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**THINKING ABOUT CESSATION**

**The Prṣṭhapālasūtra of the Dīrghāgama in Context**

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*For Nana*

*“God bless the artists, and keep them safe...”*  
-Priscilla Dewey Houghton



## Table of Contents

Preface	9
Abbreviations and Bibliography	13
General Abbreviations and Editorial Signs	13
Bibliography	14
Part I: The <i>Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra</i> of the <i>Dīrghāgama</i> in Context	19
Part II: The Section on <i>Abhisam̐jñāveditanirodha</i> from the <i>Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra</i> of the <i>Dīrghāgama</i>	47
Synoptic Edition	49
Translation	87



## Preface

The present volume is the result of research work I carried out between 2005 and 2007 as a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. I first became interested in the newly-discovered *Dīrghāgama* manuscript in 2005 when taking a graduate seminar on Indian manuscript cultures taught by Somadeva Vasudeva, who was one of the first people called in to authenticate the manuscript. In the images of the crumbling folios of the manuscript, I encountered a long-lost and idiosyncratic witness to one of the central canonical sources of the Buddhist tradition, and recognized the text's importance for helping scholars rethink the dynamics of (early) Buddhist contemplative traditions. This short study is a first step in this direction.

At the time when I began working on the *Dīrghāgama* manuscript, it remained almost entirely unedited. With the exception of initial contributions by Akira Sadakata (1999) and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (2004), and a few theses produced under Hartmann's guidance at Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich (Criegern 2002 and Zhang 2004), which have not been available to me, the text was accessible only in the form of photographs of the manuscript, and rough preliminary transcriptions. I therefore devoted my initial energies to simply deciphering various *sūtras*, getting a general sense of their contents and how they relate to their extant parallels, and understanding their peculiarities with respect to the larger body of *āgama* and *nikāya* literature. The present study engages the historical conception of the Buddhist contemplative practice of the cessation of perception and feeling (*saṃjñāvedītanīrodha*) in one portion of a single *sūtra*, the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* of the *Śīlaskandha* section of the *Dīrghāgama*. It grew out of a more general interest in a whole range of non-standard representations of contemplative practice evidenced in the folios of the remarkable new manuscript.

Since 2005, a number of articles, doctoral dissertations and master's theses (e.g. Zhang 2004, Matsuda 2006, Sadakata 2006, Melzer 2010 [2006], Peipina 2008, Zhou 2008, Silverlock 2009, Liu 2010 [2008], and Dietz 2011), focusing on specific sections of the manuscript or presenting sections of the text, have been completed. A number of additional projects are in progress (see Hartmann and Wille forthcoming), a few of which have been discussed in preliminary publications (Sander 2007, Dietz 2011, Choi 2012a, and Choi 2012b). The results of these projects will eventually be made accessible to the broader public, but at present have not yet made their way into print (with the exception of Liu 2010). Still, they have begun to give scholars a clearer picture of the state of the

manuscript, the issues involved in its study, and the possibility of what can be drawn from its contents. These philological studies make the various *sūtras* of the manuscript available in roman script, and present important aspects of their textual history.

The present study is partially philological in that I edit a portion of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra* as presented in the newly discovered *Dīrghāgama* manuscript. However, its primary aim is to engage a historical question about Buddhist contemplative practice. I offer a synoptic edition and translation (Part II) of the section on the “supreme cessation of perception and feeling” (*abhisaṃjñāvedita-nirodha*) of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra*, as preserved in three extant versions, in Sanskrit, Pāli, and Chinese. This Part of the work serves to support the arguments about the history of (early) Buddhist contemplative practice presented in Part I. At the time I produced this study, an edition of the Sanskrit text was not available. I therefore made my study of the text by producing my own edition, based on photographic images of the manuscript. Since then, Gudrun Melzer (2010 [2006]) has produced an excellent edition of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra*, which I have been able to engage only as an afterthought, as the present study was already complete when I received a copy of Melzer’s work. I have, however, in the latter stages of the editorial process, summarily consulted Melzer’s edition, doing my best to account for her understanding of the text in the notes to my edition. Her careful philological study of the *sūtra* is commendable, and access to it has allowed me to improve the readings I offer in my own partial edition. Unfortunately, Melzer’s comprehensive edition of the text has yet to appear in print. Far from a comprehensive treatment of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra* itself, this study instead focuses on the differences between the three extant versions of the text in order to better understand the concept of the meditative attainment of cessation within the history of (early) Buddhism. I present one possible approach to how the work of editing new manuscripts can contribute to new approaches to the somewhat obscure history of (early) Buddhist contemplative practice.

Since I submitted this study for publication in 2008, the field of comparative *āgama* and *nikāya* studies has exploded. The work of Bhikkhu Anālayo (e.g. Anālayo 2011) is especially remarkable, and allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the various textual traditions of the Āgamas and Nikāyas. Many other scholars, whom I will not list here, are also contributing to this process. I regret that the present study cannot fully take these recent phenomenal developments into account. I do hope, however, that it will contribute in some small way to this broader movement, allowing for a better understanding of what Buddhist canonical texts, particularly those of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins, can tell us about the history of Buddhist teaching and practice.

A number of people made this book possible. Firstly, I would like to thank Somadeva Vasudeva for first introducing me to the *Dīrghāgama* material and to



the art of reading manuscripts. I am also grateful to Lance Cousins, whose collaboration with Vasudeva on an initial transcription of the *Śīlaskandha* section served as the basis for my initial work on the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*. I would also like to thank my academic mentor at the University of California at Berkeley, Alexander von Rospatt, who encouraged me to teach with him a seminar on the *Dīrghāgama* material, helped me to better understand the text, and served as a sounding board for my ideas about (early) Buddhist meditation traditions. The input of the participants in the UC Berkeley seminar was valuable. I would especially like to thank Mari Jyväsjärvi, Rupert Gethin, Eric Greene, Sean Kerr, Miroj Shakya, and Joe Wood for their input on my reading of the text. The paper on which Part I is based was presented in two incarnations at a University of California graduate student conference at Asilomar in March of 2008 and at the International Association of Buddhist Studies conference in Atlanta in June of 2008. I want to thank all those who gave me feedback at these conferences. In particular, I would like to thank Paul Harrison, who responded to the paper, encouraged me to publish it, and was particularly helpful in pointing out several issues in the Sanskrit text and my translation of the Chinese parallel. Additionally, I would like to thank Tarin Greco, who kindly read a nearly complete draft of the study, and offered salient ideas from a practice perspective. I am also grateful to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for sharing with me a forthcoming article on the progress of research on the *Dīrghāgama* manuscript. Finally, I am indebted to Birgit Kellner, who supported the publication of the present volume, improved earlier incarnations of it with many useful suggestions, and put in a great deal of work preparing it for publication.

Daniel Malinowski Stuart  
Portland, Oregon, September 20, 2012



## Abbreviations and Bibliography

### *General Abbreviations and Editorial Signs*

C	Chinese
P	Pāli
S	Sanskrit
<i>corr.</i>	Corrected: Employed when making orthographical changes or correcting simple scribal errors.
<i>conj.</i>	Conjecture: Employed when suggesting a reading that is plausible but has no direct Ms evidence or parallel passages upon which it is based.
<i>em.</i>	Emended: This refers to changes that improve upon the manuscript reading, have an impact on the meaning of the text, and are not simply corrections of orthography.
Ms	Manuscript
<i>punct.</i>	Punctuation has been fixed
<i>rest.</i>	Restored
<i>reg.</i>	Regularized
[*]	* is difficult to read in the manuscript
<*>	* has been added by the editor to the text
+	Missing or illegible <i>akṣara</i> in the manuscript
[1r1]	Pagination of manuscript A: folio number + recto (r) or verso (v) + line number

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- AKBh Shastri, D. ed. 1970. *Abhidharmakośam [Bhāṣya sphuṭārtha sahitam]*. Vārāṇasī: Bauddhabhāratī.
- B<sup>c</sup> Burmese Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Edition of the Pāli Tipiṭaka: *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana CD-ROM from Dhammagiri. Version 2.1*.  
Dhammagiri: Vipassana Research Institute: Page numbers given refer to those of the Vipassana Research Institute’s Devanagari editions, based upon which the CD-ROM was produced.
- CBETA *Dianzi fodian (Dazhengzang) CBETA 電子佛典 (大正藏) CD-ROM*. 2007. Taiwan.
- Dhs Müller, Edward 1885. *The Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. Pali Text Society. London: Pub. for the Pali Text Society by H. Frowde.
- DN *Dīghanikāya*
- DN<sub>CS</sub> *Dīghanikāya* (B<sup>c</sup>)
- DN<sub>PTS</sub> T.W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter. 1975 [1890]. *Dīghanikāya*, Vol. I. London: Pali Text Society.
- DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: all Burmese manuscripts.
- DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: all Sinhalese manuscripts.
- DN<sub>PTS(Sc)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: Manuscript S<sup>c</sup>. See the Introduction to SV<sub>PTS</sub> for details.
- DN<sub>PTS(Sd)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: Manuscript S<sup>d</sup>. See the Introduction to SV<sub>PTS</sub> for details.
- DN<sub>PTS(Sl)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: Manuscript S<sup>l</sup>. See the Introduction to SV<sub>PTS</sub> for details.
- DN<sub>PTS(Sm)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: Manuscript S<sup>m</sup>. See the Introduction to SV<sub>PTS</sub> for details.
- DN<sub>PTS(Bm)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: Manuscript B<sup>m</sup>. See the Introduction to SV<sub>PTS</sub> for details.
- DN<sub>PTS(Bp)</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>: Manuscript B<sup>p</sup>. See the Introduction to SV<sub>PTS</sub> for details.
- Kv *Kathāvatthu*
- PTS Pali Text Society (editions of Pāli texts)
- SN *Saṃyuttanikāya*.
- Sv *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā*
- SV<sub>PTS</sub> Rhys Davids, T.W. and J. Estlin Carpenter. 1886. *The Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya*. Part I. London: Pali Text Society.

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## Part I

### The *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra* of the *Dīrghāgama* in Context

In the late 1990s, a remarkable Buddhist manuscript made its way to London and into the hands of a rare art dealer there. Found in an unknown location in northern Pakistan or eastern Afghanistan,<sup>1</sup> and written in a script almost identical to that of the famous Gilgit texts, this new manuscript was made up of hundreds of folios of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin *Dīrghāgama*.<sup>2</sup> Written in Sanskrit, it serves as an important Indic language witness to some of the seminal texts of the Buddhist tradition. It is, therefore, invaluable for reevaluating our understanding of the *āgama* and *nikāya* texts that have long been available in Pāli, Chinese, or Tibetan. This study is a small contribution to advancing the study of this important new manuscript, and will deal with one of its *sūtras*: The *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*.<sup>3</sup>

For those not familiar with the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, I will give a brief synopsis of the text, which, in broad outline, is the same in all three versions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The precise provenance of the manuscript remains unclear. Based on the similarity of its script to other texts—such as the *Vinayavastu* manuscript—found in Gilgit, Melzer (2010, pp. 4–5) suggests that the manuscript most likely originated in Gilgit. The manuscript was divided up and sold on the oriental book market in parts, such that sections of the manuscript are now held in several private collections in United States, Japan, and Norway. The majority of the manuscript, including the folios containing the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, is held in a private collection in Virginia, USA. On this collection, see Hartmann and Wille forthcoming.

<sup>2</sup> For details about this manuscript find, see Hartmann 2002 and 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Gudrun Melzer (2010 [2006]) has worked on editing the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* as part of her doctoral dissertation, and will soon be publishing it in print. As mentioned in the preface, I received a copy of her dissertation only after completing this study, and have only been able to reference it in a limited manner.

<sup>4</sup> The Pāli version can be found at pp. 178–203 of DN<sub>PTS</sub>. The Chinese version, the *Buzhapolou jing* 布吒婆樓經, can be found at T I 109c22–112c18 and is included in the *Chang ahan jing* 長阿含經. This text was ostensibly translated from a Gāndhārī original belonging to the Dharmaguptaka school. On the school affiliation of the Chinese *Dīrghāgama*, see Bailey 1946, Enomoto 1986, Schmithausen 1987 and, most recently, Salomon 2007. For a note of caution on the language and school affiliation of the Chinese *Dīrghāgama*, see Boucher 1996 and 1998. Hereafter, I will refer to the *Buzhapolou jing* 布吒婆樓經 as the “Chinese version,” as it is the only extant Chinese translation of the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*. This way of referring to the text indicates merely the language into which the text was translated, and should in no way suggest that the text was part of an independent “Chinese” tradition of āgamic textual transmission. Rather, we know that the

The ascetic Pṛṣṭhapāla (Poṭṭhapāda; *buzhapolou* 布吒婆樓), a leader of a group of wandering mendicants, is staying in the mendicant's park with a large group of his followers. They are engaged in discussion about miscellaneous topics. The Buddha comes to visit the gathering, and Pṛṣṭhapāla silences his followers and prepares a seat for the Buddha. Pṛṣṭhapāla then tells the Buddha about the theories of various ascetics on how a perceiving individual's faculty of perception functions. He questions the Buddha about the mental state (or non-state) of supreme cessation of perception (and feeling). The Buddha explains that the theories of other ascetics are all wrong. He explains his own path of practice as one that leads to the cessation of perception (and feeling). Pṛṣṭhapāla goes on to ask about the relationship between perception (*saṃjñā*; *saññā*; *xiang* 想) and knowledge (*jñāna*; *ñāna*; *zhi* 智), and whether perception and the self (*ātmā*; *attā*; *wo* 我) should be understood as identical or different. When Pṛṣṭhapāla asks whether he might be able to discern the way perception functions, the Buddha explains that such discernment would be very difficult for someone who does not practice according to the Buddha's own teachings. Pṛṣṭhapāla then questions the Buddha about whether the universe is eternal or not, and the Buddha explains that he does not teach such things, but only teaches the four noble truths. Pṛṣṭhapāla delights in the Buddha's teaching, and the Buddha departs. Once the Buddha is gone, Pṛṣṭhapāla's fellow ascetics jeer at him for approving of the Buddha's teaching.

The second part of the *sūtra* involves a separate encounter, this time between Pṛṣṭhapāla, his friend Hastiśayyātiputra (Hatthisāriputta; *xiangshoushelifu* 象首舍利弗), and the Buddha. In this exchange, the Buddha again explains that he teaches only the four noble truths, and gives a number of examples of wrong views about heaven in order to show that notions of an eternally blissful afterlife are false. The Buddha then praises the monk who practices diligently and destroys the inner defilements never to be born again. Finally, Hastiśayyātiputra questions the Buddha about the relationship of three types of selves in time. These selves are: 1. the gross material self, 2. the mind-made (subtle) material self, and 3. the immaterial perception-made self.<sup>5</sup> The Buddha counter questions Hastiśayyātiputra in order to reveal the provisional nature of his propositions, and all propositions about the self. Finally, Hastiśayyātiputra requests ordination from the Buddha and becomes an Arhat.

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Āgamas that are extant now in Chinese translation all came from different Indian schools with different histories of textual transmission.

<sup>5</sup> The Chinese version of the text adds 'the [body] of the heavenly realm of desire' (*yujietian* 欲界天) to make four types of self.

This very rich *sūtra* is full of interesting material. Particularly interesting from a historical perspective are the various differences between the newly-discovered Sanskrit version of the text and its Pāli and Chinese parallels. Here I will confine myself to a discussion of one unique aspect of the Sanskrit version, that is, the Buddha's explication of the meditative attainment of cessation of perception and feeling (*abhisamjñāveditanirodha*). I will show that the Buddha's teaching on cessation found in this version of the text is unique among all extant canonical explanations of the path of Buddhist practice, and may shed light on an ongoing scholarly debate about the meditation practices of the early Buddhist community in India.

### ***Three Early Models of the Path: The Realization-of-the-truths, Cessation, and Discernment***

In what follows, I attempt to bring several passages from the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* to bear on a time-worn scholarly debate about theories of liberation among early Indian Buddhist communities. This debate was instigated in 1937 by the eminent Buddhologist, Louis de La Vallée Poussin. De La Vallée Poussin (1937) pointed out two supposedly divergent theories of liberation in early Buddhism, one that gave precedence to the practice of meditative trance leading to a direct experiential encounter with the truth of the Buddhist path, and another that privileged wisdom, or cognitive discernment (*prajñā; paññā*) of that truth. More recently, a number of European scholars have revisited de La Vallée Poussin's theory. In particular, Lambert Schmithausen (1981), Johannes Bronkhorst (1993) and Tilmann Vetter (1988), all working with the same material, have come to different conclusions regarding the theories and practices of the early Indian Buddhist community.<sup>6</sup> It is my hope that the evidence I offer from the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* will be able to qualify some of their findings, and allow for a more nuanced understanding of the place of the meditative state of the cessation of perception and feeling within the early history of Buddhist theories of liberation.

Below I outline the findings of the above-mentioned scholars, and discuss my own interpretation of the sources. Before proceeding, however, I would like to make clear that I do not share the certainty of some of these scholars that the texts under discussion allow us to get at the teachings or teaching methods of the Buddha himself.<sup>7</sup> I am inclined to read the early canonical texts as representations, which,

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<sup>6</sup> Also notable in this regard are Zafiropulo 1993, Gombrich 1997, and Wynne 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Vetter's work is the most gratuitous in this regard. Bronkhorst and Schmithausen are more

when treated with the sharp knife of critical philology, allow us to access the changing theories, interests and attitudes of different sectors of the tradition as it developed in the centuries following the Buddha's death. This is not to deny that some remnant of what the Buddha actually taught is embedded in the material extant today. However, I believe that sifting out such material from the larger edifice of divergent discourses represented in the Canon remains nearly impossible. Thus, though I am not willing to take the extreme position that the Canonical sources do not give us any access to the formative stages of the Buddhist tradition, I am also not particularly sympathetic to attempts to pinpoint Canonical passages that must be the earliest or primordial teaching of the Buddha, or of specific proto-Buddhist ascetic communities.<sup>8</sup> Though I do argue below that we should reconsider the earliness of the Buddha's teaching on cessation, this "earliness" can only be understood in terms of a relative chronology. I, like others before me, am thus hesitant to posit a definitive relationship between the Buddha and a chronology of the early theories of liberation within the Buddhist community, and would qualify many of the arguments presented by other scholars in this regard.

With that said, let us proceed to an overview of previous scholarship on this subject. According to Lambert Schmithausen (1981), close study of the earliest sources on Indian Buddhist meditation reveals three early models of Buddhist liberation, or liberating insight:<sup>9</sup>

1. A meditator progresses through four stages of *dhyāna*, realizes the four noble truths and gains knowledge of the destruction of the inner defilements (*āśravakṣaya*). I refer to this model as the realization-of-the-truths model of liberation.
2. A meditator, without progressing through the *dhyānas*, discerns the characteristic of impermanence, suffering, and not-self in all physical and mental phenomena, and thus brings about the destruction of the inner defilements. I refer to this model as the discernment (*prajñā*) model of liberation.

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careful about focusing on the dynamics of change within early Buddhist communities.

<sup>8</sup> Particularly striking in this regard is Vetter 1988; see also Gómez 1976.

<sup>9</sup> Schmithausen 1981; Vetter 1988, pp. XXI–XXII. I prefer to render the term *saṃjñā/saññā*/想 as perception, rather than as ideation (Schmithausen 1981; Bronkhorst 1993) or apperception (Vetter 1988).

3. A meditator progresses through four stages of *dhyāna*, four immaterial attainments, finally enters the cessation of perception and feeling, (*abhisaṃjñāved(ay)itanirodha*; *abhisaññānirodha/saññāvedayitanirodha*; *xiangzhimieding* 想知滅定) and thus brings about the destruction of the inner defilements. I refer to this model as the cessation model of liberation.<sup>10</sup>

Both Johannes Bronkhorst and Tilmann Vetter have argued that the third model, advocating a sequence of eight meditative states and the final goal of cessation, must be a late development and cannot be included in a taxonomy of the earliest practices of the Indian Buddhist community.<sup>11</sup> In particular, Vetter claims that liberation through the attainment of cessation must necessarily be tied to the practice of the four immaterial attainments mentioned above:

Without having undergone the stages of formless meditation the ultimate point of this path of salvation, i.e. the cessation of apperception and feelings, is not possible. Therefore, what is being described here does not seem to be an ancient *Buddhist* means of finding salvation.<sup>12</sup>

Vetter makes this claim based on the work of Bronkhorst and Bareau, who have shown that the four immaterial attainments are most certainly not part of the inventory of early Buddhist meditation practices, as evidenced by early Abhidharma lists and a critical reading of the biography of the Buddha.<sup>13</sup>

Similarly, Bronkhorst argues that the model of eight graded meditations was an amalgam of Buddhist practice (the first four *dhyānas*) and mainstream Indian meditation, which had as its aim the attenuation of mental activity. The final addition of cessation of perception and feeling, he argues, was a late, and illogical, addition to the list:

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<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that in most descriptions of this model, after arising from the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling, the inner defilements of a practitioner are destroyed.

<sup>11</sup> Vetter 1988, p. XXII; Bronkhorst 1993, pp. 81–83. This is not a new argument. In fact, as early as 1922 Friedrich Heiler made a similar argument. Winston King (1980) follows Heiler's argument when he discusses the "reorganization" of earlier Buddhist forms, a process that involved the acceptance of the previously rejected immaterial attainments. See King 1980, pp. 14–15.

<sup>12</sup> Vetter 1988, p. XXII

<sup>13</sup> Vetter 1988, p. XXII; Bronkhorst 1985, p. 306; Bareau 1963

...the presence of feeling (*vedayita*) in the final Cessation of Ideations and Feelings must give rise to suspicion, since the whole list seems aimed at the dissolution of ideations and leaves no place for feelings. This suggests that the state of Cessation of Ideations and Feelings is an addition to the list.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, Bronkhorst not only argues that the four immaterial attainments were brought into Buddhism from outside, but also that the notion of cessation of perception and feeling does not have a logical place in the system of graded practice that includes the four *dhyānas* and the four immaterial attainments.<sup>15</sup>

Though Schmithausen does consider the historical process posited by Vetter and Bronkhorst to be plausible, and acknowledges the composite nature of the cessation model, he eventually concludes that the “spiritual exercise of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* [the cessation of perception and feeling], or mystical anticipation of the state of Final nirvāṇa,” should be included in a taxonomy of early Buddhist practices. He argues that this aspect of Buddhist meditation systems is a constitutive element in the early development of divergent theories of liberating insight.<sup>16</sup> But the following question Schmithausen raises in this regard remains largely unanswered:

The question arises how to explain the fact that, besides the conception of Liberating Insight as a comprehension of the four Noble Truths realized especially in the state of the Fourth *dhyāna*, we also find a fundamentally different view according to which Liberating insight is considered to be, or at least to include as a *conditio sine qua non*, an anticipatory personal experience, or a comprehension based on such an experience of Nirvāṇa.<sup>17</sup>

Here, Schmithausen (following de La Vallée Poussin) begins with the premise that the cessation model and the realization-of-the-truths model are “fundamentally different.” However, as I will go on to show, these two models may very well have originally been positive and negative sides of the same coin. Thus, it may be the case that the “fundamental” differences perceived by Schmithausen (among others)

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<sup>14</sup> Bronkhorst 1993, pp. 81–82.

<sup>15</sup> More recently, Wynne (2007) has countered some of the claims of Bronkhorst and Schmithausen, and attempted to show that the immaterial attainments were in fact part and parcel of the earliest Buddhist teachings of meditation.

<sup>16</sup> Schmithausen 1981, p. 219

<sup>17</sup> Schmithausen 1981, p. 218

may simply be the result of two coextensive, and interrelated, early strategies undertaken to deal with the notion of the ineffable experience of enlightenment.

Additionally, the idea that cessation of perception and feeling on the one hand, and discernment (*prajñā*) on the other, are fundamentally opposed in the context of Buddhist practice may be an artifact of the later discomfort felt by traditional Buddhist scholastics when dealing with the notion of cessation.<sup>18</sup> The idea of cessation as the final goal of the practice seems to have made some within the Indian Buddhist community uncomfortable. In my opinion, there are two likely reasons for this. Firstly, the teaching of a path leading to cessation was easily susceptible to a critique of nihilism.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, the state of cessation did not lend itself to scholastic interpretation. A state devoid of the basic properties of the phenomenal realm does not allow for the type of phenomenological analysis that many early Indian Buddhist scholastics were prone to. Thus, cessation was inaccessible as a topic for either scholastic or practice-oriented elaboration. For these reasons, when we look at the final outcome of normative Buddhist doctrine as reflected in later *śāstras* and commentaries, it becomes clear that the state of cessation of perception and feeling was relegated to an inferior position within the larger system of meditative practices. On the other hand, the idea that liberation was achieved through a process of cognitive discernment or insight (*prajñā*) won out in all quarters.

