He did. Read the sutta more closely. There’s a whole section with the header “Going for refuge.”
This explains why Payasi had to admit:
“I was delighted and satisfied with your very first simile, Mister Kassapa! Nevertheless, I wanted to hear your various solutions to the problem, so I thought I’d oppose you in this way.
This was thanks to the very first simile, that I already posted:
What do you think, chieftain? Are the moon and sun in this world or the other world? Are they gods or humans?”
“They are in the other world, Mister Kassapa, and they are gods, not humans.”
“By this method it ought to be proven that there is an afterlife, there are beings reborn spontaneously, and there is a fruit or result of good and bad deeds.”
“Even though Mister Kassapa says this, still I think that there is no afterlife, no beings are reborn spontaneously, and there’s no fruit or result of good and bad deeds.”
Great! 
So Payasi didn’t actually contradict himself and he was proven there is an afterlife because he believed in gods - “I wanted to hear your various solutions to the problem, so I thought I’d oppose you in this way.
- Going for Refuge
“I was delighted and satisfied with your very first simile, Mister Kassapa! Nevertheless, I wanted to hear your various solutions to the problem, so I thought I’d oppose you in this way. Excellent, Mister Kassapa! Excellent! As if he were righting the overturned, or revealing the hidden, or pointing out the path to the lost, or lighting a lamp in the dark so people with clear eyes can see what’s there, Mister Kassapa has made the teaching clear in many ways. I go for refuge to Mister Gotama, to the teaching, and to the mendicant Saṅgha. From this day forth, may Mister Kassapa remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge for life.
Mister Kassapa, I wish to perform a great sacrifice. Please instruct me so it will be for my lasting welfare and happiness.”
I missed this part prior to the end of the sutta because this is not something I’ve struggled with to understand, and neither did Payasi who was delighted and satisfied with the very first simile. 
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Dear Ven @Vaddha,
Thanks for explaining your views with clear passion. I like it.
But I think you misunderstood me a number of times, or paraphrased an argument that I didn’t introduce or really hold. Just a hunch, don’t get this the wrong way. But it feels like you’re projecting some preconceived views here, perhaps from discussions you’ve had with others. Also, you’re taking some of my arguments about how language is used in the Pāli canon for philosophical views. That we can definitely blame on me not taking enough time to phrase it better.
Considering how much we usually agree, there seems too much disagreement here. I think there must be some assumption behind the discussion that we haven’t addressed.
So maybe we should backpedal a bit. How would you reply to a modern physicalist/materialist who says the body is made of mathematical quantum strings (or whatever the latest theory is), that the mind is a mere illusion, and so forth? They hold no theory of any inherent existence at all. Are they still annihilationists? If so, why?
As to Nagarjuna, you say you’re basing yourself on your interpretation. That’s fine of course. But maybe that’s part of why we’re talking past one another, then. Because it seems by ‘inherent existence’ you’re not using it exactly like I understand Nāgarjuna. You’re using it more like, a sense of inherent existence. Annihilationists have a SENSE of inherent existence. They don’t have a philosophy of inherent existence (as that would make them eternalists). Am I right?
To say annihilationists have a sense of inherent existence, I’d be on board with that. (Although I would still say that is not the language of the early texts.) But what is that sense of inherent existence? That’s exactly a sense of self I’ve been saying is intrinsic to annihilationism. Psychologically, you can’t be an annihilationist and really believe that it’s only the aggregates that get destroyed. A sense of self always gets involved. Which may be be worded in the discourses as taking yourself to be an exiting being or a tathagata, or a “they” that doesn’t get reborn, all the same idea. But it’s never worded with “inherent existence” or alike.
That’s basically all I was saying on this point of annihilationism. If a sense of self you would also inherently link to your ‘inherent existence’ of annihilationism, then that probably explains about 90% of our apparent disagreement. Then it’s basically only the language in the canon, of ‘exists’ and ‘not exists’ and ‘real’ and so forth that we disagree on, and perhaps a few minutia. And our interpretation of Nagarjuna, but I have no strong views on that either way.
