical issues than is Ānanda. Thus while Ānanda uses the term *sahdaya* (e.g. p. 23 of the D.Āl.⁵⁴) he never defines it, whereas Abhinava does⁵⁵ : "Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, since the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant recitation and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts, are known as sensitive readers (*sahdaya*).". The same is true of his treatment of *vṛttipāṭi* and *pṛiṭi*, important issues on which the

D.Āl. is more or less silent.⁵⁶ In many cases Abhinava goes into much greater detail than Ānanda does. For example, he provides illustrations of *bhāva*, *bhāvābhāsa* and even *rasābhāsa*, none of which are explained or illustrated in the D.Āl. In general one sees that Abhinava is far more concerned with the drama than with *Kāvya*,⁵⁷ whereas Ānanda's concern seems to be primarily with *Kāvya*. Thus Abhinava stresses over and over again that of the three major varieties of *dhvani* (*vastudhvani*, *alanikāradhvani* and *rasadhvani*), the first two are not really valuable in themselves, but only in so far as they lead to *rasadhvani*, which they always ultimately do.⁵⁸ It is true that Ānanda (and even the *Kārikābhāṣya*, thus see IV; 5 of the D. Āl.), give prime importance to *rasadhvani*, but Ānanda never sees *vastudhvani* and *alanikāradhvani* as only aspects of *rasadhvani*, as does Abhinava. We believe that Abhinava's great interest in the drama stems from his deep concern with Tantric ritual⁵⁹ (a preoccupation almost certainly not shared by Ānanda), and the religious significance of aesthetic experiences. *Vastudhvani* cannot of course make any such exalted claims. More often that not it deals with the theme of a woman trying to make a traveller understand that she wants to sleep with him. While Abhinava seems in no way disturbed by such verses, he reserves his greatest praise for moments in the drama when the spectator is able to enter so deeply into the imaginative magic created by the verses that he transcends his own personality. In fact it is doubtful whether Abhinava's greatest achievement in literary criticism, the likening of imaginative experience with *ātmanānanda* or mystic ecstasy, would have been acceptable to Ānanda. Certainly there is no evidence at all that the author of the *Kārikās* would have been interested. Even if Ānanda was a Kashmir Saiva (for which there is no evidence either for or against, except perhaps that it would be odd for a Śaiva to invoke Viṣṇu at the beginning of his work, as Ānanda does), he seems to have been less preoccupied than Abhinava with issues stemming directly from religious convictions. Abhinavagupta is the first writer in India to deal with issues of religion in terms of literary criticism and vice-versa. This marks his greatest departure from Ānanda as indeed from all earlier writers.

In discussing Lollata⁷⁰ in whose views Abhinava does not seem terribly interested,⁷¹ one of the major problems is to decide whether his commentary on the NŚ (as well as those of Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Bhaṭṭanta) were available to the later tradition. The *Śaṅketa* on the *Kāyaśraṅkāśa* says: "These views can be known in detail from the commentaries written by Lollata and others on *rasa*!"⁷² which would seem to indicate that these texts were still available at the time of Māṇḍyaśandra (12th cen.). On the other hand, a verse which he either quotes or composes about Abhinavagupta could indicate that all his information comes from the A.Bh. (and the *Locana*), for he says that other authors may say whatever they like about *rasa*, but only Abhinavagupta knows the real essence of *rasa*.⁷³ Narendraprabhāsūri in his *Alaṅkāraśaṅketa* quotes from Lollata and others, but are not these quotations paraphrases of his own based on Abhinava? In view of such phrases as *iti bhāṭṭalollataprabhītya* where the "etc." is perfect copy of Abhinava (as are most of the phrases these later writers use), we feel this is most likely. In the whole of later literature no more than three or four verses of Lollata are ever quoted. The two most important of these verses are quoted by Hemacandra⁷⁴ and by Namiśādhi⁷⁵ and deserve a translation. When Hemacandra introduces the stanzas he speaks of the special effort required in writing artificial poetry⁷⁶ and approves of Lollata's censure. Here are the verses:⁷⁸

"As for the effort involved in describing rivers, mountains, oceans, trees, horses, cities, etc., in long works, whose only point is to proclaim the descriptive power of the poet, this is not highly thought of by those of broad intellects".

"The different varieties of rhyme, the feat of composing a stanza in such a way that its wording remains unchanged whether it is read forward or backward, *calarabandha* and the like are very much opposed to *rasa*. A poet (foolishly) engages in them either because he is, conceived or because he follows convention as blindly as sheep."⁷⁹

Clearly in Kashmir in the ninth century there was a strong movement against the kind of poetry that was being produced throughout India at the time⁸⁰ and Abhinava did not fail to be deeply influenced by these pleas against the trivialisation of the artistic experience.⁸¹ But on the basis of these few verses it is not possible to say that there were authors who had access to the original work of Lollata (indeed, are we certain that even Abhinava knew it personally? Could not this commentary, as well as others, have existed only as an oral teaching that would last only as long as it attracted adherents?). It is possible, and in fact probable, that certain important verses, such as the above, were remembered and passed on without the whole work necessarily being copied. Most literary critics must have felt, to our immense loss, the way Narendraprabhāsūri did, that the more complete exposition of Abhinava did away with any need to retain the work of Lollata.

Śaṅkuka

On the subject of Abhinava's debt to previous writers, it would seem that the major ideas which he was to refine and weave into a complex and delicate system already existed, even if only in a less developed form. Thus the observation that *rasa* is suggested should be credited of course to Ānandavardhana. But other, more subtle ideas, seem to originate with other writers before Abhinava. Let us consider the case of Śaṅkuka.⁸² Abhinava⁸³ stresses the fact that during an actual aesthetic experience, we are not conscious of what he calls *paurvāparavimarsa* which for Abhinava does not mean "sequence", but rather "propriety" (it is thus synonymous with *aucitya*). He means that a poem may be describing something that in non-literary contexts we would regard as "obscene" or "indecent" or "improper" but such notions would not occur to us during the actual reading (or witnessing of the play), for we are immersed in the secondary world of the work.⁸⁴ Now Śaṅkuka has an idea which may well lie at the root of this theory. He says⁸⁵ that during a play, although the *abhinaya*, the acting and all its gestures, is arti-

śrī *krīṇa*), or imitation (*anukāra*), still the spectator because he is immersed in the drama, is not conscious of this fact. Another idea for which Abhinava may be indebted to Śaṅkuka is the notion of *alanīkajñāna* in the theatre. The passage in the A.Bh. where Śaṅkuka's view is mentioned is somewhat obscure⁸⁸ but we think that Śaṅkuka is asking what kind of knowledge (*prāpti*) we have in the theatre. In other words, when looking at a play, what sort of feelings do we have about the reality of what we are witnessing? Now Śaṅkuka takes the four ordinary types of knowledge, *saṃjag-jñāna* etc. and shows that none of these are applicable to the dramatic experience. What kind of knowledge then is applicable? It is here that Śaṅkuka is most obscure, but if we have understood him correctly, he seems to be saying that the knowledge we have is *alanīkika*, i.e. there is no parallel to it in ordinary life.⁸⁹ This is also Abhinava's position in the A. Bh.⁸⁸ There seems to us a sense in which Śaṅkuka (who is really only following Lollata here for Lollata says, on p. 272, A. Bh., Vol. I : *sthāyīveva vibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacīto rasah*) is more faithful to Bharata than is Abhinava. For in the NS at VII. 122 (p. 379), Bharata⁹⁰ has the important line : *sthāyīveva tu raso bhavet*. Thus the idea of a *sthāyin* being *upacīta* (i.e. *poṣita*, developed) till it becomes a *rasa* seems to be Bharata's view (and one would expect Bharata to have held a fairly simple view.) Abhinava⁹⁰ rejects Śaṅkuka's view, saying that the words used by Bharata are not to be understood literally, but in a secondary sense (*aucītya*).

Strangely enough, in one passage⁹¹ Abhinava seems to accept the "*upacāya*" view, as well as the "*anukāra*" view so vigorously rejected by Bhaṭṭatauta. Abhinava does not explain, but leaves us with the tantalising words that the "imitation" theory receives support from the Viṣṇānavāda !

Bhaṭṭatauta

The assumption that Abhinava's work made superfluous the writings of his predecessors—all of whom held rival theories—is plausible as an explanation for their mysterious disappearance

from Sanskrit literature, but it breaks down when we come to the work of his teacher, Bhaṭṭatauta. From the few quotations preserved from his lost *Kāvya-kautuka*, it is apparent that it had an immense impact on Abhinava's thought, and we can think of no reason why it should have disappeared. As with Lollata, the question is, when did it disappear? It is possible to claim that the verses preserved by the later tradition were not taken directly from the work itself, but were stray verses remembered for their quality. Four of these verses recently came to light in Śrīdhara's newly discovered commentary on the *Kāvya-prakāśa* (96-100).⁹²

Another quotation from Tauta preserved again exclusively in the Śrīdhara commentary⁹³ emphasises the importance of *rasa* by showing that *alanīkās* are not the essence of poetry : "Bracelets and necklaces cannot be essential to a man as bravery and generosity are."

This implies that "external ornaments" such as figures of speech etc. cannot replace the essential *guṇas*, which in their turn depend on *rasa*. In this Tauta only follows Ānanda.⁹⁴ In reading through the section of the A.Bh. that deals with Tauta's views, it is not clear precisely where these views end.⁹⁵ The notion of *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* generally ascribed to Bhaṭṭanāyaka,⁹⁶ is also found though in less developed form, in the exposition of Bhaṭṭatauta's views. Thus on p. 275, Vol. I, it is said : *nartakāntare 'pi ca rāmo'yam iti pratīpatir asti. tataś ca rāmatvam sāmānyarūpam ity āyātam*. The idea seems to be that "this is Rāma" (*ayam rāmah*) is a perception of a general nature, and not of the individual Rāma (since no actor has actually seen Rāma, which is an argument that Tauta uses to show that there can be no "imitation"—*anukāra*—of Rāma since imitation implies an original of which we have immediate knowledge.⁹⁷) Abhinava's notion of *tanmayābhāva* (total identification) is not very different from *hrīdaya-samvāda* (sympathetic imagination) as it is understood by Tauta. Thus there is an important passage⁹⁸ in the A.Bh. where Tauta speaks of three things upon which an actor depends : his training, remembering his own past feelings, and identifying himself with the original character (i.e. sympathy).

The actor, it appears, must be conscious of his being an actor. He is not, according to Tauta, conscious of his doing an imitation however. At least this is how we interpret the difficult passage. The poetry is heightened (*udpacita*) by the actor's intonation (*hanta*) etc., but according to Tauta he only displays the *ambhāva* of the original character. Tauta says that the sympathetic imagination on the part of the actor is due to *atyāstisādhārambhāva*, which ultimately comes down to *kaṇḍayibhāva*. Since an actor has the same basic feelings as the characters in a drama, he is able to sympathise with their feelings completely. On one important point Abhinava seems to disagree with Tauta though he does not say so explicitly. Abhinava's position, as we shall see in detail, lays great emphasis on the fact that the experience of *rasa* is something that is *alaukika*, not really of this world, and beyond our concepts of time and space. It only takes place in the realm of literature, and never in real life. Thus Abhinava assures us that Bharata invented an entirely new vocabulary in order to deal with the elements of this order of reality: *vibhāva* instead of *kāraṇa*, *ambhāva* instead of *kārya*, *vyabhicāribhāva* instead of *sahakāri*, etc. Thus it is obvious that Abhinava would care to deny that the original characters, Rāma, Yuddhiṣṭhira etc. ever had feelings that we could describe as *rasa*, except in so far as they were spectators of their own deeds. Now Abhinava introduces an important remark of Bhaṭṭatauta with the following statement.⁹⁹ :

"This imaginative faculty of the poet is not to be only inferred (by the sensitive reader) as existing in the poet, rather it is directly experienced because the spectator himself is over-come with *rasa*. "He then quotes Tauta: "As our teacher Bhaṭṭatauta has said :

"The experience of the hero, of the poet and of the spectator are (one and) the same."

Bhaṭṭanāyaka

The passages from Bhaṭṭanāyaka found in later literature have all been collected together.¹⁰⁰ We have discussed the

most important of these in our book on Śāntarasa.¹⁰¹ There is nothing in the passages quoted in the A.Bh. that calls for special mention.¹⁰²

The late P. K. Gode mistakenly thought he discovered a verse of BN in the *Kāvyapradīpa*¹⁰³ – and in this he was followed by De¹⁰⁴ – though in fact the verse existed all along.¹⁰⁵ But the verse is interesting in its own right and deserves a translation :

"We speak, generally, of poetry, even where flaws exist, as long as there is clear evidence of *rasa*, just as a jewel does not cease to be a jewel even if a worm bores a small hole into it."