To sum up, based on the earliest surviving material at the disposal of scholars to date, two interpretations of the position of cessation of perception and feeling have been posited. The first (Bronkhorst 1993 and Vetter 1988) argues that a graded

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<sup>18</sup> It is perhaps a bit problematic to blame “scholastics” for the developments discussed here. In fact, I think the distinction between scholastics and practitioners is generally overstated. This problematic distinction is most apparent in works such as Sharf 1995, in which Sharf suggests that scholastic treatises should not be read as accounts of practice, influenced by practitioners’ experiences in meditation. I disagree with Sharf’s approach, and would suggest, following Griffiths 1986, that there was constant feedback between scholars, practitioners, scholastic treatises, and scholar-practitioners. However, I also assume that there may have been a significant difference between those practitioners concerned with discussing the plausibility or possibility of certain experiential events in scholastic terms, and those practitioners concerned with using more rhetorical or metaphorical language to elucidate the pith of their meditative experiences.

<sup>19</sup> See, for instance, Kv 15.10 at Kv (B<sup>c</sup>) 419–420 [PTS: Kv 518–519], in which concern about the moral status of the state of cessation of perception and feeling, as well as doubt about its being able to connect with the supramundane (*lokuttara*) is evident.



practice of *dhyānas* leading to the cessation of feelings and perceptions as a liberating anticipatory experience (or non-experience) of final nirvāṇa is not part of the practices and/or theories of the earliest Buddhist community, but was incorporated into Buddhist theories of meditation from mainstream Indian meditation practices. The second (de La Vallée Poussin 1937 and Schmithausen 1981) argues that the practice/theory of cessation was one of a number of early models of liberation. Eventually, however, it was subsumed within the more appealing or accessible notions of liberation based on insight into the four Noble Truths, and the three characteristics of existence (*anitya*, *duḥkha* and *anātman*).

### ***Evidence from the Prṣṭhapālasūtra***

Through a reading of the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin *Dīrghāgama*, I would like to present a new hypothesis regarding the early meditative practices of the Buddhist community. I suggest that the path of practice outlined by the Buddha in the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* may reflect an early stage in the development of Buddhist theories of meditation. In this model of practice, a meditator attains the state of cessation of perception and feeling directly after the fourth *dhyāna*, in a fashion analogous to the realization-of-the-truths model discussed above. This exposition of the path dissolves the arguments offered by Vetter and Bronkhorst that the theory of cessation is late, and allows us to nuance Schmithausen's understanding of the role of this state among the practices and theories of early Buddhist communities.<sup>20</sup>

According to the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, the Buddha taught the following path of meditation:

“[A monk] enters and abides in the rapture and bliss born of seclusion that is the first meditative absorption, which is removed from sensual pleasures, removed from unwholesome evil states, and is accompanied by applied and sustained thought. His previous perception of the bliss of sensual pleasures ceases. At that time, Prṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of rapture and bliss born of seclusion. [He is] trained in that training.”

The Blessed one said to him: “Further, Prṣṭhapāla, due to the subsiding of applied and sustained thought, [and] because of inward lucidity and oneness of mind, a monk enters and abides in the rapture and bliss born of meditation that is the second meditative absorption, which is free from applied and sustained thought. His previous

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<sup>20</sup> Here I make an argument for one interpretation of the source material at hand. For alternative interpretations of the text, see below, pp. 35–40.

perception of the rapture and bliss born of seclusion ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of rapture and bliss born of concentration. [He is] trained in that training.”

The Blessed one said to him: “Further, Pṛṣṭhapāla, due to the fading away of rapture, a monk dwells equanimous, mindful, and cognizant, experiencing bodily bliss, about which the Noble Ones say: ‘Equanimous and mindful, he dwells happily.’ [Thus, he] enters and abides in the third meditative absorption. His previous perception of rapture and bliss born of concentration ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of bliss devoid of rapture. [He is] trained in that training.”

The Blessed one said to him: “Further, Pṛṣṭhapāla, due to the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and because of the immediately preceding disappearance of happiness and sadness, a monk enters and abides in the fourth meditative absorption, which is the purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity, and which is free from pleasure and pain. His previous perception of bliss devoid of rapture ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity. [He is] trained in that training.”

The Blessed one said to him: “If, Pṛṣṭhapāla, a monk is percipient here and impercipient there,<sup>21</sup> he thinks thus: ‘For me not thinking is good. For me, thinking is bad. If I were to think or produce mental constructs, then this perception would cease, and a coarser perception would appear.’ [Thus] he does not think nor does he produce mental constructs. Not thinking and not producing mental constructs, he rightly touches cessation.

“Before now, Pṛṣṭhapāla, do you recall having heard of such a supreme cessation of perception and feeling?”

“Nowhere [before have I heard of it], sir Gautama, only just now...”<sup>22</sup>

This passage is remarkably similar to its Pāli counterpart, with one very important difference. In the Pāli text, the Buddha describes a meditating monk as proceeding

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<sup>21</sup> The Sanskrit text reads: *...ihasamjñī bhavati tatrāsamjñī...* Cf. Kv 15.10.736 at Kv (B<sup>c</sup>) 420 [PTS: Kv 15.10.4 at Kv 519]:

*na vattabbaṃ — “saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asaññasattupikā” ti? āmantā. nanu idhāpi asaññī tatrāpi asaññīti? āmantā. hañci idhāpi asaññī tatrāpi asaññī, tena vata re vattabbe — “saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asaññasattupikā” ti.*

Though the context of this passage differs from that of the Pṛṣṭhapālasūtra, the parallel phraseology is noteworthy.

<sup>22</sup> This is a translation of the Sanskrit text found in Part II, §14–17 and §23–25 [A 417r–418 r1].

through the first four meditative states described above, then an additional three meditative states—the immaterial attainments of the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, and the sphere of nothingness—before entering the state of cessation. The Dharmaguptaka version of the text agrees more or less with the Pāli, but adds the attainment of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (*youxiangwuxiangchu* 有想無想處; *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*) to round out the list.<sup>23</sup> Thus, in the very same *sūtra*, in its three different recensions, we are left with three divergent expositions of meditative practice:

Sanskrit	Pāli	Chinese
1 <sup>st</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	1 <sup>st</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	1 <sup>st</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>
2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>
3 <sup>rd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	3 <sup>rd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	3 <sup>rd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>
4 <sup>th</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	4 <sup>th</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>	4 <sup>th</sup> <i>dhyāna</i>
 (sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception presented as a momentary transitional state)	sphere of infinite space	sphere of infinite space
	sphere of infinite consciousness	sphere of infinite consciousness
	sphere of nothingness (pinnacle of perception)	sphere of nothingness
		sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception
cessation of perception and feeling	gradual attainment of the cessation of perception for one who is clearly aware <sup>24</sup>	meditative absorption of cessation of perception and knowing

<sup>23</sup> See Part II, §21–22.

<sup>24</sup> The differences between the terms the three versions of the text employ to describe the final attainment of cessation deserve comment. While the Sanskrit text employs the simple term *nirodha* or cessation, the Pāli text presents a somewhat convoluted compound: *anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampajānasamāpatti* or ‘the gradual attainment of the supreme cessation of perception for one who is clearly aware.’ Finally, the Chinese text offers the compound *xiangzhimieding* 想知滅定 or the meditative absorption of cessation of perception and knowing. It should be noted, however, that the Sanskrit text later has the compound *saṃjñāveditanirodha*, ‘the cessation of perception and feeling,’ and the Chinese text attests two different phrases: *cidimiexiangyinyuan* 次第滅想因緣, ‘the conditions [of

When we compare the lists of meditative attainments found in the Chinese and Pāli versions of the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* to other lists found in the Nikāyas and Āgamas, we find many correspondences. In particular, the immaterial attainments find their way into a number of important lists, including the list of eight *liberations* (*aṭṭha vimokkhā*) and *seven stations of consciousness* (*viññāṇaṭṭhīti*).<sup>25</sup> As briefly mentioned above, Bronkhorst has discussed these lists, and suggested that the four immaterial states listed in the Pāli and Chinese versions of the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, and found throughout the Nikāyas, represent a ‘hard core’ of mainstream Indian meditative practices, one that was perhaps added to Buddhist theories of meditative practice only secondarily.<sup>26</sup> Bronkhorst points out that these immaterial attainments are not present in the earliest Abhidharma lists, and are even discussed as analogous to other “heretical” (外道 *waidao*) practices in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.<sup>27</sup> Another passage from the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, unique to the Sanskrit version, seems to shed some light on Bronkhorst’s argument. Thus, Prṣṭhapāla questions the Buddha on the pinnacle of perceptions:

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training for the] gradual cessation of perception,’ and *cidixiangmiexiangding* 次第想滅定, ‘the meditative absorption of the gradual cessation of perception.’ These compounds in the Chinese seem to share more affinity with the Pāli text.

It is difficult to decide which of these readings is more authentic with respect to the early tradition. Unfortunately, the Chinese text cannot be relied on as a source for precise philological reconstruction. The relationship between the Pāli text and the Sanskrit text is complicated. By the principle of *lectio difficilior*, one might be inclined to assume that the Pāli text represents a reading closer to a hypothetical original, and that the Sanskrit text has been simplified in the process of transmission and “translation.” Though I do not wish to discount this possibility entirely, the unwieldy and artificial nature of the Pāli compound suggests to me rather a literary interpolation, for such long compounds are extremely rare in the early Pāli literature. The Pāli text as we have it today is therefore more likely the product of interpolated commentarial glosses added in the process of redaction. If this assessment of the text is adopted, then one might also argue that the term °*sampajāna*° in the Pāli compound is an attempt by the later tradition to bring the attainment of cessation of perception (and feeling?) within the purview of a discernment-oriented model of practice.

<sup>25</sup> Bronkhorst 1993, pp. 82–83.

<sup>26</sup> Bronkhorst 1993, pp. 87.

<sup>27</sup> Bronkhorst 1993, p. 80, citing Bareau 1971. See T XIII, *sūtra* no. 1545, 399b23: 謂諸外道說四解脫。一無身解脫。即空無邊處。二無邊意解脫。即識無邊處。三淨聚解脫。即無所有處。四世窣堵波解脫。即非想非非想處。

“What then does sir Gautama explain when explaining the pinnacle of these perceptions?”<sup>28</sup>

“Here, Prṣṭhapāla, secluded from sensual pleasures... up until...he enters the first meditative absorption and abides [in it]. *Some* explain this here to be the pinnacle of perceptions. Further, Prṣṭhapāla, due to the subsiding of applied and sustained thought, one...up until...enters the second meditative absorption and abides [in it]. *Some* explain this here to be the pinnacle of perceptions. In the same way one enters and abides in the third and fourth meditative absorptions, the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, and the sphere of nothingness. *Some* explain these here to be the pinnacle of perceptions. However, Prṣṭhapāla, [one] rightly touches cessation, *which comes about immediately [after] these perceptions.* This here is what *I* explain to be the pinnacle of perceptions.”<sup>29</sup>

This passage is quite important, and also problematic because two syllables are missing in the manuscript. I will, however, leave aside a discussion of the philological issues entailed in this manuscriptological problem. Beyond this issue, there are two possible ways to interpret the central message of the passage. One follows the translation above, which is based on an emendation of the Sanskrit text. The other follows the original reading of the manuscript. According to the emended reading that I have adopted, the Buddha claims that he teaches the cessation of all the previously described meditative states as the pinnacle of perceptions. Such a statement might be taken as problematic, since cessation is generally considered to be the absence of any form of perception (and feeling). The original reading of the manuscript, on the other hand, suggest that the Buddha teaches as the pinnacle of perception whichever percipient state immediately

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. Part II, §28–30 [T I, *sūtra* no. 1, 110c4–10; DN (PTS) 9.19 at DN I 185.11–20].

<sup>29</sup> “However, Prṣṭhapāla...This here is what *I explain* to be the pinnacle of perceptions”: Here the translation is interpretive and relies on the emendation of the text to *āsām tu, Prṣṭhapāla, saṃjñānām anantarapātitaṃ...* against the manuscript reading *yāsām tu, Prṣṭhapāla, saṃjñānām anantara + [t]itam...* See Part II, §44, footnote 204. The manuscript reading could be translated as follows: “However, those perceptions immediately after which [one] rightly touches cessation are what I explain when explaining the pinnacle of perceptions.” I find this interpretation to be less compelling, and one that seems to diverge from the parallelism with the preceding sentences of the paragraph. It remains, nonetheless, a perfectly feasible alternative reading to the emendation I have offered, and likewise suggests some affinities with a similar idea presented in divergent forms in the Chinese (see Part II, §29) and Pāli versions (see Part II, §30) of the text. Melzer 2006 (p. 262, §36.45) follows the manuscript in her edition and translates the text in a manner similar to the way I have above.

precedes the attainment of cessation. Following this reading, we might understand this statement to refer to the state just before cessation previously described by the Buddha (“If, *Prṣṭhapāla*, a monk is percipient here and impercipient there...”), which can be read as a reference to the nebulous state of neither-perception-nor-non-perception functioning as an intermediary between percipience and cessation.<sup>30</sup> However, it might also be read as a statement indicating that any form of perception (*yāsāṃ tu saṃjñānām*) can immediately precede cessation. The reading I offer, however, which brings the syntax of the final statement in line with the parallel sentences that precede it, suggests a more basic attempt to assert the attainment of cessation as supreme among all meditative attainments.

Regardless of which reading we follow, this passage, taken together with the one cited just previously, indicates quite clearly, in a single *sūtra*, the distinction between what the Buddha teaches as supreme among meditative states, and what “others” teach. The Buddha teaches cessation, or an intermediary state leading to cessation, as supreme. Others teach one or another of the *dhyānas* or immaterial attainments as supreme. If we take this passage seriously, and further note that the first four *dhyānas* are the only meditative states mentioned in the Buddha’s own exposition of the path of practice cited above, we find support in our *sūtra* for Bronkhorst’s argument that the four immaterial attainments filtered into Buddhist systems of meditation from outside groups.<sup>31</sup>

Here I would like to pause to point out that it is not only in the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* that we find evidence for such a sequence of meditative practice. In fact, two passages from the Pāli Canon show that similar models of practice were known to the

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<sup>30</sup> Since we find no explicit mention here of the eighth immaterial attainment, this interpretation commends itself. Again, see Part II, §29.

<sup>31</sup> See also Bareau 1963, pp. 13–71 and Vetter 1988, p. XXI–XXII.

What has to be dealt with here, however, is the problem that the first four *dhyānas* are also referred to as being taught by others. If we take this passage seriously, this would indicate that the four *dhyānas* may never have been exclusively Buddhist, but were also the common property of various Indian ascetic communities. This would not be surprising at all. What would make the Buddhist treatment of the four *dhyānas* unique is precisely how they were employed towards the attainment of liberation, be this envisioned as the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling, penetration of the Four Noble Truths, or as the powerful discernment of the truth of *anātman*.

It is also possible to interpret this passage as indicating that the Buddha’s exposition of the path cited earlier is corrupt, and most likely contained the immaterial attainments found here. This will be dealt with in more detail below. See pages 37 and 39 below.

redactors of the Pāli tradition. In the *Samyuttanikāya* we find two *suttas* that suggest affinity with the sequence of meditative states represented in the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*. The *Uppaṭipāṭikasutta*, for instance, explicitly describes a meditator ascending through the fourth *dhyāna* and then entering cessation, with the strange anomaly that without entering the attainment of the immaterial state of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the meditator nonetheless transcends such a state before entering cessation.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the *Sutta* states:<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> The presence of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in the following sequence represents something of a text-critical problem. There are several ways to solve this issue. Firstly, it is possible that the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception was added as a bridge between the fourth *jhāna* and cessation, a bridge between a state within the phenomenal world and a state beyond the phenomenal world. Secondly, it is possible that this text, like the *Dhammasaṅgani* (Dhs 265–8 at Dhs 55–6), has folded the immaterial attainments into the fourth *jhāna*. I would like to thank Rupert Gethin for pointing out to me this aspect of the early Abhidhamma tradition.

<sup>33</sup> SN 48.40 at SN (B<sup>c</sup>) III 291–92 [PTS: SN V 215–16] (See Schmithausen 1981, p. 215, footnote 54. Here, unlike in the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, we do find direct mention of the mediating state of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception between the fourth *dhyāna* and *nirodha*.):

“*idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato uppajjati somanassindriyaṃ. so evaṃ pajānāti: ‘uppannaṃ kho me idaṃ somanassindriyaṃ. tañ ca kho sanimittaṃ sanidānaṃ sasaṅkhāraṃ sappaccayaṃ. “tañ ca animittaṃ anidānaṃ asaṅkhāraṃ appaccayaṃ somanassindriyaṃ uppajjissatī” ti, n’ etaṃ thānaṃ vijjati.’ so somanassindriyañ ca pajānāti, somanassindriyasamudayañ ca pajānāti, somanassindriyanirodhañ ca pajānāti. yattha c’ uppannaṃ somanassindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati tañ ca pajānāti. kattha c’ uppannaṃ somanassindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati? idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukhasa ca pahānā dukkhasa ca pahānā pubbeva somanassadomanassānaṃ atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṃ upekkhāsati pārisuddhiṃ catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. ettha c’ uppannaṃ somanassindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati. ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, ‘bhikkhu aññāsi somanassindriyassa nirodhaṃ, tadatthāya cittaṃ upasaṃharati.’*”

“*idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato uppajjati upekkhindriyaṃ. so evaṃ pajānāti: ‘uppannaṃ kho me idaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ, tañ ca kho sanimittaṃ sanidānaṃ sasaṅkhāraṃ sappaccayaṃ. “tañ ca animittaṃ anidānaṃ asaṅkhāraṃ appaccayaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ uppajjissatī” ti, n’ etaṃ thānaṃ vijjati.’ so upekkhindriyañ ca pajānāti, upekkhindriyasamudayañ ca pajānāti, upekkhindriyanirodhañ ca pajānāti. yattha c’ uppannaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati tañ ca pajānāti. kattha c’ uppannaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati? idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sabbaso nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma, saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ upasampajja*”

“[After passing through the pain faculty, the sadness faculty, and the pleasure faculty, and respectively transcending the first, second and third meditative absorptions,] here, monks, for a monk who is dwelling heedfully, ardently, and fervently, there arises the happiness faculty. He fully understands [his experience] in this way: ‘For me this happiness faculty has arisen. It has a sign, [it] has a source, [it] is compounded, and has a basis. It is not possible for the faculty of happiness to arise without a sign, without a source, as uncompounded and without a basis.’ He fully understands the happiness faculty. He fully understands the arising of the happiness faculty, and its cessation. Where the happiness faculty ceases without remainder, he fully understands that as well. And where does the happiness faculty that has arisen cease without remainder? Here, monks, due to the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and because of the immediately preceding disappearance of happiness and sadness, a monk enters and abides in the fourth meditative absorption, which is the purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity, and which is free from pleasure and pain. There the happiness faculty that has arisen ceases without remainder. This, monks, is what is called ‘a monk who knows the cessation of the happiness faculty and directs the mind for the sake of it.’

Here, monks, for a monk who is dwelling heedfully, ardently, and fervently, there arises the equanimity faculty. He fully understands [his experience] in this way: ‘For me this equanimity faculty has arisen. It has a sign, [it] has a source, [it] is compounded, and has a basis. It is not possible for the faculty of equanimity to arise without a sign, without a source, as uncompounded and without a basis.’ He fully understands the equanimity faculty. He fully understands the arising of the equanimity faculty, and its cessation. Where the equanimity faculty ceases without remainder, he fully understands that as well. And where does the equanimity faculty that has arisen cease without remainder? Here, monks, having completely transcended the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, a monk enters and abides in the cessation of perception and feeling (*saññāvedayitanirodha*). There the equanimity faculty that has arisen ceases without remainder. This, monks, is what is called ‘a monk who knows the cessation of the equanimity faculty and directs the mind for the sake of it.’”

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*viharati. ettha c’ uppannaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati. ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, ‘bhikkhu aññāsi upekkhindriyassa nirodhaṃ, tadatthāya cittaṃ upasaṃharatī’ ”*  
*ti.*



Uppaṭṭipātikasutta
1 <sup>st</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of pain
2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of displeasure
3 <sup>rd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of bodily bliss
4 <sup>th</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of happiness
(removal of the) sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception
cessation—cessation of equanimity

Similarly, a list of 6 *passaddhis* or tranquilities found in the *Rahogatasutta* suggests a progression through the four *dhyānas* to cessation, even while it acknowledges the practice of the immaterial attainments. What is particularly striking is that the list of six tranquilities is first preceded by a description of a meditator attaining all nine of the *anupūrvavihāra* attainments. Thus, in the very same text, we find representations of both the stereotyped and irregular series of attainments:<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> SN 36.11 at SN (B<sup>c</sup>) IV 213–14 [PTS: SN IV 217–18]:

“*atha kho pana, bhikkhu, mayā anupubbasaṅkhārānaṃ nirodho akkhāto. paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa vācā niruddhā hoti. dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa vitakkavicārā niruddhā honti. tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa pīti niruddhā hoti. catutthaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa assāsapassāsā niruddhā honti. ākāśānañcāyatanaṃ samāpanassa rūpasaññā niruddhā hoti. viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ samāpanassa ākāśānañcāyatanaśāññā niruddhā hoti. ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samāpanassa viññāṇañcāyatanaśāññā niruddhā hoti. nevasaññānāśāññāyatanaṃ samāpanassa ākiñcaññāyatanaśāññā niruddhā hoti. saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpanassa saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti. khīṇāsavassa bhikkhuno rāgo niruddho hoti, doso niruddho hoti, moho niruddho hoti...*

“*cha-y-imā, bhikkhu, passaddhiyo. paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa vācā paṭippassaddhā hoti. dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa vitakkavicārā paṭippassaddhā honti. tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa pīti paṭippassaddhā hoti. catutthaṃ jhānaṃ samāpanassa assāsapassāsā paṭippassaddhā honti. saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpanassa saññā ca vedanā ca paṭippassaddhā honti. khīṇāsavassa bhikkhuno rāgo paṭippassaddho hoti, doso paṭippassaddho hoti, moho paṭippassaddho hoti” ti.*

“And further, monk, I teach the cessation of graded mental constructions. For one who has entered upon the first meditative absorption, speech has ceased. For one who has entered upon the second meditative absorption, applied and sustained thought has ceased. For one who has entered upon the third meditative absorption, rapture has ceased. For one who has entered upon the fourth meditative absorption, in and out breathing has ceased. For one who has entered upon the sphere of infinite space, the perception of materiality has ceased. For one who has entered upon the sphere of infinite consciousness, the perception of the sphere of infinite space has ceased. For one who has entered upon the sphere of nothingness, the perception of the sphere of infinite consciousness has ceased. For one who has entered upon the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the perception of the sphere of nothingness has ceased. For one who has entered upon the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling have ceased. For the monk whose defilements are destroyed, craving has ceased, aversion has ceased, ignorance has ceased...

“There are these six tranquilities, monk. For one who has entered upon the first meditative absorption, speech is tranquilized. For one who has entered upon the second meditative absorption, applied and sustained thought is tranquilized. For one who has entered upon the third meditative absorption, rapture is tranquilized. For one who has entered upon the fourth meditative absorption, in and out breathing is tranquilized. For one who has entered upon the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling are tranquilized. For the monk whose defilements are destroyed, craving is tranquilized, aversion is tranquilized, ignorance is tranquilized.”

<b>Rahogatasutta (successive cessation of formations)</b>
1 <sup>st</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of speech
2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of thought and examination
3 <sup>rd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of rapture
4 <sup>th</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —cessation of in and out breathing
sphere of infinity of space—cessation of perception of form
sphere of infinity of consciousness—cessation of perception of infinity of space
sphere of nothingness— cessation of perception of infinity of consciousness

<b>Rahogatasutta (six tranquilities)</b>
1 <sup>st</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —tranquility of speech
2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —tranquility of thought and examination
3 <sup>rd</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —tranquility of rapture
4 <sup>th</sup> <i>dhyāna</i> —tranquility of in and out breathing
Cessation of perception and feeling—tranquility of perception and feeling
The destruction of the defilements—tranquility of craving, aversion and ignorance

These Pāli passages indicate that even at the time of redaction of the Pāli Canon, its redactors were aware of somewhat irregular meditative sequences that corresponded quite closely with the one presented in the Sanskrit *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra*. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us as scholars to take the new Sanskrit text seriously, and think of it as more than a mere anomaly of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin *Dīrghāgama* manuscript tradition. What the above-cited passages also indicate is that Bronkhorst and Vetter were perhaps too quick to conclude that the cessation of perception and feeling should necessarily be grouped with the immaterial meditations, and thus did not belong to the repertoire of early Buddhist practices or theories of liberation. Our Sanskrit text and its Pāli counterparts present an irregular exposition of Buddhist practice, one that gives primacy to the four *dhyānas*, like the realization-of-the-truths model, but posits the state of cessation of perception and feeling as its final goal, to be obtained directly from the fourth *dhyāna*. Thus, the passages cited seem to support Schmithausen’s intuitions about the central role of cessation within the earliest strata of Buddhist theories of meditation/liberation, and allow us to rethink the way in which such theories were constituted historically.

