

EPISTEMOLOGICAL NEGATIVE DIALECTICS OF INDIAN
LOGIC – ABHĀVA VERSUS ANUPALABDHI

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The problem of negation is primarily an epistemological one: How do we know the absence of a thing? On this question the Indian Logic¹ is divided into two main groups: the Realist and the Idealist. The former consists of the systems in which the absence (*abhāva*) is conceived as a real non-entity (*padārtha*) and as such is a real object of its corresponding negative cognition (*abhāvadhi*). In spite of certain differences the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā systems belong to this group.

The second group comprises of the later Buddhist logicians led by Dharmakīrti and the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā thinkers who reject the objectivity ascribed to 'abhāva' by the Realists. According to the Idealists negation is an inferential judgment and as such the cognition of absence of a thing is only a logical synthesis (*vikalpa*). Absence of a perceptible thing (*dṛśya*) is inferred from its non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) and from the perception of something else, namely, the *bare locus* (*bhūtaḥ*). The suggestion of the perception or the presence of the thing negated remains as an imposed ideal situation (*dṛśyatvabuddhau samāropāt*).

Now the question is: Can Negation be an independent means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)?² The view that it is an independent means seems to be very old. According to the *Bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (IX.i.5.) rejects the view of the negative *means*.³ In the *Nyāya*

¹ The present investigation will be limited to the Buddhist and the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā systems of Indian Philosophy.

² The term 'pramāṇa' is not well defined in Indian logical writings. It is used in the sense of either (a) the means of knowledge, or (b) the form of cognition, or (c) the means of proof. (Cf. Ganganath Jha, *Sadhohal Lectures*, p. 28.) Here the term will be used in the first sense. It should also be noted that the term 'Negation' will be used to express Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's theory of 'abhāva-pramāṇa', 'Non-oppohension' for the later Bhaṭṭa's theory of 'yogyānupalabdhi', and 'Non-perception' for the Buddhist theory 'dṛśyānupalabdhi'. However, in quotations of modern writers they may occur as synonyms.

³ *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*, ed. Vinḍhyeshvariprasad Dvivedin (with Nyāyakandālī of Śrīdhara) (*Vizianagram Sanskrit Series*) (Banares, 1895), p. 225.

Sūtra (II.ii.2) there is refutation of negation as the *means*. Subsequently, with the exception of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā all schools of Indian logic rejected this theory.⁴

II

The theory of the negative means evidently belongs to the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system alone. This system accepts the six means of knowledge: (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*), (3) Analogy (*upamāna*), (4) Verbal Testimony (*śabda*), (5) Presumption (*arthāpatti*), and (6) Negation (*abhāva*).⁵ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits only the first four while the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā rejects the last one, namely, the Negation.⁶ The Buddhist logicians accept only the first two *pramāṇas*.⁷ It is evident from the early texts of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā that it was this school of thought alone that propounded Negation as a *pramāṇa*. Śābarasvāmin commenting on the *Jaimini-Sūtra* (I.i.5.) said that "Negation stands for the non-existence (or the non-operation) of the (other five) means of Knowledge; and it is what brings about the cognition that '... does not exist' in regard to things that are not in contact with the senses."⁸ Śābarasvāmin appears to have endorsed the view of a Vṛttikāra, most probably Upavarṣa, who had postulated the six means in the system before Śābara.⁹ Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his exposition of the Śābara Bhāṣya affirms: "Validity (*pramāṇatā*) of Negation (as the means of knowledge) is to apprehend the fact (*sattā*) of the (negative) entity (*vastu*) where the five (positive) means of knowledge in case of cognising the (negative) form of reality (*vastu-rūpe*) fail."¹⁰

III

Now the problem arises: How do we determine the validity of a negative

⁴ Cf. A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic & Atomism* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 53-57.

