This would be rightly identified with as self. But as the Buddha clearly separated the two, so we shouldn’t mix up 5 aggregates and the ultimate self. 5 aggregates which are impermanent, painful, perisable exist, self which is permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable does not exist.
@yeshe.tenley In the context of this sutta, then the 5 aggregates which are impermanent, painful, perisable are empty, without substance, like foam, etc.
But the self which is permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable does not exist, so the label of empty, without substance, like foam cannot be applied to things which doesn’t exist. Anyway, not applicable because that self is unchanging, whereas foam is changing, the label/characteristic of without substance is for conditioned, changable things, not for self which doesn’t seem to be conditioned or changeable.
What about annihilationists? How do you account for them if they believe the self is impermanent?
This is why “inherent existence,” “substantial existence,” “self-existence,” etc. are all just words that the Buddha would call ‘attā.’ If something has substantial existence forever, it’s eternalism; if something has temporary substantial existence, it’s annihilationism. The words are exactly equal in meaning with the Buddha’s terminology. So that may help avoid confusion and frustration.
I haven’t given this a lot of thought, so here’s my quick answer before lunch. The eternalists say soul and body are different, so when body dies, soul survives to take on another body or eternally as something.
Annihilantists would identify the body to be the same as self, so when body dies, soul also dies. No more.
Buddhist point of view is closer to annihilatists, but just without the wrong view that self exists. And parinibbāna is only for arahants. Not for everyone, not automatic.
But it sounds like it’s just a difference in words, not an actual difference in essence? It sounds like you’re saying that if annihilationists believed in cyclic rebirth, it would be Buddhism. Just that Buddhists don’t use the word “self.” But the words we use don’t really matter so much if the meaning is agreed upon.
Basically, to me, it sounds like you’re saying that Buddhists are annihilationists who believe in rebirth. Maybe you could define better what makes something a ‘soul’?
I apologize Venerable for my misunderstanding. However, I don’t think you can point at Mahāyāna in this case as some Theravada practitioners, who have not embarked on the Bodhisattva vehicle to my knowledge, seemingly share a similar misunderstanding? I’ll desist from here and stay out of it.
Hmmm… I will just use the annihilation philosophy I am most familiar with then. Physicalism. The notion that only physical things as known by physics is the most fundamental thing. Mind is just emergent from the brain. When the brain dies, the mind as software has no mechanism to transfer to another hardware of brain, so it also ceases completely at death.
This might not be 100% the same as what the sutta says about all types of annihilationism, but it is the 1st type of annihilation philosophy in DN1.
Being emergent, mind doesn’t have the creative power as shown in dependent origination to be capable of generating rebirth-relinking consciousness without any physical mechanism, but purely because the causes of rebirth is still there, namely ignorance, kamma, clinging, craving, etc.
The physicalists may agree that there’s no self philosophically speaking, no soul, since all ends in death. They agree with the classical Theravada that there’s no experiences after the death of arahant, but says it’s automatic for all, not just for enlightened ones.
Although they may not believe in a soul, nonetheless, as long as there’s still delusion of self, causes of rebirth, rebirth will happen to them. This is the same for unenlightened Buddhists.
So the main difference would be that they don’t think this sense of self, delusion of self is enough to generate rebirth. So they have no motivation to go deep into seeing the implication of no self or to train to see no self deep enough to end rebirth. Granted, there are secular Buddhists who would say that happiness of nibbāna before death can be good enough motivation for the practise to see no self.
So in short difference is in:
Believing in dependent origination or not.
linking to believing in rebirth or not.
Believing in automatically no experiences after death or not for everyone.
Believing in ending rebirth by ending the delusion of self or not.
From the noble 8fold path perspective, having right view of rebirth and dependent origination is essential for liberation. So annihilatists while they would agree with Buddhists that after death of arahant there’s no experience, they are still burdened and hindered by wrong views, which blocks their attainment.
Hmmm. It seems that there’s many cases I intuitively label as annihilationism. Including secular Buddhism… So it may not be enough to just say that annihilationists believe in a self or soul that is destroyed at death since the secular Buddhists also don’t believe in a soul, but perhaps rebirth plays a part as well. It’s complicated, I dunno how to properly map this with all the sutta citations on annihilationism as I haven’t done a proper “research” into this.