I suggest three different ways to think about the Sanskrit text in relation to the Pāli and Chinese versions, and to the larger corpus of canonical texts dealing with the early practices of Buddhist meditation:

1. The Sanskrit text represents an early textual tradition.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the meditative experience of cessation of perception and feeling was considered by some early

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<sup>35</sup> Here I use the word “textual” in a very broad sense, to include oral teachings in addition to literary productions.

Buddhists as the final goal of Buddhist practice — the experience of *nirvāṇa* in this life — to be entered from the fourth *dhyāna*. At the same time, the immaterial attainments were considered as the teachings of other groups, not suitable for practice by Buddhists. These original elements were later brought together in the standard nine-fold graded practice (*nava anupubbavīhārasamāpatti*; *nava anupūrvavīhārasamāpatti*) found in the Pāli and Chinese Nikāyas and Āgamas.

2. The text is corrupt. During some period during the long transmission of this *sūtra*, the immaterial meditations were accidentally omitted from the Buddha's exposition of the path of practice.
3. The Sanskrit text represents a late textual tradition. Thus, in a process of redaction, the immaterial attainments found today in the Pāli and Chinese versions of the text were systematically removed from their position within the Buddha's exposition of the Path of practice, and relegated to a secondary position in the mouths of other teachers.

I will deal with each of these possibilities in reverse order. It is of course possible that the text as we have it is the product of tampering in the process of redaction. Just as modern scholars such as Bareau, Schmithausen, Bronkhorst and Vetter have been able to discern certain problems of consistency in the texts under discussion, it is perfectly possible that (Mūla)Sarvāstivādin scholastics, in redacting the Āgamas, came across inconsistencies, and attempted to rectify them by altering various meditative sequences in the texts. Indeed, the standard path of practice found in most of the *Dīrghāgama sūtra*-s involves the attainment of the four *dhyāna*-s and a subsequent engagement with discernment (*prajñā*) or super-knowledge (*abhijñā*), without the attainment of the immaterial states. The text as we have it may be the result of an attempt to bring the sequence of the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* in line with these other *sūtras*. What militates against the possibility of the passages under discussion being altered, however, is the fact that none of the classical *śāstric* sources of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin tradition seem to display any compelling evidence for why anyone would have been inclined to do so.<sup>36</sup> On the contrary, texts such as the *Abhidharmakośa* may in fact provide

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<sup>36</sup> A passage from the *Samāhitabhūmi* is rather telling in this regard. It seems to indicate that some meditation practitioners felt the need to have experienced certain attainments, even when they were not felt to be entirely necessary soteriologically. See Delhey 2009, vol. 1, p. 148 (with my translation):

*ārūpyās tu na tathā pratisamvedyante. ato noktāḥ sukhavīhārā iti. te punar vyutthāya samākhyātavyāḥ. kena kāraṇena? bhavanti khalv āraṇyakasya bhikṣoḥ praśnasya*

evidence that idiosyncratic sequences of meditative practices, such as those found in the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra*, were subsumed within more inclusivist (later) models.<sup>37</sup> Thus, altering canonical texts seems to have been deemed unnecessary once scholars and practitioners had developed inclusivist interpretive methods to deal with the variations found therein. I would suggest that it may have been easier to produce entirely new scriptures than it was to alter specific texts that were already known within a given community.<sup>38</sup>

As for the text being corrupt, we also cannot entirely preclude this possibility. The presence of the immaterial attainments in the passage on the pinnacle of perceptions cited previously certainly raises a question as to whether the same sequence was originally found in the Buddha's description of the path as well. Further, the possibility of a scribal haplography here is very real, as the loss of the immaterial attainments would not affect the reading of the text in any obvious way. In fact, my own first instinct as an editor was to try to emend the text by reconstituting the immaterial attainments. However, due to the inconsistencies between our three recensions of the text and a clear triangulation of the three recensions generally speaking, if we understand the text to be corrupt, a series of issues about the historical constitution of the four immaterial attainments arise. For instance, should we assume that the Sanskrit text "originally" contained all four of the immaterial attainments, like the Chinese text? Or should we assume that it only

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*praṣṭārah. saced āraṇyako bhikṣus tatra praśnaṃ prṣṭo na vyākaroti, tato 'sya bhavanti vaktārah: .,kiṃ vatāraṇyakasyāraṇyakatvena, yatredānīm, ye śāntā vimokṣā atikramya rūpāṇy ārūpyāḥ, tatra praśnaṃ prṣṭo na vyākaroti!" iti. ataḥ samākhyānārthaṃ samāpattavyā na vihārārtham.*

"But the immaterial [attainments] are not experienced in the same way. Therefore they are not described as 'blissful abidings.' [When a meditator] comes out of [these attainments], they are declared. Why? There are people who bring questions to a forest-dwelling monk. If the forest-dwelling monk, when questioned, does not answer, then there will be people who say about him: 'How is it that by the forest dwelling of this forest-dweller, which is those immaterial peaceful liberations that transcend materiality, he does not answer when asked about them.' Because of this, [the immaterial attainments] are to be attained for the sake of declaration, not for the sake of abiding."

<sup>37</sup> See AKBh 2.42–44 (pp. 233–248). See also Griffiths 1986, pp. 120–121 and Dietz 1984, pp. 64–65. A full perusal of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* has not been possible. However, a cursory review of the text reveals no material that seems to obviously contradict the present argument. I welcome any correction to this statement from those who are better versed than myself in the traditions presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.

<sup>38</sup> See Park 2008, p. 50.

contained three of the four immaterial attainments, as the Pāli text and the Pāli commentarial tradition seem to indicate? Or should we reevaluate our reading of the Pāli text to allow for the possibility that the Pāli commentarial interpretation of “the pinnacle of perceptions” (*saññagga*) as the sphere of nothingness is incorrect, and that the reference to *saññagga* in the Buddha’s exposition of the path in the Pāli *sutta* actually refers to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception?

Answering these questions becomes even more complicated when we look more closely at a parallel passage in the Chinese version of the text. Thus, Pṛṣṭhapāla (*buzhapolou* 布吒婆樓) questions the Buddha on the unsurpassed perception (*wushangxiang* 無上想).<sup>39</sup>

The mendicant spoke further to the Buddha: “Among these perceptions, which is the unsurpassed perception?”

The Buddha said to the mendicant: “The perception of the sphere of nothingness is unsurpassed.”

The mendicant spoke further to the Buddha: “With regard to these perceptions, which is the supreme unsurpassed perception?”

The Buddha said: “Some say [it] has perception, and some say [it is] without perception. [I say that] the intermediary between these, which can [bring about] the gradual attainment of the meditative absorption of the cessation of perception and knowing, is the supreme unsurpassed perception.”<sup>40</sup>

This passage is important, because it seems to indicate that the recension of the *sūtra* that was translated into Chinese contained a reconciliatory stance with respect to the two different positions represented in the Sanskrit and Pāli texts. The Sanskrit text seems to take cessation (*nirodha*) as the “pinnacle of perceptions” (*saṃjñānām agryaṃ*), while the Pāli text takes the “pinnacle of perceptions”

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<sup>39</sup> See Part II, §29 (T I, sūtra no. 1, 110c4–10):

梵志又白佛言：「諸想中，何者為第一無上想？」

佛言：「諸言有想，諸言無想。於其中間能次第得想知滅定者，是為第一無上想。」

Here it is quite clear that the term *wushangxiang* 無上想, ‘the unsurpassed perception,’ corresponds directly to the Pāli term *saññagga* and the Sanskrit phrase *saṃjñānām agryaṃ*, or ‘pinnacle of perceptions.’

<sup>40</sup> “[I say that] the intermediary between these ...”: This is a debatable translation. One might just as easily translate “[I say that] among these ...”

(*saññaggam*) to be the sphere of nothingness (*ākiñcaññāyatana*).<sup>41</sup> The Chinese text, however, distinguishes between the “unsurpassed perception” (*wushangxiang* 無上想) that is said to have perception (*zhuyanyouxiang* 諸言無想), namely: the sphere of nothingness (*buyongchu* 不用處), and the “supreme unsurpassed perception” (*diyiwushangxiang* 第一無上想), which is said to be an intermediary state between the sphere of nothingness and *nirodha* (於其中間). This state “can [bring about] the gradual attainment of the cessation of perception and knowing” (能次第得想知滅定者). As I have done, one can understand the treatment of the “supreme unsurpassed perception” as referring to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (*youxiangwuxiangchu* 有想無想處; *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*; *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*), the state by means of which a meditator enters cessation (*xiangzhimieding* 想知滅定) in the Chinese text.<sup>42</sup>

If we take into account the fact that neither the Pāli nor the Sanskrit text refer explicitly to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, this would indicate that we can point to a doctrinal progression of sorts. That is, it seems that the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception may not be original to the *anupubbasmāpatti* system. Rather, it may have been brought in as a later addition to the list, when a scholastic concern arose as to how to bridge the gap between a

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<sup>41</sup> This is at least one Pāli commentarial standpoint. See Sv 9.413 at Sv (B<sup>c</sup>) I 276–77 [PTS: Sv 9.17 at Sv II 372]:

*yasmā pana aṭṭhamasamāpattiyā aṅgato sammasanaṃ buddhānaṃ yeva hoti, sāvakesu sārīputtasadisānaṃ pi natthi, kalāpato sammasanaṃ yeva pana sāvakānaṃ hoti, idaṃ ca “saññā saññā” ti, evaṃ aṅgato sammasanaṃ uddhaṭaṃ, tasmā ākiñcaññāyatanaparamaṃ yeva saññaṃ dassetvā puna tad eva “saññaggaṃ” ti dassetuṃ: “yato kho poṭṭhapāda ... pe ... saññaggaṃ phusatī” ti āha.*

“Because analysis of the eighth attainment according to factors is available only to Buddhas, and not to those such as Sāriputta among the disciples, to whom only analysis according to *kalāpa*-s is available—as [for them] analysis according to factors is uprooted [because of the practice of identifying] things as ‘[this] perception [or that] perception’—therefore, to show that it alone is taught as “the pinnacle of perceptions,” showing that perception is only supreme as the sphere of nothingness, [the text] states: ‘When, Poṭṭhapāda ... touches the pinnacle of perceptions.’”

Taking this passage into account, we might interpret the position presented in the Chinese version of the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* as analogous to this commentarial attitude.

<sup>42</sup> Previously, I have translated the Chinese equivalent to this phrase, *youxiangwuxiangchu* 有想無想處, as ‘the sphere that is with and without perception.’ Here, however, for the sake of consistency, I use the translation from the Pāli text: ‘the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.’

state with perception and a state (or non-state) without perception. In any case, the Chinese text allows for two highest points, within two divergent frameworks of thought, thus preserving the older tradition while maintaining the innovation as “supreme.”<sup>43</sup> Finally, it is interesting to point out that while the Chinese text insists that there is only one (supreme unsurpassed) perception, the Pāli text allows that there are many pinnacles of perception, thus allowing that every successive state that a meditator enters entails the cessation of a foregoing state, a relative pinnacle of perceptions.<sup>44</sup> This relativized notion of cessation seems to be the general interpretive model in the Pāli text.

So, this brief foray into the problems raised by the differences in the three versions of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra* shows that much remains to be done with respect to our understanding of the historical constitution of the immaterial attainments. Most importantly, if we try to think historically about the relationships between the three versions of the text, and we assume that three of the immaterial attainments were once present in the Buddha’s exposition of the path in the Sanskrit version of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra*, we must call into question Bronkhorst’s notion of a ‘hard core’ of mainstream Indian meditative practices.<sup>45</sup> Keeping in mind the various caveats discussed above, I think it is possible to suggest that the fourth immaterial attainment, the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, may have been the independent production of Buddhist scholasticism/praxis.

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<sup>43</sup> Here I would like to emphasize the fact that my notion of a historical doctrinal progression remains conjectural. It is perfectly possible that there were two parallel models of practice both going back to the Buddha or his early disciples.

<sup>44</sup> See Part II, §30:

梵志又問：「為一想。為多想？」佛言：「有一想。無多想。」(T I, *sūtra* no. 1, 110c10)

“*ekam yeva nu kho, bhante, Bhagavā saññaggaṃ paññāpeti, udāhu puthū pi saññagge paññāpetī*” ti?

“*ekam pi kho ahaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, saññaggaṃ paññāpemi, puthū pi saññagge paññāpemi*” ti.

“*yathā kathaṃ pana, bhante, bhagavā ekam pi saññaggaṃ paññāpeti, puthū pi saññagge paññāpetī*” ti?

“*yathā yathā kho, Poṭṭhapāda, nirodhaṃ phusati, tathā tathāhaṃ saññaggaṃ paññāpemi. evaṃ kho ahaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, ekam pi saññaggaṃ paññāpemi, puthū pi saññagge paññāpemi*” ti. (DN 9.19 at DN I 185)

<sup>45</sup> Bronkhorst 1993, pp. 87.



With that said, however, it cannot be decided definitively whether the immaterial attainments were once actually present in the Buddha's exposition of the path as presented in the Sanskrit version of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra*. Since a definitive conclusion remains impossible until further material comes to light, I think it is essential that we take the Sanskrit text seriously as it has been transmitted and survives. And so, we come finally to the first proposition, that the explanation of the path of practice found in the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra* represents an early Buddhist tradition of meditative practice (cum theory of liberation), one that was foundational for later elaborations of graded meditative practice as represented in lists of meditative states such as the eight *vimokṣas* and nine *anupūrvavīhārasamāpattis*. This proposition seems to fit with the available data most readily. Before the discovery of the *Dīrghāgama* manuscript, there was previously only one instance in the extant Canonical literature that described a meditator entering the state of cessation of perception and feeling from the fourth *dhyāna*.<sup>46</sup> This led many scholars to assume that the state of cessation of perception and feeling was from the outset related to the immaterial attainments, and thus fundamentally dissociated from the stereotyped description of liberation, in which a meditator cognizes the four noble truths from the fourth *dhyāna*. What the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra* seems to indicate, however, is that there was likely a point in time when the state of cessation was at least on a par with the realization of the Four Noble Truths as a model for describing the state (or process in the case of the realization of the truths) of Buddhist liberation. If we take this notion a little bit further, and acknowledge the long-standing agreement among scholars that the realization of the Four Noble Truths is a somewhat unwieldy scholastic elaboration,<sup>47</sup> I am even inclined to suggest that the theory of the cessation of perception and feeling may have been one of the earliest ways that Buddhist practitioners attempted to make sense of the ineffable liberatory experience that was supposedly attained and taught by the Buddha.<sup>48</sup> It is particularly important to

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<sup>46</sup> See SN 48.40 at SN (B<sup>c</sup>) III 291–92 [PTS: SN V 215–16], the *Uppaṭipāṭikasutta* cited above.

<sup>47</sup> See Schmithausen 1981, pp. 202–203, referring to Feer 1870, Waldschmidt 1951, and Mizuno 1971.

<sup>48</sup> I should note, however, that Vetter (1988) is less inclined to read the formulation of the four noble truths in this way. He takes the truths as a unit that was likely formulated by the Buddha himself in the context of his first teaching. Unfortunately, Vetter's overly literal treatment of the source material, particularly his reading of the biography of the Buddha, makes it almost impossible for me to take his larger argument seriously. In particular, I take

note that the third Noble Truth is also said to be a kind of cessation (*nirodha*). Here, however, we are speaking about a cessation of craving (*taṇhā; tṛṣṇā*), which serves as the cause of suffering.<sup>49</sup> The standard canonical notion is that suffering ceases when its cause, craving, ceases. It is possible that this formula was an attempt to psychologize the notion of cessation of perception and feeling, which would of course include the cessation of craving as well as any object of craving, within a discernment-oriented system. Thus, I am inclined to allow for a rethinking of the historical constitution of the Four Noble Truths, one that leaves room for the possibility that the state of cessation was constitutive of rather than derivative of the Four Noble Truths formula—or what was perhaps originally a two Truths formula (*duḥkha* and *duḥkhanirodha*).

To conclude, I would like to return to the question posed by Schmithausen in his 1981 article. He asks how we can explain the existence of two “fundamentally different” conceptions of liberating insight: one a realization of the four noble truths from the fourth *dhyāna*, and another, the anticipatory experience of *nirvāṇa* as a (non-)experience of cessation of perception and feeling.<sup>50</sup> Based on the evidence adduced above, I think we can tell a new story about how these differing notions of liberation emerged. I suggest, following well-established precedents, that the practice of the four *dhyānas* was one of the fundamental practices of the early tradition. The idea that liberation was attained directly from the fourth *dhyāna* is probably as old as the tradition itself. But how the tradition spoke about the state or process of liberation presented problems from the very beginning. It is conceivable that the cessation model and the realization-of-the-truths model were two alternative approaches, one negative and one positive, employed to describe the state of liberation attained through the practice of the fourth *dhyāna*. Thus, though there is a “fundamental difference” between a mindless state of cessation and a mindful realization of the Four Noble Truths, the practice said to lead to these states may very well have originally been singular. The most plausible way to

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issue with Vetter’s attempt to pinpoint specific words found in the biography, such as the term *amataṃ*, as the term that the Buddha himself first used to describe his attainment of liberation (see Vetter 1988, p. 8). My sense is that such arguments remain extremely problematic, and that we are much more likely to get at the early teachings by focusing on the development of systems of thought and practice, as opposed to trying to historicize minute details that seem impossible to verify systematically.

<sup>49</sup> SN 56.11 at SN (B<sup>c</sup>) III 485 [PTS: SN V 421]: *idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ — yo tassā yeva taṇhāya asesavirāgaṇirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo.*

<sup>50</sup> Schmithausen 1981, p. 218.

explain the development of these divergent concepts is to assume that they were different theoretical approaches to the problematic of making effable the ineffable. It is feasible that these developments were obscured because the differences in the systems of meditative practice leading to these states were systematically overstated. Such developments can be attributed to later elaborations of the tradition, which firstly posited the attainment of cessation as the culmination of a more protracted series of practices, and secondly relegated it an inferior status in a taxonomy of soteriological meditative attainments. The evidence from the *Prṣṭhapālasūtra* allows us to rethink the historical succession of doctrinal and practical developments, and makes it explicit that a model of Buddhist practice that prioritized the attainment of cessation after the practice of the four *dhyānas* was quite possibly one of the earliest Buddhist models of liberation.

Finally, I would finish by emphasizing that the above argument remains preliminary and is necessarily speculative. It must be tested and confirmed by further research into the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin *Dīrghāgama*, and into other early Buddhist manuscripts, more and more of which are coming to light. What becomes clear beyond doubt from the above discussion, however, is just how important the discovery of such manuscripts is.



## Part II

The Section on *Abhisamjñāveditanirodha* from the *Pṛṣṭhapālasūtra* of  
the *Dīrghāgama* of the (Mūla-)Sarvastivādins and Its Parallels

Synoptic Edition and Translation



## Synoptic Edition

This is a partial edition of the *Pr̥ṣṭhapālasūtra*, offered in support of the arguments presented in Part I. Gudrun Melzer has produced a full edition of the Sanskrit text, edited synoptically with a number of Central Asian fragments from the Hoernle collection, and accompanied by a German translation (Melzer 2010 [2006]); I am grateful to her making a copy available to me.

Melzer's edition differs from mine on several points. Since I completed the present edition before seeing hers, I have not been able to note all the differences, and therefore note only the drastic ones. Melzer's work has clarified a number of small details with respect to the manuscript, and I eagerly look forward to its appearance in print.

All punctuation in the Sanskrit text is supplied by the editor. *Sandhi* has been regularized, but not applied across punctuation marks such as full stops and colons. The manuscript does contain several *daṇḍas* but, as there seems to be no clear system of usage, I have omitted them for the sake of consistency. Italicized text indicates *akṣaras* that were either illegible or difficult to read in the manuscript. Bold type in the Pāli and Sanskrit text indicates portions of the two texts that are philologically in direct agreement.

The Pāli text is based on both DN<sub>PTS</sub> and DN<sub>CS</sub>, and includes the alternative readings presented in the footnotes of DN<sub>PTS</sub>. The punctuation in the present edition differs at points from both DN<sub>PTS</sub> and DN<sub>CS</sub>. Readings of DN manuscripts are taken from DN<sub>PTS</sub> and have not been verified. Page numbers presented in subscript brackets in the Pāli edition refer to the page numbers of DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

The Chinese text is that of the CBETA edition of the Taishō, although the punctuation is entirely that of the present editor. I supply the footnotes of the Taishō edition in the footnotes of the present edition. However, the numbering of said footnotes does not correspond to that of the Taishō.

## §1

- S: “pūrvakā<sub>[416v5]</sub>ṇi, *bho* Gautama,<sup>1</sup> *divasāni* pūrvatarakāṇi,<sup>2</sup> saṃbahulānām nānātīrthikaśramaṇabrāhmaṇacarakaparivrājakānām<sup>3</sup> kutūhalasālāyām san-  
niṣaṇṇānām sannipatitānām aya<sub>[6]</sub>m evaṃrūpo<sup>4</sup> ’bhūd antarākathāsamudāhāro,  
yaduta: abhisamjñāveditanirodhaḥ.<sup>5</sup>
- P: “purimāni, bhante, *divasāni* purimatarāni, nānātithiyānaṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇā-  
naṃ kotūhalasālāya<sup>6</sup> sannisinnānaṃ sannipatitānaṃ abhisaññā-nirodhe <sub>[180]</sub>  
kathā udapādi: ‘kathaṃ nu kho, bho, abhisaññānirodho hotī’ ti?
- C: <sub>[110a3]</sub> 梵志白佛言：「世尊，昨日多有梵志、沙門、婆羅門，集此婆羅門  
堂，說如是事，相違逆論。

## §2

- S: “tatraike evam āhuḥ: “ahetor,<sup>7</sup> bhavantaḥ, puruṣasya samjñā utpadyante,<sup>8</sup>  
ahetor <sub>[7]</sub> nirudhyante.<sup>9</sup> i iti tās caikadā upayanty apy apayanty api.<sup>10</sup> yasmim

<sup>1</sup> °ṇi bho gautama *em./rest.*; + + + tamasya A. · The emendation is based on a parallel passage below and on other similar formulas found in A.

<sup>2</sup> pūrvatarakāni *em.*; pūrvatarāni A. · One might leave *pūrvatarāni*, however we find *pūrvatarakāni* in a number of other places in the Ms. See A 433r3 and 394r1.

<sup>3</sup> °brāhmaṇacarakaparivrājakānām *em.*; °brāhmaṇarcaḥkparivrājakā A. · Emended after several parallel instances of this compound in Divy.

<sup>4</sup> ayam evaṃrūpo *rest.*; ay + [vaṃ]rūpo A.

<sup>5</sup> °nirodhaḥ *punct.*; °nirodho A. · Melzer quite reasonably emends the text here to read *abhisamjñāveditanirodhe* after the Pāli text. However, the term *abhisamjñāvedita-nirodhaḥ* might also be understood (stretching the strictures of classical Sanskrit grammar) as a *bahuvrīhi* compound describing the kind of (occurrence of a) debate that arose: “[the occurrence of a debate] pertaining to [the topic of] the complete cessation of perception and feeling.” The nominal form also indicates that, as the tradition developed, the prefix *abhi-* may have come to be used as more than a simple relational prefix. As it is commonly understood in the term *abhidharma*, the prefix *abhi-* here likely indicates the sense of ‘supreme’ or ‘ultimate.’ This semantic shift also took place within the Pāli tradition.

<sup>6</sup> kotūhalasālāya DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; kotuhala° DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>7</sup> aheter *em.*; ahetau A.

<sup>8</sup> utpadyante *em.*; utpadyate A.



samaye upayanti, saṃjñī tasmim samaye bhavati. yasmim samaye apayanty,<sup>11</sup> asaṃjñī tasmim samaye bhavatīti.” api [8] *vayam evaṃ caivaṃ ca*<sup>12</sup> *prekṣāmaha*<sup>13</sup> iti.

P: “tatr’ ekacce evam āhaṃsu: ‘ahetū appaccayā purisassa saññā uppajjanti pi nirujjhanti pi. yasmim samaye uppajjanti, saññī tasmim samaye hoti. yasmim samaye nirujjhanti, asaññī tasmim samaye hoti’ ti. itth’ eke abhisaññānirodham paññapenti.

C: 「瞿曇，或有梵志作是說言：『人無因無緣而想生，無因無緣而想滅。想有去來。來則想生，去則想滅。』

### §3

S: “apare evam āhuḥ: “jīvād, bhavantaḥ,<sup>14</sup> ii puruṣasya saṃjñā<sup>15</sup> utpadyante, jīvān<sup>16</sup> nirudhyante. iti tās caikadā upayanty apy apayanty api. yasmim samaye upayanti, saṃjñī tasmim [417r1] samaye bhavati. yasmim samaye apayanti,<sup>17</sup> tasmim samaye asaṃjñī bhavatīti.”<sup>18</sup> api *vayam evaṃ caivaṃ ca* *prekṣāmaha*<sup>19</sup> iti.

<sup>9</sup> aheto nirudhyante *em.*; aheto nirudhyataḥ puruṣasya saṃjñā utpadyante aheto nirudhyante A.