⁵ *Śloka-vārtika* (henceafter *Śl.V.*) of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, ed., with the commen. 'Nyāyaratnākara' of Pārthasārathi Mīśra by Ram Shastri Tailanga (= *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*) (Banares, 1898), Codanā-sūtra, verse 111, p. 60.

⁶ Cf. M. Hiriyanna, *Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1949), pp. 99-100, 143.

⁷ *Nyāya-praveśa* of Dignāga, Pt. I, ed. with notes by Anandshankar B. Dhruva (Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1930), p. 7.

⁸ *Śābara-Bhāṣya* (= *Bibliotheca Indica*) (Calcutta 1873), p. 10: *abhāvo'pi prāmāṇy-ābhāvo nāstityasārthasānnikṛṣṭasyeti*.

⁹ Cf. Damodarvishnu Garge, *Citations in Śābara-Bhāṣya*, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Śl.V.*, p. 473 (Abhāva ch. vers. 1-2): *pramāṇapañcakam yatra vasturūpe na jāyate. vastusattāvabodhārtham tatrābhāvapramāṇatā*.

judgment and what is the ground of its validity? According to the early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika logicians the validity of the negative judgment is established through Inference (*anumāna*).¹¹ The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, most probably following Uddyotakara, invented an unique *sense-object-contact* called 'viśeṣaṇatā-sannikarṣa' and on its basis pleaded perceptibility for the negative judgment.¹² Here we do not intend to go into the details of this theory of negative Perception. For the theory is of little significance, and the main contestants are the Bhāṭṭas and the Buddhists.

The Bhāṭṭas maintain that the negative cognition is such that it cannot be a perceptual judgment. The cognition of an object is of two kinds: (a) positive and (b) negative. For example, the cognition of a cow is considered to be positive in relation to its own nature such as "This is cow." But the cognition of the cow in relation to a horse is regarded to be a negative one such as "This is *not* horse." This cognition 'not horse' is such that it is not derived from the sense-object-contact or from perception. For there is no positive entity called *not horse* which would come into contact with the senses and without the contact there can be no perception. Thus, Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa contends that the negative cognition "This is not ..." cannot be brought about by Perception. The senses are capable of having contact only with the positive forms of reality.¹³

IV

Now the question arises: Can Inference (*anumāna*) be valid in the case of a negative cognition? Kumāriḷa maintains that Inference cannot. For an inferential judgment is possible only in the case where we can determine a logical mark or reason (*liṅga = hetu*). Since a logical mark is recognised only when the invariable concomitance of the universal relation (*vyāpti*) between the mark or the middle term and the major or *sādhyā* has been established – as is the case with smoke and fire – in the case of a negative object of cognition no logical mark of the universal relation is

¹¹ *Nyāya-Sūtra*, II. ii.2; *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, IX.i.5.

¹² Cf. *Nyāya-Vārttika* of Uddyotakara, ed. Vindhyeshvariprasad Dvivedin (= *Kashi Sanskrit Series*) (Banares, 1915), on I.i.4., p. 31. Uddyotakara, I believe, is the first Naiyāyika who propounded a systematic formula of determining a six-fold *sense-object-contact* with negative object. He is followed by Śrīdhara and others of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

¹³ *Śl.V.*, Ch. Abhāva, verse 17: *pratyakṣādyavatāras tu bhāvāṁso grhyate yadā. vyāpāras-tad-anutpattir abhāvāṁse jighrṁkṣite.*

possible.¹⁴ If it were possible we would infer all the instances of negation by cognising simply one instance of absence as we can apprehend all the instances of smoke-fire relation by knowing one instance of that fact.

Furthermore, in the case of Universal-absence no valid *means* (Inference) is possible. Then, since the relation of the hetu and sādhyā is not established (vyabhicāra), how can the particular instances of (absence) be known by that (Inference).¹⁵

Moreover, Kumāriḷa further argues, the three characters of the logical mark¹⁶ cannot be established of such an entity absence of which has yet never been apprehended. Thus, for example, the cognition of antecedent absence of *X*, that is, the absence of *X* prior to its coming into existence (prāgabhāva), cannot possibly be determined by inference.