Right, and I was actually going to make a post today investigating the Pāli of this specifc passage today!
I mentioned this once in a PM with Bhante @NgXinZhao as well, correct.
Ajahn Brahm is surely a tricky monk! This would make a funny Zen Kōan.
It is funny how different languages treat nothingness - in English we say “There’s nothing”, in French, it’s “Il n’ya pas de rien” which is “There isn’t nothing” (“It doesn’t have of nothing” to be painstakingly pedantic), it’s “Hiçbirşey yok” in Turkish “Not anything doesn’t exist”.
I try to be precise and delicate around this subject, because it’s ultimately the ultimate subject. Arguably, entire reason beings are lost in samsara is because beings are afraid of nibbāna - if not, they would be arahats already. Translated to fear of death for people without the view of rebirth and such, this is the basis of entire psychological issues, traumas, wars, thievery, on and on.
The more aggressive and careless we’re around the subject, the greater the confusion and associated negative emotions. And saying “There is nothing” is an interesting symbolical explanation, treating absence as a metaphysical object that exists, which I assume would bug out a computer if translated into code, and likewise, it can be a source of confusion for human brains as well.
And I do get equally frustrated when people wrap all sorts of eternalist views to fit the suttas, trying to imply that nibbāna is a type of (unlanding) consciousness or such. But my frustrations are equally my faults; it can’t be helped that people are going to be afraid of concept of nibbāna, and even try to make Buddha’s words speak for their eternalist views.
(Likewise tho, some of us are equally terrified of wandering and sufferin pointlessly in samsara, so we do have people militantly banging on the emphasis of “nothingness” with an equal fervor…)
We could be all the more patient and careful handling this subject, I think. This is the greatest source of fear of all subjects in the world, after all. And Ajahn Brahm’s a shining example - correct, humorous and joyful in our treating of the subject.
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Anyway, enough with hijacking the thread, and may you all carry on semanticising in peace.
Have you sit into his retreats? Available for free on youtube. Finish the whole playlists.
It’s not very subtle how Ajahn Brahm keep on using nothing to describe Nibbāna. Ok, maybe he stopped short of saying exactly that Nibbāna is nothing.
Here’s a few from memory:
Arising and ceasing vs disappeared.
Impermanence is not just arising and ceasing. The real impermanence is when things disappears. When he was a lay person joining zen retreat open eyes staring at the wall, the wall disappeared one day. He was shocked. How could it happen? It’s an insight. Whatever doesn’t change for long enough, it disappears. So impermanence, that’s not just the TV channels changing, it’s the whole TV gone. It’s not just the waves of the ocean changing, it’s the whole ocean gone.
There isn’t cake.
In the sutta/ commentaries, Nanda made a vow in a past life that may he never know the meaning of natthi: there isn’t. Due to his merits, the devas have to make sure of it or else the deva’s head got split open. So in his final life, Nanda thought food just appeared on the table, when the covering for that tray of food is lifted. In some gambling session with friends, he asked his mother to send some cakes. His mother did, a few times, until there’s no more ingredients for cakes anymore. Then she said natthi cakes. There isn’t (anymore) cakes. Nanda, replied (all via messenger), send those as well. His mom realized that Nanda did not know the meaning of natthi. So she thought it’s time he does. She put in the covering for the cakes, but it’s empty inside. And send it to nanda (via messengers). On the way, the devas had to put celestial cakes in it. Nanda was crying that his mom didn’t loved him before for not cooking such a cake for him before when she knows how to cook this cake in the first place. And that Nanda would never want to eat anything else other than this cake. His mom then continued to just send empty coverings, which becomes celestial cakes for nanda. So this is the lesson of making nothing into something.
Why? Because there’s nothing.
One time when ajahn chah was visiting the branch monastery that ajahn brahm was in to use the sauna that they build in order to attract ajahn chah. After a dhamma talk ajahn chah went to the sauna, but ajahn brahm was inspired and used the opportunity to meditate and got good deep meditation. After he was done with meditation, he wanted to serve ajahn chah in the sauna, but ajahn chah was done. And ajahn chah saw ajahn Brahm and knew it was a right time to give a teaching when ajahn brahm just came out of meditation. He asked why?