<sup>10</sup> api *corr.*; apa A.

<sup>11</sup> apayanty *rest.*; a + [ya]nti A.

<sup>12</sup> *vayam evaṃ caivaṃ ca rest.*; [vayam eva]ṃ [c]ai[va]ṃ + A. · See following paragraph.

<sup>13</sup> *prekṣāmaha em.*; [p]r[eṣ]yāmaha A.

<sup>14</sup> *jīvād, bhavantaḥ em.*; jīvād [ku]vantaḥ A.

<sup>15</sup> *saṃjñā em.*; saṃjñī A.

<sup>16</sup> *jīvān em.*; jīvā A.

<sup>17</sup> *apayanti corr.*; supayanti A. · This mistake is based on a scribal confusion between the *akṣaras* अ (initial *a*) and सु (*su*).

<sup>18</sup> *bhavatīti conj.*; bhavati | ity A. · Melzer retains the punctuation of A, and reads the half *daṇḍa* here as a full stop, so that it indicates a break between the previous statement and *iti*. I prefer to interpret the half *daṇḍa* as marking off the quote in service of *iti*.

<sup>19</sup> *prekṣāmaha corr.*; *prekṣāpaha* A. · This is an example of the common confusion between the *akṣaras* प (*pa*) and म (*ma*).

P: “tam añño **evam āha**: ‘na kho nām’ etaṃ, bho,<sup>20</sup> evaṃ bhavissati. **saññā** hi, bho, purisassa attā. **sā ca** kho **upeti pi, apeti pi. yasmim samaye upeti, saññī tasmim samaye hoti. yasmim samaye apeti, asaññī tasmim samaye hotī’** ti. itth’ eke abhisaññānirodhaṃ paññapenti.

C: 「瞿曇，或有梵志作是說：『由命有想生，由命有想滅。彼想有去來。來則想生，去則想滅。』」

#### §4

S: ---

P: “tam añño **evam āha**: ‘na kho nām’ etaṃ, bho,<sup>21</sup> evaṃ bhavissati. santi hi, bho, samaṇabrāhmaṇā mahiddhikā mahānubhāvā. te imassa purisassa saññaṃ upakaḍḍhanti pi apakaḍḍhanti pi. yasmim samaye upakaḍḍhanti, saññī tasmim samaye hoti. yasmim samaye apakaḍḍhanti, asaññī tasmim samaye hotī’ ti. itth’ eke abhisaññānirodhaṃ paññapenti.

C: ---

#### §5

S: “apare **evam āhuḥ**: “**devatā, bhavantaḥ,**<sup>22</sup> puruṣasya saṃjñā<sup>23</sup> upasaṃharanti. deva<sub>[2]</sub>tā apasaṃharanti. iti tās<sup>24</sup> caikadā upasaṃharanty<sup>25</sup> api apasaṃharanty api.<sup>26</sup> **yasmim samaye** upasaṃharanti **saṃjñī tasmim samaye bhavati. yasmim samaye** apasaṃharanty<sup>27</sup> **asaṃjñī tasmim samaye bhavatīti.**”<sup>28</sup> api vayam<sup>29</sup> evaṃ caivaṃ ca<sup>30</sup> prekṣā<sub>[3]</sub>maha’ iti.

<sup>20</sup> na kho nām etaṃ bho DN<sub>PTS</sub>; na kho pana me taṃ bho DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>21</sup> na kho nām etaṃ bho DN<sub>PTS</sub>; na kho pana me taṃ bho DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; na kho pana me tam DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>22</sup> bhavantaḥ *em.*; bhavanta A.

<sup>23</sup> puruṣasya saṃjñā *em.*; puru\_ṣasaṃjñā A. · The open space between *u* and *ṣa* indicates that the original reading likely had an additional *akṣara*. Thus I emend after parallel passages that read *puruṣasya*.

<sup>24</sup> iti tās *em.*; tās A. · Emendation based on three parallel passages above and below.

<sup>25</sup> upasaṃharanty *em.*; upasaṃharaty A.

<sup>26</sup> apasaṃharanty api *em.*; *om.* A.

<sup>27</sup> apasaṃharanty *em.*; apasaṃharaty A.

P: “tam añño **evam āha**: ‘na kho nām’ etaṃ, bho,<sup>31</sup> evaṃ bhavissati. santi hi, **bho, devatā mahiddhikā mahānubhāvā. tā imassa purisassa saññaṃ upakaḍḍhanti pi apakaḍḍhanti pi. yasmim samaye upakaḍḍhanti, saññī tasmim samaye hoti. yasmim samaye apakaḍḍhanti, asaññī tasmim samaye hotī’ ti. itth’ eke abhisaññānirodhaṃ paññapenti.**

C: 「瞿曇，或有梵志作是說：『如先所言，無有是處。<sup>[110a11]</sup> 有大鬼神，有大威力，彼持想去，彼持想來。彼持想去則想滅，彼持想來則想生。』

## §6

S: “apare evam āhuḥ: “śaikṣye,<sup>32</sup> bhavantaḥ, puruṣasya saṃjñā<sup>33</sup> utpadyante,<sup>34</sup> śaikṣye<sup>35</sup> nirudhyante. iti<sup>iii</sup> tās<sup>36</sup> caikadā<sup>37</sup> upayanty apy apayanti<sup>38</sup> ... pūrvavad ... ” iti. api vayam evaṃ caivaṃ ca prekṣāmaha’ iti.

P: ---

C: ---

<sup>28</sup> bhavatīti *em.*; bhavaty A.

<sup>29</sup> vayam *em.*; yam A.

<sup>30</sup> evaṃ caivaṃ ca *reg.*; evaṃ ca A.

<sup>31</sup> na kho nām etaṃ bho DN<sub>PTS</sub>; na kho pana me taṃ bho DN<sub>CS</sub>; na kho pana me taṃ DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; na kho pana me taṃ DN<sub>PTS(Sm)</sub>; na kho pana me taṃ DN<sub>PTS(Sdt)</sub>.

<sup>32</sup> śaikṣye *em.*; śaikṣyo A. · Melzer reads with A here, but suggests in a long footnote that this reading is problematic. The locative works syntactically and can be explained through the common scribal confusion between *-e* and *-o*, which are distinguished by only one small *pṛṣṭhamātra*.

<sup>33</sup> saṃjñā *em.*; saṃjñī A.

<sup>34</sup> utpadyante *em.*; utpadyate A.

<sup>35</sup> śaikṣye *em.*; śaikṣyo A.

<sup>36</sup> tās *em.*; kadās A.

<sup>37</sup> caikadā *corr.*; cekadā A.

<sup>38</sup> apayanti *em.*; apayaṃ A.

## §7

S: “**ta**<sub>[4]</sub>**sya mama, bho** Gautama, etad abhavan: nāhaṃ etaj jāne.<sup>39</sup> nāham etat paśyāmi. nāham atra yukto.<sup>40</sup> <sup>iv</sup> nāham atra kuśalo. **bhavān** Gautama etaj jānīta. **bhavān** Gautama etat paśyet.<sup>41</sup> <sub>[5]</sub> *bhavān Gautamo*<sup>42</sup> ’tra yuktaś ca **kuśalaś** ca.’

P: “**tassa mayhaṃ, bhante, Bhagavantaṃ** yeva ārabba sati udapādi: ‘aho nūna bhagavā, aho nūna sugato, yo imesaṃ dhammānaṃ sukusalo’<sup>43</sup> ti. **Bhagavā, bhante, kusalo, Bhagavā** pakataññū<sup>44</sup> abhisaññānirodhassa.

C: 「我因是故生念念:『沙門瞿曇先<sup>45</sup>知此義, 必能善知想知滅定。』」

## §8

S: “tasya mama, bho Gautama, etad abhavat:<sup>46</sup> ‘kadā svid ahaṃ bhavantaṃ<sup>47</sup> Gautamaṃ drakṣyāmi. kadācit<sup>48</sup> <sup>vi</sup> prakṣyāmi<sup>49</sup> kaṃcid eva pradeśaṃ saced avakāśaṃ kuryā<sub>[6]</sub>t *praśnasya* vyākaraṇāyeti.’

P: ---

<sup>39</sup> nāhaṃ etaj jāne *conj.*; nādāṃ svid ahaṃ evaṃ jāne A. · The reading *nādāṃ svid ahaṃ evaṃ...* may be a contamination from a passage found below in the Ms, which reads: *kadā svid ahaṃ Bhagavantaṃ Gautamaṃ prakṣyāmi ...*

<sup>40</sup> atra yukto *em.*; atrāyukto A. · Emended after the Pāli.

<sup>41</sup> paśyet *corr.*; paśye A.

<sup>42</sup> bhavān Gautamo *conj.*; + + [Gauta]mo A.

<sup>43</sup> aho nūna bhagavā aho nūna sugato yo imesaṃ dhammānaṃ sukusalo DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; aho nūna bhagavā sugato yo (S<sup>dm</sup> so) bhante kusalo DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub> (S<sup>m</sup> has imesaṃ *inserted, as a correction, after so.*); aho nūna bhagavā sugato yo so imesaṃ bhante kusalo DN<sub>PTS(Sm)</sub>.

<sup>44</sup> Bhagavā pakataññū DN<sub>PTS</sub>; Bhagavā, bhante, kusalo, Bhagavā pakataññū DN<sub>CS</sub>.

<sup>45</sup> 先=必【宋】【元】【明】。

<sup>46</sup> abhavat *em.*; abhava A.

<sup>47</sup> bhavantaṃ *em.*; bhagavantaṃ A.

<sup>48</sup> kadācit *em.*; kadāci svid A. · Melzer omits, but the sentence makes perfect sense without such an emendation.

<sup>49</sup> prakṣyāmi *em.*; drakṣyāmi A. · The *akṣaras* 𑖇 (*dra*) and 𑖇 (*pra*) are easily confused.

C: ---

## §9

S: “so ’haṃ bhadantaṃ Gautamaṃ etam evārthaṃ pariṣcchāmi, yad idaṃ,<sup>50</sup> **bho** Gautama, **kathaṃ** tad idaṃ? kathaṃ **syād**”<sup>51</sup> iti?

P: “**kathan** nu kho, **bhante**, abhisaññānirodho **hotī**” ti?

C: ---

## §10

S: “ādita eva, **Pr̥ṣṭhapāla**,<sup>52</sup> taiḥ śramaṇabrāhmaṇair [7] **aparāddhaṃ**<sup>53</sup> ya evam āhuḥ: ‘ahetoṛ, bhavantaḥ, **puruṣasya saṃjñā**<sup>54</sup> **utpadyante** ’hetoṛ **nirudhyanta**’<sup>55</sup> iti.

“tat kasya hetoḥ? **śaikṣya** eva, **Pr̥ṣṭhapāla**, **puruṣasya saṃjñā**<sup>56</sup> **utpadyante** **śaikṣya eva**<sup>57</sup> **nirudhyante**. tadānaiva<sup>58</sup> te, **Pr̥ṣṭhapāla**, paryāyena **veditavyaṃ** yat: ‘**śaikṣya**<sup>59</sup> eva **puruṣasya saṃjñā**<sup>60</sup> **utpadyante**<sup>61</sup> **śaikṣya eva** **nirudhyanta**’ iti.

<sup>50</sup> yad idaṃ *em.*; tad idaṃ A

<sup>51</sup> yad idaṃ...kathaṃ syād · Melzer omits *tad idaṃ kathaṃ*, and takes *syād* with the initial question word, but wonders whether the question might have been intended to be reiterated; I believe so and have therefore left the manuscript text unchanged.

<sup>52</sup> **Pr̥ṣṭhapāla** *em.*; **Pr̥ṣṭhapālaṃ** A.

<sup>53</sup> **aparāddhaṃ** *em.*; **pararāddhaṃ** A.

<sup>54</sup> **saṃjñā** *em.*; **saṃjñī** A.

<sup>55</sup> **utpadyante** ’hetoṛ **nirudhyanta** *em.*; **utpadyata** **aheto** **utpadyata** A.

<sup>56</sup> **saṃjñā** *em.*; **saṃjñī** A.

<sup>57</sup> **śaikṣya eva** *em.*; **śaikṣye** A. · Emended to maintain the parallel several lines below in A and in the Pāli text, where we find *ekā* instead of *eva*.

<sup>58</sup> **tad anenaiva** *em.*; **tadānaiva** A.

<sup>59</sup> **yat** **śaikṣya** *conj.*; **ye** **śaikṣya** A. · This is a questionable conjecture, but it is certain that the demonstrative pronoun *ye*, as found in A, cannot stand. The demonstrative particle *yat* is suggested as a subordinating conjunction, indicating that an example is to follow.

P: “tatra, Poṭṭhapāda, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evam āhaṃsu: ‘ahetū appaccayā purisassa saññā uppajjanti pi nirujjhanti pī’ ti, ādito<sup>62</sup> ’va tesam aparaddham.

“tam kissa hetu? sahetū hi, Poṭṭhapāda, sappaccayā purisassa [181] saññā uppajjanti pi nirujjhanti pi. sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.”<sup>63</sup> vii

C: 爾時，世尊告梵志曰：「彼諸論者皆有過咎，言：『無因無緣而有想生，無因無緣而有想滅。想有去來。來則想生，去則想滅。』」

「或言：『因命想生，因命想滅。想有去來。來則想生，去則想滅。』」

「或有言：『無有是處。有大鬼神。彼持想來。彼持想去。持來則想生。持去則想滅。』」

「如此言者，皆有過咎。 [110a21]

「所以者何？梵志，有因緣而想生，有因緣而想滅。

## §11

S: “iha, Pṛṣṭhapāla, śāstā loka utpadyate ... vistareṇa yathā Tṛdaṇḍisūtre tathaiva ...<sup>64</sup>

P: Bhagavā avoca: “idha, Poṭṭhapāda, tathāgato loke uppajjati araham, sammāsambuddho ... pe ...

C: 「若如來出現於世，至真，等正覺，十號具足，有人於佛法中出家為道…乃至…

<sup>60</sup> saṃjñā *em.*; saṃjñī A.

<sup>61</sup> utpadyante *em.*; utpate A.

<sup>62</sup> ādito DN<sub>CS</sub>; ādiso DN<sub>PTS</sub>

<sup>63</sup> uppajjati ... nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; uppajjanti ... nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub>; so also below (henceforth not reported).

<sup>64</sup> Manuscripts of the *Tṛdaṇḍisūtra* are held in the Hirayama and Bukkyō University collections in Japan. The passage referred to is at *Tṛdaṇḍisūtra*, folios 360v2–367r4. On the *Tṛdaṇḍisūtra*, see Matsuda 2006 (the beginning and end of the elided passage can be found on p. 982 [131]) and Choi 2012b. The section missing here also corresponds with Gnoli 1977, pp. 230.11–240.18.

## §12

S: ---

P: “kāyakammavācīkammena <sup>65</sup> samannāgato kusalena parisuddhājīvo sīlasampanno indriyesu guttadvāro satisampajaññaena samannāgato santuṭṭho. kathaṅ ca, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sīlasampanno hoti? Idha Poṭṭhapāda bhikkhu pāṇātipataṃ pahāya, pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti, nihitadaṇḍo nihtasattho lajjī dayāpanno sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī viharati? idam pi ’ssa hoti sīlasmiṃ ... pe ... yathā vā pan’ eke, bhonto, samaṇabrāhmaṇā saddhādeyyāni bhojanāni bhujjivā, te evarūpāya tīracchānavijjāya micchājīvena jīvakaṃ kappenti, seyyathīdaṃ santīkammaṃ, paṇīdhīkammaṃ ... pe ... osadhīnaṃ paṭimokkha; iti vā iti evarūpāya tīracchānavijjāya micchājīvā paṭivirato hoti. idam pi ’ssa hoti sīlasmiṃ. sa <sup>66</sup> kho, Poṭṭhapāda, evaṃ sīlasampanno na kuto ci bhayaṃ samanupassati, yadidaṃ sīlasaṃvarato. seyyathāpi, Poṭṭhapāda, rājā khattīyo muddhāvasitto <sup>67</sup> nihitapaccāmitto na kuto ci bhayaṃ samanupassati, yadidaṃ paccatthikato. evam eva kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu evaṃ sīlasampanno na kuto ci bhayaṃ samanupassati, yadidaṃ sīlasaṃvarato. so iminā ariyena sīlakkhandhena samannāgato ajjhataṃ anavajjasukhaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti. evaṃ kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sīlasampanno hoti.

“kathaṅ ca, Poṭṭhapāda, <sup>68</sup> bhikkhu indriyesu guttadvāro hoti? idha, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā, na nimittaggāhī hoti, nānuyyañjanaggāhī. yatvādhikaraṇaṃ enaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ, tassa samvarāya paṭipajjati, rakkhati cakkhundriyaṃ, cakkhundriye <sup>[182]</sup> saṃvaram āpajjati. sotena saddaṃ sutvā ... pe ... ghānena gandhaṃ ghāyitvā, jivhāya rasaṃ sayitvā, kāyena poṭṭhabbaṃ phusitvā, manasā dhammaṃ viññāya, na nimittaggāhī hoti, nānuyyañjanaggāhī. yatvādhikaraṇaṃ enaṃ manindriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ, tassa samvarāya paṭipajjati, rakkhati manindriyaṃ, manindriye saṃvaram āpajjati. so iminā ariyena

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<sup>65</sup> kāyakammavācīkammena ... sīlasampanno hoti DN<sub>PTS</sub>; sammāsambuddho ... yathā Sāmaññaphalaṃ evaṃ vitthāretabbaṃ ... evaṃ kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sīlasampanno hoti DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>66</sup> sa DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; atha DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>67</sup> muddhāvasitto DN<sub>CS</sub>; muddāvasitto DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

<sup>68</sup> kathaṅ ca, Poṭṭhapāda ... evaṃ kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu indriyesu guttadvāro hoti DN<sub>PTS</sub>; ... pe ... DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

indriyasamvarena samannāgato ajjhataṃ avyāsekasukhaṃ paṭisamvedeti. evaṃ kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu indriyesu guttadvāro hoti ... pe ...<sup>69</sup>

C: ---

### §13

S: ---

P: “tass’ ime pañcanīvaraṇe pahīne attani samanupassato pāmojjaṃ<sup>70</sup> jāyati, pamuditassa pīti jāyati, pīṭimanassa kāyo passambhati, passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedeti, sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati.

C: 「滅五蓋覆蔽心者，

### §14

S: “**viviktaṃ kāmair** <viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśaladharmaiḥ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ><sup>71</sup> [417v1] **prathamam dhyānam upasampadya, viharati. tasya yā pūrvam kāmasukhasamjñā,**<sup>72</sup> **sā niruddhā bhavati. vivekajaprītisukhasamjñā,**<sup>73</sup> <sup>viii</sup> **Prṣṭhapāla,**<sup>74</sup> **tasmim samaye āryaśrāvako viharati, tasyāṃ ca śikṣāyāṃ śikṣita**” iti. [2]

P: “so vivicc’ eva kāmehi, vivicca akusalehi dhammehi, savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ **paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati. tassa yā purimā kāmasaññā, sā nirujjhati.** vivekajaprītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā<sup>75</sup> tasmim samaye hoti. **vivekajaprītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā** yeva **tasmim**

<sup>69</sup> ... pe ... tass’ ime pañca° · For corresponding passages of the text that have been elided here, see DN<sub>PTS</sub> II 65–74.

<sup>70</sup> pāmojjaṃ DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; pāmujjaṃ DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>71</sup> viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśaladharmaiḥ...prītisukhaṃ yāvat A. · Text restored after Gnoli 1977, p. 242.

<sup>72</sup> kāmasukhasamjñā *em./rest.*; kā + [s]ukhaṃ samjñā A.

<sup>73</sup> vivekajaprītisukhasamjñā *em.*; vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ sam A.

<sup>74</sup> Prṣṭhapāla *em.*; Prṣṭhapālas A.

<sup>75</sup> vivekajaprītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; vivekajaṃ pītiṃ sukhasukhumasaccasaññā DN<sub>PTS(all MSS)</sub>.



**samaye hoti.** evam pi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>76</sup> ayam sikkhā” ti.

C: 「除去欲，惡不善法，有覺，有觀，離生喜樂，入初禪。先滅欲想，生喜樂想。梵志，以此故知有因緣想生，有因緣想滅。

## §15

S: Bhagavān asyāvocat: “punar aparaṃ, Pṛṣṭhapāla, bhikṣur<sup>77</sup> vitarkavicārāṇaṃ vyupaśamād <adhyātmaṃ samprasādāc cetasa ekoṭībhāvād avitarkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ><sup>78</sup> dviṭiyaṃ dhyānaṃ upasampadya, viharati. tasya yā pūrvaṃ vivekajapītisukhasaṃjñā,<sup>79</sup> sā niruddhā bhavati. sa<sub>[3]</sub>mādhijapītisukhasaṃjñī,<sup>80</sup> Pṛṣṭhapāla,<sup>81</sup> tasmim samaye āryaśrāvako viharati, tasyāṃ ca śikṣāyāṃ<sup>82</sup> śikṣita” iti.

P: Bhagavā avoca: “puna c’ aparaṃ,<sup>83</sup> Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu vitakkavicārāṇaṃ vūpasamā ajjhataṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. tassa yā purimā vivekajapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā,<sup>84</sup> sā nirujjhati. samādhijapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā tasmim samaye<sub>[183]</sub> hoti. samādhijapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññī yeva tasmim samaye hoti. evam pi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>85</sup> ayam pi sikkhā” ti.

<sup>76</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>77</sup> bhikṣur *corr.*; bhikṣu A.

<sup>78</sup> vyupaśamād adhyātmaṃ...samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ *rest.*; vyupa[·am]ād yāva A; text restored after Gnoli 1977, p. 243.

<sup>79</sup> vivekajapītisukhasaṃjñā *em.*; vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ saṃjñā A.

<sup>80</sup> samādhijapītisukhasaṃjñī *em.*; sa[mādhij]jaṃ pītisukhasaṃjñā A.

<sup>81</sup> Pṛṣṭhapāla *em.*; Pṛṣṭhapālas A.

<sup>82</sup> śikṣāyāṃ *em.*; *om.* A.

<sup>83</sup> puna c’ aparaṃ *em.*; puna ca paraṃ DN<sub>PTS</sub>. · Rhys Davids consistently reads: *puna ca paraṃ*. Corrected in all instances hereafter and not further reported.

<sup>84</sup> vivekajapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; vivekajaṃ pītiṃ sukhasukhumasaccasaññā DN<sub>PTS(all MSS)</sub>.

<sup>85</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

C: 「滅有覺觀，內喜，一心，無覺，無觀，定生喜樂，入第二禪。梵志，彼初禪想滅，二禪想生。以是故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

## §16

S: **Bhagavān asyāvocat: “punar aparaṃ, Pṛṣṭhapāla, bhikṣuḥ prīter virāgād** **⟨upekṣako viharati, smṛtaḥ saṃprajānan sukhaṃ ca kāyena pratisaṃvedayate** **yat tad āryā ācakṣate: ‘upekṣakaḥ smṛtimān sukhaṃ viharatīti’ niṣpṛītikaṃ<sup>86</sup> [4]** **trītiyaṃ dhyānam upasaṃpadya,<sup>87</sup> viharati. tasya yā<sup>88</sup> pūrvam samādhi-** **prītisukhasaṃjñā,<sup>89</sup> sā niruddhā bhavati. niṣpṛītikasukhasaṃjñī,<sup>90</sup> Pṛṣṭhapāla,** **tasmim samaye āryaśrāvako viha<sub>[S]</sub>rati,<sup>91</sup> tasyāṃ ca śikṣāyāṃ śikṣita”** iti.

P: **Bhagavā avoca: “puna c’ aparaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā** **upekkhako<sup>92</sup> ca viharati sato ca sampajāno, sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti,** **yaṃ taṃ ariyā ācikkhanti: ‘upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī’ ti, tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ** **upasaṃpajja viharati. tassa yā purimā samādhi-japītisukhasukhumasacca-** **saññā, sā nirujjhati. upekkhāsukhasukhumasaccasaññā tasmim samaye hoti,** **upekkhāsukhasukhumasaccasaññī yeva tasmim samaye hoti. evam pi sikkhā ekā** **saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>93</sup> ayam pi sikkhā”** ti.

C: 「捨喜修護，<sub>[110b]</sub> 專念，一心，自知身樂，賢聖所求，護念清淨，入三<sup>94</sup> 禪。梵志，彼二禪想滅，三禪想生。以是故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

<sup>86</sup> upekṣako viharati...sukhaṃ viharatīti’ niṣpṛītikaṃ *em.*; yāva A. · Text restored after Gnoli 1977, p. 244.

<sup>87</sup> trītiyaṃ dhyānam upasaṃpadya *em.*; [trītiyaṃ [dhyānam up]asaṃpadya A.

<sup>88</sup> yā *em.*; yāva A.

<sup>89</sup> samādhi-japītisukhasaṃjñā *em.*; samādhi-japītisukhasaṃjñā A.