Rājasekhara

A possible influence upon Abhinava that has not so far been noticed is Rājasekhara's remarkable work, the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*. Abhinava knew Rājasekhara for his *Kārpūra-mañjarī*,¹⁰⁶ but nowhere, oddly enough, does Abhinava mention the KM. It is thus not possible to claim with certainty that Abhinava knew the following passages, but they are important enough to merit quoting in their own right. As is usual in the KM,¹⁰⁷ Rājasekhara has entirely new things to say about *rasa*. Thus he quotes Aparājitī (which may be simply another name for Lollāta –¹⁰⁸

"One should not include in a poem too many (descriptions) of bathing, picking flowers, sunsets, moon-rise, etc., even though they be lovely in themselves, if they are not directly relevant to the major *rasa* (being suggested in the poem)."

He already said : "It may well be that the caravan of ideas (source material) is never ending. Still a work should not be devoid of *rasa*, rather it *must* contain *rasa*. "Yes", says Yāyavaiya (Rājasekhara himself). It is a matter of experience that ideas are (sometimes) favourable to *rasa* and sometimes unfavourable to *rasa*. In a poem, however, it is the words of the poet (i.e. the manner of expression) that endow a poem with *rasa*¹⁰⁹ or deprive it of *rasa*, and not the ideas in the poem." He then quotes a verse (or composes it).¹¹⁰

"A bad poet, even in love in separation (where emotions are easily aroused) manages to avoid a true aesthetic experience. Whether there is *rasa* in the original subject-matter or not is of no importance. What counts is that it be in the words of the poet!"

He then quotes one Palyakīrti¹¹¹: "Never mind what form the subject-matter takes (i.e. the subject can be anything at all). *Rasa* resides in the character of the speaker. This is why a man in love will praise something that a man who is not in love will revile, whereas a third man, indifferent, will not feel anything at all."

Rājasekhara then quotes his wife, Avantisundarī¹¹²: "The form of any subject depends on the skilful manner in which it is conveyed. No subject has any permanent form."

He quotes a verse of hers (?):

"The subject-matter is independent of the poet. (i.e. he should not be concerned with it). Merit and demerit depend on the linguistic skill of the poet. Thus one poet, in praise, will say that the moon is "full of ambrosial rays", whereas another clever man will fault it, saying it is "a mine of flaws" (also: "night-maker").

IV - THE POETIC UNIVERSE

It has become something of a cliché to remark that the Indians include both prose (*śūlīya*) and verse (*padya*) in their definitions of poetry.¹¹³ But we should note that the illustrations of "poetry" rarely come from prose works, they are almost always taken either from *saṃgābandhas* (*mahābandhas*), or are isolated stanzas (*mukākas*), poetic "miniatures" as they have been called.¹¹⁴ Much more important from the Indian point of view is the way we react to poetry, what poetry brings to the reader. And this impact of poetry is the same whether the poetry in question is a verse or a play. For Abhinava (taking his hint from Bharata¹¹⁵) does not distinguish "poetry" from "drama."¹¹⁶

In any definition of poetry according to Indian standards, at least three considerations must play an important role: How does poetry differ from other forms of expression? What

is the purpose of poetry? What does the appreciation of poetry lead to? The answer to the last question is *rasa*, or *rasāsvāda*, the most important concept in Indian poetics, for which we have reserved the whole of the next section. In answering the first question we must keep in mind the influence of the D.Āl. Throughout the D.Āl. runs a common theme: poetry is created by a verbal power so far unrecognised. At every available opportunity Ānanda comes back to the linguistic functions (*śabdavyāpāra*) *abhidhā* (denotation) and *gunavrtti* or *lakṣanā*, secondary usage. One can understand this preoccupation, for it is only when it can be shown that these two *śaktis* are incapable of explaining the origin of serious poetry that we are ready to admit a third, hitherto unnamed power of language; suggestion (*vyañjana*).¹¹⁷ This is not the place to go into detail about Ānanda's achievement¹¹⁸ in this realm, but directly relevant to the delimitation of poetry is the way that Abhinavagupta improves upon the reasoning Ānanda employs to distinguish suggestivity from denotation and secondary usage. Central to the argument is a qualification that Ānanda and Abhinava have added to their criteria for poetry which has not previously been noted and which deserves some comment. The common example of secondary usage: *ganīgāyān ghosaḥ* has often been given as an example of "suggestion".¹¹⁹ But this is in fact an error whose source sheds interesting light on what Abhinava and Ānanda mean by "poetry". The mistake lies in confusing the function of suggestion with the actual achievement of poetry. The mere fact that we are able to suggest something does not mean that we have written a poem.¹²⁰ Now *ganīgāyān ghosaḥ* is generally given as an example of *lakṣanā*,¹²¹ for the locative case in *ganīgā* means, by *gunavrtti*, *ganīgāne ghosaḥ* (where *ganīgā* is the *lakṣyarthā*). But the example is further qualified by saying that it is *prayojanavati lakṣanā*, secondary usage that has a special purpose, and this "purpose" is to "suggest" the purity and coolness of the village.¹²² Is not this then enough to have written a poem? The later tradition (followed by Western writers) has often mistakenly thought yes. But in fact a careful reading of the D.Āl. and the *Locana* will show that this is not the case. For Ānanda says explicitly¹²³ and the

Locana too is clear on this, that what makes a poem is "beauty" and not merely suggestion. The key word here is *cārvataprāñī* for which Abhinava adds the fine expression : *viśrāntisthāna*, that which affords the reader aesthetic repose.

Here is the *Locana*¹²⁴ : "Objection : How can there be a secondary use of words without suggestion, for earlier you yourself said : *mukhyān vṛttiṇi parivṛtya* etc. There is no secondary usage of words without a purpose, and you yourself have said that the function of *vyañjanā* is always responsible for conveying the element in the form of the purpose (of the secondary usage). In order to answer this objection, Ānandavardhana says that the suggestiveness intended by him, namely that which can afford aesthetic repose (to the reader) is not present (in such examples as *gaṅgāyān ghosaḥ* and *agnir mānavakah*) (because they do not possess sufficient beauty)."

Thus what is really essential to poetry is the creation of beauty. Abhinava notes this in the *Locana* on the first Uddyota¹²⁵ : "As for what has been said (by a critic) : 'Then the perception of beauty will be the soul of poetry', we actually accept this. The only dispute is about the name (i.e. whether to call this *cārvataprāñī* or to call it *dhvani*). Abhinava brings out the implication of this difference between "suggestion" and other unusual uses of language, and this difference lies at the very heart of poetry. Suggestion cannot be pressed into intellectual service, for its sphere of operation is totally distinct from verbal powers that satisfy purely intellectual needs. When we use a phrase like : *agnir mānavakah* (lit. "the boy is a fire") we do not mean it literally, for both words cannot be in the nominative case and yet be separate entities. What we mean is that the two entities share certain qualities, i.e. that there is a *sādṛśya* between them : both blaze up easily, i.e. what we really mean is : "The boy is quick-tempered" or even "fiery". Abhinava, in one of his most brilliant passages, shows how suggestion is different from yet another function of language, namely "*arthāpatti*", (in which we presume something not stated, to be the case)¹²⁶ : "The second (i.e. suggested) meaning (e.g., "The boy is brilliant like fire") only serves to explain away the contradiction involved in identifying two distinct things, as in presumption based on a report".

(We "hear" the phrase : *pīno devadattah divā na bhunkte* - "Devadatta, who is fat, does not eat during the day," and presume that he must therefore eat at night. This presumed knowledge only serves to explain away the contradiction inherent in the original phrase. It serves no aesthetic purpose). "Beautiful" means "that which gives rise to aesthetic repose." In the absence of that the function of suggestion cannot unfold itself, because, recoiling backwards, it comes to rest in the literal sense itself (i.e. it spends its power in justifying the literal sense). It is like a man who sees heavenly wealth for one moment only, and the next moment it is gone."¹²⁷ Abhinava means that suggestion, if given its proper scope, would carry us deeper and deeper into a poem, but if hampered by other considerations, it is emasculated and merely performs an intellectual function. One is on the brink of a true aesthetic experience in such cases, but the lack of beauty in the original frustrates the possibilities about to open up (perhaps this is why Abhinava compares a true aesthetic experience to a flower in full bloom). It is clear from these passages that one of the great unspoken criteria for poetry is the subjective one of artistic beauty. Abhinava makes this clear when he insists on the fact that *rasa* (which is only the result of poetry) is not something "certain" (*niyata*). Ānanda¹²⁸ and Abhinava¹²⁹ make the important point that the conditions for understanding direct utterances are less complex than are those required in understanding suggestive utterances. They explain that once we are taught the lexical meaning of a given word, its denotative scope is fixed (*niyata*),¹³⁰ for convention, which lies at the root of denotation, is limited. The suggested meaning is however completely unfixed (*aniyata*), since it depends on intangibles like the culture of the reader, the situation depicted, the person speaking, etc.¹³¹ Ānanda quotes again the important verse of the DĀI.¹³² where we are told that a mere knowledge of the lexical meanings of words is not sufficient for understanding their hidden suggestions.¹³³ Now this subjective element makes possible the introduction of a whole new vocabulary, for once we are dealing with an individual's response to poetry, such subjective words as *camatkāra* and *ānanda* make sense, for as Abhinava says, in a lovely passage¹³⁴ : "In literature the

aesthetic relish (of the suggested sense) through the verbal paraphernalia (of a drama) is like (the blossoming) of a magic flower; it is essentially a thing of the present moment which does not depend on past or future time."¹³⁵ It would seem that Ānanda uses *camatkāra* for the first time.¹³⁶ After that it becomes very common¹³⁷ and the later tradition¹³⁸ very often associates *camatkāra* and *ānanda*.¹³⁹ This is the whole point of the *Camatkāracandrikā* of Viśveśvarakavicaṇḍa.¹⁴⁰ The position is summed up by an oft-quoted verse of a relative of Viśvanātha.¹⁴¹ :

"The essence of *rasa* is aesthetic delight (*camatkāra*) and it is found in all the *rasas*".

This is also why the audience for poetry is restricted. For poetry, as Abhinava never tires of telling us, is not philosophy. The Saṅkṛdaya's heart is often said to "melt" (*dravati*).¹⁴² Whereas the heart of the "scholar" has become hardened and encrusted by his readings of dry texts on metaphysics.¹⁴³ As Abhinava's learned commentator¹⁴⁴ tells us : "The person fit for (appreciating poetry) is the one whose state of being a saṅkṛya (i.e. sympathetic responsiveness) has reached its highest pitch. This only applies to some people, not to all, for we find that Mīmāṃsakas and Vedic scholars are simply not sensitive to literature".

Poetry, Abhinava tells us, is like a woman in love¹⁴⁵ and should be responded to with equal love. Abhinava repeats the fine smile of the NṢ,¹⁴⁶ that the reader is like dry wood, and poetry like fire. He adds a smile of his own : good poetry is like a clean cloth dipped into pure water : the cloth quickly absorbs the water.¹⁴⁷ When we know all this it becomes fairly easy to predict what Abhinava will regard as the goal of poetry : delight,¹⁴⁸ with a nod in the direction of intellectual refinement.¹⁴⁹ In this he is not really departing from the text of the NṢ, for both of these goals, with emphasis on the former, are already mentioned in the NṢ in several important verses : Already in the first *adhyaṃya*, the gods approach Brahmā and tell him : "We want something to amuse us. Something we

can see and listen to (at the same time)".¹⁵⁰ Brahmā agrees to create drama : "Since these Vedas cannot be heard by women, by Śūdras and other classes, I will create a fifth Veda, different from these, that will be for *all* people. I will create a fifth Veda called "drama" out of past stories (ītiḥāsa), that will lead to righteousness, to material gain, to fame, with good advice and full of wise sayings (saṅgraha?). It will display the deeds of all people in the world to come. It will be enriched by the subject-matter of all sciences and allow scope for all kinds of arts and crafts (associated with the theatre)".¹⁵¹ When the demons complain that the play performed in heaven shows them in a prejudiced light, Brahmā says that the drama is perfectly impartial and favours no one group over any other.¹⁵² :

"In the drama, neither you nor the gods are exclusively presented. The drama is an imitation (or "presentation," *anukṛtana*) of the emotions found in all the three worlds."

"Sometimes (it shows) dharmā, sometimes play, sometimes material gain, and sometimes (mystic) peace. Sometimes (it depicts) comic situations, sometimes battles, sometimes sexual love and sometimes slaughter." Later¹⁵³ Bharata will say that the drama is *vinodakarma*,¹⁵⁴ i.e. it creates entertainment. Brahmā writes a drama about Śiva, and together with Bharata and his actors, they go the mountain "abounding in beautiful caves and waterfalls" where Śiva lived, and performed the play for his benefit. Śiva is delighted and says¹⁵⁵ :

"This play makes me remember the dance I dance at sunset. With its many movements of the limbs, such varied kinds ! — it is most lovely. Use it in your *Purvaṅga*."