The inferential cognition is contended to be that cognition which is derived from the three-fold *reason* (trilakṣaṇa). But in the case of (the cognition of the absence of) the form of the Antecedent (an-utpattirūpasya), no cause is found anywhere (which can become the logical mark of the negative inference – as is the case in smoke-fire relation).¹⁷

By perceiving the effect (smoke) we infer the presence of the cause (fire) at the given time and place. But with reference to the Antecedent-absence that is never produced by any cause,¹⁸ inference cannot be the *means* of knowledge.

Further Kumāriḷa reasons in a naive realistic tone:

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, verse 29: 'na cāpyasyānumānatvaṃ liṅgābhāvāt pratiyate'. For a detailed exposition of Universal relation (vyāpti) the reader is referred to Karl H. Potter's scholarly work *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (= *Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series*) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), pp. 59-74.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, verse 39: na cāpyabhāva-sāmānye pramāṇam upajāyate. vyabhicārād viśeṣāṣ tu pratiyeran katham tayā.

¹⁶ The three characters of the mark (*trairūpyam liṅgasya*) are (1) the existence *only* (never non-existence) in the Subject or thing denoted by the minor term; (2) existence in things which resemble the Subject *only* (never in things which do not resemble the Subject, i.e., in *vipakṣas*); (3) *only* non-existence (never existence) in things which do not resemble the Subject. Cp. H. N. Randle, *Indian Logic in The Early Schools* (Oxford, 1930), p. 181.

¹⁷ *Śl.V.*, *op. cit.*, verse 44: trilakṣaṇena yā buddhir janyate sānumeṣyate. na cānutpattirūpasya kāraṇāpekṣitā kvacit.

¹⁸ Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa postulates four-fold negative entity: antecedent or prior-absence (*prāg-abhāva*), posterior-absence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), mutual-absence (*anyonyābhāva*) and absolute-absence (*atyantābhāva*). *Ibid.*, verses 2-4. The antecedent absence is that which *exists* prior to the creation of the thing. Hence this absence has no beginning and no cause of its creation. However it has an end when it is destroyed by the creation of the thing. Cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (= *Harvard Oriental Series*, Vol. 40) (1951), p. 54 (27). Also *Nyāya Sūtra*, II, ii, 12; *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, IX. i. 1. *Nyāyalīlavati*, pp. 544-579.

Just as Negation cannot be the *means* (pramāṇa) where the object of knowledge is a positive one, so also in the case of a negative object nothing positive can be the *means* of knowledge.¹⁹

The Mīmāṃsaka here seems to be unaware of the Method of Difference and the Principle of double negation where positive facts are cognised by applying negative methods.²⁰

V

The strongest opposition to the Mīmāṃsakas' view of Negation came from the Buddhist logicians led by Dharmakīrti. To the argument of the Mīmāṃsakas that the non-operation of all the positive means of knowledge, being real, *ipso facto* becomes an independent means of negative knowledge, the Buddhist objects: How can it be said that the absence of knowledge is a self-established fact, and that the absence of the the object is determined by the absence of the *means* of knowledge? For as the presence of the means of knowledge, say, Perception requires no other means for its establishment – it is self-evident – so is the absence of the means also a self-evident fact. For instance, on the basis of the sense-perception we know that the book is on the table. Similarly, when the book is not present and therefore no sense-perception is produced in the intellect, the absence of the cognition of the book is known by the same intellect by which we know when it is present before us. For if it were really an absence of all means of knowledge it would require some other means to establish its validity and that would lead to an *infinite regress*.²¹ Dharmakīrti postulates three *logical marks* (*hetu*), (1) Causation (*kārya*), (2) Identity (*svabhāva*) and (3) Non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), as the basis of all inferential judgments. The first two are to establish the knowledge of real (positive) things and the third one, Non-perception is the *reason* of all negation (*pratiśedhahetuḥ*).²²

¹⁹ Śl.V., *op. cit.*, verse 46: *bhāvātmake tathā* (read: *yathā*) *meve nābhāvasya pramāṇatā. tathābhāvaprāmēya'pi na bhāvasya pramāṇatā.*

²⁰ For the Method of Difference cp. Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed. (New York, Macmillan Co., 1961), pp. 368 ff.