I dunno.
Because there’s nothing. Do you understand?
Yes?
No you don’t.
Ajahn Brahm then asked the audience: do you understand? No you don’t.
Partly because of all the above, is why I am so bold on this topic. Nothing leftover after parinibbāna.
I have watched his videos, retreat q&as, dhamma talks quite extensively, perhaps even too extensively as to hear the same stories so much to make a Brahmn bingo game out of it with some friends.
My point wasn’t the doctrinal difference, it’s the attitude of compassion and kindness with which he teaches. You can see his caring oozing through the screen and heard from his voice, the diligence with which he utters every word, without anger or frustration.
Obviously, this is harder in an online forum - but as I said, this is the ultimate source of confusion, anger, fear and all the problems in the world. If this topic doesn’t deserve our utmost care and kindness, I don’t know what does.
I’ve been typing a bit too much here lately. Keyboards are even falling apart at the office here! Perhaps I should blame it on you! But I’ll keep engaging you a bit more because it helps me think more clearly about these matters, which I hope to communicate to others one day. Not because I’m here to prove you wrong or anything! (You know that already, but I point it out for those who may read along.)
I’m happy you also are interested in discussing things that actually matter, interpretations that are fundamentally different, not just semantics.
But it may be that we too are stuck in the latter. Your objection to me saying annihilationists assume there is something “more than just the aggregates” I think also is a matter of semantics. I’ll blame it on my clumsy use of words (and so can you if you want). I actually expected a reply of your kind but then thought, “Ah, no need to be so precise, people will understand what I mean.”
To illustrate what I did mean, imagine two friends walk in the desert and see a mirage. One says: “Look, water!” When they get closer, it turns out it was just a mirage. I would then say, “Yo! He was assuming something that doesn’t exist, something “more than just that mirage”, namely water.” You might reply: “No, he was assuming that the mirage is water, not something more than a mirage.” I would say, “Fair enough, that’s what I meant as well.” Because this is just a semantic difference.
Likewise, that’s what I meant by a self “more than just” or “outside of” the aggregates. To take an aggregate as equal to a self is also assuming something “more than the aggregates”—namely a self doesn’t exist, a self “outside of” what exists, if I may put it like that. You’re adding things to reality that aren’t there.
I didn’t mean that self is somehow literally taken to be outside the aggregates.
I’ll use “in addition to” instead.
Yes, exactly, impermanent things exist! That’s the language of the early texts. So when people say things exist, it doesn’t mean that these things exist absolutely, even when not directly said to be impermanent. Like when the Buddha says, “suffering exists”—which I would like to point out again is part of understanding the middle way between the two extremes of annihilationism and eternalism—it doesn’t mean it exists in some inherent way. (SN12.17) To the Buddha, for all purposes suffering simply exists. And then one fine day it ceases.
Even in the DN1 quote on “existing being”, the word atthi (in form sato) doesn’t actually mean inherent existence. Because how can an inherently existing (i.e. eternal) being be annihilated? Annihilationists would have been smart enough to realize that that can’t happen. So also here, even in a wrong view, atthi describes a temporal, non-absolute existence.
What I’m getting at is, if you claim that to think something exists necessarily entails eternalism, then annihilationists, who claimed that something exist (as they aren’t saying natthi but atthi) would also be eternalists.
I’m making a linguistic point here about the use of atthi in the Pali canons, not about their views. I hope you get that. I do know that annihilationists can also be regarded as assuming some inherent existence.
But the mistake the annihilationist make, as described in the Pali canon, doesn’t have to do with the notion of existence per se; it’s assuming the existence, even if it’s temporal, of something that doesn’t exist, namely a “being” that is taken as a self. That is what their mistake of “existing being” entails. We can rephrase “they assert the annihilation […] of an existing being” as “they assert there exists a being that is annihilated”.
That’s always the case in the suttas with annihilationists: they assume something to exist in addition to (!) the aggregates: a self, a being, a tathāgata. We never see annihilationists claiming that just the aggregates themselves get destroyed. In fact, that’s the Buddhist wording in a handful of suttas. (It’s obscured in translations sometimes, so I won’t go there now.)