But on the latter. I don’t know about Katsura, but Siderits knows his stuff for sure. His explanations of anatta in the Pali canon are some of the best I’ve seen (from the philosophical side of things; he doesn’t talk about practice afaik). Either way, their comments are based on classical commentaries to the MMK, so I’m assuming that is where this comes from. So are Garfield’s based on Chandrakirti, who explains on his translation of the MMK:
In the Discourse to Katyayana, the Buddha argues that to assert that things exist inherently is to fall into the extreme of reification, to argue that things do not exist at all is to fall into the extreme of nihilism, and to follow the middle way is neither to assert in an unqualified way that things exist nor in an unqualified way that things do not exist. […]
To say of something that it existed in this strong sense—with an essence—in the past, but does not do so now, is absurd. For if for something to exist is for it to do so inherently, and if it is not now existent, it could never have been. So since everything we observe is impermanent, if the only existence that there could be were inherent existence, nothing could exist at all. That would be nihilism.
The understanding here is that Nagarjuna is using uccheda in a different way than the Pali canon. Many translators translate it as nihilism instead of annihilationism.
Whether this was Nagarjuna’s intended message or not, I’m not arguing for or against. But I would say this makes sense. I would agree with this, philosophically at least. But note that annihilationists don’t hold that nothing exists at all. So this then is not about annihilationism. Nor is this what natthitā is about in the Pali canon.
And if this interpretation by Garfield is right, I would again say you are saying something different from Nagarjuna. Not to prove you wrong, but to indicate where our misunderstandings may come from. Because you’ll see that here ‘inherent existence’ is not used as a feeling, but as a philosophical position. So then you’ll see why I said inherent existence is incompatible with annihilationism. That’s what Garfield is saying Nagarjuna was telling us as well.
I may certainly be confused about Nagarjuna myself, because now I’m no longer sure what I was referring to with “For elsewhere Nāgārjuna certainly does explain annihilationism more conventionally”… I think I was having two interpretations in mind at once. (as the noob I said I was on this topic)
I know I didn’t reply to specifics, sorry about that. But just to clarify one thing:
You’ll have to allow me to use the language that I think is present in the Pali canon. When I say “notion of existence” I don’t mean inherent existence. Just to be clear.
Then also, I said “the notion of existence per se”, the latter which you left out of the quote. So to explain my point: To say that aggregates exist (in a non-inherent way!) is not problematic. Clearly it isn’t, because the Buddha did so. So holding that something exists by itself doesn’t make one an annihillationist. It’s assuming there exists some self (or sense of inherent existence, if you will) that comes to an end that makes one an annihilationist. So annihilationism is about the existence of a self, not about existence per se. Otherwise, what distinguishes the Buddha, who does say “rupa, etc, exist”, from an annihilationist?
Finally, you also wrote about how people will interpret certain statements, that not all Buddhists take the aggregates as processes, so it’s important to talk about this concept of inherent existence. I can get that. But here is part of my motivation: If we don’t clearly link annihilationism to a self (as I think the suttas are doing), then the difference between cessation and annihilationism soon gets vague.
If you don’t feel like responding at length or at all, I’d get that. But perhaps just my earlier question on the modern-day materialists.
Thanks for the discussion, Venerable. (Can I send you a draft of a next essay before I post it here? No idea when it will be ready, and no rush to reply or reply at all.)
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@Green in the context of death/rebirth/Samsara the annihilationists do not say like eternalists that it is the same self through all the various lives.
Instead they say there is one self that dies, and another that is reborn:
“Suppose that the person who does the deed experiences the result. Then for one who has existed since the beginning, suffering is made by oneself. This statement leans toward eternalism.
Suppose that one person does the deed and another experiences the result. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. This statement leans toward annihilationism.
Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way: ‘Ignorance is a condition for choices.
