A few translation contexts for anattā as not self

Can someone parse this for me? I am not following I have something like, "just as mentality/materiality is the basis for consciousness, so “Self” is the basis for self-consciousness [“Self” is kind of “inner” mentality/materiality]. Thus the basis ‘mentality/materiality’ is external to the basis ‘self’ whereas ‘consciousness of’ is external to self-consciousness. Consciousness of is therefore not directly external to Self.

I thought putting in english words for the Pali ones might help but I am still completely lost.

If the whole point of the Buddhas teaching is that atta is not known or percieved in any phenomena then how could it be the basis for anything, or internal to any external, if the argument is that false-self is the basis of false-selfconsciousness then in what sense is real-consiousness “not directly external” to it?

There is definitly a point in European philosophy where I hit a wall, where between the last book and this one there is some shift in the way words and phrases are used that seems to become quite willfully incoherant, I think it’s somwhere around Hegel, at least with Kant you get a sense that if you just thought about it harder and read more it might come into view, with Hegel you get this feeling like maybe he has actually untethered slightly, but you still see a “gist” and get a “vibe”, it might not all make complete logical sense, but, you get the idea…

WIth Hiedegger tho… there really seems to emerge this tradition of willful obscurity that is just never broken down, like you have to be initiated into the secret language and accept that it will never make sense in terms of what you understood words to mean before. It’s wierd, because so much of what he says is so resonant and feels so “insightful” but there are so many passages seemingly written under his influence, like the one above, that just seem to not ever resolve into something that I can actually understand.

Sigh.

I am very keen one day to read and engage more with Ven. Nanavira though, I think the anglo/german post hiedeggarian buddhists are quite fascinating and refreshing.

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I should say that I am not necessarily endorsing what Ven. Ñaṇavīra says here, but rather find it an interesting springboard for contemplation of these issues.
A couple of quick thoughts, maybe I can return to it later.

-simply substituting English words for the Pāli might not be a good move, and it seems significant that the Pāli is left untranslated. Why? Possibly because part of the aim is to figure out what these words actually mean, and by plugging in an English word we have preconceived notions about may take us further rather than closer to the Buddha’s meaning.
Of course, we require some idea of what is implied otherwise it would all be meaningless. So we’re trying to hone in.

-the problem of ‘inner and outer’, or ‘me and you’, or ‘what ‘out there’ is really real?’ is one that has vexed philosophically minded people for a long time. Ven. Ñaṇavīra seems to clearly be working with the assumption that the Buddha has made the definitive pronouncement on the matter, if only we could understand it…
I find the statement, “attā’, ‘self’, is sometimes more of a rationalization than ‘I’” right on the money.

-I find his description of viññaṇa vs. nāmarūpa in terms of positive/negative (this ‘negative’ should not be thought of a value judgement but rather like an old fashioned film ‘negative’) fascinating and worthy of further thought.

-There is no mention of any Western philosophers in this quote, so it seems unnecessary to bring them up to trash them.

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Sorry, I don’t mean to trash Heidegger as much as voice my frustrations at my own incapacity to understand him and indicate the general pattern I see from Kant to Hegel to Heidegger where a certain type of obscurity seems to become more evident.

As for leaving words untranslated that’s all well and good when your interlocutor is Ven. Nanamoli, alas, I need a little more scaffolding, especially when the English around the terms is so convoluted and parenthetical (again, no “trashing” intended).

As for the necessity of framing Ven. Nanavira in terms of any particular western philosophy, I agree that the question is somewhat vexxed, I think I agree with you that Ven. Nanavira takes the Buddha to have made the “definitive pronouncement” and so the necessity of invoking Western philosophers aught to be moot, but I think that it is relevant more because so much of the “mainstream” English language exegesis of Buddhism seems to me to take a kind of blurry undergraduate version of “analytic” philosophy as it’s frame for placing the Buddha, that those thinkers who seem to attack the issues from other starting points are interesting.

I think what I am saying is that just because western philosophers are not mentioned very often in these discussions doesn’t mean they aren’t there, and it seems to me restrictive and potentially even misleading to insist that we confine our conversations to only “buddhism” or whatever.

I also find this intriguing!

Metta.