As to Nāgarjuna, I’m quite a noob on it. But Siderits and Katsura note on their translation, based on the commentaries to MMK:
The reference [by Nāgārjuna] is to the Sanskrit parallel of Kaccāyanagotta Sutta. There the Buddha tells Katyāyana that his is a middle path between the two extreme views of existence and nonexistence. Ābhidharmikas interpret this text as rejecting two views about the person: that there is a self, so that persons exist permanently; and that since there is no self, the person is annihilated or becomes nonexistent (at the end of a life, or even at the end of the present moment). The middle path is that while there is no self, there is a causal series of skandhas that is conveniently designated as a person.
Nāgārjuna holds that while the Abhidharma claim about persons is not incorrect, there is a deeper meaning to the Buddha’s teaching in the sūtra. This is that there is a middle path between the extremes of holding that there are ultimately existing things and holding that ultimately nothing exists.
They elsewhere explain that “ultimately nothing exists” means “metaphysical nihilism”, the philosophy that there is nothing whatsoever, not even temporary things. I would say what you are defending, as well as others who have similar views, is closer to the Abhidharma understanding of this sutta than this. Because “ultimately nothing exists” is clearly not what the annihilationists were saying. They also held that things exist. So if this interpretation of Nāgārjuna is right (and I believe it is quite a common one) then according to your interpretation Nāgārjuna was overextending natthitā.
Siderits and Katsura suggest Nāgārjuna made this move to defend his notion of emptiness (i.e. everything in the entire universe being empty from any inherent quality whatsoever, as opposed to the person being empty of a self/essence) from attacks by Abhidharmists, who thought it lead to metaphysical nihilism. So it was a dialectical move. I can’t tell if that’s correct but it would make sense.
Either way, take that as a sidenote. For elsewhere Nāgārjuna certainly does explain annihilationism more conventionally, as the annihilation of some inherent entity (or dharma with svabhāva, technically). If such an entity first exists, and then doesn’t anymore, it means annihilation. No objection from me here, although the further ways Nāgārjuna explains and applies it go beyond the early texts quite considerably.
However, importantly, the aggregates/senses/suffering are not entities. Once you realize that, you can say that they “exist and then cease”. You can say they don’t exist anymore after parnibbāna. That is clearly the way the Pāli suttas talk about these things.
And such language wouldn’t go against Nāgārjuna either, it seems to me. Because when he says “exists and then doesn’t”, he is referring specifically to things that have inherent nature, not to impermanent processes such as suffering/aggregates. It doesn’t mean that every time someone uses the word “exists” they are assuming an inherent nature automatically. That would be to put the cart before the horse, it seems to me.
In short, it seems notions of absolute existence as taken by Nagarjuna are not discussed in the Pali canon. We can infer them from the Pali canon, but the language of the Pali canon itself is different. More psychologically focused.
I say that because I think natthitā and atthitā are also “notions” i.e. feelings people have regarding the afterlife, rather than philosophical standpoints about it. They feel they are going to keep existing after death or not. That feeling is what noble ones have abandoned, not just some conceptual idea about the nature of the aggregates. Along with any doubt about what will actually happen after death, about whether there is rebirth or not.
This is all just to balance things out a bit. Because I do think the way the Pali canon explains things is sufficient, and we don’t need to introduce later ideas. But as I said earlier, I have no fundamental disagreements.
PS. No hate! I’m not saying it’s “all Nāgarjuna-nonsense” or whatever term you used before (can’t find it again). In fact, Nāgārjuna’s statement that nothing differentiates nirvāṇa from saṃsāra, when put in context, is one of my favorite reflections ever.
Payasi never became a buddhist and never took refuge in the triple gem!
Despite many attempts to change his wrong views with many similes while Payasi was alive, none of these changed Payasi’s mind.
Then Payasi died and had rebirth in the lowest heaven (the gods of the Four Great Kings).
All Payasi did after his death was to tell the buddhist monk Venerable Gavampati, to tell humans to not give gifts the way Payasi did: ”carelessly, thoughtlessly, not with his own hands, giving the dregs.”
But instead give gifts: ”carefully, thoughtfully, with your own hands, not giving the dregs.”