<sup>90</sup> niṣpṛītikasukhasaṃjñī *em.*; niṣpṛītikasukhasaṃjñā A.

<sup>91</sup> viharati *rest.*; viha + + A.

<sup>92</sup> upekkhako DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; upekhako DN<sub>PTS</sub>. · Hereafter I follow DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub> without further notation.

<sup>93</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>94</sup> 三 = 第三【宋】【元】【明】。

## §17

- S: **Bhagavān** asyāvocat: “**punar aparaṃ, Pṛṣṭhapāla,**<sup>95</sup> **bhikṣuḥ sukhasya ca prahāṇād,** (duḥkhasya ca prahāṇāt pūrvam eva saumanasyadaurmanasyayor aṣṭaṅgamād aduḥkhāsukhaṃ upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhiṃ)<sup>96</sup> **caturthaṃ dhyānam upasampadya, viharati. tasya yā pūrvam**<sup>97</sup> **niṣpṛī<sub>[6]</sub>tikasukhasaṃjñā,**<sup>98</sup> **sā niruddhā** bhavati. upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhisamjñī,<sup>99</sup> **Pṛṣṭhapāla,**<sup>100</sup> **tasmim samaye** āryaśrāvako viharati, tasyāṃ *ca śikṣāyāṃ śikṣita*” iti.
- P: **Bhagavā avoca:** “**puna c’ aparaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sukhasa ca pahānā dukkhasa ca pahānā pubb’** eva somanassadomanassānaṃ atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṃ upekkhāsati<sup>pārisuddhiṃ</sup> **catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. tassa yā purimā** upekkhā **sukhasukhumasaccasaññā, sā nirujjhati.** adukkhamasukhasukhumasaccasaññā **tasmim samaye** hoti, adukkhamasukhasukhumasaccasaññā yeva tasmim samaye hoti. Evam pi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>101</sup> *ayam pi sikkhā*” ti.
- C: 「捨苦捨樂，先滅憂喜，護念清淨，入第四禪。梵志，彼三禪想，四禪想生。以是故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

## §18

S: ---

<sup>95</sup> Pṛṣṭhapāla *em.*; Pṛṣṭhapālas A.

<sup>96</sup> duḥkhasya ca prahāṇāt...upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhiṃ *rest.*; yavād A. · Text restored after Gnoli 1977, p. 245, with emendation of his *upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhaṃ* to *upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhiṃ*. This not only conforms to the reading *upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhisamjñā* in A below, but also agrees with the Pāli *upekkhāsati<sup>pārisuddhiṃ</sup>*.

<sup>97</sup> pūrvam *em.*; arthaṃ A.

<sup>98</sup> niṣpṛītika° *em.*; niṣpītika° A.

<sup>99</sup> upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhisamjñī *em.*; upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhisukhasamjñā A. · The insertion of *-sukha-* can be easily explained as a mistaken repetition of *-sukhasamjñā-* in previous parts of A.

<sup>100</sup> Pṛṣṭhapāla *em.*; Pṛṣṭhapālas A.

<sup>101</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

- P: Bhagavā avoca: “puna c’ aparaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā,<sup>102</sup> paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā ‘ananto ākāso’ ti ākāsañācāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. tassa yā purimā rūpasaññā sā nirujjhati. ākāsañācāyatanasukhumasaccasaññā tasmim̐ samaye hoti. ākāsañācāyatanasukhumasaccasaññī yeva tasmim̐ samaye hoti. evam pi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>103</sup> ayam pi sikkhā” ti.
- C: 「捨一切色想，滅恚，不念異想，入空處。梵志，一切色想滅，空處想生。以是故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

## §19

S: ---

- P: Bhagavā avoca: “puna c’ aparaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sabbaso ākāsañācāyatanaṃ<sup>[184]</sup> samatikkamma ‘anantaṃ viññāṇan’ ti viññāṇañācāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. tassa yā purimā ākāsañācāyatanasukhumasaccasaññā sā nirujjhati. viññāṇañācāyatanasukhumasaccasaññā tasmim̐ samaye hoti. viññāṇañācāyatana-sukhumasaccasaññī yeva tasmim̐ samaye hoti. evam pi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>104</sup> ayam pi sikkhā” ti.
- C: 「越一切空處，入識處。梵志，彼空處想滅，識處想生。〈以是〉<sup>105</sup>故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

## §20

S: ---

- P: Bhagavā avoca: “puna c’ aparaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu sabbaso viññāṇañācāyatanaṃ samatikkamma ‘natthi kiñcī’ ti ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja, viharati. tassa yā purimā viññāṇañācāyatanasukhumasaccasaññā, sā nirujjhati. ākiñcaññāyatana-sukhumasaccasaññā tasmim̐ samaye hoti. ākiñcaññāyatana-sukhumasacca-

<sup>102</sup> samatikkamā DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; samatikkamma DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>103</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>104</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub> DN<sub>PTS(Sdt)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(Se)</sub>; uppajjati...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS(Sm)</sub>.

<sup>105</sup> 以是 *reg. after parallel passages; om. CBETA*

saññī yeva tasmim samaye hoti. evam pi sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati.<sup>106</sup> ayam pi sikkhā” ti.

C: 「越一切識處，入不用處。梵志，彼識處想滅，不用處想生。以是故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

## §21

S: ---

P: ---

C: 「捨不用處，入有想無想處。梵志，彼不用處想滅，有想無想處想生。以是故知有因緣想滅，有因緣想生。

## §22

S: ---

P: ---

C: 「彼捨有想無想處，入想知滅定。<sup>i</sup>梵志，彼有想無想處想滅，入想知滅定。以是故知有因緣想生，有因緣想滅。

## §23

S: **Bhagavān asyāvocat:** <sup>[7]</sup> “sacet<sup>107</sup> sa, Prṣṭhapāla, **bhikṣur ihasaṃjñī bhavati tatrāsaṃjñī,**<sup>x</sup> **tasyaivaṃ**<sup>108</sup> **bhavati: ‘acetayato me**<sup>109</sup> **śreyah.**<sup>110</sup> **cetayato me pāpam. ahaṃ cec**<sup>111</sup> **cetayeyam**<sup>112</sup> **abhisamskuryām,** evam me iyaṃ<sup>113</sup> ca

<sup>106</sup> uppajjati...nirujjhati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub> DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>; uppajjanti...nirujjhanti DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

<sup>107</sup> sacet *corr.*; sace A.

<sup>108</sup> tasyaivaṃ *em.*; tatraivaṃ A. · Emended after the Pāli text: *tassa saññagge thitassa evaṃ hoti* DN<sub>PTS</sub>. Melzer reads with A, but suggests that it is possible to do as I have done.

<sup>109</sup> me *conj.*; *om.* A. · Conjectured following the Pāli text. Without the additional pronoun *me* the present participle *cetayato* seems awkward. The Chinese text is here entirely without pronouns.

<sup>110</sup> śreyah *corr.*; śreya A.

<sup>111</sup> cec *em.*; cad A.

saṃjñā nirudhyeta, anyā<sup>114</sup> caudāri<sub>[8]</sub>katarā<sup>115</sup> saṃjñā<sup>116</sup> prādurbhavet.’ *sa na cetayate nābhisamskaroti. so ’cetayamāno ’nabhisamskurvaṃ*<sup>117</sup> samyag eva nirodhaṃ sprśati.

P: Bhagavā avoca: “yato kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu idhasakasaññī<sup>118</sup> xi hoti, so tato amutra tato amutra anupubbena saññaggaṃ phusati. tassa saññagge ʔhitassa evaṃ hoti: <sub>[185]</sub> ’cetayamānassa me pāpiyo,<sup>119</sup> acetayamānassa me seyyo. ahañ ce ’va kho pana ceteyyaṃ, abhisankhareyyaṃ, imā ca me saññā nirujjheyyaṃ, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā uppajjeyyaṃ.<sup>120</sup> yaṃ nūnāhaṃ na c’ eva ceteyyaṃ na ca abhisankhareyyan’ ti. so na c’ eva ceteti, na ca abhisankharoti. tassa acetayato anabhisankharoto<sup>121</sup> tā c’ eva saññā nirujjhanti, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā na uppajjanti. so nirodhaṃ phusati. evaṃ kho, Poṭṭhapāda, anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampajānasamāpatti<sup>122</sup> hoti.

C: 「彼得此想已，作是念：『有念為惡。無念為善。』彼作是念時，彼<sup>123</sup>微妙想不滅，更麤想生。彼復念言：『我今寧可不為念行，不起思惟，』彼不為念行。不起思惟已，微妙想滅，麤想不生。彼不為念行，不起思惟，微妙想滅，麤想不生時，即入想知滅定。

<sup>112</sup> cetayeyam *corr.*; cetrayeyam A.

<sup>113</sup> evaṃ me iyaṃ *em.*; evaṃ iyaṃ A. · Emended after 418r2 below, and following Melzer.

<sup>114</sup> anyā *em.*; anyo A.

<sup>115</sup> caudārikatarā *em.*; caudari[ka]r[ā] A. · Conjecture after 418r2 below.

<sup>116</sup> saṃjñā *rest.*; + + A.

<sup>117</sup> so ’cetayamāno ’nabhisamskurvaṃ *em.*; sā[c]e[tayam]ānābhisamskurvaṃ A.

<sup>118</sup> idhasakasaññī *em.*; idha sakasaññī DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

<sup>119</sup> pāpiyo DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; pāpiyo DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>120</sup> uppajjeyyaṃ yaṃ nūnāhaṃ na DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; uppajjeyya abhisamkharoti DN<sub>PTS(Semt)</sub>.

<sup>121</sup> anabhisamkharoto DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; na abhisamkharoto DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>122</sup> anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampajānasamāpatti DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampādanasamāpatti DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>123</sup> [彼] — 【宋】 【元】 【明】。

## §24

S: “abhijānāsi tvaṃ, **Prṣṭhapāla**, **itah pūrvam** imam evaṃrūpam abhisamjñā-  
[418r1]veditanirodhaṃ<sup>124</sup> śrotuṃ?”<sup>125</sup>

P: “taṃ kiṃ maññasi, **Poṭṭhapāda**, api nu te **ito pubbe evarūpā** anupubbābhi-  
**saññānirodhasampajānasamāpatti** sutapubbā” ti?

C: 「云何，梵志，汝從本已來，頗曾聞此次第滅想因緣不？」

## §25

S: “**bho** Gautama, nānyatredānīm eva.<sup>126</sup> vayaṃ **bhavato** Gautamasyaiva  
**bhāṣitasyārtham ājānāmo** yad bhavān Gautama evam āha: ‘sacet, **Prṣṭhapāla**,  
**bhikṣur**<sup>127</sup> **ihasamjñī bhavati**, [2] **tatrāsamjñī**,<sup>128</sup> **tasyaivaṃ**<sup>129</sup> bhavati: “**aceta-**  
**yato me**<sup>130</sup> **sreyaḥ**. **cetayato me pāpam**. **ahaṃ cec**<sup>131</sup> **cetayeyam**<sup>132</sup> **abhi-**  
**samskuryāṃ**, evaṃ **me iyaṃ ca samjñā**<sup>133</sup> **nirudhyeta**, **anyā caudārikatarā**  
**samjñā**<sup>134</sup> **prādurbhaved**”<sup>135</sup> **iti. sa na cet**<sub>[3]</sub>**ayate**<sup>136</sup> **nābhisamskaroti. so**

<sup>124</sup> samjñāveditanirodhaṃ *em./rest.*; samjñāveni[vedita-]i+[dh]aṃ A.

<sup>125</sup> śrotuṃ *em.*; śrottraṃ A. · Emended following Melzer. One should be cautious about this emendation, as the Pāli text reads *sutapubbā*, suggesting the admittedly grammatically deviant possibility of reading *śrutaṃ* here.

<sup>126</sup> bho Gautama, nānyatredānīm eva. vayaṃ... · Melzer adds *no* at the beginning of the sentence, thus reading: ⟨no⟩ *bho Gautama* ⟨⟩ *nānyatra idānīm eva vayaṃ...*, but the sentence works perfectly well without this addition when punctuated with a full stop after *eva*.

<sup>127</sup> bhikṣur *em.*; bhikṣubhir A.

<sup>128</sup> tatrāsamjñī *corr.*; tatrāsamkṣī A.

<sup>129</sup> tasyaivaṃ *em.*; tatraivaṃ A.

<sup>130</sup> acetayato me *em.*; acetayato A. · Emended after parallel phrase above, following Melzer.

<sup>131</sup> cec *corr.*; ce A.

<sup>132</sup> cetayeyam *corr.*; caitayeyam A.

<sup>133</sup> samjñā *em.*; samjñī A.

<sup>134</sup> samjñā *em.*; samjñī A.

<sup>135</sup> prādurbhaved *em.*; prādurbhavatid A. · Emended after parallel phrase above.

'cetayamāno 'nabhisamskurvan samyag eva **nirodham spr̥satīti.**' nanu bhavān Gautama evam āha.”

P: “no h’ etaṃ, bhante. evaṃ kho ahaṃ, bhante, **Bhagavato bhāsitaṃ ājānāmi:** ‘yato kho **Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu idha sakasaññī** hoti, so tato amutra tato amutra anupubbena saññaggam phusati.<sup>xiv</sup> **tassa saññagge ṭhitassa evaṃ hoti:** “cetayamānassa me **pāpiyo,**<sup>137</sup> **acetayamānassa me seyyo. ahañ ce** ’va kho pana **ceteyyaṃ abhisāṅkhareyyaṃ,** imā **ca me saññā nirujjheyyuṃ, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā** uppajjeyyuṃ. yaṃnūnāhaṃ na c’ eva ceteyyaṃ, na ca abhisāṅkhareyyan” **ti. so na c’** eva **ceteti, na cābhisāṅkharoti.** tassa acetayato anabhisāṅkharoto tā<sup>138</sup> c’ eva saññā nirujjhanti, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā na uppajjanti. **so nirodham phusati.** evaṃ kho, **Poṭṭhapāda,** anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampajānasamāpatti<sup>139</sup> hoti” **ti.**

C: 梵志白佛言：「從本已來，信自不聞如是次第滅想因緣。」

又白佛言：「我今生念：謂此有想，此無想，或復有想。此想已，彼作是念：『有念為惡。無念為善。』彼作是念時，微妙想不滅，麤想更生。彼復念言：『我今寧可不為念行，不起思惟。』<sup>[110c]</sup> 彼不為念行。不起思惟已，微妙想滅，麤想不生。彼不為念行，不起思惟，微妙想滅，麤想不生時，即入想知滅定。」

## §26

S: “**evaṃ, Pr̥ṣṭhapāla.**”

P: “**evaṃ, Poṭṭhapādā**” ti.

C: 佛告梵志言：「善哉，善哉！此是賢聖法中次第想<sup>140</sup>滅想定。」

## §27

S: “anyad api, tāvad, vayaṃ bhavantaṃ Gautamaṃ<sup>141</sup> p̥rcche<sub>[4]</sub>ma, kaṃcid<sup>142</sup> eva pradeśaṃ saced avakāśaṃ kuryāt<sup>143</sup> praśnasya vyākaraṇāya.”

<sup>136</sup> cetayate *em.*; cetayaṃte A.

<sup>137</sup> pāpiyo DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; pāpiyyo DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>138</sup> tā DN<sub>PTS</sub> DN<sub>CS</sub>; na DN<sub>PTS(Sdt)</sub>.

<sup>139</sup> anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampajānasamāpatti DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; anupubbābhisaññānirodhasampadānasamāpatti DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

<sup>140</sup> [想] — 【宋】 【元】 【明】。



“pṛccha, Pṛṣṭhapāla, yad yad evākāṃkṣasi.”

P: ---

C: ---

## §28

S: {See §43-44}

P: ---

C: 梵志復白佛言：「此諸想中，何者為無上想？」

佛告梵志：「不用處想為無上。」

## §29

S: {See §43-44}

P: ---

C: 梵志又白佛言：「諸想中，何者為第一無上想？」

佛言：「諸言有想<sup>144</sup>，諸言無想。於其中間能次第得想知滅定者，是為第一無上想。」

## §30

S: ---

P: “ekaññ eva nu kho, bhante, Bhagavā saññaggaṃ paññapeti, udāhu puthū<sup>145</sup> pi saññagge paññapetī” ti?

“ekam pi kho ahaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, saññaggaṃ paññapemi, puthū pi saññagge paññapemī” ti.

<sup>141</sup> bhavantaṃ Gautamaṃ *em.*; bhavantaṃ bho Gautamaṃ A.

<sup>142</sup> pṛcchema kaṃcid *rest.*; pṛcche + + d A.

<sup>143</sup> kuryāt *corr.*; kuryā A.

<sup>144</sup> Here I read with the Taisho variant: 諸+（言有）【宋】【元】【明】。

<sup>145</sup> puthū DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(all MSS)</sub>; puthu DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

“yathā kathaṃ pana, bhante, bhagavā ekam pi saññaggaṃ paññapeti, puthū pi saññagge paññapetī” ti?

“yathā yathā kho, Poṭṭhapāda, nirodhaṃ phusati, tathā tathāhaṃ saññaggaṃ paññapemi. evaṃ kho ahaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, ekam pi<sup>146</sup> saññaggaṃ paññapemi, puthū pi saññagge paññapemī” ti.

C: 梵志又問：「為一想。為多想？」 佛言：「有一想。無多想。」

### §31

S: “kin nu, bho<sup>147</sup> Gautama, saṃjñā tāvat puruṣasya<sup>148</sup> tatprathamata utpadyate tataḥ paścāj<sup>149</sup> xv [5] jñānam,<sup>150</sup> āhosvij<sup>151</sup> jñānam tāvat prathamata utpadyate, tataḥ paścāt<sup>152</sup> saṃjñā, āhosvit saṃjñā ca jñānam ca itīmau dvāv apūrvācaramau dharmau yugapad utpannāv utpadyete?”<sup>153</sup>

P: “saññā nu kho, bhante, paṭhamaṃ uppajjati pacchā ñāṇaṃ, udāhu<sup>xvi</sup> ñāṇaṃ paṭhamaṃ uppajjati pacchā saññā, udāhu saññā ca ñāṇaṃ ca apubbaṃ acari-maṃ uppajjantī” ti?

C: 梵志又問：「先有想生然後智，先有智生然後想，為想智一時俱生耶？」

### §32

S: “saṃjñā tāvat,<sup>154</sup> Pṛṣṭhapāla, puru[6]ṣasya tatprathamata utpadyate. tataḥ paścāj jñānam. saṃjñōtpādāc<sup>155</sup> ca punaḥ samyag eva jñānāvabodhaṃ<sup>156</sup> sprśati: ‘idaṃ pratītya saṃjñōtpanneti.’”<sup>157</sup> xvii

<sup>146</sup> ekam pi DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; ekasmiṃ DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>147</sup> bho *em.*; bhavāṃ A. · Melzer reads with A.

<sup>148</sup> puruṣasya *em.*; puruṣa A.

<sup>149</sup> paścāj *corr.*; paścā A.

<sup>150</sup> jñānam *rest.*; + + [m] A.

<sup>151</sup> āhosvij *corr.*; [ahosv]i A.

<sup>152</sup> paścāt *corr.*; paścā A.

<sup>153</sup> utpadyete *em.*; utpadyate A. · Emended following Melzer.

<sup>154</sup> tāvat *em.*; vā tat A.

P: “saññā kho, Poṭṭhapāda, paṭhamam uppajjati, pacchā ñāṇam. saññuppādā ca pana ñāṇuppādo hoti.<sup>158</sup> so evam pajānāti: ‘idappaccayā kira me ñāṇam udapādī’ ti. iminā kho etaṃ,<sup>159</sup> Poṭṭhapāda, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ: yathā<sup>160</sup> saññā paṭhamam uppajjati, pacchā ñāṇam. saññuppādā ca pana ñāṇuppādo hotī” ti.

C: 佛言：「先有想生，然後智。由想有智。」

### §33

S: “labhyam, bho Gautama, asmābhiḥ svayam eva jñā<sub>[7]</sub>tum: ‘idaṃ me pratītya samjñotpanneti’”

“na labhyam, Pṛṣṭhapāla.<sup>161</sup> tat kasya hetoḥ? yathāpi tvayā<sup>162</sup> dīrgharātram anyadrṣṭinānyakṣāntinānyarucinānyābhiprāyeṇa.”

“saced, bho Gautama, na labhyam asmābhiḥ<sup>163</sup> svayam eva <sub>[8]</sub> jñātum: ‘idaṃ me pratītya samjñotpanneti,’ anyad api, tāvad, vayaṃ bhavantam Gautamam

<sup>155</sup> paścāj jñānam. samjñotpādāc *em.*; paścād utpannasamjñotpādā A. · Melzer reads: *tataḥ paścād utpanna(m jñānam)*, which, though possible, is extremely awkward. Replacing *utpanna-* with *jñānam* preserves the parallelism with the preceding statement of Pṛṣṭhapāla and also agrees with the Pāli and Chinese texts.

<sup>156</sup> jñānāvabodham *em.*; jñānāvābodham.

<sup>157</sup> idaṃ pratītya samjñotpanneti *punct.*; samjñā utpanneti A. · On the basis of a parallel phrase below, Melzer suggests to insert *me* here, thus reading: *idaṃ (me) pratītya samjñā utpanneti*. The Pāli text also supports this insertion, but it may obscure a subtle difference, perhaps intended by the redactor of the *sūtra*, between the Buddha’s understanding of causality and Pṛṣṭhapāla’s understanding. The Chinese text does not suggest the presence of *me* here.

<sup>158</sup> hoti DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; hotīti DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>159</sup> iminā kho etaṃ DN<sub>CS</sub>; iminā p’ etaṃ DN<sub>PTS</sub>; iminā kho DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; iminā etaṃ DN<sub>PTS(Scmt)</sub>.

<sup>160</sup> yathā DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; tathā DN<sub>PTS(Scmt)</sub>.

<sup>161</sup> na labhyam, Pṛṣṭhapāla *em.*; labhyam Pṛṣṭhapāla A. · This emendation is confirmed by Pṛṣṭhapāla’s reiteration of the negative statement below.

<sup>162</sup> tvayā *em.*; [tad] A. · Melzer reads with A, but the sentence seems incomplete without the emendation.

<sup>163</sup> asmābhiḥ *corr.*; asmābhi A.

ṛcchema<sup>164</sup> kaṃcid eva pradeśaṃ saced avakāśaṃ kuryāt praśnasya vyākaraṇāya.”

“ṛccha, Pṛṣṭhapāla,<sup>165</sup> yad yad evākāṃkṣasi.”

P: {See §45-47}

C: {See §45-47}

### §34

S: “*kiṃ*,<sup>[418v1]</sup> **bho Gautama, puruṣasyaiṣa saṃjñā naivātmeti?**”<sup>xviii</sup>

P: “**saññā nu kho, bhante, purisassa attā, udāhu aññā saññā añño attā**” ti?

C: 梵志又問：「想即是我耶？」

### §35

S: “**kiṃ punas tvam, Pṛṣṭhapāla, puruṣasyātmānam prajñāpayan**<sup>166</sup> prajñāpayasi?”

P: “**kaṃ**<sup>167</sup> pana tvam, **Poṭṭhapāda, attānam paccesi**” ti?<sup>[186]</sup>

C: 佛告梵志：「汝說何等人是我？」

### §36

S: “**rūpiṇam ahaṃ, bho Gautama, puruṣasyaudārikam cāturmahābhūtikam ātmānam prajñāpayan prajñāpayāmi.**”<sup>168</sup> [2]

P: “**oḷārikam kho ahaṃ, bhante, attānam paccemi rūpiṇ cātumahābhūtikam**<sup>169</sup> kabaḷikārāhārabhakkhan”<sup>170</sup> ti.<sup>xix</sup>

<sup>164</sup> ṛcchema *em.*; ṛcchāma A.

<sup>165</sup> ṛccha, Pṛṣṭhapāla *em.*; ṛcchema Pṛṣṭhapālaḥ A.

<sup>166</sup> prajñāpayan *em.*; prajñāpayā A.

<sup>167</sup> kiṃ DN<sub>PTS</sub>; kaṃ DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>168</sup> prajñāpayāmi *em.*; prajñāpayāsi A.

<sup>169</sup> cātumahābhūtikam DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; cātumahābhūtikam DN<sub>PTS</sub>. · So also three times below.

C: 梵志白佛言：「我不說人是我。我自說色身四大、六入，父母生育，乳舖成長<sup>171</sup>，衣服莊嚴，無常，磨<sup>172</sup>滅法，我說此人是我。」

### §37

S: “**rūpī** cet, **Pr̥ṣṭhapāla**, **puruṣasyaudārikaś**<sup>173</sup> **cāturmahābhūtika ātmā** syāt, **tiṣṭhed** asya saṃjñā utpadyata ātmā<sup>174</sup> **samyak tathaiva**, **anyā cāsya saṃjñā utpadyeta**, **anyā nirudhyeta**.”