This is how dance came into drama. Later the sages ask Bharata about the purpose of dance. They remark that the purpose of acting (*abhinaya*) is to reveal meaning. But they can see no point in dance,¹⁵⁶ since it is not necessarily related to the meaning of a song (*gītārthakasaṃbadhā*), nor does it reveal (*bhāvanā*) meaning in general. Bharata gives a magnificent reply :

"Dance does not require any meaning. It has been created for the simple reason that it is beautiful. It is in the very

nature of things that all people find dancing beautiful."¹⁵⁷ Abhinava is well aware of this most important of all insights, namely that literature has no goal other than delight. At the beginning of the A.Bh.¹⁵⁸ he says that Śiva is one of the deities of the drama because the dance he performs at sundown is a manifestation of ecstasy, without any purpose.¹⁵⁹ In the third Volume of the A.Bh.¹⁶⁰ Abhinava points out that we can display the full moon several times in a single play (in under one month) for the drama need not imitate the world. He quotes a verse from Bhaṭṭatauta to show that in writing a play we are "free".¹⁶¹ Thus it follows that poetry should be *enjoyed*, it should not be *studied*. Abhinava has nothing but scorn for the purely "intellectual" pursuit of poetry, for the curse of the academies.¹⁶² Of course this means that remarks on the readers of poetry are bound to acquire more and more importance, and in fact they do. Already in the NĪ¹⁶³ Bharata compares the reader to a gourmet, and the word he uses, *sumanas* is surely the source of the later *sahitya*. Bharata also has an important verse later in the NĪ¹⁶⁴ where he speaks of the necessary sympathy that a spectator (or reader) must have:

"(True) spectators at a drama are those who, (when the character) is depressed, become themselves depressed; when (the character) is in sorrow, are themselves in sorrow."

This may well be the source of Abhinava's use of the term *hridayasamvāda*.¹⁶⁵

Unlike other forms of communication, we read a poem over and over again: "Aesthetic relish is seen (produced) by the repeated recitation (*niṣpīḍana*) of words, which constitute poetry. For we find that the sensitive reader reads the same poem over and over again (and thereby) enjoys it (all the more)."¹⁶⁶ Poetry may be like a flower in its delicacy, but one reason Abhinava calls it an *adbhuta* *puṣpa* is because it can never fade.¹⁶⁷ When we seek information, a single reading is only natural, but when we wish to have *citraṇā*, we must be willing to "take a long slow walk into the deep paths of the woods of poetry."¹⁶⁸ *Citraṇā* is an appropriate word, for it comes from the idea of savouring some fine food again and again.¹⁶⁹ Poetry without joy, the later tradition tells us,¹⁷⁰ is like sugarcane

without its juice! This vocabulary communicates the sense of something slow and meditative. Comparisons with religious states do not seem out of place,¹⁷¹ especially if we consider much of the vocabulary used in religious discourse as merely misplaced enthusiasm for an aesthetic experience for which our everyday life does not really prepare us.

The criteria of poetry are not those of everyday life. Abhinava has realised the implications of this for judging what is "proper" in poetry. He bases himself on Ānanda's perceptive remarks¹⁷² on the "propriety" of the eighth chapter of the *Kumār-sambhava*. Ānanda says the "impropriety" that stems from describing the love-making of two gods who are regarded as the mother and father of the universe is "*apratīṭa*", not perceived, i.e. not felt, because Kālidāsa is a great poet. Now the question will naturally occur to us that if the *anacūṭya* (impropriety) is "*apratīṭa*", how do we come to apply a stricture that we don't in fact apprehend? Abhinava answers this¹⁷³: "*Anacūṭya* means that which obstructs the delight of those who experience *rasa*, because this experience is the all-in-all of *rasa*. What pleasure can there be in a reference to the love-making of the highest god, which can only produce shame and horror in the mind of the reader, just as would a description of the love-making of one's own parents. (And yet), although the love-making has been described, nonetheless, because of the genius of the poet, the heart is so engrossed in the poetry that it does not stop to consider whether it is proper or improper. Just as when a man is genuinely courageous but happens to be fighting an improper battle, we might well laud him at the time, but would cease to do so if we consider at a later time the correctness or incorrectness of his behaviour. The same is true here."¹⁷⁴

Such discussions bear an obvious affinity with the problem of "sequence" (*krāma*) in *Asaṃlakṣya* *krāmanāvagādhavān*. Logically we know that there must elapse some time between the apprehension of the literal sense, and the beginning of a true aesthetic experience (*rasadhvani*),¹⁷⁵ but this *krāma* is so swift, or we are so absorbed, that we cannot notice it.¹⁷⁶ The later tradition¹⁷⁷ likens it to a needle piercing the heart of a hundred

looses in one second. The N's¹⁷⁸ comparison to a Yogi absorbed in meditation is not inappropriate. Obviously standards of truth and falsity have little relevance in this sphere.¹⁷⁹

What then are the implications for the writing of poetry? Clearly this theory would not in any way detract from the power of individual stanzas, and in fact we find Ānanda praising the *muktakas* of the *Amarasūta* as being equal, in their aesthetic impact, to entire books.¹⁸⁰ What then is to be avoided? Clearly artificiality of any kind, whether in the poem, or in the way we go about helping others to appreciate it.¹⁸¹ Ānanda's scorn, in the third Uddyota, for *citrakāvya*, verbal tricks, is real.¹⁸² Already in the first Uddyota Abhinava has explained why *citrakāvya* is to be avoided: "(Citrām means) that which astonishes (only) by virtue of its handling of meters (rhymes, alliterations, etc.). But it does not consist in the flow of *rasa* which has for its essence the aesthetic delight that is desired by sensitive readers."¹⁸³ It follows that in style one must be clear¹⁸⁴ and one's use of figures of speech must be judicious.¹⁸⁵ "That alone is considered a figure of speech in the realm of *rasa*, which the poet accomplishes spontaneously (i.e. as naturally growing out the *vibhāvas*, *tamāntarīyakatayā*) as he presents the *vibhāvas* etc. that are consistent with his preoccupation with *rasa*. Nothing else (should be considered a figure of speech). Therefore the use of *yanamaka* etc. will always be a source of conflict with the *rasa*, both for the reader and for the poet, even in *rasas* such as *vīra*, *adbhuta* etc. The meaning (of Kārikā xv) is: I have said that (it should be avoided) in love and especially love in separation with the intention of winning over people who cannot attain the eminence of the sensitive critic and who blindly follow convention."¹⁸⁶ As Ānanda says¹⁸⁷: to include evidence of one's verbal talents is a fruitless activity. This, he tells us,¹⁸⁸ is the whole point of his own writings. Abhinava¹⁸⁹ makes one important qualification to this doctrine:

("We can say that) although poetry will bubble up to the man (gifted with imagination) spontaneously, nonetheless by reflecting on it in detail and thinking to himself: 'Ah, this should be like this (i.e. I should say such and such, not such and

such, in short the poet is carefully going over his work and making changes), it will branch out a thousand-fold."¹⁹⁰

V - RASA - "IMAGINATIVE EXPERIENCES".

We come now to the key word of all Sanskrit literary criticism, the word that Abhinava¹⁹¹ says sums up the whole of the critical literature: *rasa*. First what are the most simple meanings of the technical terms used in aesthetic experiences? How does the tradition regard a viewing of the *Śakuntalam* from the point of view of *rasa*? The *vibhāvas* (sources),¹⁹² belong to the characters represented on the stage. The *ālambana-vibhāvas* (primary sources) will be Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta.¹⁹³ The *uddīpanavibhāvas* (setting¹⁹⁴) will be the physical beauty of both characters, the spring flowers, the bees, etc.. The *ambhāvas* (in which are included the more intimate *sāttvikabhāvas*¹⁹⁵) will also belong to the characters and are the physical indices of love (or more simply, "actions" as Bharata himself sometimes calls them), trembling, sweating, etc.. These are the essential elements of the preliminary stage. Now we come to the more problematic three: the *vyabhicārībhāvas* (also called *sañcārībhāvas*,¹⁹⁶ the *sthāyībhāva*, and finally *rasa* itself. *Vyabhicārībhāvas* are emotions that accompany the primary feelings of the character. They are liable to change and are not inherent to the character's personality. Examples are joy (*harsa*), longing (*autsukya*), etc., all of which belong exclusively to the characters. Duṣyanta's longing for Śakuntalā is not shared by the audience.¹⁹⁷ Now the *sthāyībhāva* (*rati*, there are eight or nine of them) is a state of mind which because it is more deeply felt,¹⁹⁸ dominates all other emotions. It belongs to both the character and to the spectator. The difference is this: Once the character experiences the *sthāyībhāva*, he has reached the height of emotion. But the spectator can go farther, and in a sense deeper. For when "love" is awakened in him, it is not like the love that the original character felt. The spectators do not fall in love with Sītā.¹⁹⁹ This *sthāyībhāva rati* is transformed (*perinata*) into an extrawordly state (*alaukikāvasthā*), and this is what is called *rasa*. The *sahridaya* sympathises (*hridayasamvāda*) with the original character, and to a large

degree he even identifies (*tanmayibhāva*) with the situation depicted. But he does not identify completely; he retains a certain *aesthetic distance*, the name for which is *rasa*.²⁰⁹ The actor,²¹¹ in the opinion of Abhinavagupta and most later writers,²¹² does not experience *rasa*, nor does the original character, nor even the author. For *rasa* implies distance. Without this aesthetic distance, there cannot exist literature, only the primary world. This is what, in our opinion, lies behind Abhinava's famous comparison of drama to a dream: in both cases nothing in the real world "happens" or is affected. It would be as absurd for a spectator to fall in love with a character in a drama as it would be to expect the golden lady-bug of a dream to still be shining on our hand in the morning. The transparent but adamant glass partition that separates both is art.

Whereas *dhvani* was for a long time a much debated issue, with many prominent critics refusing to admit its existence let alone importance, *rasa*²⁰⁸ never met with any such controversy.²⁰⁴ Everybody admitted its existence. It has not been generally recognised that in fact Ānandavardhana said that the whole point of his work was not so much to show the existence of *dhvani* as to establish the importance of the suggestion of *rasa*.²⁰⁵ In our view, the major thrust of the *Dhvanyaloka* is directed towards a reordering of priorities in literary criticism²⁰⁶ and not towards trying to establish the superiority of one "school" over another. (It is very artificial to speak, as De and Kane do, of the "*rasa*" school, opposing it, without any justification, to the "*dhvani*" school). Mahimabhata²⁰⁷ justly asks who would question the priority of *rasa*.²⁰⁸ but the question is not one of belief, but of practice. Ānanda is the first author to make *rasa* the pivotal point around which his discussion of literature revolves. Earlier writers²⁰⁹ are brief,²¹⁰ for reasons that are not entirely clear.²¹¹ In fact, to the great detriment of Sanskrit literary criticism, later writers too, on the whole, tend to busy themselves once again with scholastic deliberation on figures of speech. But regardless of their practical preoccupations, no writer would, we think, ever have denied the importance of *rasa*. The later tradition²¹² compares a poem

without *rasa* to a marriage without love! Judging Sanskrit criticism by the standards of universal application, there can be no doubt that *rasa* is the greatest contribution that India has made to world literature. For *rasa* is no less than the reader's reaction to, his personal involvement with literature.²¹³ It is true that there is some confusion in its use in the D.Āl. and the *Locana*. Often²¹⁴ it is used to mean simply the *sthāyibhāva*, or even simply "emotion",²¹⁵ or whatever important takes place when literature is appreciated. Abhinava is not unaware of this fact, and seems to take a particular delight in the richness of the "associations" the word calls up. He does not seem to wish to restrict its meaning too narrowly. *Rasa* has so many connotations in Sanskrit that it would indeed be limiting to always apply its purely technical sense of the experience of the reader. Ānanda and Abhinava used it as the nucleus of an entire new vocabulary that soon dominated the whole of Sanskrit literary criticism.²¹⁶ Of course when Bharata says that a poem has *rasa*, he does not mean this literally. It is the poem's capacity to elicit a deep response from a sensitive reader.²¹⁷ *Rasa* is after all not an objective "thing" in the real world. It is a private experience. This is perhaps why later writers tend to compare it to religious experiences²¹⁸ for ecstatic experiences are essentially private, inner happenings more or less invisible to a third party and which are liable to evaporate under rigorous questioning. Abhinava says that a *rasa*, too roughly handled, will fade like a flower.

There has been a tendency, as we noted earlier, for the post-Abhinava writers to remain relatively silent on the issue of *rasa*. No doubt it is due partly to awe; the silence of admiration faced with a nearly perfect mind. For there is no doubt that no later writer has written anything more profound on *rasa* than Abhinavagupta. But there seems more to it than this. Perhaps the desire to abdicate reason when faced with the mysterious or the inexplicable is a natural reaction. In part it must be the natural respect we feel for that which we cannot understand fully and surely *rasa* belongs to this category of experience. But there is also a sense in which we

simply retreat from an exacting task. Ānanda already noticed²¹⁹ that many sincere critics admitted the importance of suggestion (including *rasa*), but said that it lay beyond the realm of speech,²²⁰ and one would do well to simply keep quiet about it.²²¹ There is a fine verse from the anthologies on this theme.