²¹ Vide, Karṇakagomin's commentary on *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti [hereinafter *PVS*], ed. Rahula Sankṛtyāyana (Allahabad, 1943), p. 30: *kevalam yadi svasantāne jñānam syād upalabhyetānupalambhād asad eva tad iti svata eva jñānābhāvaḥ siddha iṣyate.*

²² *PVS*, ed. Raniero Gnoli (Rome, Istituto Italiano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960), p. 2: *ta eta kāryasvabhāvānupalabdhi-lakṣaṇās trayo hetavaḥ. ... tatra dvau vastusādhanāv ekaḥ pratiśedhahetuḥ.*

Dharmakīrti further explains the formula of Non-perception in the following:

(Thesis): On some particular place there is no jar. (Reason): Because it is not perceived, although the conditions (*lakṣaṇa*) of perception are fulfilled. If it were present it would have been perceived – as it cannot be otherwise.²³

Thus the Non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) becomes the *reason* of negation with reference to the object capable of being perceived (*yuktopalambha*).²⁴ In this theory, non-perception of a non-perceptible (*adrśya*) is merely problematic (*saṃśayahetu*).²⁵ This definition of the negative *reason* (*hetu*) provides the fundamental principle governing all possible kinds of formulations of negative judgments.²⁶

VI

It has been stated above that Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, in his allegiance to the Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā tradition, postulated Negation (*abhāva*) as an independent *means* (*abhāvapramāṇa*) of cognising negative facts. Also it has been demonstrated clearly that the Buddhist logicians led by Dharmakīrti admitted negation but as an inferential judgment (*drśyānupalabdhi*) These two theories are diametrically opposed to each other, and their distinction is marked by the two distinct terms by which the logicians referred to their respective theories – *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi*.

It is pertinent to point out here that the use of the two different terms by the two opposite systems is very significant, for they denote two different approaches to negation. In discussing different theories, especially in Indian Philosophy, one must strictly adhere to the terminology applied by the philosophers in the original texts.

All through the history of Indian Philosophy, the term *Abhāva* refers to an ontological situation, meaning *Non-Ens* or a *real* negative category (*padārtha*). Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's position is unique inasmuch as he postulated Negation as the *means* (*pramāṇa*) of cognising its own corresponding

²³ *Ibid.*, *pradeśaviṣeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ. yadi syād upalabhyasattva eva syān nānyathā.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20: *yuktopalambhasya tasya cānupalambhanaṃ pratiṣedhahetuḥ. – yuktopalambha = drśya = lakṣaṇaprāpta.*

²⁵ *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti [hereinafter *NB*], II, 48: *viprakṛṣṭaviṣayānupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumāna-nivṛttilakṣaṇā saṃśayahetuḥ.* English translation by B. L. Stcherbatsky, Vol. II, p. 107.

²⁶ For manifold negative formula in Buddhist logic the reader is referred to *PVS*, I, and *NB*, II, 32ff.

negative object. To him *abhāva* is an object as well as the *means* of its own knowledge. On the epistemological question, How do we know a negative fact or the absence of a thing?, Kumārila explained his theory of *abhāva-pramāṇa* in terms of 'non-existence of all other positive means of knowledge'. This absence of all positive *means* being 'absence real' *ipso facto* becomes an independent *means* of negative judgment.²⁷

The term *anupalabdhi*, on the other hand, denotes an inferential character of the problem. That is *an-upalabdhi* or non-perception = the denial of perception. This refers to the fact that the perceptibility of the negatum is the *a priori* cognition and the absence of the thing is known on the ground of its being non-perceived. This is the view upheld by the Buddhist logicians led by Dharmakīrti.²⁸