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@josephzizys Joseph wrote:
“Can someone parse this for me?”

Here’s my understanding of this exploration of attā by Ven. Ñaṇavīra.
Quoted parts of the ‘P.S’ followed by my gloss.

"If attā (‘self’ or ‘I’) is as much absent from the positive (nāmarūpa) as from the negative (viññāṇa), is it not then proper to say that viññāṇa is as much bahiddhā as nāmarūpa (considered as loka)?"

Where is it that we can find this so-called ‘attā’? And what would be is its relationship to viññaṇa and nāmarūpa?
If the ‘self’ cannot be found in either nāmarūpa or viññaṇa, can we then say both ‘viññaṇa’ and nāmarūpa are external to attā? (not a part of it). Should they instead be considered part of ‘the world’?

"Not quite; for the reason that just as nāmarūpa is the ārammaṇa of viññāṇa, so attā or ‘self’ is the ārammaṇa of self-consciousness [attā is a kind of ajjhattika nāmarūpa]."

Although this seem a reasonably logical conclusion, it is not correct. ‘Viññaṇa’ takes nāmarūpa as its object, its sphere of awareness, and an ‘attā consciousness’ must take the ‘attā’/ self as its object. Since ‘attā’ seems to be ‘known’, there must be a ‘knower’ of it, which we can call ‘self-consciousness’. A parallel can be drawn between viññaṇa (internal)–nāmarūpa (external) and ‘self-consciousness’ -attā. Both self-consciousness and attā seem internal their relationship to the ‘world’.

"Thus the ārammaṇa 'nāmarūpa or loka’ is bahiddhā to the ārammaṇa 'attā or self’, whereas viññaṇa [i.e. the consciousness (of) nāmarūpa] is bahiddhā to self-consciousness. Viññaṇa is not therefore directly bahiddhā to attā."

The object called nāmarūpa or ‘world’ is external to the object of ‘self-consciousness’ we call ‘attā’.
‘Viññaṇa’ (the knower of nāmarūpa) is outside of ‘self-consciousness’. What, therefore is the relationship between viññaṇa and ‘attā.’?
This ‘knower of attā’, self-consciousness, is just as imaginary as attā.

So we can see from this discussion that if an ‘attā’ is posited, a knower of that attā, ‘self-consciousness’ must be as well. Because it would not be viññaṇa that knows attā.

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Thank you! I still find the theorising of structure strange, if as you say, Ven. Ñaṇavīra Took the Buddha Dhamma as definitive then how is all this talk of self and self consciousness to be understood? Is it simply a sort of “if it where it would have to be like this” or is there more going on?

Also, did Ven Nanamoli ever write back? I would be fascinated to hear of the response.

I think most people have a reflexive notion of a permanent ‘self’ being real. In fact, it is said that only those who attain stream-entry are able to see through it. So I would imagine this exchange would be related to shedding the reflexive notion and coming to see the Buddha’s position ‘personally’. That is to say, using deductive reasoning to move from ‘faith’ to ‘directly knowing’.
Of course, neither ‘faith’ or this type of deductive reasoning is a substitute for personally knowing for one’s self.

It seems the correspondence mostly exists today in this one-way fashion. I don’t know what happened to the other letters.

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I have often thought that there has been a shift in the “heft” of terms like ‘stream winner’ - reading a piece by Batchelor apparently there was some “controversy” about Ven. Ñaṇavīra attaining stream entry, when I read the EBT’s I get the impression that stream entry is not only very common, it is also not a particularly “refined meditative attainment” rather it amounts to little more than having gained confidence in the truth of the teachings (rather than taking them on faith) and living ethically; as here:

“Reverend, how many things do people have to possess in order for the Buddha to declare that they’re a stream-enterer, not liable to be reborn in the underworld, bound for awakening?”
“katinaṁ nu kho, āvuso sāriputta, dhammānaṁ samannāgamanahetu evamayaṁ pajā bhagavatā byākatā sotāpannā avinipātadhammā niyatā sambodhiparāyaṇā”ti?
“Reverend, people have to possess four things in order for the Buddha to declare that they’re a stream-enterer, not liable to be reborn in the underworld, bound for awakening.
“Catunnaṁ kho, āvuso, dhammānaṁ samannāgamanahetu evamayaṁ pajā bhagavatā byākatā sotāpannā avinipātadhammā niyatā sambodhiparāyaṇā.