Charity & generosity is common in all religions and Payasi even says to instead give gifts like the brahmin student Uttara who gave gifts carefully, thoughtfully, with his own hands, not giving the dregs. When Uttara’s body broke up, after death, he was reborn in company with the gods of the Thirty-Three.’”
That’s all, Payasi never became a buddhist, no refuge in the triple gem. Nothing.
Not even promoting buddhism, but just the very basics of being spiritual/religious, like how the brahmins give gifts.
The God Pāyāsi
Now at that time Venerable Gavampati would often go to that empty sirisa palace for the day’s meditation. Then the god Pāyāsi went up to him, bowed, and stood to one side. Gavampati said to him, “Who are you, reverend?”
“Sir, I am the chieftain Pāyāsi.”
“Didn’t you have the view that there is no afterlife, no beings are reborn spontaneously, and there’s no fruit or result of good and bad deeds?”
“It’s true, sir, I did have such a view. But Venerable Kassapa the Prince dissuaded me from that harmful misconception.”
“But the student named Uttara who organized that offering for you—where has he been reborn?”
“Sir, Uttara gave gifts carefully, thoughtfully, with his own hands, not giving the dregs. When his body broke up, after death, he was reborn in company with the gods of the Thirty-Three. But I gave gifts carelessly, thoughtlessly, not with my own hands, giving the dregs. When my body broke up, after death, I was reborn in company with the gods of the Four Great Kings, in an empty sirisa palace.
So, sir, when you’ve returned to the human realm, please announce this: ‘Give gifts carefully, thoughtfully, with your own hands, not giving the dregs. The chieftain Pāyāsi gave gifts carelessly, thoughtlessly, not with his own hands, giving the dregs. When his body broke up, after death, he was reborn in company with the gods of the Four Great Kings, in an empty palace of sirisa. But the brahmin student Uttara who organized the offering gave gifts carefully, thoughtfully, with his own hands, not giving the dregs. When his body broke up, after death, he was reborn in company with the gods of the Thirty-Three.’”
So when Venerable Gavampati returned to the human realm he made that announcement.
And despite this you will still claim:
The annihilation that materialists imagine happens at death is a complete fiction, unreal and something that all spiritual people, be they eternalists or annihilationists, reject.
The Buddha practiced many paths in his last life and he also had at least one annihilationist meditation master as his teacher.
The Buddha also recollected his past lives (this ability can lead to eternalism - and does for 99.99%)
It is in this very spiritual context based on the actual experiences from meditation/spiritual paths that annihilationism and eternalism is refuted with Dependent Origination.
So while all the views The Buddha refutes are based on actual experiences by meditators; materialist annihilation is NEVER BASED ON ANY ACTUAL EXPERIENCE: it is only pure speculation and a delusional fantasy.
So there you have it, the view of ”mere cessation” takes the wrong delusional view of materialist annihilation, and then claim that if one gives up all greed/hatred/delusion one can achieve exactly that what materialists imagine happens at death.
This is then combined with how mundane states of unconscioussness (like dreamless sleep) have no dukkha, therefore Nibbāna must be like eternal dreamless sleep.
I have no problem at all claiming that those buddhists that say there is only ”mere cessation” come specifically from a scientific/materialist/atheist background.
If one was truly interested in things spiritual one would have been a seeker, trying out different spiritual paths.
If not in this current life, then certainly in the past lives(!).
Were ”mere cessationists” buddhists in their past lives?
Certainly not.
But one would hope they were on some kind of spiritual path(s)…
So all the wrong views, that ONLY Dependent Origination can solve, must have been views that ”mere cessationists” held on to in previous existences, prior to discovering buddhism and DO.
But there are no indications of this among ”mere cessationists”.
Rather there is a atheist/materialist/scentific stance superimposed on to the Dhamma where everything is reduced to ”myths”.
While the very same things are real to non-buddhists, even someone non-spiritual like Payasi:
Well then, chieftain, I’ll ask you about this in return, and you can answer as you like. What do you think, chieftain?
Are the moon and sun in this world or the other world? Are they gods or humans?”
“They are in the other world, Mister Kassapa, and they are gods, not humans.”
“By this method it ought to be proven that there is an afterlife, there are beings reborn spontaneously, and there is a fruit or result of good and bad deeds.”