On the question of the epistemological negative dialectics a confusion prevails in the history books of Indian Philosophy. A critical study of the history books would reveal the fact that Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan and Sinha, on the question of Negation, do not present a comparative study of the Buddhists and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā systems – the two main rival schools of India. Their statements on Negation are ill-founded and misleading. They betray the whole historical development of the problem of negation in Indian logic. These scholars, I submit, have failed to recognise the very demonstrative influence of Buddhist logic on the thinkers of the Brahmanic tradition.

Dasgupta writes: "In addition to the four positive *pramāṇas*, Kumārila admits a fifth kind of *pramāṇa*, viz., *anupalabdhi* for the perception of the non-existence of a thing."²⁹

Radhakrishnan states: "Kumārila, after Vṛttikāra, admits non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) as an independent source of knowledge. (See Śābara on I, i. 5.) Dissimilarity is only want of similarity, and it is accounted for by the principle of non-apprehension. When we say "There is no jar in this place," we cognise the absence of the jar. Absence (*abhāva*) cannot be apprehended by perception, which stands in need of sense-contact with a present object, which is not possible in the case, (refers to: Śloka-Vārttika, *Abhāvapariccheda*) nor can non-existence be apprehended by the other *pramāṇas*. Non-apprehension is a means of knowledge (*mānam*) with reference to the object negated. We perceive the vacant space and think of the absence of the jar. We may say that the non-

²⁷ See above note 10.

²⁸ Cf. notes 21-25.

²⁹ Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 397.

existence of the jar is as much perceived as the vacant space, yet, since perception involves contact of an actual object with the sense, we cannot identify the act of non-apprehension with perception. We perceive the vacant space, remember the jar that is absent, and then we have the knowledge of the absence of the jar, which has no reference to the act of perception. Apprehension of non-existence is through *anupalabdhi*. (Refers to: *Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 234 ff).³⁰ Here I may point out the fact that *Śāstradīpikā* is the work of Pārthasārathi Mīśra who lived in 900 A.D. about 300 years after Kumārila. Radhakrishnan explains the non-perceptibility of *abhāva*, according to Pārthasārathi Mīśra, and does not say why it cannot be an inferential cognition. In Kumārila's theory repudiation of negative inference is the crux of his argument.

Sinha observes: "Śavara recognises non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) as an independent *pramāṇa*, and defines it as the absence of any means of valid knowledge..."³¹ In another section of his volume Sinha writes: "Kumārila holds that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is known by non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*)."³²

According to these scholars the theory of *anupalabdhi* appears as propounded by the Pūrva Mīmāṃsaka philosophers, namely, Vṛttikāra Upavarṣa, Śabara, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In fact, none of these Mīmāṃsakas show any awareness of the theory of *anupalabdhi*. My conclusions are as follows:

1) Dasgupta is wrong in stating that "for the *perception of the non-existence* of a thing, Kumārila admits a *fifth* kind of *pramāṇa*, viz., *anupalabdhi*." Unfortunately, Dasgupta quotes no work in support of his statement. During my investigation I have not come across any work of the Mīmāṃsakas or non-Mīmāṃsakas where Negation is mentioned as the *fifth* *pramāṇa*. On the contrary, *abhāva* is frequently referred to as the sixth *pramāṇa* (*ṣaṣṭham kiledam pramāṇam*).³³ Moreover, Kumārila himself candidly opposed the perceptibility of the non-existence and said that *abhāva* is the *means* in addition to the other five positive ones, which include perception.³⁴ Hence, Dasgupta's statement is completely erroneous.

2) The two terms, namely, *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi* refer to two entirely different theories on epistemological negative dialectics. In the early

³⁰ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (London 1948, reprint), p. 394-395.

³¹ J. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Calcutta, 1956), p. 789.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 309.