P: “**oḷāriko** ca hi<sup>175</sup> **te**, **Poṭṭhapāda**, **attā** abhavissa **rūpī**<sup>176</sup> **cāturmahābhūtika**<sup>177</sup> **kabaḷikārāhārabhakkho**. **Evaṃ** santam kho **te**, **Poṭṭhapāda**, **aññā** va<sup>178</sup> **saññā** bhavissati<sup>179</sup> **añño attā**.<sup>180</sup> **tad** iminā p’ **etaṃ**, **Poṭṭhapāda**, **pariyāyena** veditabbaṃ **yathā** aññā va **saññā** bhavissati **añño attā**. **tiṭṭhat’** evāyaṃ,<sup>181</sup> **Poṭṭhapāda**, **oḷāriko** attā **rūpī** cāturmahābhūtika **kabaḷikārāhārabhakkho**, **atha** imassa purisassa **aññā ca saññā uppajjanti**, **aññā** ca **saññā nirujjhanti**. **iminā** pi

<sup>170</sup> kabaḷikārāhārabhakkhan DN<sub>CS</sub>; kabalinkārāhāra-bhakkhan DN<sub>PTS</sub>. · So also three times below.

<sup>171</sup> 成長 = 長成【明】。

<sup>172</sup> 磨 = 摩【宋】 \* 【元】 \* 【明】 \*。

<sup>173</sup> puruṣasyaudārikaś *corr.*; puruṣasyaudārika A.

<sup>174</sup> asya saṃjñā utpadyata *conj.*; asya sa ātmā A. · *utpadyata* supplied after 418v1. Melzer reads *asya sa(ṃjñā) ātmā samyak tathaiva...*, and omits *utpadyata* when it comes later in the text. The presence of the verb makes the sentence clearer, although its presence could certainly be a scribal contamination from the various other instances of the verb in the vicinity.

<sup>175</sup> oḷāriko ca hi DN<sub>CS</sub>; oḷāriko hoti vegi DN<sub>PTS(Se)</sub>; oḷāriko va hi DN<sub>PTS(Sd)</sub>; oḷāriko hi ce hi DN<sub>PTS(Sm)</sub>; oḷārikehi ce hi DN<sub>PTS(Si)</sub>.

<sup>176</sup> rūpī DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; bhūtirūpī DN<sub>PTS(Scet)</sub> DN<sub>PTS(Bm)</sub>.

<sup>177</sup> cāturmahābhūtika DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; mahārājiko DN<sub>PTS(Scet)</sub>.

<sup>178</sup> va DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>. · There is inconsistency in the Pāli manuscripts as to this *va* and its parallels in the various manuscripts. Some read *ca*, some have the *va* before or after *aññā*.

<sup>179</sup> bhavissati DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; bhavissa DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>180</sup> attā DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; attā ti DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

<sup>181</sup> evāyaṃ DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; ev’ayaṃ DN<sub>PTS(Sd)</sub>; evabhayaṃ (!) DN<sub>PTS(Scmt)</sub>; sāyaṃ DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>.

kho etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā aññā va saññā bhavissati añño attā” ti.

C: 佛告梵志：「汝言色身四大、六入，父母生育，乳哺長成，衣服莊嚴，無常，磨<sup>182</sup>滅法，說此人是我。梵志，且置此我，但人想生，人想滅。」

[110c21]

### §38

S: ---

P: ---

C: 梵志言：「我不說人是我。我說欲界天是我。」

佛言：「且置欲界天是我，但人想生，人想滅。」

### §39

S: “rūpiṇaṃ ahaṃ, bho<sup>183</sup> Gautama, manomayaṃ puru<sub>[3]</sub>sasyātmānaṃ<sup>184</sup> prajñāpayan prajñāpayāmi.”<sup>185</sup>

P: “manomayaṃ kho ahaṃ, bhante, attānaṃ paccemi sabbaṅgapaccaṅgiṃ ahīndriyaṃ”<sup>186</sup> ti.

C: 梵志言：「我不說人是我。我自說色界天是我。」

### §40

S: “rūpī cet, Prṣṭhapāla, puruṣasya manomaya ātmā syāt, tiṣṭhed asya saṃjñā utpadyata ātmā samyak tathaiva, anyā cāsya<sup>187</sup> saṃjñā utpadyeta, anyā nirudhye<sub>[4]</sub>ta.”

<sup>182</sup> 磨 = 摩【宋】 \* 【元】 \* 【明】 \*。

<sup>183</sup> bho *corr.*; bhoḥ A.

<sup>184</sup> puruṣasyātmānaṃ *em.*; puruṣā[t]mānaṃ A.

<sup>185</sup> prajñāpayan prajñāpayāmi *em.*; prajñāpayan na prajñāpayāmi A.

<sup>186</sup> ahīndriyaṃ DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; abhinindriyaṃ DN<sub>PTS(Sed)</sub>.

<sup>187</sup> anyā cāsya *reg.*; anyāsya A. · Regularized after the preceding and following parallel paragraphs.

P: “**manomayo** ca hi te, **Poṭṭhapāda**, **attā** abhaviṣṣa sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo, evaṃ santam pi kho te, Poṭṭhapāda, aññā ’va saññā bhavissati añño attā. tad iminā p’ etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā aññā ’va saññā bhaviṣṣati añño attā.

“**tiṭṭhat’** evāyaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, **manomayo attā** sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo, atha imassa purisassa **aññā** ca **saññā uppajjanti**, **aññā** ca saññā **nirujjhanti**. iminā pi kho etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā aññā va saññā bhavissati añño attā” ti. [187]

C: 佛言：「且置色界天是我，但人想生，人想滅。」

## §41

S: “**arūpiṇam**<sup>188</sup> **ahaṃ**, **bho** Gautama, puruṣasya **saṃjñāmayam ātmānam** prajñāpayan<sup>189</sup> prajñāpayāmi.”

P: “**arūpiṃ** kho **ahaṃ**, **bhante**, **attānam** paccemi **saññāmayan**” ti.

C: 梵志言：「我不說人是我。我自說空處、識處、不用處、有想無想處，無色天是我。」

## §42

S: “**arūpī** cet, **Prṣṭhapāla**, puruṣasya **saṃjñāmaya**<sup>190</sup> **ātmā** syāt, tiṣṭhed asya **saṃjñā utpadyata**<sup>191</sup> **ātmā** samyak tathai<sub>[5]</sub>va, **anyā**<sup>192</sup> **cāsyā saṃjñā utpadyeta**, **anyā**<sup>193</sup> **nirudhyeta**.”

P: “**arūpī** ca hi te, **Poṭṭhapāda**, **attā** abhaviṣṣa saññāmayo, evaṃ santam pi kho te, Poṭṭhapāda, aññā ’va saññā bhavissati añño attā. tad iminā p’ etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā aññā ’va saññā bhavissati añño attā.

<sup>188</sup> arūpiṇam *rest.*; [a] + · i · [m] A.

<sup>189</sup> prajñāpayan *em.*; prajñāpayat A.

<sup>190</sup> saṃjñāmaya *em.*; saṃjñāmayā A. · Melzer reads with A.

<sup>191</sup> saṃjñā utpadyata *em.*; saṃ A.

<sup>192</sup> tathai<sub>5</sub>va anyā *rest.*; tathai + + [n]yā A.

<sup>193</sup> utpadyeta, anyā *em.*; utpadyetonyā A. · This seems to be a case of double *sandhi* in the Ms.

tiṭṭhat' evāyaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, arūpī attā saññāmayo, atha imassa purisassa aññā ca saññā uppañjanti, aññā ca saññā nirujjhanti. iminā pi kho etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, pariāyena veditabbam yathā aññā 'va saññā bhavissati añño attā' ti.

C: 佛言：「且置空處、識處、無所有處、有想無想處，無色天是我，但人想生，人想滅。」

### §43

S: “atha kin nu bhavān Gautama āsāṃ saṃjñānām agryaṃ prajñāpayan<sup>194</sup> prajñāpayati?”

P: ---

C: {See §28-29}

### §44

S: “iha, Prṣṭhapālaiko viviktaṃ kāmair ... yāvat prathamam dhyāna<sub>[6]m</sub> upasampadya,<sup>195</sup> viharati. idam atraike saṃjñānām agryaṃ prajñāpayantaḥ prajñāpayanti. punar aparaṃ, Prṣṭhapālaiko<sup>196</sup> vitarkavicārāṇām vyupaśamād ... yāvad<sup>197</sup> dvitīyaṃ dhyānam upasampadya, <sub>[7]</sub> viharati.<sup>198</sup> idam atraike<sup>199</sup> saṃjñānām agryaṃ prajñāpayantaḥ prajñāpayanti. evaṃ tṛtīyaṃ dhyānam, catuṛtham, ākāśānāntyaīyatanam, vijñānānāntyaīyatanam,<sup>200</sup> ākiñcanyāyatanam upasampadya, viharati. idam atraike<sup>201</sup> <sub>[8]</sub> saṃjñānām<sup>202</sup> agryaṃ<sup>203</sup> prajñāpayantaḥ

<sup>194</sup> prajñāpayan *em.*; [y]ā prajñāpayat A.

<sup>195</sup> dhyānam upasampadya *rest.*; dhyāna + + + ṃ[pa]dya A.

<sup>196</sup> prṣṭhapālaiko *corr.*; prṣṭhapālaika A. · Melzer reads: *prṣṭhapāl{aik}a*, omitting the word *eko*.

<sup>197</sup> yāvad *corr.*; yāva A.

<sup>198</sup> viharati *em.*; viharaṃti A.

<sup>199</sup> atraike *reg.*; tatraike A. · Melzer reads with A.

<sup>200</sup> vijñānānāntyaīyatanam *em.*; vijñānānāntyaīyatam A.

<sup>201</sup> atraike *rest.*; atr[ai] ? A.

<sup>202</sup> saṃjñānām *em.*; saṃjñāyā + A.

<sup>203</sup> agryaṃ *rest.*; + + ṃ A.



*prajñāpayanti. āsām*<sup>204</sup> tu, Prṣṭhapāla, saṃjñānām anantarapatitam<sup>205</sup> eva samyag eva nirodhaṃ spṛśati.<sup>206</sup> idam atra saṃjñānām agryaṃ prajñāpayan<sup>207</sup> prajñāpayāmi.”

P: ---

C: {See §28-29}

## §45

S: {See §33}

P: “sakkā pan’ etaṃ, bhante, mayā ñātum: ‘saññā purisassa attā’ ti vā ‘aññā ’va saññā añño attā’ ti vā” ti?

C: 梵志白佛言：「云何，瞿曇，我寧可得知人想生，人想滅不？」

## §46

S: {See §33}

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<sup>204</sup> prajñāpayantaḥ prajñāpayanti. āsām *conj.*; [prajñā]payanti yāsām A. · This is a tentative conjecture. I suggest that the *y* in *yāsām* is in fact an intervocalic glide. It is also quite possible that the scribe confused the *akṣaras* अ (yā) and आ (initial ā), as they have a similar appearance. It is, however, perfectly feasible to read, like Melzer, *yāsām*. On the alternative meanings of the two interpretations, see footnote 10 of the translation, and further the discussion of this passage on pp. 29–30 of Part I, particularly footnotes 28–29. The interpretation of this passage is central to how we understand the relationship between the three versions of the text.

<sup>205</sup> anantarapatitam *conj.*; anantara + [t]itam A. · Melzer suggests: *anaṃtar(otpa)ti-tam*.

My conjecture is questionable, as such a compound is attested nowhere else in the literature I have consulted. Although the exact word that should stand here cannot be determined with certainty, a word meaning “immediately coming about” or “successively coming about” seems the most likely.

<sup>206</sup> viviktaṃ kāmair ... ākiñcānyāyatanam upasampadya viharati · Note that explicit mention of the eighth meditation, the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatanam*, 有想無想處), is absent here.

<sup>207</sup> prajñāpayan *em.*; prajñāpayat A.

P: “dujjānaṃ kho etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, tayā aññadiṭṭhikena aññakhantikena aññarucikena aññatrāyogena<sup>208</sup> aññatrācariyakena: ‘saññā purisassa attā’ ti vā, ‘aññā ’va saññā añño attā’ ti vā” ti.

C: 佛告梵志：「汝欲知人想生，人想滅者，甚難，甚難。所以者何？汝異見，異習，異忍，異受，依異法故。」<sup>[111a]</sup>

## §47

S: {See §33}

P: “sace taṃ, bhante, mayā dujjānaṃ aññadiṭṭhikena aññakhantikena aññarucikena aññatrāyogena<sup>209</sup> aññatrācariyakena: ‘saññā purisassa attā’ ti vā, ‘aññā ’va saññā añño attā’ ti vā, kiṃ pana, bhante, sassato loko, idam eva saccam mogham aññan” ti?

C: 梵志白佛言：「如是，瞿曇，我異見，異習，異忍，異受，依異法故，欲知<sup>210</sup>人想生，人想滅者，甚難，甚難，所以者何<sup>211</sup>我，世間有常，此實餘虛？<sup>212</sup>

## §48

S: {Compare A 419r3, endnote xx, and Melzer 2010, §36.49.}<sup>xx</sup>

<sup>208</sup> aññatrāyogena DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; annatrapayogena DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>209</sup> aññatrāyogena DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; annatrapayogena DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>

<sup>210</sup> 知=解【宋】【元】【明】。

<sup>211</sup> The phrase 所以者何 is problematic in the broader context of this paragraph. I suggest that it may stand here due to an error in the constitution of the text whereby it was inserted by a scribe or copyist who considered the sentence to be parallel to that found in §46. While this four character phrase usually stands on its own, and thus read literally would break up the sentences that come before and after it, in the present context it should serve as a conjunctive question phrase that sets up the statements that follow as question statements.

<sup>212</sup> 我，世間有常，此實餘虛？· This phrase, and the series of parallel phrases that follow, read as if they were propositions held by Pṛṣṭhapāla. However, the context, as well as explicit indications in our Pāli parallel, make it clear that these phrases should be taken as questions, not propositions. Indeed, Pṛṣṭhapāla could not possibly himself hold all the contradictory views here described. I have punctuated the text accordingly.

P: “abyākatam<sup>213</sup> kho etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā: ‘sassato loko, idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ’” ti.

C: ---

## §49

S: {Compare A 419r3 and Melzer 2010, §36.49}

P: “kiṃ pana, bhante, asassato loko, idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ” ti?

C: 「我，世間無常，此實餘虛？

## §50

S: ---

P: “etaṃ pi kho, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā abyākatam: ‘asassato loko, idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ’” ti. [188]

C: ---

## §51

S: ---

P: ---

C: 「我，世間有常無常，此實餘虛？我，世間非有常非無常，此實餘虛？

## §52

S: {Compare A 419r3-5 and Melzer 2010, §36.49.}

P: “kiṃ pana, bhante, antavā loko ... pe ...<sup>214</sup> anantavā loko.

“taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ<sup>215</sup> ... aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ ...

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<sup>213</sup> abyākatam DN<sub>CS</sub>; avyākatam DN<sub>PTS</sub>. · This is a consistent variation between DN<sub>CS</sub> and DN<sub>PTS</sub>, not reported hereafter.

<sup>214</sup> kiṃ pana, bhante, antavā loko ... pe ... DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>. · In DN<sub>PTS</sub> the *pe* does not apply. Each view is raised as a complete question – as formulated in the phrase beginning *kim pana, bhante, asassato loko ...* – and is likewise answered by the Buddha. This is similar to the Chinese translation.

“hoti tathāgato paraṃ marañā ... na hoti tathāgato paraṃ marañā ... hoti ca na ca<sup>216</sup> hoti tathāgato paraṃ marañā ... n’ eva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ marañā, idam eva saccaṃ moghamaññan” ti?

C: 「我，世間有邊，此實餘虛？我，世間無邊，此實餘虛？我，世間有邊無邊，此實餘虛？我，世間非有邊非無邊，此實餘虛？

「是命是身，此實餘虛？命異身異，此實餘虛？身命非異非不異，此實餘虛？無命無身，此實餘虛？

「如來終，此實餘虛？如來不終，此實餘虛？如來終不終，此實餘虛？如來非終非不終，此實餘虛？」

### §53

S: ---

P: “etam pi kho, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā abyākataṃ: ‘n’ eva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ marañā, idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññan” ti.

C: 佛告梵志：「世間有常…乃至…如來非終非不終，我所不記。」

### §54

S: ---

P: “kasmā pan’ etaṃ,<sup>217</sup> bhante, bhagavatā<sup>218</sup> abyākatan” ti?

C: 梵志白佛言：「瞿曇，何故不記我，世間有常…乃至…如來非終非不終，盡不記耶？」

### §55

S: {Compare A 420r3-4 and Melzer 2010, §36.62.}

P: “na h’ etaṃ, Poṭṭhapāda, atthasaṃhitaṃ na dhammasaṃhitaṃ<sup>[189]</sup> nāḍibrahma-cariyakaṃ, na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya saṃvattati. tasmā etaṃ mayā abyākatan” ti.

<sup>215</sup> taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; *om.* DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>216</sup> hoti ca na ca DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; hoti ca na DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

<sup>217</sup> kasmā pan’ etaṃ DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS(BB)</sub>; kasmā DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

<sup>218</sup> bhagavatā DN<sub>CS</sub> DN<sub>PTS</sub>; bhagavato DN<sub>PTS(SS)</sub>.

C: 佛言：「此不與義合，不與法合，非梵行，非無欲，非無為，非寂滅，非止息，非正覺，非沙門，非泥洹，是故不記。」

## §56

S: ---

P: “kiṃ pana, bhante, bhagavatā byākatan” ti?

C: 梵志又問：「云何為義合，法合？云何為梵行初？云何無為？云何無欲？云何寂滅？云何止息？云何正覺？云何沙門？云何泥洹？云何名記？」

## §57

S: {Compare A 420r4-6 and Melzer 2010, §36.63.}

P: “‘idaṃ dukkhan’ ti kho, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā byākatam. ‘ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo’ ti kho, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā byākatam. ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodho’ ti kho, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā byākatam. ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ ti kho, Poṭṭhapāda, mayā byākatan” ti.

C: 佛告梵志：「我記苦諦、苦集、苦滅、苦出要諦。

## §58

S: {Compare A 420r6-7 and Melzer 2010, §36.64.}

P: “kasmā pan’ etaṃ, bhante, bhagavatā byākatan” ti?

C: 「所以者何？」

## §59

S: {Compare A 420r7-8 and Melzer 2010, §36.64.}

P: “etañ hi, Poṭṭhapāda, atthasaṃhitam, etaṃ dhammasaṃhitam, etaṃ ādibrahma-cariyakam, etaṃ nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati. tasmā etaṃ mayā byākatan” ti.

C: 「此是義合，法合，梵行初首，無欲，無為，寂滅，止息，正覺，沙門，泥洹，是故我記。」

## §60

S: atha Pṛṣṭhapālaparivrājako Bhaga<sub>[419r1]</sub>vato bhāṣitaṃ sarveṇa<sup>219</sup> sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ<sup>220</sup> abhyanumodate: “subhāṣitaṃ Bhavato<sup>221</sup> Gautamasya subhāṣitam āyuṣmataḥ.”

P: “evam etaṃ, Bhagavā, evam etaṃ, sugata yassa ’dāni, bhante, Bhagavā kālaṃ maññatī” ti.

C: ---

## §61

S: **atha Bhagavān** Pṛṣṭhapālaṃ parivrājakaṃ dharṃyayā kathayā saṃdarśya samādāpya samuttejya saṃpra<sub>[2]</sub>harṣyotthāyāsanāt prakrāntaḥ.<sup>222</sup>

P: **atha kho Bhagavā uṭṭhāyāsanā pakkāmi.**

C: 爾時，世尊為梵志說法。示教利喜已，即從坐<sup>223</sup>而去。

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<sup>219</sup> bhāṣitaṃ sarveṇa *rest.*; bhāṣi + + + ṇa A.

<sup>220</sup> sarvathā sarvaṃ *em.*; sarvathām A. · Emended after two parallel passages below.

<sup>221</sup> bhavato *em.*; bhagava[to] A.

<sup>222</sup> Note the direct correspondence between this paragraph and the Chinese text, against the Pāli text.

<sup>223</sup> 坐 = 座起【元】【明】。

## Philological Commentary and Testimonia

<sup>i</sup> *ahetor, bhavantaḥ...ahetor nirudhyante* || The text as it stands in the Ms, *ahetor, bhavantaḥ, puruṣasya saṃjñā utpadyante. ahetor nirudhyataḥ puruṣasya saṃjñā utpadyante, ahetor nirudhyante*, can be meaningfully translated: “Without cause, good sirs, a man’s consciousness arises. Without cause, the consciousness of a dying man arises; without cause it ceases.” But this seems quite convoluted and likely the result of multiple dittographies. I have thus quite radically pared down the text so as to get a simpler reading that keeps the parallelism that is found in the Pāli and Chinese versions. In particular, I have omitted the somewhat peculiar present participle *nirudhyataḥ*, which seems to be a later accretion, an attempt to complicate the text. On the other hand, the text might also have once read *ahetor bhavataḥ puruṣasya saṃjñā utpadyante. ahetor nirudhyataḥ puruṣasya saṃjñā nirudhyante*, thereby rendering the phrases: “Without a cause the perceptions of a man coming into existence arise. Without a cause, the perceptions of a dying man cease.” This would be quite elegant, and also a real divergence from the Pāli and Chinese versions.

<sup>ii</sup> The use of the term *jīva* in A is important to note because the Chinese translation makes it clear that the translators were at this point in the text working from a text that corresponds to A and not to DN<sub>PTS</sub>. This becomes evident in the phrase: 由命有想生, 由命有想滅。 “Because of the life force, there is the arising of the faculty of perception. Because of the life force, there is the cessation of the faculty of perception.”

<sup>iii</sup> Although this passage does not have a parallel in the Pāli or the Chinese text, it does correspond to the Buddha’s own teaching in a passage found later in the Pāli *sutta*. This is puzzling and perhaps problematic, although it is not unthinkable that the Buddha’s teaching would have been included amongst the views of other teachers. In fact, it would seem a bit odd if his teaching were not included. This may be a case in which the Sanskrit text represents an older reading, more faithful to the original social context, where the Buddha’s teaching was presented regularly as one among many *śramaṇa* traditions. Finally, unlike the Chinese text, which offers only three separate theories of consciousness, both the Sanskrit and Pāli texts offer four.

<sup>iv</sup> *atra yukto em.*; *atrāyukto A.* · The text could also be read as it stands, however, taking the *ā*-prefix in the sense of *samantāt* (completely) or *iṣat* (a little bit), so that the phrase might mean either “entirely proficient” or “partially proficient.” The former makes sense in the context of the narrative.

<sup>v</sup> 我因是故生念念 || The doubling of the character *nian* 念 here is somewhat puzzling. The Taishō editors put a full stop between the two characters, so that the second *nian*

appears as an adjective of the Buddha. But the repetition could also indicate the idea of repeated thought, or simply be a dittography.

<sup>vi</sup> *kaḍācit* || The reading *kaḍāci svid* in A seems to be a contamination from the previous *kaḍā svid ahaṃ ...*. The emendation also makes more sense in the context. Pṛṣṭhapāla's first makes an aspiration (*kaḍā svid*) and then states that he will ask the Buddha at a specific time (*kaḍācit*), and about a specific topic (*kaṃcid*) *eva pradeśaṃ*, if he gets the opportunity.

<sup>vii</sup> *sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjati, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhati* || This passage, though present in a slightly different form in the Sanskrit text, is not present in the Chinese. Likewise, where this phrase is repeated several times in the Pāli text below during the explanation of the *dhyānas*, the Chinese text reads: 有因緣而想生, 有因緣而想滅。 “Having a cause and condition, perceptions arise. Having a cause and condition, perceptions cease.” The absence of an emphasis on training may signal that the Chinese translators either read a rather different text or mistranslated what is arguably an essential aspect of the Sanskrit and Pāli texts.

<sup>viii</sup> *pūrvam kāmasukhasaṃjñā ... vivekajaprītisukhasaṃjñī* || Here I hesitatingly emend the text after the Pāli. The use of accusatives in A is peculiar, but is also fairly consistent in the sentences that follow. Such usage could indicate a peculiar quality of the dialect of the region in which this text was circulating. Thus, the phrase *pūrvam kāmasukham saṃjñā ... vivekajam prītisukham saṃjñī* might have the sense of *pūrvam kāmasukham adhikṛtya saṃjñā ... vivekajam prītisukham adhikṛtya saṃjñī*, “the previously [arisen] perception pertaining to [the experience of] sensual bliss ... [being] the agent who is percipient in regard to rapture and bliss born of seclusion.” In this case, the presence of the accusatives can be accounted for by the fact that the preceding phrase, in which the practitioner enters and dwells in the *samādhi*, necessarily renders the *samādhi* in the accusative. Otherwise, these accusative forms in A might indicate a contamination of the Ms, based on the adverbial *pūrvam*. However, following the Pāli, we might consider emending to *pūrvā*, but this would conflict with the consistency of the reading *pūrvam*. It is also possible that the scribe was not particularly familiar with Sanskrit grammar, and was simply thoughtlessly copying or taking down a dictation of the text. Finally, I would point to the phrase *upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhi{sukha}saṃjñī* below. Here we find the expected compound, indicating that A, at least at some point in its transmission, agreed with the Pāli text. Due to the lack of clear grammatical markers in the Chinese translation, it is hard to tell whether the Chinese translator read the words in compound or as accusatives, but the word order suggests that the Chinese may have agreed with the Pāli.