“Even though Mister Kassapa says this, still I think that there is no afterlife, no beings are reborn spontaneously, and there’s no fruit or result of good and bad deeds.”
So it clearly doesn’t matter what one says, if someone has made up their mind regarding Nibbāna they don’t even care if they contradict themselves, just like Payasi did.
It’s certainly possible that this Payasi eventually followed the Buddhadhamma and became Enlightened in such a Heaven as the seed of the Dhamma was planted in him by the Venerable.
Hello, Bhante! Thanks again for your thoughts. So much typing!!! I hope your keyboard still works, bhante. I understand if this is too much to reply to. But I hope it’s helpful for some in evaluating the ideas.
Me too! That’s why I enjoy discussion here. It helps clarify and hone my ideas, and the shortcomings they may have.
My objection isn’t necessarily to your actual intention. Because I cannot know your mind, and also because I know other people will be reading these discussions and thinking about them. So my objection with the self and aggregates distinction was more to clarify the words as they appear and could be, or often are, interpreted by other people. But overall, I actually doubt we disagree on these issues! It’s possible. But my feeling is we probably don’t, based also on many other things you’ve mentioned before.
Here’s my reasoning for the objection:
You said annihilationism isn’t necessarily about inherent existence of phenomena, but only of persons. And you quoted SN 5.10 as an example or support for this view. What’s interesting though is that SN 5.10 is the only place in the early Pāli I’m aware of that makes this argument. One time in hundreds of discourses on non-self and the aggregates and so on. And it just so happens that this persons-only emptiness is the Theravāda reading that Bhante Sujato says is different from the EBTs general argument in his essay on Theravāda vs. Early Buddhism.
So you can see why I objected to basing an interpretation of annihilationism on this alone. To be clear, I’m not saying the argument in SN 5.10 is wrong. But I’m saying it needs to be interpreted in the larger context of the entire sutta-pitaka. So when someone uses it to try and define annihilation as not related to selflessness of phenomena, then I feel it should be clarified.
In case it’s unclear to anyone why or how the argument is different, I’ll try to explain. In almost every sutta, the Teacher says that the aggregates themselves are impermanent, empty, painful, hollow, changing, etc. And therefore they should not be grasped or taken as a self. So he doesn’t say “What you think is your self is actually five aggregates!” That’s a later way of teaching non-self. Rather, what the Buddha taught is “The five aggregates which you do think are your self are not substantial, lasting, or worth holding on to.”
It’s like someone saying “You’re not going to be annihilated, only the five aggregates will be!” And the response is “Exactly, I am the five aggregates, or some among them.” Or “There’s no being here, just five aggregates!” And they reply “Exactly! The five aggregates are the same thing as a being.” Because self-views in the suttas regard one or some aggregates as the self. Like the self is form, or has feeling, or has perception, or is consciousness, etc. So saying it’s “the aggregates” doesn’t prove it’s not a self. It’s showing that the aggregates are empty that does. It’s showing that the aggregates don’t exist as we think they do that proves non-self; not saying that only the aggregates exist.
SN 5.10 has a different argument, which again isn’t wrong, but it isn’t the full picture of anattā in the suttas. It denies the idea of a possessor of the khandhas or a being inside of them. But it doesn’t remove the view that the plain khandhas are a substantial self.
Thanks for clarifying though, Bhante. The mirage example is clear, yes. BTW, this is why I don’t think selflessness of phenomena is more philosophical. It is a feeling. A feeling that things are real. Like the feeling that a nightmare is real, or terrifying hallucinations. The feeling that things are real isn’t a complex philosophical view. It’s that we need more nuanced terms to articulate to people who argue for that view in more detail why it isn’t the case.
SN 12.17 is a perfect example. Because the Buddha says suffering exists after saying it is not self-made, other-made, made by both, or arisen without a cause. Meaning it exists only in dependence on other conditions. This is argued at SN 12.67 with each of the ten links of DA IIRC. The Buddha uses the word ‘exists’ in the sense of conditional manifesting or appearing. Which is what “not substantial” is a word for, basically. It can sound more fancy, but the idea is the same.
I raised this question in the thread before, I believe.