"I respect the person who (in the face of great poetry) is forced into silence. His visibly thrilled body bears testimony to the intention of the poet which is beyond the reach of words, but which vibrates in his language that overflows with emotion."²²²

The poet Hṛṣīkeśa²²³ in fact addresses a stanza to Ānanda:

"This nectar (of suggestion) which is a fusion of both word and meaning, bathes the minds of sensitive readers with the oozeings of bliss. It is the truth of poetry, shining without cessation. Clear to the heart, it is yet beyond words."²²⁴ But Abhinava, while he may have renounced reason at the last moment of his life, used his renowned intellect all the rest of it. He was very willing to bring his powerful mind to bear on the problem of *rasa*, and he does so, as one might expect, in a most impressive way²²⁵: "In the course of our ordinary life, we acquire a certain proficiency (*pāṭana*) through long practice (*abhyāsa*) in inferring people's mental moods (*cittānti*), i.e. their basic emotions (*sthayāyātma*) from observing certain signs (*liṅga*) consisting in causes, effects and accompanying elements (*sahacāra*). In watching a drama (or reading a poem - *adhunā*), a garden,²²⁶ or a glance, i.e. ordinary causes (effects, etc.) lose their ordinary characters of cause etc. and take on the essential nature of the function of awakening a permanent emotion (*vibhāvanā*), the function of leading the spectator to a recognition of this permanent emotion (*ambhāvavānā*) and of adding color (to the emotions in question - *sanniparāñjakatva*). And so they acquire the non-ordinary names of *vibhāvas* etc. Now it is through these things called *vibhāvas* etc., precisely in order to proclaim the fact that they are dependent upon the *sanskāras* (latent impressions) of their nature as a cause etc. and whose essential characteristics will be given in the *bhāvādhyāya* (seventh chapter), when they, by assuming a

leading or subordinate role, attain a unity, a joining, a fusion (*yoga*)²²⁷ in the mind of the spectator, that an emotional situation (*artha*) whose essence consists exclusively in aesthetic pleasure (*carvamaṇālaikasāra*) is brought to the state of aesthetic relish (*carvaṇā*) which is a form of consciousness (*samvedana*) free from worldly obstacles (i.e. worldly preoccupations). It is not something that is objectively existent (*siddhasvabhāva*)²²⁸ (for) it exists only for the duration of aesthetic relish (*tātkaḥka eva*) and does not persist for any time after the aesthetic emotion.²²⁹ It is completely different from the permanent emotions. It is *rasa*."

There are two places in the *Locana* where he gives similar statements about *rasa*. Both are difficult but important. In these passages Abhinava distinguishes the process whereby *rasa* is achieved from other more "mundane" (*laukika*) processes. In this he is only following the D.Āl., where the views of writers who claimed that suggestion is nothing more than secondary usage (*bhakti, guṇānti, lakṣaṇā*), or inference (*anumāna*), or *tātparyā* are all refuted.²³⁰ The first passage contains Abhinava's famous example: *puṅras te jātāh*.²³¹ "Now this (suggested) sense such as *rasādi* is not "produced" the way joy is produced when (a man hears the words): "A son has been born to you",²³² nor does it come about through *lakṣaṇā*. No, rather this (suggested sense) arises in the fully responsive reader as being relished by him through his awareness of the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, from the force of his sympathetic response, and through his identification. It is different from happiness etc. whose nature is well-known.²³³ Its sole essence consists in aesthetic enjoyment." The next passage is even more important for it brings in the NŚ and shows us how Abhinava interprets Bharata's *rasasūtra*²³⁴: "Do you think that the apprehension of *rasa* is the apprehension of the mental mood of somebody else? Please don't be so foolish as to think so. For we know about another person's mental mood by inference. What aesthetic experience is involved in this? Aesthetic experience has for its very essence a transcendental delight, and consists in the aesthetic relish of the *vibhāvas* etc. in poetry. It should not be degraded to the level of recollection or inference.

However the (literary critic) whose mind has been trained (*samskrita*) by everyday inferences of causes from effects (and vice-versa) perceives the *vibhāvas* etc. not in an objective (i.e. indifferent, uninvolved) manner (*lāṭasthyena*) but by being completely overcome by sensitivity, *sahyadayatva*, which is another name for sympathetic response of the heart. Because of the sprouting (*anukūṭibhāva*) of the relish of *rasa* which is heading towards completion (*purvibhāviṣyat*) without employing the process of inference and recollection, (he perceives the *vibhāvas*) as having for their essence aesthetic relish which is the result of (literally : appropriate to, *ucita*) complete identification. Now this aesthetic relish was not formerly the product of some other valid means of cognition such that it could now be "recollected". Nor has it now arisen from any other valid means of cognition. For the (empirical) means of valid cognition such as direct perception (inference), etc., (simply) cannot operate in regard to something that is transcendental. And so the designation as *vibhāva* etc. (in the case of kāraṇa etc. of *rasapratīti*) is an indication of the transcendental nature of *rasapratīti*. As has been said (NŚ. VII, p. 346, GOS edn.) : "The word *vibhāvas* has an epistemological significance." In everyday life it is called a cause and not a *vibhāva*. The *ambhāvas* are also transcendental. As has been said : (NŚ. VII, p. 347) "Since verbal and physical acting and the acting of involuntary physical reactions of certain mental states (such as stupefaction, perspiration, horripilation etc.) brings to our consciousness (*ambhāvaṃyati*) (the working of the *sthāyībhāva* and the *vyabhicārībhāvas*), therefore it (the acting) is called an *ambhāva*. For experience (*ambhāvāna*) (of the *sthāyībhāva* and the *vyabhicārībhāvas*), is the complete identification (*tanmayībhāvāna*) with these mental moods. In everyday life we use the term *kārya* and not *ambhāva*. And so (in aesthetic experience) it is not another person's mental mood that is inferred. With this in mind Bharata did not mention the word *sthāyī* in his *sūtra* : "Rasa arises from the combination of the *vibhāvas*, *ambhāvas*, and *vyabhicārībhāvas*." Had he done so, far from being (helpful) it would have been a great (source of) error.²³⁵ It is quite proper to say that the

sthāyībhāvas become *rasas* (or perhaps better : This is said in a metaphorical manner). Because (the final result) is the beautiful experience that takes place when one's latent impressions are aroused through the mental moods corresponding to the *vibhāvas* and *ambhāvas* that belong to the character. And further, because at the time of (the inferential) knowledge of the (aroused) mental mood in the (original) character, which (knowledge) is extremely useful (i.e. necessary) for the sympathetic response of the heart of the *sahyadya*, there is the apprehension of the mental mood such as love aroused in the (original character), with the help of the (*vibhāvas*) like bristling hair etc.²³⁶ Now (the reason that Bharata) mentioned the *vyabhicārībhāvas*, though they are mental moods (just like the *sthāyībhāvas*) among the *vibhāvas* and *ambhāvas* (in this *sūtra*) is that they are relished as subsidiary to the major mental mood (the *sthāyībhāva*). Therefore the emergence of aesthetic experience is the enjoyment (by the *sahyadya* of the mental mood evoked in him by the objective mental mood of the character portrayed), by suppressing the ordinary worldly emotions such as joy etc. which arise (in the character portrayed) from such causes as reunion with his dear relatives, etc. as described in a literary work... What sort of thing is this that arises? Why it is *rasa*, something transcendental..... Where else can such a thing be seen? (Reply :) the very fact that such a thing is not seen elsewhere shows that it is transcendental. Objection : if this is the case, then *rasa* would be unreliable (*apramāṇa*) (as a means leading to *vyutpatti*). Yes, so what? Since pleasure (*prīti*) and instruction (*vyutpatti*) are achieved from the relish of aesthetic experience, what else is required ?²³⁷

This brings us to the heart of the controversy about *rasa* that is alive today as it was in the eleventh century : there are eight *rasas*. Certainly in the case of love (*śṛṅgāra*) one can immediately understand why it would appeal to everybody²³⁸ : being in love is pleasant, hearing about love is pleasant, watching a play that deals with love is pleasant. Yes, we can all agree, this is what our best moments are like, they are full of the most unmysterious kind of pleasure. But there are other *rasas* as well, among them, in particular, *karuṇa*, where

what we see on the stage is not pleasant, it is rather painful, and we often leave the theatre where a tragedy has been presented feeling deeply disquieted. We may even be struck by the incongruity of our friends' questions: "Did you enjoy the play?". "Well, yes, but." And here we have struck the heart of the matter. How can we have enjoyed something that deals with a painful situation? Aristotle put forward the theory of *katharsis*. What did the Indians say? First we must dispose of a common misunderstanding: while it is true that most Indian plays end happily, this does not mean that Indian writers and critics were not alive to the importance of the tragic element in literature. They most emphatically did admit that *kāruṇya* can be a dominant emotional mood in a poem or a play. In fact, we feel that there is a sense in which the Indians believed that the emotions associated with *kāruṇya* (sadness, regret, nostalgia, a kind of emotional weariness²³⁹) are the very essence of human life. Viśvanātha²⁴⁰ quotes a verse to the effect that love cannot reach its height until one has experienced separation.²⁴¹ We don't think any culture has been more conscious than the Indian of the frailty of human existence, the tragedy inherent in simple everyday life:

"If you have really decided to go, then leave you must. But what is this hurry? Stay two or three minutes more, while I gaze at your face. In this world, our life is like water in a jug, swiftly rushing out. Who knows if we shall ever meet again."²⁴²

This sense of "disquiet" is conveyed by Kālidāsa in what must be his most beautiful verse: *raṁyāṇi vīkṣya madhuraṁś ca niśānya śabdān* etc.,²⁴³ and even Kṣemendra moves us²⁴⁴:

"When he witnessed the death of his friend, he stood without moving. Then Kapiñjala let out a piteous cry resounding through the thicket of trees, and strong enough to break the stones of the mountain, piercing his own life, rendering him unconscious: O Puṇḍarikā! Even now, long past, when the deer remember it, the grass drops from their mouths".

Abhinava in an obscure passage²⁴⁵ even says that śoka in-forms comedy, for it is the lightning flash of sorrow that illumi-

nates the comic in our lives.²⁴⁶ Ānandavardhana²⁴⁷ says that *kāruṇya* is the *pradhānarasa* of the whole Rāmāyaṇa.²⁴⁸ Even more to the point is Bhavabhūti's great *Uttararāmacarita*. What is the rasa of this play?²⁴⁹ On purely technical grounds, one can argue that it is *vīpralambhaśṅgāra*, since the lovers are eventually reunited, and the play ends with their happiness. It is, in the terms of the Nṣ, *sāpekṣabhāva*, and not *nirapekṣabhāva*.²⁵⁰ But this is only a technicality.²⁵¹ The real *rasa* of the *Uttararāmacarita* is *kāruṇya*, as the famous saying: *kāruṇyaṁ bhāva-bhūti eva tannule*, proves. Does the reader then experience sorrow, or more to the point, is the *kāruṇya* of the *Uttararāmacarita* *duḥkhaṇuvīdha*? The most interesting discussion of this occurs in Dhanika's commentary on his brother's *Daśupakā*²⁵²: Kārikā 43 says that *svāda* (aesthetic pleasure) comes from *ātmanānda*. "Objection: it is quite proper to say that *śṅgāra*, *vīra*, *hāsa*, etc., which consist essentially in delight, arise because of the identification of the spectators with the matters presented in the drama (*kāvyaṛthasambheda*),²⁵³ from the joy of the Self. But in *kāruṇya* etc. (i.e. in *vīpralambhaśṅgāra* as well) which consists primarily in sorrow, how can joy arise? For when sensitive readers listen to a poem that consists essentially in *kāruṇya*, they feel sorrow, shed tears, and do similar other things. If (*kāruṇya*) were to consist in joy, this would surely not be the case. (Answer :) What you say is true. But this (aesthetic joy) in *kāruṇya* etc. is such that it consists in both pleasure and pain,²⁵⁴ as when women, in the act of love²⁵⁵ hit (their lovers) pretending to repulse them (*kuṭṭimīa*).²⁵⁶ The compassion²⁵⁷ of a poem is different from the compassion found in the ordinary world. The explanation is that sensitive readers (*rasika*) become more and more deeply attracted towards this aesthetic experience of grief whereas they tend to shun the real experience.²⁵⁸ For if (*kāruṇya*) were to consist exclusively in sorrow the way worldly *kāruṇya* does, then nobody would feel like going (to plays in which *kāruṇya* was present) and thus large (and important) works such as the *Rāmāyaṇa* etc. which consist exclusively in *kāruṇya*, would fall into oblivion. There is nothing wrong if spectators shed tears upon listening to the description of a tragic event,