What four?
Katamesaṁ catunnaṁ?
It’s when a noble disciple has experiential confidence in the Buddha …
Idhāvuso, ariyasāvako buddhe aveccappasādena samannāgato hoti—
itipi so bhagavā …pe… satthā devamanussānaṁ buddho bhagavāti.
the teaching …
Dhamme …pe…
the Saṅgha …
saṅghe …pe…
And they have the ethical conduct loved by the noble ones … leading to immersion.
ariyakantehi sīlehi samannāgato hoti akhaṇḍehi …pe… samā­dhi­­saṁvattanike­hi­.
People have to possess these four things in order for the Buddha to declare that they’re a stream-enterer, not liable to be reborn in the underworld, bound for awakening.”
Imesaṁ kho, āvuso, catunnaṁ dhammānaṁ samannāgamanahetu evamayaṁ pajā bhagavatā byākatā sotāpannā avinipātadhammā niyatā sambodhiparāyaṇā”ti.

I also think that the meaning of sakkāyadiṭṭhi is probably more like “this body view” as in it is something more like the view that I am my body right here and now, rather than “self view” the eradication of which is in many places equated with enlightenment as here:

And how is a mendicant a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached?
Kathañca, bhikkhave, bhikkhu ariyo pannaddhajo pannabhāro visaṁyutto hoti?
It’s when a mendicant has given up the conceit ‘I am’, cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, obliterated it, so it’s unable to arise in the future.
Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno asmimāno pahīno hoti, ucchinnamūlo tālāvatthukato anabhāvaṅkato, āyatiṁ anuppādadhammo.
That’s how a mendicant is a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached.
Evaṁ kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu ariyo pannaddhajo pannabhāro visaṁyutto hoti.

When a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, the gods together with Indra, Brahmā, and Pajāpati, search as they may, will not find
Evaṁ vimuttacittaṁ kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuṁ saindā devā sabrahmakā sapajāpatikā anvesaṁ nādhigacchanti:
anything that such a Realized One’s consciousness depends on.
‘idaṁ nissitaṁ tathāgatassa viññāṇan’ti.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
Because even in the present life the Realized One is undiscoverable, I say.
Diṭṭhevāhaṁ, bhikkhave, dhamme tathāgataṁ ananuvijjoti vadāmi.

this explains why a non-returner can have overcome sakkāyadiṭṭhi but still think “I am”:

Although a noble disciple has given up the five lower fetters, they still have a lingering residue of the conceit ‘I am’, the desire ‘I am’, and the underlying tendency ‘I am’ which has not been eradicated.
Kiñcāpi, āvuso, ariyasāvakassa pañcorambhāgiyāni saṁyojanāni pahīnāni bhavanti, atha khvassa hoti: ‘yo ca pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato asmīti māno, asmīti chando, asmīti anusayo asamūhato.

at SN22.89.

So in conclusion, although I have no direct support in the EBT’s for my view, I think sakkāyadiṭṭhi is something more like “you only live once” style hedonism whereas the giving up of the more subtle conceit, that there is ‘something’ that experiences this body and past and future bodies and whatever that ‘something’ is is what ‘you’ are is a much higher attainment.

Metta.

It would be instructive if you could provide some evidence for this rather dramatic claim.
Do you consider yourself, and many people you know, to be stream-enterers?

Since the attainment of stream-entry, the cutting off of the first three fetters, not only prevents rebirth in lower realms but also assures complete liberation in a comparatively short amount of time, you must think arahants are very common as well?

““So too, bhikkhus, for a noble disciple, a person accomplished in view who has made the breakthrough, the suffering that has been destroyed and eliminated is more, while that which remains is trifling. Compared to the former mass of suffering that has been destroyed and eliminated, the latter is not calculable, does not bear comparison, does not amount even to a fraction, as there is a maximum of seven more lives.”
SN 56.60: The Mountain

Would you say that those who believe in an eternal transcendent soul cannot possess the fetter of sakkāyadiṭṭhi?