I think it’s possible you typed too quickly the second part though? Because “temporal, non-absolute existence” is what you are arguing the Buddha taught, and I would agree (if by ‘temporal’ you mean ‘temporary’). So they wouldn’t be annihilationists who thought an existing being was destroyed if they had the Buddha’s view of the middle way!
Either way, it’s a good point: How can something with inherent existence cease? That’s exactly what Nāgārjuna argued. And I argued it earlier in this thread as well. And now you have also argued it!
If something really exists, then it can’t turn into non-existence. It’s like saying something can arise out of nothingness! Nothingness can’t create somethingness, and somethingness can’t create nothingness. Nāgārjuna argued as well, I believe, that Buddhists who believed in a kind of annihilation of dhammas would actually be forced to accept eternalism. Because there would be no conditions that could make the dhamma actually cease.
It doesn’t mean annihilationists wouldn’t hold this view. And it’s not that inherent existence must manifest as belief in eternalism. It’s just that the implications of believing in or feeling like there is inherent existence are difficult to grasp.
It’s precisely the view which annihilationists hold, including the modern ones! They do it by denying the conditionality of experience, which denies the dependency with consciousness and so on and makes matter a primary, independent substance. By not seeing the “arising of the world” (lokasamudaya), i.e. their perspective of the world through the senses, they just focus on the world beyond their senses and reify that.
They think matter truly exists and must be preserved in space-time, and that their feeling of a self will be destroyed at death because their mind will not emerge from the real matter. It’s like Ajita’s view: earth will go back to the substance/mass of earth, etc. Isn’t it cool how the Buddha, before science and philosophy developed, was able to pin down why and how people held to wrong views!
Annihilationists who believe in rebirth would have to hold similar views of an externally, independently existing world of stuff that is beyond them and which exists. That substance could be matter, a universal mind (idealism), or whatever other things people believe in. It doesn’t have to be an external world of matter.
Or they hold an incoherent philosophical view that somethingness can turn into nothingness and just be destroyed and poof out of existence. But just because it’s incoherent doesn’t mean it’s obvious. Buddhist people for millenia have been arguing that this is possible though as well! That stuff just goes from being real, existing, independent, and then turns into nothingness! Conservation of energy, anybody??
This is just as much a feeling, emotion, or psychological tendency as it is a philosophical view. And belief in this external, real world also arises because of self-view. People who believe in a self have to locate that self in relationship to other real things. And so they locate an external, real world they inhabit as outside of their selves, and then they think their self will cease to exist within that world. But “the real world” is just a concept that arose because of self-view. Not that this is saying only our mind exists — which is solipsism and also could be eternalist/annihilationist.
I see this as a kind of contradiction, Bhante. Probably just an oversight in the wording. You say it “doesn’t have to do with the notion of existence,” it just has to do with “assuming the existence … of something.” Which is precisely assuming the notion of existence!
The point is that assuming the aggregates exist as actual things is assuming the existence of something which isn’t there. And so it is assuming a self or being or entity or soul. By showing that what we take to be permanent or independent aggregates are actually mere temporary arising and ceasing, then the idea of a really existing aggregates is critiqued. The “aggregates” turn into a mere label we use despite not being actual solid things. All of which I think you agree with
I’ll give a quick (attempt!) at an example. What we take to be “consciousness” isn’t actually a thing. First of all, consciousness can manifest in many forms, and we call it all “consciousness.” But it actually isn’t one, enduring, existing, independent consciousness. Also, consciousness arises and ceases. Sometimes it’s present, sometimes it isn’t. If it was actually an external “thing” that existed, it would have to always be there at least until it is annihilated. But it isn’t always there. So where is this “existing consciousness” hiding? Also, when we talk about “consciousness,” we have to talk about what we are conscious of. We have to talk about perceptions, and feeling, maybe form or volitions. None of those things are the same as consciousness! But if we try to point out, talk about, find, designate, prove, or claim that “consciousness” is a separate thing (either temporary OR eternal), we won’t be able to.
“Consciousness aggregate” is just a LABEL we use, like “Me” or “being,” for a string of disconnected, dependent, transient, illusory, conditional appearances. There is no actual consciousness aggregate existing in the world that makes up our aggregates. The same is true for all the aggregates. I hope this makes sense, and shows how saying “the aggregates exist” is just as much a label as “beings exist.” Because there is no actual aggregate persisting through space-time independent of conditional arising and ceasing.