just as there is nothing wrong with people being plunged in grief and shedding tears over the actual downfall and death of people in the real world. Therefore, *karuṇā*, like all the other *rasas*, consists in joy.²⁵⁹ Abhinava's answer²⁶⁰ to the above question also seems to be no, that *karuṇarasa* is not painful.²⁶¹ Why? Because literature is not the real world. Nothing really takes place.²⁶² The world of the past is transformed into art, and in watching this transformation (where all terms are from a different order of reality, *vibhāva* belongs only to art, not to the real world, where we say *kāraṇa*), we somehow (for it is never explained precisely how this is achieved) touch the very core of our being. In doing so, we experience a bliss that has its parallel only in the world of mysticism.²⁶³ One distinction is that *rasas* and *vibhāvas* are magical. That is they exist for the duration of a play. Abhinava explains²⁶⁴ that they have no parallel in the real world. *Rasa* is not *kārya*, and therefore *vibhāvas* are not *utpādayakāraṇas*. *Vibhāvas* are not *jñāpakahetus* because *rasa* is not *jñāpya*.²⁶⁵ The opponent asks Abhinava: "But there is nothing in the whole world like this." "Ah," says Abhinava, "at last you have understood"²⁶⁶ *Rasa* is *alaukika*. It is above and beyond its constituent parts.²⁶⁷ *Rasa* is not something we know, but something we feel: *rasayamānatākaprāṇo hy asau na prameyādisvabhāvaḥ*.²⁶⁸ So Abhinava says²⁶⁹: *rasanā ca bodhanāpauva*. Aesthetic experience consists exclusively in knowledge." But Abhinava qualifies this knowledge as being in a class by itself, not comparable to any other kind of knowledge: *kintu bodhāntarebhyo laukikebhyo viākṣanauva*.²⁷⁰ Abhinava makes it clear in this passage, that in the theatre, we live neither in the time or space of the original characters, nor of the actors. We are, in a sense, outside both time and space altogether: *ata evobhayadeśakālavyāgh*.²⁷¹ There is no parallel to what takes place in a literary experience. Nor can we duplicate it. This is why Abhinava says it is like a wondrous flower (*adbhutaḥpuspavat*), it is *sui generis*, nobody can create it at will. Just as you cannot tell somebody to fall in love, so also, you cannot tell someone to create *rasa*. Or even to experience it. *Rasa* is not subject to our will (*anivyakta*). It just happens. What we see in the theatre suggests emotions,

e.g. love, that are not bound by time: *deśakālanyamena tatva* (i.e. in the theatre) *ratim gamayanti*.²⁷² Abhinava puts all of these ideas together in a marvellous passage at the beginning of the first volume of the A.Bh.²⁷³

'When we go to the theatre (*nāṭye*) we do not have any inclination to think (*abhisandhisanskāra*): Today I will have to accomplish something real (*pāramarṭhikam*). Rather we feel: 'I will listen to and see something beyond my everyday experience (*lokottara*), something worthy (of my attention), whose innermost essence is pure joy (from beginning) to end (reading: *āparyanta samādarāṇya*). I will share this experience with the whole audience (*sarvaparīṣatsādhāraṇa*): 'One's heart becomes like a spotless mirror (i.e. able to reflect without distortion), for all of one's normal preoccupations (*sāṃsārika-bhāva*) have been completely forgotten, and one is lost in aesthetic rapture (*caraṇā*), listening to the fine singing and music." Later in this same remarkable passage, Abhinava says that what the spectator sees is divorced from time and space (the *deśakālavisēṣavēśānāṅgite*). No kind of intellectual thinking bears any parallel to what happens in the theatre (*sanyamīthyāśmāśyāsamubhāvamādhijñānavijñeyatvaḥparāmarśanāśpade*). The spectator is so wrapt in what he sees, so carried away by a mysterious delight (*camatkāra*), that he identifies completely with the original character and sees the whole world as he saw it (*ladīyacaritamādhyaḥpravaiṣṭasvātmarūpanatīḥ svātmadvāreṇa viśam tathā psyan*). The whole fairy world of the play is now deeply embedded in his heart (*hrdayābhyantarānikṣhatam*) and can never be extricated, nor can it ever lose its original power (*tata evotpukhṣātair api mlānīmātram apy abhijamānam*), for it has now become a part of his innermost experience. We cannot think of a more eloquent justification of art.²⁷⁴ At a more mundane level, we can say that our own experiences have been so varied that there is little we cannot appreciate; Terence's "Nothing human is alien to me". Of course for Abhinava this is due to rebirth, but we need not accept this in order to appreciate the idea. Thus Abhinava records a very fine objection (which sounds suspiciously like his own view)²⁷⁵: "It is not impossible that this verse was written by somebody who was

himself beyond passion, but who was nonetheless acquainted with passion, since (everyone) is influenced by propensities towards love, for we have all experienced them over and over in this endless course of existences. Or the man could even be indifferent, but seeing the woman as she really is, i.e. as possessed of exquisite beauty (and without his ascetic prejudices). For it is not true that a man without passion must see things all topsy turvy. If he hears the sounds of a lute, he does not after all think he has heard the raucous crowings of a crow !”

Thus it is clear that the key term for Abhinava is *alaṅkāra*. Many other ideas reinforce this notion. Anything that takes us away from preoccupation with ourselves is considered useful. In speaking of *Nāṭyadharmī*²⁷⁶ Bharata has a verse which reads :

“A play should always be acted with such conventions,²⁷⁷ For the spectator will not derive any aesthetic pleasure²⁷⁸ whatever unless there is both acting and music.”²⁷⁹

All later writers would agree, we think, on the importance of music in drama.²⁸⁰ The very notion of *abhinaya*²⁸¹ (acting) includes the dance.²⁸² Commenting on the fourth *Adhyāya*, Abhinava has an obscure passage²⁸³ which seems to contain a very important idea. Abhinava uses the famous Buddhist analogy of the fire-brand²⁸⁴ : if there is no movement, we do not see a wheel. It is only when the fire-brand is rapidly revolved that we see a steady wheel of fire. In the same way, Abhinava seems to be saying, until the actors dance and sing, i.e. set the play in motion, it is not really a “drama.”

Everything can be useful to the strange world of art. Ānanda²⁸⁵ says that even physical objects can be “suggestive”. Abhinava says²⁸⁶ that even letters are useful in *rasa*, for the moment they are heard, irrespective of their meaning, the ear immediately grasps them and decides whether their nature is soft or harsh. He compares this to music without words (*apadaśtadhvanivat*). We are reminded of Kuntaka's fine verse²⁸⁷ :

“Poetry, even when the meaning has not yet been consi-

dered, because of the beauty of its style, can, like music, give those sensitive to literature an exquisite delight.”

Finally Ānanda recognises that there is no object that cannot be transformed into the world of art,²⁸⁸ for everything can serve as the setting for the free imagination.²⁸⁹ Mammata²⁹⁰ quotes a lovely Prākṛit verse :

“Glory to speech ! For she sits in the mouth of poets and creates the whole world anew, laughing at the ancient creator !”

Dhanañjaya²⁹¹ too recognises that we are not in an ordinary state when we watch a drama. His explanation is less philosophical than Abhinava's, but certainly more charming :

“When children play with clay-elephants, the source of their delight is their own fertile imagination. The same is true of spectators watching Arjuna and other heroes on the stage.”

VI - THE REAL WORLD AND THE WORLD OF DRAMA

Abhinava distinguished between conceiving an emotion and actually having one.²⁹² In the theatre we are at one remove from real emotions, we are “meta-feeling” as it were, feeling *about* emotions rather than directly experiencing them. As spectators we are in a privileged position that neither the writer nor the actor can enjoy. Abhinava is clear in his refusal to grant aesthetic experiences to the actor.²⁹³ One of the reasons why Abhinava denied this experience to the actor (whereas other writers permitted it²⁹⁴ can be deduced from a passage in the *Sanṅītaratnākara*. There we are told that an actor experiences no *rasa*.²⁹⁵ The commentator explains that the actor is “involved”, he has many things to do : *svakṛtyābhinayaavhi-tārena*, whereas the spectator is free : *kāryāntarāmasandhānā-bhāvāt*. It was objected that an actor cannot ever be at peace, and so *śāntarasa* is impossible :

*śāntasya śamasādhyatvān na te tu tadāsamabhavāi
aśīau eva rasā nājyeṣu iti acūcudān*

This is the same objection we find, though in a slightly different form, in the A.Bh.:²⁹⁶ Abhinava's response was that rasas do not depend on the actor. The *Saṅgītaratnākara*²⁹⁷ sums it up as follows :

*īd accodyann yataḥ kaṇcin na rasam svadate nāḥ
sāmīkās tu līhate rasān pūrṇam nāto malah*

which comes from Abhinavagupta.²⁹⁸

At another level, Abhinava compares the actor to the *Paramātmān*. He retains his identity (just as the *Ātman* never gives up its self-luminosity) and yet manages to so engross people that they feel they are watching the original character.²⁹⁹ The spectator is thus like the *Jīva*, liable to illusion. So we come back once again to the fundamental notion of the real world and the world of shadow. Anything that takes us out of this dream world of literature, anything that comes between us and this lovely sub-creation of *māyā* (cf. *aghātiaghātaṁpālīyastī māyā*) is to be avoided.³⁰⁰ The delicate web must not be shattered. This is why Abhinava insists that present events have no purpose in the drama, for the spectator is too personally involved, too unable to shed his real-life preoccupations.

What we have seen is no doubt impressive. Abhinava has been able to tie together the most disparate strands of poetic experience. He makes wonderful use of the Vedānta and Śaiva doctrines that underlie theories of illusion and reality. When we discussed Abhinava's debt to philosophical doctrines and read some of the relevant passages with the great Paṇḍitarāja Rājēśvaraśāstri Draviḍ, he shook his head in awe and said : *sa eva, sa eva*. It is important to stress this fact : Abhinava is unique. For there is little reason to suppose that Bharata was equally abstract in his conception of the theatre, and much reason to suppose that he was not. For when he prohibits something from the stage, it is for purely ordinary reasons, with no philosophical implications :³⁰²

"Those who know what is appropriate to drama will not (allow the actor) to sleep on the stage. If it must be alluded to,³⁰³ the act should be terminated."

"If it is absolutely essential for someone to sleep alone or with someone else (in the same bed), one must not permit, on the stage, kissing, hugging, or what should be private, (for example), biting the lover's lip, scratching him with one's nails, taking off the woman's sari, or fondling both her breasts."

"One should not show a character eating, or indulging in (sexual) play in the water, or doing anything else on the stage that might embarrass (the spectator)."

"Since a play must be witnessed by the father, the son, the mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law, one must take special care to avoid the above-mentioned acts." Even death is not invariably forbidden,³⁰⁴ and in fact Bharata prescribes acting for it :

"Death should be acted out, in the case of those who are sick, by drooping (*viśaṁṇa*) limbs, lack of movement and the loss of one's faculties."³⁰⁵

Moreover, love for Bharata is an activity of the world, the activity *par excellence*. He does not indulge in any of Abhinava's philosophical justifications.³⁰⁶ Thus he writes :

"Generally all emotions come from sexual love. Sexual love is various, associated as it is with the quality of desire (in general)."

"There is a desire for *dharma*, for material wealth, as well as a desire for supreme liberation. But (generally) when we speak of "love", we mean sexual union between a man and a woman."

"Sexual love can overpower the ordinary feelings of happiness and sorrow³⁰⁷ for all people. But generally, even in sorrow, it brings joy."

"Most people always want happiness. And women, of infinite variety, are the source of happiness."