Eternalism = same self through all lives
Annihilationism = not the same, but another
Middle way = Neither the same nor another
The livespan in higher world is extremely long so once a annihilationist has found ”the right place” depending on their insights they might stay there until death but not know they are still mortal - that is why there as so many different types.
This is the annihilationist formula that The Buddha praised:
This is the best of the convictions of outsiders, that is: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ When someone has such a view, you can expect that they will be repulsed by continued existence, and they will not be repulsed by the cessation of continued existence. Some sentient beings have such a view. But even the sentient beings who have views like this decay and perish.
Now since they never actually get ’totally annihilated” and there are those that are annihilationists who know of for example heaven;
They would have no problem at all with dying here on earth and would not even see it as ”I am dying - I will die” since they do not see it as the same dying and the same being reborn, but instead one dying and another being reborn.
Or just transcending and moving on from the current existence to a higher existence.
- This is the best of the convictions of outsiders, that is: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ When someone has such a view, you can expect that they will be repulsed by continued existence, and they will not be repulsed by the cessation of continued existence.
The very same formula The Buddha praises as the best of the convictions of outsiders is the same one is told to give up in SN 28.11:
Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. Nor do they have such a view: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ Still, they have such a view: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ But that annihilationist view is just a conditioned phenomenon. And what’s the source of that conditioned phenomenon? … That’s how you should know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life.
So despite being the best conviction of outsiders it is just an hindrance on the buddhist path. 
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- “This is how he attends unwisely: ‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I become in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where will it go?’ - MN 2
“If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are eternalists.
- When he attends unwisely in this way, the view ‘self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established - MN 2
And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists.
- When he attends unwisely in this way, the view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established - MN 2
“If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ would this have been consistent on my part with the arising of the knowledge that ‘all phenomena are nonself’?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’
I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now.’” =
Attakārīsutta The Self-Doer AN 6.38
- ”All phenomena are nonself”:
This also applies to unconditioned phenomena:
What two things should be directly known?
Two elements:
the conditioned element and the unconditioned element. - DN 34
“But sir, could there be another way in which a mendicant is qualified to be called ‘skilled in the elements’?” *
“There could, Ānanda.
There are these two elements:
the conditioned element and the unconditioned element.
When a mendicant knows and sees these two elements,
they’re qualified to be called ‘skilled in the elements’.” (MN 115)
Venerable Sāriputta has long ago totally eradicated I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit. That’s why it didn’t occur to you: ‘I am entering the cessation of perception and feeling’ or ‘I have entered the cessation of perception and feeling’ or ‘I am emerging from the cessation of perception and feeling’.” - SN 28.9
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This is interesting. I wonder how would it map to the 4-fold framework I posted here? Truly Exist, dependently exist, dependently ceased, truly not existing
Let’s try with eternalism first, an eternalist would see no. 2, conditioned phenomena which are impermanent, as 1, as permanent, some essence, a self. To dispel that notion, just ask them to see cessation of all phenomena.
To dispel the notion of all doesn’t exist, just ask them to see arising of phenomena from 3 (dependently cease) to 2. Then they wouldn’t say all doesn’t exist. I am a bit in doubt about how to map all doesn’t exist here. Do they see 2 as 4 (totally not existing)? Or 3 as 4? But 3 is unobservable as well as 4. Do they deny that 2 exists at all, despite the senses tells them that there’s experience? Maybe like the movie the matrix. It’s all just brain signals and thus we cannot be sure that the world exist, and even the signals itself can just be abstract thing, simulated on something but not even a brain. I dunno.
But does all doesn’t exist is the same as annihilationism?
The self I previously had no longer exist now… Hmmm… so a person doesn’t start in life believing in annihilationism, but gets brainwashed into it. The self…might be referring to the 5 aggregates, and doesn’t exist means denying the 5 aggregates even exist as 2 (dependently existing). So everything is fake, unreal. Does sounds similar to all doesn’t exist. The next life, or even moment is another person, so go hedonistic, for it’s another person who bears the results of the action. Completely no sense of self, including conventional self, no basis for morality then. This doesn’t gel much with the 7 annihilationist view in DN1, as there it is the sense of self identified with the 7 body-mind which dies at death that the self is annihilated.