<sup>ix</sup> At this point, the Chinese translation diverges from the basic structure that is common to the Sanskrit and Pāli versions. Instead of deciding to cease mental activity just prior to



touching cessation, the Chinese text seems to indicate that a meditator first enters cessation, then comes out of it (?), and then has the thought that ceasing mental activity is beneficial. Subsequently, the meditator again enters cessation. This model of practice is peculiar and seems a bit forced and scholastic when compared to the more straightforward model found in the Pāli and Sanskrit texts. By way of a suggestion, one might consider the description of the process by which the meditator enters cessation as a sort of commentarial elaboration of the process previously described, but this cannot be corroborated without further evidence.

<sup>x</sup> Cf. Kv 15.10.736 at Kv (B<sup>c</sup>) 420 [PTS: Kv 15.10.4 at Kv 519]: *na vattabbaṃ — “saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asaññasattupikā” ti? āmantā. nanu idhāpi asaññī tatrāpi asaññīti? āmantā. hañci idhāpi asaññī tatrāpi asaññī, tena vata re vattabbe — “saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asaññasattupikā” ti.*

<sup>xi</sup> idhasakasaññī || The use of the word *saka* in this compound is somewhat puzzling. The Pāli commentators likewise struggle with it and understand it in different ways. Buddhaghosa displays the ambiguity of the phrase when he writes (DN-a (B<sup>c</sup>):9:414): “*idha sakasaññī hotī*” *ti. idha sāsane sakasaññī hotī, ayam eva vā pāṭho, attano paṭhamajjhānasaññāya saññāvā hotī ti attho*, “*Idha sakasaññī hotī*” [means] he is self-percipient here in this training (that is, the Buddha’s own training). Or [one can] read it as: [Thus,] one is endowed with his own perception of the first meditative absorption.”

<sup>xii</sup> *cec em. ce A.* · The form *ce* represents a Middle Indic form of the Sanskrit particle *cet*. This perhaps represents a holdover from a more archaic version of the text, which was less Sanskritic. But the form could also simply be the result of scribal carelessness. See, for instance, above, where we find the reading *cad* instead of *ce* or *cet*.

<sup>xiii</sup> *cetayate* || At this point in the Pāli text there is an additional line that is not found in the Sanskrit text. It reads: *tassa acetayato anabhisankharoto tā c’ eva saññā nirujjhanti, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā na uppajjanti*. It is interesting to note that the verbs are in the plural in this sentence. The presence of the plural form, *cetayante*, may very well indicate that an earlier version of our Sanskrit text was originally closer to the Pāli text. Similarly, we do find a parallel passage in the Chinese text, but with a slight variation in phraseology: 彼不為念行。不起思惟已，微妙想滅，麤想不生。 “Once he has stopped producing mental activity and giving rise to thoughts, that subtle perception ceases, and a coarse[r one] does not arise.”

<sup>xiv</sup> Here, again, the Chinese text seems to correspond more closely to the Sanskrit text than to the Pāli, which further complicates how we understand the relationship between the three texts: 又白佛言：「我今生念：謂此有想，此無想，或復有想。此想已，彼作是念：『有念為惡。無念為善。』...」 ([Pṛṣṭhapāla] spoke further to the Buddha: “Now I

understand [what the Blessed One said] in this way, namely: ‘[One is] percipient in regard to this. [Then one is] not percipient in regard to this. [One] is again percipient [and], having become percipient in regard to this, thinks thus: “Mental activity is bad. The absence of mental activity is good.”’) The phrase 我今生念: 謂此有想, 此無想, 或復有想。此想已, 彼作是念... seems to correspond to a phrase found in the Sanskrit text: *sacet sa, Prṣṭhapāla, bhikṣur ihasaṃjñī bhavati tatrāsaṃjñī. tasyaivaṃ (tatraivaṃ A) bhavati*. In the Chinese text, however, this phrase comes only in Prṣṭhapāla’s response to the Buddha, and not in the Buddha’s initial teaching, which is in fact a bit different, as discussed above. The phrase corresponding to Prṣṭhapāla’s response in the Pāli text reads: “*evaṃ kho ahaṃ, bhante, bhagavato bhāsitaṃ ājānāmi: ‘yato kho, Poṭṭhapāda, bhikkhu idha sakasaññī hoti, so tato amutra tato amutra anupubbena saññaggaṃ phusati, tassa saññagge ṭhitassa evaṃ hoti: “cetayamānassa me pāpiyo, acetayamānassa me seyyo.”’*” (“Good sir, I understand the speech of the Blessed One in this way: ‘Poṭṭhapāda, when a monk is here self-percipient, he [proceeds] from stage to stage [and ultimately] touches cessation. One who dwells at the highest point of perception thinks thus: “It is bad for me when I think. It is good for me when I do not think.”’”) This passage is clearly distinct from the Chinese and Sanskrit texts, which, in this case, are more closely related to each other.

<sup>xv</sup> paścā || The form *paścā* appears twice in the text. I have emended this word to *paścāt*, with appropriate *sandhi* because the Sanskrit form is attested at several other places in A. However, the form *paścā* may also well be a holdover from Middle Indic.

<sup>xvi</sup> udāhu || Here we seem to find a direct correspondence between the use of the term *udāhu* in Pāli and the term *āhosvit* in Sanskrit.

<sup>xvii</sup> idaṃ pratīya saṃjñōtpanneti || This phrase diverges from both the Pāli and Chinese texts, which agree at this point, although the Chinese phraseology is certainly lacking in several of the details presented in the Pāli text, cf. ‘*idappaccayā kira me ñāṇaṃ udapādī ti* and 「先有想生, 然後智。由想有智。」 However, the Sanskrit text seems to preserve a clearer and more coherent understanding of the topic under discussion in that it offers the content of the cognitive understanding of the practitioner, whereas the Pāli and Chinese versions simply repeat the reasoning put forth in the preceding statement.

<sup>xviii</sup> puruṣasyaiva saṃjñā naivātmeti || The use of the particle *eva* in this context is unusual. If understood as an enclitic particle, as would be expected in Sanskrit, then we can translate the text as: “Is the very perception of a certain man the self [of that man]?” The text makes more sense, however, if we understand the particle *eva* as indicative of a restrictive prepositional clause. I am not aware of such a usage in Sanskrit, but the dialect in which this text is written has many peculiarities and I would not rule out such a reading, which amounts to the question: “Is the perception of some man the self of that very [man]?”

Another possibility that might explain the awkwardness of this sentence is that the *eva* particles in the text are actually derived from misreadings of the word *anyā* or *aññā*. This diagnostic conjecture is suggested by the Pāli text, which makes Poṭṭhapāda's question quite explicit by stating it in two different ways: “*saññā nu kho, bhante, purisassa attā? udāhu aññā saññā añño attā*” *ti?* “Is perception the self of a person? Or is perception one thing and the self another?” Thus, I would suggest the possibility that the Sanskrit text may have once read: *kiṃ, bho Gautama, puruṣasyānyaiva saṃjñānyaivātmeti?* Unfortunately, the Pāli is too different here to help us understand the Sanskrit text definitively. It seems that the redactors of the Pāli text felt the need to expand the text and make the import of Poṭṭhapāda's question explicit. The Chinese translation, on the other hand, is even less developed than the Sanskrit text and seems to derive from an original with only one *eva*: 「想即是我耶?」 “Is this very perception the self?”

<sup>xix</sup> oḷārikam ... rūpiṃ cātumahābhūtikam kabalīkārāhārabhakkhan . This phrase corresponds in different ways with its Chinese and Sanskrit counterparts. The Sanskrit phrase is the most attenuated, and the Chinese text offers a much more extensive phrase that goes beyond both the Sanskrit and the Pāli. However, this phraseology is also commonly found in the Pāli literature. See, for example, DN 1.2.234 at DN (B<sup>c</sup>) I 67 [PTS : DN I 76]: *ayaṃ kho me kāyo rūpī cātumahābhūtikō mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsūpacayo aniccucchādāna-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhaṃsana-dhammo...*

<sup>xx</sup> It becomes clear later in A that an entire section of the text has accidentally been omitted by the scribe in the process of copying the text. This is obvious because we find the exchange quoted first by Pṛṣṭhapāla's followers, and later by Pṛṣṭhapāla himself in another conversation with the Buddha. For example, we find the *avyākṛtāni vastūni* described by Pṛṣṭhapāla's followers (here I present the text as I have edited it without any critical notes or annotations):

*‘śāśvato loka; idam eva satyaṃ moham anyad’ iti. ‘aśāśvataḥ śāśvataś cāśāśvataś ca naiva śāśvato nāśāśvataḥ. antavāṃ loko ’nantavāṃ loko ’ntavāṃś cā<sub>[419rA]</sub>nantavāṃś ca naivāntavān nāntavān. sa jīvas tac charīraṃ. anyo jīvo ’nyac charīraṃ. bhavati Tathāgataḥ paraṃ maraṇāt. na bhavati, bhavati ca na bhavati, naiva bhavati na na bhavati Tathāgataḥ paraṃ maraṇāt. i<sub>[5]</sub>dam eva satyaṃ moham anyad’ iti.*

We find similar parallel passages, although unique in detail in the Sanskrit text, for the other passages found in the Pāli and Chinese texts.



## **Translation**

In translating all three versions of the text, I attempt to render straightforward, readable English, while not diverging too much from the syntax and grammar of the original languages. The translation is only lightly annotated, as the most important problems are discussed in Part I and in the footnotes of the editions presented above. The folio and page numbers referenced in the translation are those of the respective source texts presented in the editions.

## §1

- S: [Pṛṣṭhapāla spoke to the Buddha:] “Some days back <sup>[416v5]</sup>, friend Gautama, quite a few, while various fordors, ascetics, *brāhmaṇas*, mendicants and wanderers were sitting gathered in the debating-hall, a discussion of this type occurred, that is, [a discussion on the topic of] the supreme cessation of perception and feeling (*abhisamjñāveditanirodha*).
- P:<sup>1</sup> [Poṭṭhapāda spoke to the Buddha:] “Some days back, venerable sir, quite a few, among the ascetics and *brāhmaṇas* of various groups who were sitting gathered together in the debating-hall, there arose a discussion on the topic of the supreme cessation of perception <sup>[180]</sup>. [The question arose:] ‘How does the supreme cessation of perception [come about]?’
- C: <sup>[110a3]</sup> The mendicant said to the Buddha: “World-honored one, in the past few days there were mendicants, ascetics, and *brāhmaṇas* gathered here in the hall of *brāhmaṇas*. They spoke on this topic, [putting forth] opposing theses.

## §2

- S: “In that regard, some spoke thus: “The perceptions of a man, good sirs, arise without a cause and cease without a cause. In this way, those [perceptions] come and go, [each] at a single moment. When they arrive, at that time there is a perceiver. When they depart, at that time there is no perceiver.” We see [the issue] in such and such a way.’
- P: “In that regard, some spoke thus: ‘Without cause or condition, the perceptions of a man arise and cease. When they arise, at that time there is a perceiver. When they cease, at that time there is no perceiver.’ In this way, some explain the supreme cessation of perception.
- C: “Gautama, first there were some mendicants who spoke thus: ‘Without cause or condition, the perceptions of a man arise. Without cause or condition, [his] perceptions cease. Perceptions come and go. When [they] come, perception arises, when they go, perception ceases.’

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<sup>1</sup> The inserted page-numbers refer to DN<sub>PTS</sub>.

### §3

- S: “Others spoke thus: “‘Because of the life faculty, the perceptions of a man arise; because of the life faculty [they] cease. In this way, those [perceptions] come and go, [each] at a single moment. When they arrive, at that time <sup>[417r1]</sup> there is a perceiver. When they depart, at that time there is no perceiver.” We see [the issue] in such and such a way.’
- P: “Someone else spoke thus to him: ‘Friend, that is not how it is. Perception is the self of a person, and it comes and goes. When it comes, at that time there is a perceiver. When it goes, at that time there is no perceiver.’ In this way, some explain the supreme cessation of perception.
- C: “Gautama, [then] there were [other] mendicants who spoke thus: ‘Because of the life faculty, perceptions arise. Because of the life faculty, perceptions cease. Those perceptions come and go. When [they] come, perception arises, when they go, perception ceases.’

### §4

- S: ---
- P: “Someone else spoke thus to him: ‘Friend, that is not how it is. For there are, friend, ascetics and *brāhmaṇas* of great magic and power. They draw in the perception of a person, and draw [it] out. When they draw [it] in, at that time there is a perceiver. When they draw it out, at that time there is no perceiver.’ In this way, some explain the supreme cessation of perception.
- C: ---

### §5

- S: “Others spoke thus: “‘Deities, good sirs, draw in the faculties of perception of a man; deities draw [them] out. In this way, those [perceptions] come and go, [each] at a single moment. When they arrive, at that time there is a perceiver. When they depart, at that time there is no perceiver.” We see [the issue] in such and such a way.’
- P: “Someone else spoke thus to him: ‘Friend, that is not how it is. For there are, friend, deities of great magic and power. They draw in the perception of a person, and draw [it] out. When they draw [it] in, at that time there is a perceiver. When they draw it out, at that time there is no perceiver.’ In this way, some explain the supreme cessation of perception.

C: “Gautama, [then] there were [other] mendicants who spoke thus: ‘What was just said previously is without foundation. There are great deities, with great powers. They draw out perception and draw [it] in. When they draw it out, perceptions cease. When they draw it in, perceptions arise.’

## §6

S: “Others spoke thus: “‘By training, good sirs, the faculties of perception of a man arise; by training, [they] cease. In this way, those [perceptions] come and go, [each] at a single moment ... as previously ... ” We see [the issue] in such and such a way.’

P: ---

C: ---

## §7

S: “[Then] this is what I thought, friend Gautama: ‘I will never understand this! I do not see it. I am not clever in this regard, I am not clever in this regard. Sir Gautama knows about this. The Blessed Gautama sees it. Sir Gautama is clever and skilled in this regard.’

P: “[Then], venerable sir, I recalled the Blessed One, [thinking]: ‘Surely the Blessed One, the Sublime One is supremely skilled with respect to these things.’ The Blessed One, venerable sir, is skilled in and understands the nature of the supreme cessation of perception.”

C: “For this reason, I thought: ‘The ascetic Gautama already understands this matter. Surely he is skilled in the knowledge of the meditation of cessation of perception and knowing.’”<sup>2</sup>

## §8

S: “[Then], friend Gautama, I thought: ‘When might I see sir Gautama? At some time I will speak [to him] about some [such] topic, if he finds an opportunity to expound upon [my] question.’

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<sup>2</sup> The meditation of cessation of perception and knowing (想知滅定) || In order to be faithful to the Chinese linguistic context, I translate the Chinese character *zhi* 知 as *knowing* rather than feeling, even though this character most likely renders the term *\*ved(ay)ita*, which is best understood as feeling.



P: ---

C: ---

## §9

S: “[So now] I will ask the venerable Gautama about that very topic, that is: What is it, and how is it to be [understood]?”

P: “What then, venerable sir, is the supreme cessation of perception?”

C: ---

## §10

S: “From the very beginning, Pṛṣṭhapāla, those ascetics and *brāhmaṇas* erred when they said: ‘Good sirs, the perceptions of a man arise without a cause and cease without cause.’

“Why is that? Only by training do the perceptions of a man arise, only by training [do they] cease. So, in this way, Pṛṣṭhapāla, you should understand that: ‘Only by training do the perceptions of a man arise, only by training [do they] cease.’

P: “In this matter, Poṭṭhapāda, [all] those ascetics and *brāhmaṇas* have erred, beginning with those who say: ‘Without cause or condition the perceptions of a man arise and cease.’

“Why is that? Because, Poṭṭhapāda, the perceptions of a man arise and cease with causes and conditions. <sup>[181]</sup> Due to training one perception arises, due to training one perception ceases.”

C: At that time, the World-honored One spoke to the mendicant: “Those who put forth [such] theses have all erred.

“They say: ‘Without cause or condition, the perceptions of a man arise. Without cause or condition, [his] perceptions cease. Perceptions come and go. When [they] come, perception arises, when they go, perception ceases.’

“Others say: ‘Because of the life faculty, perceptions arise. Because of the life faculty, perceptions cease. Those perceptions come and go. When [they] come, perception arises, when they go, perception ceases.’

“Others say: ‘[That] is without foundation. There are great deities. They draw in perception and draw [it] out. When they draw it in, perceptions arise. When they draw it out, perceptions cease.’

“Those who speak in this way have all erred.”

“Why is that? Mendicant, perceptions arise with causes and conditions. Perceptions cease with causes and conditions.”

## §11

S: “Here, Pṛṣṭhapāla, a teacher is born in the world ... the extent [of this passage] is just as [found] in the *Tṛdaṇḍisūtra*.

P: The Blessed One Said: “Here, Poṭṭhapāda, a Tathāgata is born in the world, an Arahāt, a Fully Awakened Buddha...[a disciple goes forth in his dispensation, and dwells keeping all the training rules of the Pātimokkha...]

C: “When a Tathāgata appears in the world, a Fully Enlightened Buddha, endowed with the ten qualities, there are men who, leave home in the teaching of the Buddha, and enter upon the way...

## §12

S: ---

P: “He is endowed with skilful physical and vocal conduct, with a pure livelihood, perfect in morality, with sense-doors guarded, endowed with mindful awareness, and content.

“And how, Poṭṭhapāda, is a monk perfect in morality? Here, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk, having abandoned killing, refrains from killing. He is one who has laid down the stick, laid down the sword, he is conscientious, compassionate, and dwells with sympathy for the benefit of all beings. This is his [accomplishment] with respect to morality...

“Whereas, good sirs, some ascetics and *brāhmaṇas*, partaking of food offered by the faithful, make a living by means of wrong livelihood, with such base arts as promissory offerings to the *devas* and redeeming such vows...[or] using medicines to take away the effects of [previous] remedies, [the disciple of the Buddha] is one who refrains from wrong livelihood by means of such and such base arts. This is his [accomplishment] with respect to morality. He is thus perfect in morality, Poṭṭhapāda, and sees no danger anywhere, because of [his] moral restraint.

“Poṭṭhapāda, it is just as though a properly consecrated warrior king, who has struck down all his enemies, would not see danger anywhere from one who might oppose him. In the same way, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk who is thus perfect in

morality sees no danger anywhere, because of [his] moral restraint. He is endowed with this noble aggregate of morality, and experiences inwardly the bliss of blamelessness. In this way, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk is one who is perfect in morality.

“And how, Poṭṭhapāda, is a monk guarded with respect to the sense-doors? Here, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk sees a visual object with the eye, [but] does not grasp after [its] major marks or minor characteristics. Because evil unwholesome states of craving and aversion would overwhelm him who is dwelling with his eye sense-door unguarded, he practices to restrain the eye sense-door; he protects it, and controls it. <sup>[182]</sup>

“[A monk] hears a sound with the ear...smells a scent with the nose...tastes a taste with the tongue, touches a tangible with the body...thinks a thought with consciousness (*viññāṇa*), [but] does not grasp after [its] major marks or minor characteristics. Because evil unwholesome states of craving and aversion would overwhelm him who is dwelling with his mind sense-door (*manindriya*) unguarded, he practices to restrain the eye sense-door; he protects it, and controls it.

“Endowed with this noble restraint of the faculties, he experiences inwardly perfect bliss. In this way, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk is one who is guarded with respect to the sense-doors...

C: ---

### §13

S: ---

P: “When he sees that these five hindrances have been abandoned, joy arises for him. He who is joyful, experiences rapture. With a mind of rapture, the body tranquilizes. One with a tranquil body experiences bliss. The mind of one experiencing bliss becomes concentrated.”

C: “When he has done away with the five hindrances, he is one whose mind is guarded.”

### §14

S: “[A monk] enters and abides in the rapture and bliss born of seclusion that is <sup>[417v1]</sup> the first meditative absorption, which is removed from sensual pleasures, removed from unwholesome evil states, and is accompanied by applied and sustained thought. His previous perception of the bliss of sensual pleasures

ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of rapture and bliss born of seclusion. [He is] trained in that training.”

- P: “Being thus removed from sensual pleasures, removed from unwholesome states, he enters and abides in the rapture and bliss born of seclusion that is the first meditative absorption, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought. His previous perception of sensual pleasures ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of rapture and bliss born of seclusion. At that time, [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of rapture and bliss born of seclusion. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”
- C: “[Then] he removes desire, [he removes] evil and unwholesome states, and enters upon the first meditative absorption, which is accompanied by thought and vision, as well as the rapture and bliss born of seclusion. The previous cessation of the perception of sensual pleasure gives rise to the perception of rapture and bliss. Mendicant, because of this, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §15

- S: The Blessed One said to him: “Further, Pṛṣṭhapāla, due to the subsiding of applied and sustained thought, [and] because of inward lucidity and oneness of mind, a monk enters and abides in the rapture and bliss born of concentration that is the second meditative absorption, which is free from applied and sustained thought. His previous perception of the rapture and bliss born of seclusion ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of rapture and bliss born of concentration. [He is] trained in that training.”
- P: The Blessed One said: “Further, Pṛṣṭhapāda, due to the subsiding of applied and sustained thought, [and] because of inward lucidity and oneness of mind, a monk enters and abides in the rapture and bliss born of concentration that is the second meditative absorption, which is free from applied and sustained thought. His previous perception of the subtle truth of rapture and bliss born of seclusion ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of rapture and bliss born of concentration. At that time, <sup>[183]</sup> [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of rapture and bliss born of concentration. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”
- C: “With the subsiding of thought and discrimination, and because of inward rapture and singleness of mind, he enters upon the second meditative absorption, which is free from thought and discrimination and which consists of

rapture and bliss born of concentration. Mendicant, the perception of the first meditative absorption ceases, and the perception of the second meditative absorption arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §16

- S: The Blessed One said to him: “Further, Pṛṣṭhapāla, due to the fading away of rapture, a monk dwells equanimous, mindful, and cognizant, experiencing bodily bliss, about which the Noble Ones say: ‘Equanimous and mindful, he dwells happily.’ [Thus, he] enters and abides in the third meditative absorption. His previous perception of rapture and bliss born of concentration ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of bliss devoid of rapture. [He is] trained in that training.”
- P: The Blessed One said: “Further, Poṭṭhapāda, due to the fading away of rapture, a monk dwells equanimous, mindful, and cognizant, experiencing bodily bliss, about which the Noble Ones say: ‘Equanimous and mindful, he dwells happily.’ [Thus, he] enters and abides in the third meditative absorption. His previous perception of the subtle truth of rapture and bliss born of concentration ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of equanimity and bliss. At that time, [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of equanimity and bliss. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”
- C: “[Then] he removes rapture, and practices equanimity. <sup>[110b]</sup> Aware and single-minded, he experiences bodily bliss, which is sought by the noble ones, and which is pure due to equanimity and awareness.<sup>3</sup> Thus he enters the third meditative absorption. Mendicant, the perception of the second meditative absorption ceases, and the perception of the third meditative absorption arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

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<sup>3</sup> Pure due to equanimity and awareness (護念清淨) || It is peculiar that this phrase, usually only present in the formula for the 4<sup>th</sup> *dhyāna*, is present here, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> *dhyāna* formula. It is probably a mistake in the textual transmission, and stands in for the standard 3<sup>rd</sup> *dhyāna* phrase found in both the Sanskrit and Pāli formulas (*upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī; upekkakāḥ smṛtimān sukhaṃ viharatī*).