"One practises austerities for the sake of religion. And after all, we are (only) concerned with religion because we want to be happy. The source of happiness is women, and we want to make love to them."³⁰⁸

Nonetheless, Bharata's discussions of many of the important technical terms of the drama are fraught with implications which a writer like Abhinava was bound to exploit. Let us see how he (Bharata) deals with the major elements in *rasāsūtrāda*. He defines a *bhāva*, i.e. a *sthāyibhāva* or a *vyabhicāribhāva* as :

"A *bhāva* is so named because by taking the help of involuntary acting (i.e. sweating, tears, etc.), facial changes (*mukhaṅga*), speech and bodily movements, it suggests (or manifests, *bhāvayan*) the internal feelings of the poet."³⁰⁹

But it is in the seventh *Adhyāya* that Bharata deals most clearly with the terms *bhāva*, *vibhāva*, *ambhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*. Here is a translation of what we feel are the major passages, those that have had the greatest influence on the later tradition :

"There are eight permanent emotions, thirty-three transient ones, and eight involuntary actions (displaying emotional states). These are the types of emotions. Thus there are forty-nine *bhāvas* to be reckoned as responsible for the manifestation (or suggestion—*abhiyakti*) of aesthetic experiences in poetry. *Rasas* arise from them by virtue of the quality of universality (*sāmānya*). There is a verse on this topic :

'The externalisation (*bhāva*) of that emotion (*artha*) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source of *rasa*. The body is suffused by it as dry wood is suffed by fire.'³¹⁰

Someone (might) ask : If *rasas* arise by virtue of the quality of universality, from the forty-nine *bhāvas* which are suggested by the *vibhāvas* and *ambhāvas*, and are conveyed by the meaning of poetry, then how is it that only the permanent emotions are transformed into *rasa* ? The answer is as follows : just as it is a fact that (all) men have the same marks (*lakṣaṇa*), i.e. have the same limbs and parts of the body and possess hands, feet and belly in common, still, some, because of their family, behaviour, knowledge and skill in various kinds of arts and crafts,³¹¹ become kings, whereas others, less intelligent, become their servants, so also, the *vibhāvas*, *ambhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* are subordinated to

the permanent emotions. The permanent emotions are like kings, because many depend on them. So also, the other *bhāvas*, being like servants that are subordinate to the person occupying the position of a king, resort to the *sthāyibhāvas* as being subordinate to them (or as depending on them—).³¹² The permanent emotions attain the status of *rasa*.³¹³ The *vyabhicāribhāvas* are like servants (or like a retinue). One (might) ask : What is a (good) analogy ? (Answer) : Just as a king, though he is surrounded by a retinue of many men, alone receives the title (of king), withheld from all the others however eminent they may be, so also the permanent emotion (alone) surrounded by a retinue of *vyabhicāribhāvas*, *ambhāvas* and *vibhāvas*, attains the name of *rasa*.³¹⁴

"From the point of view of a performance (*prayogatah*), there is no such thing as a poem that arises from only one *rasa*."³¹⁵

"That *rasa* should be considered to be the permanent one whose presence (*rūpa*) among many other (emotions) is most conspicuous (*bahu*). The other (emotions) are considered as auxiliary (*sañcārinah*)."³¹⁶

"The wise should employ (many) *rasas* in their poems, scattered like flowers."³¹⁷

From a later passage it is clear that Bharata was not out to restrict the number of subsidiary emotions (*vyabhicāribhāvas*) possible in a drama. Thus at XIX 107-109, he mentions certain *viśeṣas* of the *sandhis*. Now some of these, e.g. *hrī*, *bhṛānti* etc. are emotions that do not figure in any list of *vyabhicāribhāvas* or *ambhāvas* given in chapters six and seven. But Abhinava points out³¹⁸ that they belong to this category and therefore, by implication, there are more *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *ambhāvas*³¹⁹ than Bharata mentions in any one place. Thus Abhinava says that the figure twenty-one is only an *upalaksana*³²⁰ and is not meant to be exhaustive.³²¹ In fact, anything that occurs in a drama is automatically either a *vyabhicāribhāva* or an *ambhāva* : *na tu tadatīkṛtam jagati kincid asti prayoge*.³²²

Later writers, beginning with Abhinava, develop the contrast between these *vyabhicāribhāvas* and the *sthāyibhāvas*.³²² Thus in a complex passage,³²⁴ Abhinava says that the *sthāyibhāvas* are the pure white thread of a necklace. The *vyabhicāribhāvas* are the colored gems that are strung on this thread. The many colors reflect on to the thread, but ultimately the white thread remains unaffected.³²⁵ The effect is nonetheless beautiful. It is like a screen on which images are projected to our benefit. But they disappear and the screen is as blank as before.³²⁶ The proof that Abhinava gives of the transitory character of the *vyabhicāribhāvas* is a good one³²⁷: *lathā hi—glāno 'yam ity—ukte kuta it hetuprasaṇena sthāyī tasya śūcyaṭe. na tu rāma utsāhaśaktimān ity atra hetuprasaṇam āhuh*. This means: "This man is weak. Why?" The question is perfectly legitimate, since we do not think of physical weakness, the state of being tired, as his permanent nature. But we never ask: Why is Rāma powerful. It is his very nature."³²⁸

Bharata, in his concern with a real world, one that was moreover carefully divided into different social groups, makes two divisions that were equally influential on the later tradition. Abhinava must have taken his cue for ascribing a liking for certain *rāsas* to a particular class of spectators³²⁹ from Bharata.³³⁰ For Bharata says that people are different, and respond differently to drama³³¹:

"Young people delight in sexual love (i.e. in scenes presenting love). Intellectuals enjoy logical debates,³³² those concerned with material objects take pleasure in (descriptions or scenes) of wealth; and those who are detached from the world delight in spiritual liberation."

"Heroes delight in *vīra* and *raudra*, in hand to hand combat, and battles. Old people are constantly pleased with tales about religion and (stories from) the *Purāṇas*."

"Low people cannot understand the behaviour of the noble. The wise always take delight in all that concerns the Truth."

"Children, fools and women always delight in the comic and in costumes (*naipāthyā*). He who is pleased³³³ when (the

character is pleased), who is in sorrow when the character is in sorrow, who is angry when *krodha* (is being presented) and afraid when *bhaya* (is presented), he should be known as the ideal spectator."

Similarly Bharata divides the characters of drama into three basic types. The passage has generally been taken for granted and many writers have assumed that the distinction is based on "class". But actually the distinctions Bharata makes are based on character, not on class or even caste.³³⁴ The verses are worth quoting:³³⁵

"The highest type of character (*uttama*) has control over his senses, is wise, knowledgeable about many practical arts, generous and having noble ideals,³³⁶ a comforter of those who are afraid, knows the meaning of many sciences, is profound (or dignified, *gāmbhīrya*), noble (*audārya*), and has qualities of generosity and firmness."

"A middling character is one who is skilled in the ways of the world (*lokoṣaṭvā*), who is proficient (in actually) using the science of practical arts, and who has practical wisdom (*vijñāna*) and gentleness."

"The lowest type of character is harsh in his speech, discourteous, mean-minded (*kusattva*), unsubtle,³³⁷ easily angered, a killer, treacherous to his friends, searching for faults, slanderous (*piśuna*), (uses) brave (but empty) words, ungrateful, lazy, doesn't know the distinction between those who should and those who should not be honoured,³³⁸ lusts (indiscriminately) after women, is fond of heated arguments, is an informer (*sūcaka*), evil-acting and a thief."

"A woman of the highest type is gentle in her emotions (*mīḍubhāva*—),³³⁹ faithful (*acāpālā*), smiles when she speaks, is not cruel in her words, obeys her elders, is bashful and polite. She has such natural qualities as beauty, nobility, sweetness (etc.). She is endowed with profundity and steadiness." The middling woman has only some of these qualities, and a low woman is similar to the low man.

Curiously, the important concept of *ābhāsa* is not dealt

with in the NS. One would have thought that Bharata, like all later writers³⁴⁰ would want to distinguish genuine situations in literature, i.e. those likely to give rise to true *rasa*, from spurious ones. But we must realise too that the later tradition was to a great extent indulging in artificiality when they discussed this question. *Rasa* came to be almost like a technical term in grammar : certain rules were necessary for its operation. If these were absent, *rasa* too must be absent. The ever present danger of divorcing theory from its natural basis in literature seems to have prevailed in this sphere. Many of these discussions smack of too much theorising. Too often, while the critics argued over what was "permissible", the poets made nonsense of their theories by writing successful poems on the very themes supposedly "ungenuine". For most later writers³⁴¹ agreed that love among the animals was a subject that could not lead to a genuine imaginative experience. Yet many of Kālidāsa's finest verses³⁴² deal with this theme. By the stricter canons of many later writers,³⁴³ Vasantasenā's love for Cāradatta would be a case of *ābhāsa*.³⁴⁴ Yet it is one of the most moving love stories in the literature. Similarly, to be in love with another man's wife is strictly *rasābhāsa*³⁴⁵ though a source of great poetry. The greatest writers are always the least willing to force people into stereotypes. If it is a "rule" of Sanskrit literary criticism that the prostitute cannot feel love as genuine as can the great heroines of the orthodox tradition, Sītā, Sāvitrī, etc. it is certainly not a rule of real life. Often it is precisely what is forbidden that is most moving. After all, does not the tradition discourage a combination of *śānta* and *śṛṅgāra* ? Yet many of the finest verses in Sanskrit are based on their juxtaposition.³⁴⁶ Grief is especially recalcitrant to the philosopher's rules. Marpa the translator, a great Yogi, breaks down and weeps uncontrollably when he sees his dead son : "Come back from your ride, come live in my heart." This may be *anucita*, but it is strangely moving. As Bharata stresses, the greatest poets are those who are most closely attuned to the real world. The willingness to flout conventions and restrictive rules is surely one sign of the great artist. They hear a music of their own.

PART II

THE RASADHYAYA OF THE NĀṬYASĀSTRA
WITH TRANSLATED EXCERPTS FROM THE
ABHINAVABHĀRATĪ

THE RASADHYAYA OF THE NĀṬYAŚĀSTRA

- (1) All the great sages, after listening to the rules on the *pūrvanga*, spoke again to Bharata and said : Please answer for us these five questions.
- (2) Theorists speak of "rasas" in drama — please tell us wherein lies the essence of these *rasas*.
- (3) What are *bhāvas* (emotions), and what do they create (*bhāvayanti*) ? What really are *saṅgraha*, *kārikā* and *nirukta* ?
- (4) When Bharata the sage heard their request, he gave an answer defining *rasa* and *bhāva*, (and also said) :
- (5) Sages of great asceticism, I will tell you everything you want to know about *saṅgraha*, *kārikā* and *nirukta* respectively.
- (6) It is of course impossible to deal comprehensively with drama. Why ? Because there is so much specialised knowledge (that is important to understand drama)³⁴⁷ and because you can never exhaust the subject of the practical arts.³⁴⁸
- (7) Since it is not possible to exhaustively investigate even one (branch of) knowledge, (deep like) an ocean, how could you ever investigate all of them thoroughly (*arthalattvatas*) ?
- (8) Still I will list the *rasas* and *bhāvas* of drama giving very concisely the subject-matter (*artha*) of the aphoristic definitions (*sūtra*) and their exposition (*grantha*)³⁴⁹ so that (this list) will allow one to infer (further details) (*anumāna-prasādhaka*).
- (9) Authorities define *saṅgraha* as a concise list of the topics extensively dealt with in *sūtras* and *bhāṣyas*.³⁵⁰
- (10) Such a list (of the main subjects of dramatic theory includes) *rasas*, *bhāvas*, acting, conventions (or practice),

vr̥ttis, *pravr̥ttis*, success (of the performance), musical notes (*svara*), as well as instrumental music, singing and stage-craft.³⁵¹

(11) Experts say that in a *kārikā* a subject is briefly (*samāsena*) set down, i.e. in a few words (*alpābhīdhānena*), and in the manner of an apophorism (*sūtrataḥ*), (so that it) explains the essential point (*arthapradaśinī*).

(12) A *nirukta* (etymological explanation) is based on the various nominal forms used in the definition, contains (justifications from) dictionaries and grammatical analyses as well as (considerations) of the meanings of the verbal roots and of the syntactic relations involved and takes into account differing views.

(13) When the meaning (of a particular word), which (in turn) throws light on the meaning (of the whole sentence), is established by giving the meaning of the root (from which this particular word is derived), that is called a *nirukta* (etymological explanation).³⁵²

(14) O best of Brahmins, I have given briefly the *sangraha*. Now I will speak of those topics in more detail and include *nirukta* and *kārikā*.

(15) In a drama³⁵³ there are the following eight³⁵⁴ *rasas*: erotic (*śṛṅgāra*),³⁵⁵ comic (*hāsyā*), compassionate (*karuṇā*), furious (*raudra*), heroic (*vīra*), terrifying (*bhayaṇaka*), disgusting (*bībhatsa*) and awesome (*adbhuta*).³⁵⁶

(16) For the great Brahmin has declared that these are the eight *rasas*. Now I will list the *bhāvas*—those that are primary (*sthāvi*),³⁵⁷ those that (only) accompany the primary emotions (and are thus transitory) (*saṁcārī*), and those expressions of feeling that stem from a deep-felt emotion (*sattva*).

(17) The permanent emotions³⁵⁸ have been declared to be love (*raṭi*), amusement (or laughter) (*hāsa*), sorrow (*śoka*), anger (*krodha*), dynamic energy (*utsāha*), fear (*bhaya*), disgust (*jugupsā*) and wonder (*viśmaya*).