It’s hard to get a consistent picture of annihilationism from all these suttas. Maybe there are different types of them.
As for Buddhism, we acknowledge the conventional self of the 5 aggregates, but say that ultimate self doesn’t exist in all 4 levels of truly existing (1), existing dependently (2), not existing dependently (3), not existing truly (4). In short, self doesn’t exist (4), but 5 aggregates exists (2).
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Hello venerable, 
I agree, I will try to make a deep dive into all these various views (not only annihilationists) found in DN 1 together with the descriptions from MN 2
Just look at this very first rough draft, how should one even label these various self-views properly?
The view ‘self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established;
- This is eternalism
The view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established;
- This applies to annihilationists (regarding their current and past existences but not the future).
The view ‘I perceive self with self’ arises in him as true and established;
-
This applies to the brahma gods
-
But funnily enough also materialist-annihilationists(!) since they never deny a self, but as long as that self that they imagine will be annihilated endures, they percieve this self with self. (So one could put them in the ‘self exists for me’ category too)
‘I perceive not-self with self’ arises in him as true and established;
- partial-eternalists who say death & rebirth is the same self yet know of an afterlife and that the body will have to break up prior to heaven.
‘I perceive self with not-self’ arises in him as true and established:
- Spiritual annihilationists fit into this views since they know of another self beyond the current ”not-self”.
- Partial-eternalists also fit into to this view.
Or else he has some such view as this: ‘It is this self of mine that speaks and feels and experiences here and there the result of good and bad actions; but this self of mine is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and it will endure as long as eternity.’ -
- Both eternalism and partial-eternalism like Sāti the fisherman
Just a very first attempt at trying to figure out where all these views might belong.
The view: ‘My self survives.’
‘Atthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘My self does not survive.’
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive the self with the self.’
‘attanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive what is not-self with the self.’
‘attanāva anattānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive the self with what is not-self.’
‘anattanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
It always helps to focus on the Pāli, instead of cherry picking the translations to support our views.
Never any cherry picking from me! 
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
- natthi: “there is not”
- me: “for me”
- attā: “self” or “soul”
- ’ti: quotation marker, equivalent to “that”
- vā: “or”
- assa: “of him” or “for him”
- saccato: “truthfully”
- thetato: “really” or “actually”
- diṭṭhi: “view” or “belief”
- uppajjati: “arises” or “occurs”
Translation:
“The view arises that ‘There is no self (or soul) for me’ in a real and true sense.”
What are the five higher fetters?
Katamāni pañcuddhambhāgiyāni saṁyojanāni?
Desire for rebirth in the realm of luminous form, desire for rebirth in the formless realm, conceit, restlessness, and ignorance.
Rūparāgo, arūparāgo, māno, uddhaccaṁ, avijjā—
How can Rūparāgo, arūparāgo become = ”Desire for rebirth” when there is no rebirth mentioned in the Pali?
BTW what is my view?
Please stop this. Check the translations of different Pali experts and you will see there can be huge differences. And we can all see that Sujato often chooses different then other translators. I do not believe anymore this is a matter of Pali expertise.
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Well, translations are always faulty. I do not mean “Check Ven. Sujato”, I mean, check the Pāli for yourself and translate for yourself.
What do you mean “Stop”? Are we supposed to rely on different translations, or are we best best served going back to Pāli whenever possible? That’s all I say. Check the Pāli.
@Dogen And I did check the pali and not a single word in pali hinting at survival.
Check it yourself:
- natthi: “there is not”
- me: “for me”
- attā: “self” or “soul”
- ’ti: quotation marker, equivalent to “that”
- vā: “or”
- assa: “of him” or “for him”
- saccato: “truthfully”
- thetato: “really” or “actually”
- diṭṭhi: “view” or “belief”
- uppajjati: “arises” or “occurs”
Translation:
“The view arises that ‘There is no self (or soul) for me’ in a real and true sense.”