## §17

- S: The Blessed One said to him: “Further, Pṛṣṭhapāla, due to the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and because of the immediately preceding disappearance of happiness and sadness, a monk enters and abides in the fourth meditative absorption, which is the purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity, and which is free from pleasure and pain. His previous perception of bliss devoid of rapture ceases. At that time, Pṛṣṭhapāla, the noble disciple dwells as one percipient of purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity. [He is] trained in that training.”
- P: The Blessed One said: “Further, Poṭṭhapāda, due to the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and because of the immediately preceding disappearance of happiness and sadness, a monk enters and abides in the fourth meditative absorption, which is the purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity, and which is free from pleasure and pain. His previous perception of the subtle truth of equanimity and bliss ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of neither-pleasure-nor-pain. At that time, [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of neither-pleasure-nor-pain. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”
- C: “[Then, due to] the removal of pleasure and pain, and [due to] the previous cessation of sadness and happiness, he enters the fourth meditative absorption, which is pure due to equanimity and awareness. Mendicant, the perception of the third meditative absorption ceases, and the perception of the fourth meditative absorption arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §18

S: ---

- P: The Blessed One said: “Further, Poṭṭhapāda, due to the complete transcendence of perceptions of materiality, the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and inattention to perceptions of diversity, a monk [thinks]: ‘Space is infinite,’ [and thus] enters and abides in the sphere of infinite space. His previous perception of materiality ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of sphere of infinite space. At that time, [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of the sphere of infinite space. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”
- C: “[Then,] due to the removal of all perceptions of materiality, he does away with resistance, does not give attention to perceptions of difference, and enters upon

the sphere of [infinite] space. Mendicant, the perception of all materiality ceases, and the perception of the sphere of [infinite] space arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §19

S: ---

P: The Blessed One said: “Further, Poṭṭhapāda, having completely transcended the sphere of infinite space, <sup>[184]</sup> a monk [thinks]: ‘Consciousness is infinite,’ [and thus] enters and abides in the sphere of infinite consciousness. His previous perception of the subtle truth of the sphere of infinite space ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of the sphere of infinite consciousness. At that time, [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of the sphere of infinite consciousness. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”

C: “Entirely rising above the sphere of [infinite] space, he enters upon the sphere of [infinite] consciousness. Mendicant, the perception of the sphere of [infinite] space ceases, and the perception of the sphere of [infinite] consciousness arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §20

S: ---

P: The Blessed One said: “Further, Poṭṭhapāda, having completely transcended the sphere of infinite consciousness, a monk [thinks]: ‘There is nothing,’ [and thus] enters and abides in the sphere of nothingness. His previous perception of the subtle truth of the sphere of infinite consciousness ceases. At that time, there is a perception of the subtle truth of the sphere of nothingness. At that time, [he] is one percipient of the subtle truth of the sphere of nothingness. In this way, it is due to training that one perception arises, and due to training that one perception ceases.”

C: “Entirely rising above the sphere of [infinite] consciousness, he enters upon the sphere of nothingness. Mendicant, the perception of the sphere of [infinite] consciousness ceases, and the perception of the sphere of nothingness arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §21

S: ---

P: ---

C: “[Then he] abandons the sphere of nothingness and enters into the sphere that is with and without perception. [At that time,] mendicant, his perception of the sphere of nothingness ceases, and the perception of the sphere that is with and without perception arises. Therefore, he understands that perceptions cease due to causes and conditions and arise due to causes and conditions.

## §22

S: ---

P: ---

C: “He [then] abandons the sphere that is with and without perception and enters upon the meditative absorption of the cessation of perception and knowing. Mendicant, his perception of the base that is with and without perception ceases, [and he] enters the attainment of the cessation of perception and knowing. Therefore, he understands that perceptions arise due to causes and conditions and cease due to causes and conditions.

## §23

S: The Blessed One said to him: “If, Pṛṣṭhapāla, a monk is percipient here and impercipient there,<sup>4</sup> he thinks thus: ‘For me not thinking is good. For me thinking is bad. If I were to think or produce mental constructs, then this perception would cease, and a coarser perception would appear.’ [Thus] he does not think nor does he produce mental constructs. Not thinking and not producing mental constructs, he rightly touches cessation.

P: The Blessed One said: “When, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk is self-percipient here [in this training], he proceeds from stage to stage and gradually touches the pinnacle of perceptions. When he stands at the pinnacle of perceptions, it occurs to him <sup>[185]</sup>: ‘For me thinking is bad. [For me] not thinking is good. If I were to

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<sup>4</sup> “A monk is percipient here and impercipient there...” (*bhikṣur ihasaṃjñī bhavati tatrāsaṃjñī...*) || The phraseology here leaves this passage open to interpretation. I understand this phrase as a description of the state of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as a mediating state leading into cessation.



think and produce mental constructs, this perception would cease, and another coarse perception would arise. Why don't I not think, why don't I not produce mental constructs.' [So,] he neither thinks nor produces mental constructs. When he does not think or produce mental constructs, that perception of his ceases and another coarse perception does not arise. He touches cessation. In this way, Poṭṭhapāda, there comes about the gradual attainment of the supreme cessation of perception for one who is clearly aware.

- C: "Once he has attained this perception, he thinks: 'Thinking is bad, not thinking is good.' When he thinks this, that subtle perception does not cease, and a coarser perception arises. Again, he thinks: 'Why don't I not produce mental activity and not give rise to thoughts.' [So,] he does not produce mental activity. Once he has stopped giving rise to thoughts, that subtle perception ceases, and a coars[er one] does not arise. At the moment that he does not produce mental activity or give rise to thoughts, that subtle perception ceases, a coarser one does not arise, and he immediately enters the meditative absorption of the cessation of perception and knowing.

## §24

- S: "Before now, Pṛṣṭhapāla, do you recall having heard of such a supreme cessation of perception and feeling?" <sup>[418r1]</sup>
- P: "What do you think about this, Poṭṭhapāda? Have you, before now, ever heard of such a gradual attainment of the supreme cessation of perception for one who is clearly aware?"
- C: "I ask, mendicant, have you, before this time, ever heard of such causes and conditions for the gradual cessation of perception?"

## §25

- S: "Nowhere [before have I heard of it], sir Gautama, only just now. I understand the meaning of sir Gautama's speech to be as sir Gautama said, [that is]: 'If, Pṛṣṭhapāla, a monk is percipient here and impercipient there, he thinks thus: "For me not thinking is good. For me, thinking is bad. If I were to think or produce mental constructs, then this perception would cease, and a grosser perception would appear." [Thus] he does not think nor does he produce mental constructs. Not thinking, and not producing mental constructs, he rightly touches cessation.' Is this how sir Gautama spoke?"
- P: "Indeed I have not, venerable sir. This is how I understand what the Blessed One said: 'When, Poṭṭhapāda, a monk is self-percipient here [in this training],

he proceeds from stage to stage and gradually touches the pinnacle of perceptions. When he stands at the pinnacle of perceptions, it occurs to him: <sup>[185]</sup> ‘For me thinking is bad. [For me] not thinking is good. If I were to think and produce mental constructs, this perception would cease, and another coarse perception would arise. Why don’t I not think, why don’t I not produce mental constructs.’ [So,] he neither thinks nor produces mental constructs. When he does not think or produce mental constructs, that perception of his ceases and another coarse perception does not arise. He touches cessation. In this way, Poṭṭhapāda, there comes about the gradual attainment of the supreme cessation of perception for one who is clearly aware.”

C: The mendicant said to the Buddha: “Before now, I have truly never heard of such causes and conditions for the gradual cessation of perception.”

The mendicant spoke further to the Buddha: “Here is how I understand [it]: One is [first] percipient of this, then not percipient of this. Then again he is percipient [of this]. Being percipient of this, he thinks thus: ‘Thinking is bad, not thinking is good.’ When he thinks this, that subtle perception does not cease, and a coarser perception arises. Again, he thinks: ‘Why don’t I not produce mental activity and not give rise to thoughts.’ <sup>[110c]</sup> [So,] he does not produce mental activity or give rise to thoughts. Once he has stopped producing mental activity and giving rise to thoughts, that subtle perception ceases, and a coarse[r one] does not arise. At the moment that he does not produce mental activity or give rise to thoughts, that subtle perception ceases, a coarser one does not arise, and he immediately enters the meditative absorption of the cessation of perception and knowing.”

## §26

S: “Yes, Pṛṣṭhapāla.”

P: “Yes, Poṭṭhapāda”

C: The Buddha spoke to the mendicant: “Excellent, excellent! This is the gradual cognizant meditative absorption of the cessation of perception<sup>5</sup> in this noble dharma.”

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<sup>5</sup> The gradual cognizant meditative absorption of the cessation of perception (次第想滅想定) || Except for no direct indication of the prefix *abhi-*, this phrase seems to correspond directly with the Pāli compound: *anupubbābhisaññā-nirodha-sampajāna-samāpatti*.

**§27**

S: “Friend Gautama, if I now might question sir Gautama on another particular topic, perhaps he might find an opportunity to expound upon [such a] question.”

“Pṛṣṭhapāla, ask whatever you like.”

P: ---

C: ---

**§28**

S: {See §43–44}

P: ---

C: The mendicant spoke further to the Buddha: “Among these perceptions, which is the unsurpassed perception?”

The Buddha said to the mendicant: “The perception of the sphere of nothingness is unsurpassed.”

**§29**

S: {See §43–44}

P: ---

C: The mendicant spoke further to the Buddha: “With regard to these perceptions, which is the supreme unsurpassed perception?”

The Buddha said: “Some say [it] has perception, and some say [it is] without perception. [I say that] the intermediary between these, which can [bring about] the gradual meditative absorption of the cessation of perception and knowing, is the supreme unsurpassed perception.”

**§30**

S: ---

P: “Venerable sir, does the Blessed One teach the pinnacle of perceptions as just one, or as many?”

“Poṭṭhapāda, I teach the pinnacle perceptions as both one and many.”

“Venerable sir, how is the pinnacle of perceptions both one and many?”

“Poṭṭhapāda, through whatever means one touches cessation, I teach the pinnacle of perceptions in that way.<sup>6</sup> In this way, Poṭṭhapāda, I teach the pinnacle of perceptions as both one and many.”

C: The mendicant questioned the Buddha further: “Is [this] perception single, or manifold?”

The Buddha said: “There is [only] one [such] perception, not many.”<sup>7</sup>

### §31

S: “Friend Gautama, does a man’s perception arise first, and only afterwards knowledge? Or does knowledge arise first and, after that, perception? Or do these two, perception and knowledge, arise simultaneously, two *dhammas* that have arisen neither before nor after [one another]?”

P: “Venerable sir, does perception arise first, and afterwards knowledge, does knowledge arise first and afterwards perception, or do perception and knowledge arise neither before nor after?”

C: The mendicant questioned the Buddha further: “Does perception arise first, and this being the case then knowledge? [Or,] does knowledge arise first, and this being the case then perception? [Or,] do perception and knowledge arise together at the same time?”

### §32

S: “Pṛṣṭhapāla, the perception of a man arises first, and only after that knowledge. Because of the arising of perception, then [one] rightly touches the realization of knowledge. [He understands]: ‘Based on this, perception has arisen.’”

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, perception arises first, and afterwards knowledge, and, due to the arising of perception, there is the arising of knowledge. One understands thus: ‘Based on this, knowledge arose for me.’ In this way, Poṭṭhapāda, it should be understood that perception arises first, and afterwards knowledge, and, due to the arising of perception, there is the arising of knowledge.”

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<sup>6</sup> Compare §29 and §44, taking into account footnote 204 of the edition.

<sup>7</sup> “There is [only] one [such] perception, not many.” || This statement seems to contradict §28–29, which conforms to the position presented here in the Pāli text.

C: The Buddha said: “First perception arises, and, this being the case, then knowledge. Because of perception, there is knowledge.”

### §33

S: “Friend Gautama, is it possible for us to know for ourselves: ‘Based on this, my perception has arisen?’”<sup>8</sup>

“It is not possible, Pṛṣṭhapāla. Why is that? Because you [have], for a long time, [held] a different view, [practiced] a different endurance, a different proclivity, a different intention.”

“Friend Gautama, if it is not possible for me to know for myself: ‘Based on this, my perception has arisen,’ then perhaps I might question sir Gautama on another particular topic, [and] he might find an opportunity to expound upon [such a] question.”

“Pṛṣṭhapāla, ask whatever you like.”

P: {See §45–47}

C: {See §45–47}

### §34

S: “Friend Gautama, is <sub>[418v1]</sub> perception not the very self of a person?”

P: “Is perception the self of a person, venerable sir, or is perception one thing and the self another?”

C: The mendicant questioned further: “Is perception [the same as] this very self?”

### §35

S: “Pṛṣṭhapāla, what do you describe when describing the self of a person?”

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, what is it that you take to be the self?” <sub>[186]</sub>

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<sup>8</sup> “Friend Gautama...‘based on this, perception has arisen?’” || There is no definite indication in the Sanskrit or the Pāli texts that this phrase should be taken as a question. Thus, we might read the text in a different way, such that Pṛṣṭhapāla is making a claim that he and his fellow mendicants are also capable of attaining the type of understanding described by the Buddha. The Chinese translators, however, unequivocally translated this phrase as a question.

C: The Buddha said to the mendicant: “What do you explain as the self of a person?”

### §36

S: “Friend Gautama, when describing the self of a person, I describe the gross material [body] made up of the four great elements.”

P: “Venerable sir, I take the gross material [body], made up of the four great elements and fed by material food, to be the self.”

C: The mendicant said to the Buddha: “I don’t say that this is the self of a person.<sup>9</sup> I say that the body, made up of the four great elements, the six sense-bases (*\*āyatana*), given life by mother and father, nourished by breast milk, clothed in ornaments, impermanent and subject to turn to dust, is the self of a person.”

### §37

S: “Pṛṣṭhapāla, if the self of a person were the gross material [body] made up of the four great elements, it would remain the case that his perception [would] arise [while] the self was just as it were. [Thus,] his perception would arise as something different and cease as something different [from the self].”

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, for you the self is the gross material [body], made up of the four great elements and fed by material food. This being so, perceptions will be one thing and the self another. In this way it should be understood that perception is one thing and the self another.

“Let it stand, Poṭṭhapāda, that this gross material [body], made up of the four great elements and fed by material food, is the self. Then, the perceptions of this person [would] arise as something different and cease as something different [from the self]. In this way also it should be understood that perception is one thing and the self another.”

C: The Buddha said to the mendicant: “You say that the body, made up of the four great elements and the six sense-bases, given life by mother and father, nourished by breast milk, clothed in ornaments, impermanent and subject to

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<sup>9</sup> “I don’t say that this is the self of a person.” (我不說人是我) || The presence of this phrase here is somewhat peculiar, as there is no direct referent for the pronoun *shi* 是. The phrase was probably inserted later, under the influence of its repeated occurrence in the sequences that follow, and owing to a streamlining tendency of the Chinese translator.

pass away, is the self of a person. Mendicant, if this were the self, still a person's perceptions [would] arise and cease."

### §38

S: ---

P: ---

C: The mendicant said: "I don't say that this is the self of a person. I say that the [body] of the heavenly realm of desire is the self."

The Buddha said: "If the [body of the] heavenly realm of desire were the self, still a person's perceptions [would] arise and cease."

### §39

S: "Friend Gautama, when describing the self of a person, I describe the mind-made material [body]."

P: "Venerable sir, I take the mind-made [body], with all its limbs great and small, not lacking any faculty, to be the self."

C: The mendicant said: "I don't say that this is the self of a person. I myself say that the [body of the] heavenly realm of [subtle] materiality is the self."

### §40

S: "Pṛṣṭhapāla, if the self of a person were the mind-made material [body], it would remain the case that his perception [would] arise [while] the self was just as it were. [Thus,] his perception would arise as something different and cease as something different [from the self]."

P: "Poṭṭhapāda, for you the self is the mind-made [body], with all its limbs great and small, not lacking any faculty. This being so, perceptions will be one thing and the self another. In this way it should be understood that perception is one thing and the self another.

"Let it stand, Poṭṭhapāda, that this mind-made [body], with all its limbs great and small, not lacking any faculty, is the self. Then, the perceptions of this person [would] arise as something different and cease as something different [from the self]. In this way also it should be understood that perception is one thing and the self another." <sup>[187]</sup>

C: The Buddha said: “If the [body of the] heavenly realm of [subtle] materiality were the self, still a person’s perceptions [would] arise and cease.”

### §41

S: “Friend Gautama, when describing the self of a person, I describe the immaterial [body] consisting of perception.”

P: “Venerable sir, I take the immaterial [body], consisting of perception, to be the self.”

C: The mendicant said: “I don’t say that this is the self of a person. I myself say that the non-material heavenly realm is the self. [That is:] the sphere of [infinite] space, the sphere of [infinite] consciousness, the sphere of nothingness, and the sphere that is with and without perception.”

### §42

S: “Pṛṣṭhapāla, if the self of a person were the immaterial [body] consisting of perception, it would remain the case that his perception [would] arise [while] the self was just as it were. [Thus,] his perception would arise as something different and cease as something different [from the self].”

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, for you the self is the the immaterial [body], consisting of perception. This being so, perceptions will be one thing and the self another. In this way it should be understood that perception is one thing and the self another.

“Let it stand, Poṭṭhapāda, that this immaterial [body], consisting of perception, is the self. Then, the perceptions of this person [would] arise as something different and cease as something different [from the self]. In this way also it should be understood that perception is one thing and the self another.”

C: The Buddha said: “If the non-material heavenly realm—[that is,] the sphere of [infinite] space, the sphere of [infinite] consciousness, the sphere of nothingness, and the sphere that is with and without perception—were the self, still a person’s perceptions [would] arise and cease.”

### §43

S: “What then does sir Gautama explain when explaining the pinnacle of these perceptions?”



P: ---

C: {See §28–29}

## §44

S: “Here, Pṛṣṭhapāla, secluded from sensual pleasures ... up until...he enters the first meditative absorption and abides [in it]. *Some* explain this here to be the pinnacle of perceptions. Further, Pṛṣṭhapāla, due to the subsiding of applied and sustained thought, one ... up until...enters the second meditative absorption and abides [in it]. *Some* explain this here to be the pinnacle of perceptions. In the same way one enters and abides in the third and fourth meditative absorptions, the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, and the sphere of nothingness. *Some* explain these here to be the pinnacle of perceptions. However, Pṛṣṭhapāla, [one] rightly touches cessation, *which comes about immediately [after] these perceptions.* This here is what *I explain* when explaining the pinnacle of perceptions.”<sup>10</sup>

P: ---

C: {See §28–29}

## §45

S: {See §33}

P: “Is it possible, venerable sir, for me to know [whether]: ‘Perception is the self of a person,’ or ‘Perception is one thing and the self another?’”

C: The mendicant said to the Buddha: “Gautama, would it be possible for me to attain understanding [of how] a person’s perceptions arise, and how they cease?”

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<sup>10</sup> “However... This here is what *I explain* to be the pinnacle of perceptions.” || Here my translation is interpretive, and relies on my emendation of the Sanskrit text to read *āsāṃ tu, Pṛṣṭhapāla, saṃjñānām anantarapatitaṃ...*, when the Ms actually reads *yāsāṃ tu, Pṛṣṭhapāla, saṃjñānām...* Reading with the Ms, one might alternately translate: “However, those perceptions, immediately after which [one] rightly touches cessation, are what I explain when explaining the pinnacle of perceptions.”

**§46**

S: {See §33}

P: “It is very difficult, Poṭṭhapāda, for you, who is of a different view, a different endurance, a different proclivity, a different engagement, and a different practice, [to know whether]: ‘Perception is the self of a person,’ or ‘Perception is one thing and the self another.’”

C: The Buddha said to the mendicant: “You want to understand [how] a person’s perceptions arise, and how they cease. [This] is very difficult, very difficult. Why is that? Because you are of a different view, a different practice, [111a] a different endurance, a different experience, [and you] depend on a different *dharma*.”

**§47**

S: {See §33}

P: “If, venerable sir, it is very difficult, for me, who is of a different view, a different endurance, a different proclivity, a different engagement, and a different practice, [to know whether]: ‘Perception is the self of a person,’ or ‘Perception is one thing and the self another,’ then [I would ask]: Is the world eternal, venerable sir, and this alone being the truth, all else is false?”

C: The mendicant said to the Buddha: “[If] it is so, Gautama, that because I am of a different view, a different practice, a different endurance, a different experience, [and] depend on a different *dharma*, it is very difficult, very difficult [for me] to understand [how] a person’s perceptions arise, and how they cease, [then I would ask:] With respect to the self, is the world eternal, [and], this being true, all else is false?”

**§48**

S: {Compare A 419r3, endnote xx of the edition, and Melzer 2010, §36.49.}

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, I do not teach that ‘the world is eternal and, this alone being the truth, all else is false.’”

C: ---

**§49**

S: {Compare A 419r3 and Melzer 2010, §36.49}

P: “Is the world impermanent, venerable sir, and this alone being the truth, all else is false?”

C: “With respect to the self,<sup>11</sup> is the world impermanent, [and], this being true, all else is false?”

## §50

S: ---

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, I do not teach that ‘the world is impermanent and, this alone being the truth, all else is false.’”<sup>[188]</sup>

C: ---

## §51

S: ---

P: ---

C: “With respect to the self, is the world eternal and impermanent, [and], this being true, all else is false? With respect to the self, is the world neither eternal nor impermanent, [and], this being true, all else is false?”

## §52

S: {Compare A 419r3–5 and Melzer 2010, §36.49.}

P: “Is the world bounded, venerable sir...is it unbounded?”

“Is the spirit the same as the body? ... Is the spirit one thing and the body another? ...

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<sup>11</sup> “With respect to the self...” || Here, and in the following series of questions, each sentence is prefaced by the Chinese term *wo* 我, I or the self. This is somewhat strange and makes the rendering of the sentence awkward and ambiguous. I have taken this character as a topic marker, indicating that the propositions presented here are constructed in relation to conceptions of a self. For instance, if the world is eternal, or permanent, this notion can likewise be applied to the self. The point that seems to be made here by the translator is that essentialist propositions, which are not taught (*avyākṛta*) by the Buddha, are basically propositions about the self, and conceptions of the self in relation to the world.

“Does the *Tathāgata* exist after death? ... Does the *Tathāgata* not exist after death? ... Does the *Tathāgata* both exist and not exist after death? ... Does he neither not exist nor exist after death, and, this alone being the truth, all else is false?”

- C: “With respect to the self, is the world bounded, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “With respect to the self, is the world unbounded, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “With respect to the self, is the world bounded and unbounded, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “With respect to the self, is the world neither bounded nor unbounded, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Is the spirit the same as the body, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Is the spirit different than the body, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Are the body and the spirit neither different nor the same, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Is there no spirit and no body, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Does the *Tathāgata* die, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Does the *Tathāgata* not die, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Does the *Tathāgata* both die and live on, [and], this being true, all else is false?  
 “Does the *Tathāgata* neither die nor live on, [and], this being true, all else is false?”

### §53

S: ---

- P: “This also, Poṭṭhapāda, I do not teach: ‘The *Tathāgata* neither exists nor does not exist after death, and, this alone being the truth, all else is false.’”  
 C: The Buddha said to the mendicant: [About these statements:] ‘The world is eternal... The *Tathāgata* neither dies nor lives on,’ I do not teach.”

### §54

S: ---

- P: “For what reason, venerable sir, does the Blessed One not teach this?”  
 C: The mendicant said to the Buddha: “Gautama, Why don’t you teach, with respect to the self, [whether] the world is eternal... [or whether] the *Tathāgata* neither dies nor lives on. Why don’t [you] teach [this] in its entirety?”

## §55

S: {Compare A 420r3–4 and Melzer 2010, §36.62.}

P: “Because, Poṭṭhapāda, this is not conducive to benefit, not conducive to *dharma*, does not pertain to the primordial holy life, and does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calming, to super-knowledge, to awakening, to *nibbāna*, therefore I do not teach it.”

C: The Buddha said: “These are not conducive to benefit. [They are] not conducive to *dharma*. [They] do not pertain to the holy life, to dispassion, to inactivity, to cessation, to stopping, to awakening, to asceticism, to *nirvāṇa*. Therefore, [I] do not teach [about them].”

## §56

S: ---

P: “What, venerable sir, does the Blessed One teach?”

C: The mendicant asked further: “What is conducive to benefit? [What is] conducive to *dharma*? What pertains to the primordial holy life, to inactivity, to dispassion, to cessation, to stopping, to awakening, to asceticism, to *nirvāṇa*? What is it that you teach?”

## §57

S: {Compare A 420r4–6 and Melzer 2010, §36.63.}

P: “Poṭṭhapāda, I teach: ‘This is suffering,’ ‘This is the arising of suffering,’ ‘This is the cessation of suffering,’ This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering.’ This is what I teach.”

C: The Buddha said to the mendicant: “I teach the truth of suffering, the arising of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the truth of the way out of suffering.

## §58

S: {Compare A 420r6–7 and Melzer 2010, §36.64.}

P: “Why, venerable sir, does the Blessed One teach this?”

C: “Why is that?”

**§59**

S: {Compare A 420r7–8 and Melzer 2010, §36.64.}

P: “Because, Poṭṭhapāda, this is conducive to benefit, conducive to *dharma*, it pertains to the primordial holy life, and leads to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calming, to super-knowledge, to awakening, to *nibbāna*, therefore I teach it.”

C: “These are conducive to benefit, conducive to *dharma*. [They] pertain to the primordial holy life, to dispassion, to inactivity, to cessation, to stopping, to awakening, to asceticism, to *nirvāṇa*. Therefore, [I] teach [them].”

**§60**

S: Then the wanderer Prṣṭhapāla <sup>[419r1]</sup> delighted completely in everything the Blessed One [had] said, [saying]: “Good is the speech of sir Gautama, Good is the speech of the venerable sir!”

P: “So it is, Blessed One, so it is, Sublime One. Now it is the time for the Blessed One to do as he thinks fit.”

C: ---

**§61**

S: Then, after teaching, bestowing, arousing, and delighting the wanderer Prṣṭhapāla with a Dharma discourse, the Blessed One got up from his seat and departed.

P: Then the Blessed One got up from his seat and departed.

C: Then, the World-honored One spoke the *Dharma* for the sake of the mendicant. After instructing, teaching, benefitting, and delighting [him], he got up from his seat and departed.