(18-21) The thirty-three accompanying transitory states³⁵⁹

should be known as³⁶⁰: world-weariness (*nivveda*), physical weakness (*glānī*), anxiety (*śaṅkā*), envy (*asūyā*), intoxication (*mada*), fatigue (*śrama*), laziness (*ālasya*), depression (*dāmya*), worry (*cintā*), confusion (*moha*), remembrance (*smṛti*), peace of mind (*dhṛti*), shame (*virād*), rashness (*capalatā*), joy (*harsa*), panic (*āvega*), lifelessness (*jāḍatā*), pride (*garva*), dejection (*viśāda*), longing (*autsukya*), sleeping (*nidrā*), apoplexy (*āpasmaṇḍa*), dreaming (*svpna*), awakening (*vibodha*), resentment (*amarṣa*), dissimulation (*avacitttha*), violence (*ugratā*), attentiveness (*matī*), sickness (*vyādhi*), insanity (*unmāda*), death (*marana*), fright (*trāsa*) and perplexity (*vitarka*). They are explained (*samākhyaṭa*) by their name (i.e. they are *anvartihanāma*, or “significant”).

(22) The eight involuntary states are³⁶¹: paralysis (*stambha*), perspiration (*sveda*), horripilation (goose-flesh) (*romāṇca*), faltering voice (*svarabhanga*), trembling (*vepathu*), change of color (*vaivarya*), tears (*asru*) and fainting (*pralaya*).³⁶²

(23) In drama there are four kinds of dramatic representation (*abhinaya*): that which uses the body (*āṅgika*), that which uses speech (*vācika*), that which uses costume (*āhārya*), and that which is involuntary (*sāttvika*).³⁶³

(24-26) Convention (or practice) (*dharmā*)³⁶⁴ is divided into two kinds: that which obtains in the real world (*loka-dharmā*), and that which is peculiar to the drama (*nāṭya-dharmā*).³⁶⁵

A play is based on the four *vr̥ttis* (styles)³⁶⁶: *Bhānatī*, *Sātvatī*, *Kaiśikī* and *Ārabhaṭī*.

The *pravr̥ttis*³⁶⁷ (usages prevalent in a local district) are: Āvantī, Dākṣiṇāṭyā, Oḍramāgadhī and Pāñcālamadhyamā. Success (*siddhi*)³⁶⁸ is of two kinds: divine and human.

(27-30) There are seven *svaras*³⁶⁹ (in music) such as *śaḍja* etc. which can be sung, or played on a stringed instrument. The four kinds of musical instruments are³⁷⁰: Taṭa, Avanaddha, Ghana and Suśira and here is their explanation (*lakṣaṇa*):

Tata is a stringed instrument. Avanaddha is a percussion instrument (such as a drum). Ghana is an instrument like a cymbal and the Susira is a hollow instrument (such as a flute).

There are five kinds of songs each accompanied by a *dhruvā*³⁷¹ : that which is sung on (an actor's) entrance (*praveśa*), that which accompanies the transition from one emotion to another (*āśeṣa*), that which is sung on (an actor's) exit (*niṣkāma*), that which conveys (the character's) mental mood (*prāsādhika*), and that which is sung as the character moves about on the stage (*ānata*).³⁷² A stage is of three kinds³⁷³ : square, rectangular and triangular.

(31) Thus I have given a summary of the dramatic topics in a small number of verses. Now I will give the *sūtra-granthaikalpaṇa*, i.e. an investigation of the definitions of these topics and my comments on these definitions.

Among these topics, we will first of all explain what are *rasas*. For³⁷⁴ without *rasa* no topic (of drama) can appeal (to the mind of the spectator) (*na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthah pravarjate*—perhaps, "For without *rasa*, there can be no (true) meaning, i.e. no real poetry."). *Rasa comes from a combination of the bhāvas, the ambhāvas and the vyabhicribhāvas (vibhāvambhāvavyabhicārisanyogād rasamspatibh)*.³⁷⁵

What is a (good) analogy?³⁷⁶ Here is one³⁷⁷ : Just as flavour (*rasa*) comes from a combination of many spices, herbs and other substances (*dravya*), so *rasa* (in a drama) comes from the combination (*upagana*) of many *bhāvas*.³⁷⁸ For example, in the same way that beverages such as *śāḍana*³⁷⁹ (a combination of the six flavours) are created (*nirvartayante*) from substances such as molasses, spices (*vyāñjana*)³⁸⁰ and herbs (*osaḍhi*), the permanent emotions attain the status of *rasa* when they are accompanied (*upagata*) by the various *bhāvas*.³⁸¹ At this point someone (might) ask : What is it you call *rasa*?³⁸² The answer is : (It is called *rasa*) because it can be savored (*āśvādyatvāt*). How is *rasa* savored? As gourmets³⁸³ (*śunmanas*) are able to savor the flavour of food prepared with many spices, and attain pleasure etc., so sensitive spectators (*śunmanas*) savor the primary emotions suggested

(*abhiṇyāñjita*)³⁸⁴ by the acting out of the various *bhāvas* and presented with the appropriate modulation of the voice, movements of the body and display of involuntary reactions, and attain pleasure etc..³⁸⁵ Therefore they are called (*abhiṇyā-khyātibh*) *nāṭyarasas* (dramatic flavours). On this same subject there are the following two traditional (*ānuvartanśya*)³⁸⁶ verses :

(32) As gourmets (*bhaktavit*) savor food prepared with many tasty ingredients (*dravya*) and many spices.³⁸⁷

(33) So sensitive people (*budha*) enjoy in their minds³⁸⁸ the permanent emotions presented with different kinds of the acting out of (transient) emotions (and presentation of their causes).³⁸⁹ This is why³⁹⁰ (these primary emotions) are known as *nāṭyarasas*.^{391, 392}

Now one might ask : Do the *bhāvas* come from *rasa*, or does *rasa* come from the *bhāvas*. Some hold that they arise from their relation of mutual dependence, but this is not true. Why? Because we find that *rasas* come from the *bhāvas*, but *bhāvas* do not come from *rasas*. On this point there are the following verses³⁹³ :

(34) Those who stage dramas (*nāṭyayoktibh*) should know that the *bhāvas* are so called because they give rise to (*bhāva-yanti*) *rasas* that are related to the various kinds of acting.

(35) As a spicy (flavour) is created from many substances (*dravya*) of different kinds, in the same way the *bhāvas* along with (various kinds of) acting, create *rasas*.³⁹⁴

(36) (In literature) there is no *rasa* without *bhāva*, nor any *bhāva* without *rasa*.³⁹⁵ Their realization in gesture is dependent on their relation of mutual dependence.³⁹⁶

(37) As a combination of herbs and spices will bring (*mayet*) food to tastiness (*svādūtām*), in the same *bhāvas* and *rasas* create (*bhāvayanti*) each other.

(38) As a tree arises from a seed, and from the tree a flower and fruit, so all the *rasas* are the roots, and on them are founded the *bhāvas*.³⁹⁷

Now we will give the origin (*utpatti*), the colors, the presiding deities, and examples (*nīdānśana*) of these *rasas*. There are four (major) *rasas* which give rise to the other four. (The original four are) : The erotic, the wrathful, the heroic and the disgusting. On this point (there are the following verses) :

(39) The comic aesthetic experience comes from the erotic. The compassionate comes from the furious. The awesome aesthetic experience comes from the heroic and the terrifying from the disgusting.³⁹⁸

(40) An imitation (*anukṛti*)³⁹⁹ of the erotic is known as the comic. The result (*karma*) of the furious should be known to be an aesthetic experience of compassion.⁴⁰⁰

(41) The result of the heroic (*rasa*) is known as the awesome, and the sight of the disgusting (gives rise to) the terrifying.⁴⁰¹

Now for the colors :

(42-43) The erotic *rasa* is a shining dark (*śyāma*).⁴⁰² The comic is said to be white. The compassionate is a light grey (*kapota*) and the furious is said to be red. The heroic *rasa* should be known to be light green or skin-color (*gaurā*) and the terrifying is black. The disgusting is blue and the awesome yellow (*pīta*).

Now the presiding deities :⁴⁰³

(44) The presiding deity of the erotic *rasa* is Viṣṇu; of the comic it is Pramātha (the attendants of Śiva),⁴⁰⁴ for the furious (*rasa*) it is Rudra; Yama is the god of the compassionate;

(45) Śiva of the disgusting. The god of time is the presiding deity of the terrifying *rasa*; Indra is the god of the heroic and Brahmā of the awesome.⁴⁰⁵

In this manner the origins, the colors and the presiding gods of the *rasas* have been set forth. Now we will explain the definitions and examples (of the *rasas*) with their *ambhāvas*,

vibhāvas and *vyabhicārībhāvas*.⁴⁰⁶ And⁴⁰⁷ we will bring (*upaneśyāmah*)⁴⁰⁸ the *sthāyībhāvas* to the status of *rasas*.

Of the various *rasas*, the erotic one arises from the *sthāyībhāva* love. Whatever in the ordinary world is bright, pure (*medhya*), shining or beautiful, is associated with love.⁴⁰⁹ For example, people say that a man who wears beautiful clothes must be in love. As people are given names according to paternal (*gotra*) and maternal (*kula*) descent⁴¹⁰ and their professions on the basis of a reliable tradition (*āptopadesasiddha*), so the names of the *rasas*, *bhāvas* and other elements (*artha*) connected with the drama (are given) on the basis of an unbroken tradition according to custom (*ācāra*?)⁴¹¹ This is why the erotic *rasa*, because it consists in a charming and beautiful dress⁴¹² is called by a name (namely *śṛṅgāra*)⁴¹³ which has become established through (conventional) usage. It has for its (*ālambana*)-*vibhāvas*⁴¹⁴ young men and women who are noble-born.⁴¹⁵ It has two major divisions : love in union,⁴¹⁶ and love in separation. To begin with love in union : It arises from (*udātīpana*)-*vibhāvas*⁴¹⁷ such as a (representation) of the seasons, garlands, ornaments, ornaments, people dear to one,⁴¹⁸ objects of the senses, fine homes, love-making (*upabhogā*), going to gardens (and there) experiencing, listening to and seeing, games,⁴¹⁹ sexual play⁴²⁰ and so forth.⁴²¹ It should be acted out by such *ambhāvas* as a skilful (use) of the eyes, frowning, side-glances,⁴²² flirtatious movements (*lalita*), gentle bodily movements (*aṅga-hāra*), and soft speech. The accompanying transitory emotions that do not belong to love are laziness, violence, disgust. As for love in separation, it should be acted out by *ambhāvas* such as world-weariness,⁴²³ physical weakness, anxiety, envy, fatigue, worry, longing, dreaming,⁴²⁴ awakening, sickness, insanity, apoplexy, lifelessness, and death.⁴²⁵ Now one might ask : If this erotic aesthetic experience arises from love, how can its *bhāvas* (i.e. *ambhāvas*) (also) belong to the compassionate? The answer is as follows : We have said above that the erotic (*rasa*) is divided into love in union and love in separation.⁴²⁶ Writers on erotics (*vaiśikāśāstra*) have explained that love has ten stages. We will give these in the chapter on *sāmānya* acting.

The compassionate (*rasa*), on the other hand, consists in

all loss of hope of ever meeting again (*vinapekṣabhāva*), and arises from suffering due to a curse (*śāpekṣeśa*), a fall in status (*vinipātita*) of one's beloved, his imprisonment, his death or the loss of wealth. Love in separation consists in retaining some hope of meeting again (*sāpekṣabhāva*) and arises from longing and worry. And so the compassionate (*rasa*) is one thing, and love in separation is another. Thus the erotic (*rasa*) is accompanied by all *bhāvas*.⁴²⁷ Moreover :

(46) A man who has a young woman, enjoys the seasons, garlands and the like, and is provided with agreeable things,⁴²⁸ is said to (experience) love (*śṛṅgāra*).⁴²⁹

There are two Āryā stanzas on the same subject as this *sūtra* :

(47) An aesthetic experience of love arises from listening to music and poems with one's beloved,⁴³⁰ and from enjoying the seasons, garlands, ornaments, going to gardens and walking.

(48) It should be acted out by showing a pleasant face and eyes, a smile and pleasant words, mental contentment and delight as well as by graceful body movements.

As for the comic (*rasa*), it consists of⁴³¹ (or is based on)⁴³² the primary emotion of laughter. It arises from such *vibhāvas* as wearing clothes⁴³³ and ornaments that belong to someone else or do not fit (*vikṛta*),⁴³⁴ shamelessness (*dhūṁśṭya*), greed (*lauhya*), tickling certain sensitive parts of the body (*kubhaka*),⁴³⁵ telling fantastic tales (*asatpralāpa*), seeing some (comic) deformity (*vyanga*), and describing faults (*doṣodāhana*).⁴³⁶ It should be acted out by puffing out the cheeks, the nose, the lips, widening and contracting one's eyes, sweating, coloring of the face, grabbing one's sides (in laughter) and so forth. The ephemeral emotions (that accompany it) are : dissimulation, laziness, drowsiness (*tandā*), sleep, dreaming, awakening, envy, etc. It is of two kinds : existing in oneself, and existing in another person. When one laughs on one's own, that laughter is said to be existing in oneself.⁴³⁷ When one causes another person to laugh, then the laughter is said to be existing in another person.⁴³⁸ On this subject there are the following two traditional Āryā stanzas :

(49) One laughs because of misplaced ornaments, eccentric behaviour, language and dress, and other peculiar actions (*arthavāśeṣa* ?),⁴³⁹ and the resulting aesthetic experience is known as the comic (*rasa*).