Where is survival?
Where is rebirth in Rūparāgo, arūparāgo?
- But honestly, what is ”my view ” that forces me to cherry pick suttas and only certain translations, so I feel more safe in enforcing ”my view ”on everybody else?
Please answer, I will not be the slightest bit offended, I am just really curious, so with a lot of metta 
:
- What you think my view is?
- Why you think I would cherry pick suttas to enforce this ”view of mine’ (whatever it now might be)?
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Yes. To say there is no self for me is still assuming a sense of me. It’s the me that is the problem, not the no self.
I’m a bit surprised by Ven Sujato’s translation. The Pali has no verb ‘to have’ and instead always uses atthi with a genitive case (me in our case) to convey the same idea as English ‘to have’. I translate it as “I have no self”. Here the problem is the I bit, not the no self bit.
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Hello Venerable @Sunyo
But numerous wrong views are often said or quoted in first-person in the suttas - this is not really important.
Even if we take away the ”for me” and ”I” and are left with only ”there is no self at all” this would contradict Attakārī Sutta: The Self-Doer AN 6.38 and would prevent The Buddha from recollecting past lives and saying:
Ānanda, you might think: ‘Surely the brahmin student Jotipāla must have been someone else at that time?’ But you should not see it like this. I myself was the student Jotipāla at that time.” - MN 81
Householder, you might think: ‘Surely the brahmin Velāma must have been someone else at that time?’ But you should not see it like this. I myself was the brahmin Velāma at that time. I gave that gift, a great offering. - AN 9.20
Now, mendicants, you might think: ‘Surely that chariot-maker must have been someone else at that time?’ But you should not see it like that. I myself was the chariot-maker at that time. Then I was skilled in the crooks, flaws, and defects of wood. - AN 3.15
The whole point of rejecting both:
"‘There is for me a self’ ”I have a self” arises as a true and established view;
The view arises that ‘There is no self (or soul) for me’ ” ”I have no self” in a real and true sense.”
and the other views found in MN 2
- Is because one takes the approach of the middle way and never any extreme view:
And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists.
I think it’s easiest to explain it that the past life recall thing is using conventional self to refer to the individual stream of consciousness which has continuity linked by kamma and rebirth to the Buddha. There being no self absolutely in MN2 is rejected for rejecting this conventional self as well, but there’s no issue to say ultimately, there’s no self.
Why is it difficult for the mind to accept without Self there is life there is existence !
I suppose you try to mean “Why is it difficult for the mind to accept without Self there is life and no annihilation”
This is a good question and sometimes a delicate one.
You are fully right because we know the Buddha never taught the eradication of existence or non-existence. He taught the eradication of birth and death, which is a very different thing.
There is life without falling into existence, -self delusion, birth and death. We could say the nibbana is full of life, without limits and without decay.
A main difficulty for the people keeping the annihilation wrong view, is to understand how the life and Reality is not annihilated when birth, death, and the falling into existence, all are eradicated.
For many people there is no difficulty; just they look how the Buddha accomplished all that while he was in the world. Although for those with annihilation positions this image was leaved long time ago, and they become entangled in philosophical views, trying to fit their preconceived ideas requesting the annihilation after death.
At least I understand a main logical cause is no experience of nibbana and then still no understanding about death is delusion and the consequences. And second, because the wish of annihilation works like a -self version of the Buddha teaching to put an end to the existence, birth and dukkha.
We know the Buddha claimed all that while he was alive and without being annihilated. However, they ignore just this simple fact to build their necessary image.
That position is basically the same than the worldly position kept by many suicidal people. In a general way, the suicidal people are attached to life. What they reject are the conditions in how the life is manifest. And because this reason they wish to destroy the existence. That action is an affirmation of life, and this is carried by denying the conditions impeding the life could be manifest as this should have been.