I feel that even if the first three conditions might be considered as relatively easier to possess, the fourth one is not meant in some casual “be good” kind of way. “Having ethical conduct loved by noble ones”, is quite possibly a stricter requirement. Otherwise, all well-behaved people would be full of deep immersion! “Possessing” is likely referring to experiential, internalized, and unbroken mode of behavior that has become a natural state for oneself such that immersion is a natural byproduct of such a way of being. I think that is what makes stream-entry difficult.
:pray:

You mean apart from the three linked and formatted quotes directly from the EBT’s I gave in the post?

as for me, I have had the experience of directly seeing how following the teaching has improved my life and reduced my suffering, so I think I do have experiential confidence in the Dhamma, but my conduct is still pretty prone to setbacks :slight_smile: so I would not make any particular claims to spiritual attainment on my own part. As for others, I certainly don’t have clairvoyance or anything of that sort, so people I suppose have to look within and see for themselves where they are at.

I guess it’s the “dramatic claim” part that I find quite strange, as in I see no support for the idea that stream entry is some super rare “high spiritual attainment” in the EBT’s, in fact a lot of the things I have trouble with in contemporary Buddhism have this flavour, where words and phrases that appear in the EBT’s to mean simple, straightforward things are now seemingly spoken of like they mean big, important things that are beyond the pale of human understanding. Buddhism in the EBT’s to me seems quite “down to earth”, especially in the Atthakavagga, Parayanavagga and the Sīlakkhandhavagga. Whereas these days a lot of Buddhism has taken on a quite mystical flavour, as if there is some deep secret behind every term, and so even if the teaching makes sense to you and you implement it in your life you shouldn’t take any confidence from this fact… it seems to me that this is ultimately detrimental to the practice, contributing to vicikicchā.

Metta

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um, no, I guess I take it that there must be some difference tho between the first of ten fetters and the achievement of complete enlightenment.

I don’t think that this is implied, as the beings that are to be liberated my be reborn elsewhere, so there is no logical requirement that we observe the same number of stream enterers as arahants.

Well, I think Australia must truly be a wonderful place!

That being said, it seems like this discussion has moved well off the topic of ‘anattā’ and its translation.

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finally I am not sure your quote refers to stream-entry at all:

“In the same way, for a person with comprehension, a noble disciple accomplished in view, the suffering that’s over and done with is more, what’s left is tiny.
“Evameva kho, bhikkhave, ariyasāvakassa diṭṭhisampannassa puggalassa abhisametāvino etadeva bahutaraṁ dukkhaṁ yadidaṁ parikkhīṇaṁ pariyādinnaṁ; appamattakaṁ avasiṭṭhaṁ.
Compared to the mass of suffering in the past that’s over and done with, it doesn’t count, there’s no comparison, it’s not worth a fraction, since there are at most seven more lives.
Saṅkhampi na upeti, upanidhampi na upeti, kalabhāgampi na upeti, purimaṁ dukkhakkhandhaṁ parikkhīṇaṁ pariyādinnaṁ upanidhāya yadidaṁ satta­k­kha­t­tu­parama­tā­;
Such a person truly understands about suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path.
yo ‘idaṁ dukkhan’ti yathābhūtaṁ pajānāti …pe… ‘ayaṁ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti yathābhūtaṁ pajānāti.

That’s why you should practice meditation …”
Tasmātiha, bhikkhave, ‘idaṁ dukkhan’ti yogo karaṇīyo …pe… ‘ayaṁ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti yogo karaṇīyo”ti.

ariyasāvakassa diṭṭhisampannassa puggalassa abhisametāvino is attested ONLY in the SN fingernail suttas at SN13 and SN56 and never occurs in sotāpannasamyutta

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Yes, your probably right, but I think that again, we shouldn’t be too quick to enforce limitations on discussion when it is occuring in good faith, we seem to hold ourselves to such high standards that we cannot digress from very narrow parameters without worrying that we are “derailing” things.

the way that people are described as understanding anatta in the EBT’s themselves is relevant to how we can take ourselves to be understanding or misunderstanding the term, so while it’s not exactly “on topic” I think that stream entry is not exactly “off topic” either, anyway, I am happy to move on in any case, but by all means PM me if you want to continue our conversation in private, I am enjoying having some robust discussion!

Metta.