(50) Because one can make people laugh by eccentric actions, words, and bodily movements and dress, therefore the resulting sentiment (*rasa*) should be known as the comic.

(51) This sentiment is to be found primarily among women and low-class people. It has six varieties which I shall now enumerate :

(52) Smiles, slight laughter, open laughter (*vihasita*), mocking laughter (*upahasita*), loud laughter and excessive laughter. The first two are characteristic of noble characters, the second two of common (*mādhya*) characters, and the last two of the lowest characters.

On this subject (it has been said) :

(53) Smiles and slight laughter are characteristic of the best characters, and open laughter and mocking laughter are found among common characters. Loud laughter and excessive laughter belong to the lowest class (of people).

There are (also) the following verses :

(54) In a smile, which is characteristic of noble characters, the cheeks are only a little expanded, and one's glances are elegantly suggestive. The teeth are not visible and the smile is restrained (*dhīra*).

(55) In slight laughter the eyes begin to dilate, the cheeks are puffed out, and the mouth is slightly open. The teeth are also partially visible.

Now for the common characters :

(56) In open laughter the eyes are slightly contracted (*ākūñcīta*) and the cheeks fully distended. The sound of the laughter is soft. The laughter is appropriate to the occasion, and the face is colored.

(57) In mocking laughter the nostrils are distended, the eyes squint and the shoulders and head are bent.

Now for the lowest characters :

(58) In loud laughter one laughs out of place, with tears in one's eyes, and the shoulders and head are shaking (with laughter).

(59) In excessive laughter the eyes are swollen and bathed in tears, and there are loud and violent cries and one holds one's sides with one's hands.

(60) Thus one should give expression to (or act out) (*prayojayet*) occasions for laughter that arise in the course of the action, according to whether the characters are high-born, common or low-class.

(61) And one should know that the aesthetic experience of the comic is two-fold in so far as it arises in oneself or in someone else. Its three stages (*avasthā*) correspond to the three types of characters.

Now (the *rasa*) known⁴⁴⁰ as *karuṇā*⁴⁴¹ arises from the permanent emotion of sorrow. It proceeds from *vibhāvas* such as a curse, affliction (*kleśa*, or "affliction of a curse"), separation from those who are dear, (their) downfall,⁴⁴² loss of wealth⁴⁴³ death and imprisonment, or from contact with misfortune (*vyasana*),⁴⁴⁴ destruction (*upaghāta*),⁴⁴⁵ and calamity (*vidrava*).⁴⁴⁶ It should be acted out by tears, laments,⁴⁴⁷ drying up of the mouth, change of color, languour in the limbs, sighs, loss of memory etc. Its *vyabhicāribhāvas* are : world-weariness, physical weariness, worry, longing, panic, mental aberration (*bhrama*), confusion, weariness, fear, dejection, depression, sickness, lifelessness, insanity, apoplexy, fright, laziness, death, paralysis, trembling, change of color, tears, change of voice and the like.⁴⁴⁸

On this subject there are two Āryā stanzas :

(62) *Karuṇarasa* comes into being from certain causes⁴⁴⁹ (*bhāva*, i.e. *vibhāva*) such as hearing bad news, or seeing a person one cherishes killed.

(63) *Karuṇarasa* should be acted out by loud sobbing, fainting, lamenting, wailing, abusing the body violently and beating it.

Now (the *rasa*) called *raudra* has⁴⁵⁰ anger for its permanent emotion. Demons, monsters and violent men are its characters. It is caused by battles. It arises (sic) from such *vibhāvas* as anger, provocative actions (*adhaṛṣaṇa*), insult⁴⁵¹ (*adhiḥsepa*), lies, assault (*upaghāta*), harsh words, oppression (*abhidroha*), or according to A. "murderous intent", and envy. The appropriate actions that accompany it are⁴⁵² : beating, splitting open (*pātana*), crushing, ripping open, breaking, brandishing of weapons (*praharaṇābharaṇa*), hitting so as to inflict a wound (*samprahāra*), hitting without inflicting a wound (*śāstrasampāta*) (tr. according to A), drawing of blood, etc.⁴⁵³ It should be acted out by red eyes, furrowing of the brows, biting one's lips and grinding one's teeth, puffing out the cheeks, wringing the hands, and similar gestures. Its (*vyabhicāri*)-*bhāvas* are : correct perception (*asammoha*), dynamic energy (*utsāha*),⁴⁵⁴ panic, resentment, rashness, violence, pride, sweat, trembling, horriplation, stuttering (*gadgada*) and so forth. Now (one might) ask : It was said that *raudrarasa* pertains to demons, monsters, etc. Does this mean that it does not apply to others? The reply is that *raudrarasa* applies equally to others as well. However it is predominant (*adhikāra*) among these particular creatures. For they are by their very nature violent. Why? Because they have many arms, many mouths, their hair is yellow and lies in a wild mess on their heads, their wide-opened eyes are red and their black bodies are terrifying. Whatever they undertake,⁴⁵⁵ whether natural actions (i.e. their most casual actions), speech or bodily movements, is terrifying. Generally they even make love in a violent fashion.⁴⁵⁶ Men who imitate them give rise to *raudrarasa* (in the spectator) from blows and battles. On this subject there are the following two traditional (*ānucaraṇīya*) Āryā stanzas (and one verse composed by me)⁴⁵⁷ :

(64) *Raudra* is produced by wounding, savage mutilation (*vikṛtachedana*), cutting and striking in battles, by the tumult of war and the like.

(65) It should be acted out by special effects (i.e. tricks? *arthavisēṣa*) such as the release of many missiles, and cutting off the head, the trunk or the arms.⁴⁵⁸

(66) Such is *raudrarasa* in which words and actions are terrifying. There is a great deal of armed assault in it, and it consists in cruel actions and deeds.⁴⁵⁹

Now (the *rasa*) called *vīra*⁴⁶⁰ has (only) noble people for its characters⁴⁶¹ and consists in dynamic energy (*utsāha*). It arises from such *vibhāvas* as : correct perception, decisiveness (*adhyaśāśāya*), political wisdom (*nyāya*),⁴⁶² courtesy (*vinaya*),⁴⁶³ an army (*bala*), bravery⁴⁶⁴ skill in battle (*śakti*), might (*prāṭapa*),⁴⁶⁵ eminence (*prabhāva*)⁴⁶⁶ etc. It should be acted out by such *ambhāvas* as firmness, patience, heroism, generosity and shrewdness (*vaiśāradya*). Its (*vyabhicāri*)-*bhāvas* are happiness, attentiveness, pride, panic, violence, resentment, remembrance, and horriplation. There are the following two Āryā stanzas in the *Rasavivartanukha* (on this subject) :

(67) *Vīraśa* is dynamic energy (*utsāha*)⁴⁶⁷ which arises from various causal factors (*arthavisēṣa*) such as decisiveness, not giving way to depression (*aviśāda*), not being surprised or confused.⁴⁶⁸

(68) *Vīraśa* is properly acted out by firmness, patience, heroism, pride, dynamic energy (*utsāha*),⁴⁶⁹ bravery,⁴⁷⁰ might, and profound remarks (*ākṣēṣapakeṭavākyā*).⁴⁷¹

Now (the *rasa*) called *bhayānaka* has fear as its permanent emotion. It arises from such *vibhāvas* as ghastly noises,⁴⁷² seeing supernatural beings (ghosts), fear and panic due to the (cries) of owls (or the howling of) jackals, going to an empty house or to a forest, hearing about, speaking about, or seeing the imprisonment or murder of one's relatives. It should be acted out by such actions as trembling of the hands and feet, darting motions of the eyes, the hair standing on end, changing facial color (i.e. going white with fear) or stuttering. Its (*vyabhicāri*)-*bhāvas* are : paralysis, sweating, stuttering, horriplation, trembling, a break in the voice, change of color, anxiety, confusion, depression, panic, rashness, lifelessness, fright, apoplexy,

death and so forth.⁴⁷³ On this subject there are the following Āryā stanzas :

(69) Pretended (*kiṭaka*) *bhayānaka* results from an offence against a Guru or a king. (*Bhayānaka* also arises) from (hearing) a ghastly noise, seeing a supernatural being, going to battle, to a forest, or to an empty house.

(70) Terror (*bhaya*) (can be acted out?)⁴⁷⁴ by violent changes (*bheda*) of the limbs, the face or the eyes, (such as) paralysis of the legs, looking about in panic, collapsing (*sanma*) (on the ground), drying up of the mouth, palpitation of the heart, and horriplation.

(71) The above is genuine (fear). It should be represented as arising from deeply felt emotions (*sattvasamūṭha*).⁴⁷⁵ Pretended (fear) should be acted out by means of the same *bhāvas* (i.e. *ambhāvas*), only with milder gestures.⁴⁷⁶

(72) *Bhayānaka* should always be acted out by trembling of the hands and feet, paralysis of the limbs (*gāṭhastambha*?), fast beating of the heart, and dryness of the lips, palate and throat.⁴⁷⁷

Now (the *rasa*) known as *bībhatsa* has disgust as its permanent emotion. It arises from such *vibhāvas* as discussing, hearing, or seeing what is ugly,⁴⁷⁸ unpleasant, unclean (*acoṣya*)⁴⁷⁹ and undesired. It should be acted out by contractions of the whole body (*sarvāṅgasamṛhāra*), facial contortions (*mukha-vikṛāṇa*), vomiting (*ullekhaṇa*), spitting, violent trembling of the body (*udveṣṭāṇa*), and similar gestures. Its (*vyabhicāri*)-*bhāvas* are apoplexy, agitation (*udvega*), panic, confusion, sickness, death and the like. On this *rasa* there are the following two traditional Āryā stanzas :

(73) *Bībhatsarasa* arises from seeing something one doesn't like, from unpleasant smells, tastes, physical contacts, words and from many violent tremblings of the body.

(74) It can be well acted out by contortions of the mouth and eyes, holding one's nose, bending one's head, and unsure steps.⁴⁸⁰

Now (the *rasa*) called *abdhuta* has for its permanent emotion wonder. It arises from such *vibhāvas* as seeing heavenly beings, gaining one's desired object, going to a temple, a garden (*upavana*) or a meeting place, or (seeing) a flying chariot, a magic show (*māyā*),⁴⁸¹ or a juggler's show.⁴⁸² It should be acted out by such *ambhāvas* as opening one's eyes wide, staring, horripilation, sweat, tears, ecstatic delight, cries of "bravo", the donation of gifts, continuous (*prabandha*) cries of "Oh", "Oh", waving the arms, nodding the head (in agreement and admiration), waving one's clothes or one's fingers. Its (*vyabhicāri*)-*bhāvas* are paralysis, tears, sweat, stuttering, horripilation, panic, flurry, lifelessness, fainting, etc. On this subject there are the following two traditional Āryā stanzas :

(75) One should know that all the following are *vibhāvas* of *abdhutarasa* : any speech that contains an unusual idea, any unusual work of art (*śilpa*) or any remarkable act (*karma-rūpa*).⁴⁸³

(76) It should be acted out by such gestures as touching and seizing (parts of one's body) (*sparśagraha*?),⁴⁸⁴ throwing oneself in the air (*ulhāsana*?), shouts of "Oh!", "Oh!" (How wonderful!), and cries of "Bravo!", "Well done!", stuttering, trembling and sweating.

(77) *Śringāra* is of three kinds, in so far as it is suggested by speech costume or by action. *Hasya* and *raudra* are also of three kinds, suggested by the body, by costume and by speech.

(78) *Karuna* is traditionally considered three-fold as well, since it arises from obstruction (*upaghāta*?) of *dharma* (religious observances),⁴⁸⁵ from the loss of wealth and from sorrow.

(79) *Brahmā* said that *vīraśa* is also of three kinds : heroism in generosity, heroism in religion, and heroism in battle.⁴⁸⁶

(80) *Bhayānaka*⁴⁸⁷ is also of three varieties : arising from simulated (fear),⁴⁸⁸ deriving from some offence (A : from a thief), and from terror (*vītrāstaka*).⁴⁸⁹

(81) *Bibhatsa* is of two kinds : *ksobhaja* (that which arises from agitation) and pure *udvegī* (that which is nauseat-

ing). *Udvegī* (*bibhatsarasa*) comes from (seeing) faeces, worms (etc.), and the other comes from (seeing) blood etc.⁴⁹⁰

(82) *Abdhutarasa* has been said to be two-fold : that which is divine and that which is born from joy. The divine (*abdhutarasa*) arises from seeing heavenly sights, and the *abdhutarasa* which is born from joy comes from delight (i.e. the fulfilment of one's desires).⁴⁹¹

(83) Thus one should understand the eight *rasas* which I have illustrated with definitions. In what follows I will define the *bhāvas* as well.