Annhilationists are doing a similar thing with their images on parinibbana-annhilation. In that wish for an impossible annihilation into non-existence they manifest the attachment to existence.
There is no real detachment in the annihilation positions neither it is strange the Buddha adviced to avoid suicide, except in the case of arhants as they are really free of any attachment to be alive or dead.
The true escape from the Wheel only exist among the phenomena of the Wheel. This is the real freedom from the Wheel. Is this not logical?.
Who was really escaped from a feared jungle: somebody who escaped from the jungle, or somebody who escaped from the fear of the jungle?.
After death there is no any difference, it is the same issue. The grasping of atta phenomena will continue. Hearing, seeing, touching… all the same. Similar to what happens in our dreams, and depending kamma it would be the search for a new rebirth.
We only can be free following what the Buddha taught: understanding the grasped phenomena and realizing its anatta nature and nibbana. It can happens while being alive or after death, this is no relevant. Neither whatever ambit of experience at that moment will be annihilated.
However, this is also a delicate question. Because just by reading these things some of that people can feel bad. And sometimes if one insist too much using Buddhist sources and proofs maybe it could be too much.
Probably this is due to the commented rejection to the dukkha arising from the conditions of the existence. This is a necessary factor to fit the Dhamma in the own life. Although the understanding about the end of dukkha only can exist without falling into non-existence, this is like a new jump. And for some people it can touch the first worldly understanding important to keep the Dhamma as a refuge.
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(Possible devil’s advocate here)
This annihilationism alluded to in this thread got me thinking. I’d just like to clarify in what way the modern, scientific, clinical definition of death is any different from final Nibbana?
If we regard the living body as a mere biological process starting at conception, and ceasing at death; in between being just a matrix of bio/neurological impulses creating a sense of self, which breaks up at death. Science has not discovered a soul, afterlife, god, heaven or hell, or rebirth.
Even if we are willing to believe in rebirth, and take a close look at Buddhist doctrine, it really make no difference, as there is no ‘person’ who gets reborn. No elements cross over (even consciousness) as this would imply an eternalist continuum. Buddhists state that no ‘person’ is ever destroyed, as that which never existed in the first place cannot be destroyed. There is no self, beyond a mistaken one which is erroneously imputed on the aggregates, so no thing gets reborn. If a new life is sparked off in some undefinable way, then the aggregates are entirely new aggregates (even consciousness) so no big deal.
An Arhat clearly benefits (pre-death) from the peace of his realisation, but experiences nothing after death, just like any other corpse.
Any thoughts?
according the sources, at death only the 5 senses are leaved and this doesn’t include the mind. When there is the mind there is possibility to experience a Reality. Think in example in our dreams, in where there is seeing, hearing, touching… all the same, although with a different consistence.
While the arhant is alive he realize the true nature of the generation of the Reality and himself (body and mind) and he is free from that production. This is called arhanthood or the complete enlightenment . After death we can be sure that the same will happens whatever ambit of experience can arise
the person don’t posses the aggregates but it’s the opposite: the person and the body arise from the aggregates.
In the Buddha teaching, it is expected the realization about there is no “person” or “body” but this arise like an experience from the relation between consciousness and the production becoming from the aggregates.
It means that we don’t possess the aggregates, neither there are new aggregates for a new person after death, neither the aggregates can be annihilated after death. Because the notion of “person” arises from that and these possibilities doesn’t fit. It is not that a person posses all that but it is the inverse case: the person(my body, my mind) arise at each instant from that.
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No , i didnt say “no annihilation” . It just means the mind deceived itself thinking there is a Self . And if there is a Self , when physical body disintegrates the Self that exists suddenly disappear which many would take it as annihilation . Life refers to something alive , existence would be including something animate , flora and fauna or inanimate . Plants exist , manifest and are able to grow yet without requiring a Self to sustain their existence . A stone could exist without needing a Self to be in existence .