³³ *Byhātī-ṛjuvimalā*, p. 120.

³⁴ *Śl.V.*, *op. cit.*, verses 1-2.

writings of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system we find no mention of the theory 'anupalabdhi'. Neither Vṛttikāra Upavaṛṣa, nor Śabara or Kumārila ever referred to *anupalabdhi*.³⁵ Sinha has quoted Śabara (on *Jaimini-Sūtra* I.i.5) but missed the point that he mentioned only *abhāva*, not *anupalabdhi*.

3) Pārthasārathi Miśra (circa 900 A.D.) seems to be the first Mīmāṃsaka who, after about 300 years of Kumārila, introduced 'anupalabdhi' to the system. Defending Kumārila's tradition against the Buddhist reasoning, Pārthasārathi modified the Mīmāṃsā theory of Negation (*abhāvapramāṇa*), and admitted that, in fact, the negative cognition is an inferential judgment. Thus, he contended that the Mīmāṃsaka theory of Negation may also be termed as *drśyādarśana* or *yogyānupalambha*. He still hesitated to use the Buddhist term *drśyānupalabdhi*. Instead he split the Buddhist term and coined new expressions, 'drśya-adarśana' and 'yogya-anupalambha'. Pārthasārathi contended that these terms are synonymous and the theory expressed by them is the same as the theory referred to by the term 'pramāṇābhāva' in the *Bhāṣya* of Mīmāṃsā.³⁶

4) Admission of *anupalabdhi* by the later Mīmāṃsakas was indeed a great blow to the original stand taken by the early Mīmāṃsakas. The view of an independent negative *means* lost its vigour, and the theory of *abhāvapramāṇa*, evidently under Buddhist influence, was transformed into an inferential theory called *yogyānupalabdhi*. For example, Gāgābhaṭṭa, a later follower of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, explaining the logical process of the modified negative theory, observes that the non-perception of the counter-entity or the negatum (*pratiyogin*) is the *reason* (*karaṇa* = *liṅga*) of negation and the process is similar to that of inference.³⁷ Here we must bear in mind that this view of negation is identical with the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti's view that the non-perception of the negatum is the negative *reason* (*hetu*) of inference.³⁸ Further, Gāgābhaṭṭa explicitly admits that as a matter of fact there is no difference between the non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) of the Mīmāṃsaka and the principle of inference.³⁹

³⁵ Vide G. Jha, *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources*, pp. 163-165.

³⁶ *Śāstradīpikā*, ed. Laxman Shastri Dvavid (= *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, 188) (Banares, 1916), p. 234: *drśyādarśana-yogyānupalambhādi paryāyo bhāṣye pramāṇābhāva-śabdenoktaḥ*.

³⁷ *Bhāṭṭa-cintā-maṇi* (= *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, 25 & 27) (Banares, 1933), p. 47: *atra pratiyogipratyakṣābhāvaḥ karaṇam anumitir ivāntaravyāpāraḥ*.

³⁸ Cf. *PVS* (G. ed.), p. 20, verse I. 29 (R. ed., p. 85, I. 31): *yuktupalambhasya tasya cānupalambhanam pratiśedhahetuḥ*.

³⁹ *B. Cin.*, p. 47: ...*anumānāc-ca bhedaṃ nākalayāmaḥ*.

Hence, I may conclude that this modified theory of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas called Non-apprehension (*yogyānupalabdhi*) reduces Negation (*abhāvapramāṇa*), the earlier theory of the Mīmāṃsakas, to a mere negative form of Inference which is equivalent to the Buddhist theory of *Non-perception*; that the term *anupalabdhi* refers to the inferential character of the negative cognition; and that there is no evidence to support the view that the theory of *anupalabdhi* was propounded by the early Pūrva Mīmāṃsā philosophers.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. D. Friedman of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for his constructive suggestions and discussions concerning many problems of Negation in Indian Logic.