As you said, impermanence is enough for this! The Buddha’s teachings already avoid this problem! And this is also what Nāgārjuna says in e.g. Yuktisāstika. That if Buddhists claim things are impermanent, it’s inconsistent to also think things hold real existence. But some of them still did, of course.
The problem is if people philosophize and make assumptions to think there is a thing which is impermanent and changing but enduring through time based off of the Buddha using a noun like “consciousness.” That’s how tricky wrong views and grasping can be! Māra will even try to turn impermanence into a self-theory if we aren’t careful to evaluate our assumptions.
Just an aside, but I don’t think I agree with Siderits and Katsura here. I’d have to read their work. But I’m a bit suspicious, especially as many of these scholars don’t seem to know much about the early discourses beyond Abhidhamma systems.
Sādhu! And I agree: the aggregates aren’t entities, so we can say they arise and cease! But I hope you’ll understand that many Buddhists actually do treat them like entities even if you do not.
There’s actually a whole other thread where I am basically making the case over and over again that we should and can say “the aggregates cease when the Buddha passed away.” So trust me, it’s very context dependent. Here, we are specifically trying to identify annihilationist Buddhism, and therefore the topic of cessation is under heavy scrutiny. But it isn’t like this in most contexts!
I would disagree, as I’ve explained reasons for above. With the caveat that I’m not claiming to know much about Nāgārjuna! So based off what I think he was saying. And also with the caveat that I definitely thinn Nāgārjuna went above and beyond in explaining different concepts. But his basic reading of eternalism/annihilationism/dependency I think is valid exegesis of the suttas, which he was clearly very familiar with.
Because if we set aside the language differences, “substantial existence” and “self” are the same thing, and both are psychological. It’s the idea of something real. Me living in a real world. Me living in my mind. Me being an eternal soul. Me surviving after death. Me being destroyed after a period of time. It’s all a feeling. But as I said before, Buddhists are trained so thoroughly to say “It’s not self! It’s not self!” That I think many people don’t realize that they basically believe annihilation is the way to end suffering.
As I said before in this thread, believing in annihilationism of phenomena has serious philosophical problems. It requires the belief that somethingness and nothingness can turn into each other. We don’t need the Buddha to tell us this is wrong if we aren’t convinced. We can just reflect on it ourselves. Existence and non-existence are incompatible, separate things. They can’t mix. Then we can ask if the Buddha’s teachings of the four noble truths and dependent arising offer a solution beyond the extremes of existence and non-existence.
Sādhu sādhu! Definitely agree! I don’t think the Buddha’s teachings in the āgamas are insufficient or that we need to study later texts. Obviously I think it’s beneficial to understand other views and evaluate our assumptions. We can use the suttas alone to avoid these views as long as we don’t convince ourselves of a wrong view before reading the suttas. Then we just read our views into the texts!
I think if we stick to what the Buddha actually taught in the suttas, the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism already include the views of substantial existence and dependent origination is the teaching he offers to avoid them! Dependent arising and dependent ceasing
So cool, right!? And not the heresy people think.
Thanks again for your reflections, venerable! I always find great inspiration in the simplicity of the suttas and how you discuss them as well! And so I’m all for using language as they do. Just hoping to clear up potential misconceptions or miscommunication!
Unlike the materialist annihilationists like Ajita Kesakambala and Payasi who deny rebirth, all the other 6 types of annihilationists have right view and know that there is an afterlife and that good & bad deeds have consequences and so on.
The Buddha himself, prior to enlightenment, was a disciple to such annihilationist meditation master(s) with right view.
It is naturally in the light of such spiritual annihilationists that The Buddha previously studied under, that annihilationism is refuted in the suttas and not those materialists like Ajita Kesakambala and Payasi that want nothing to do with any spiritual path whatsoever.
Therefore all suttas mentioning annihilationism should be read as the view of spiritual people on a path and never the views of those like Ajita Kesakambala and Payasi (unless specifically mentioned) since such people would never want anything to do with buddhism or spirituality. Right view is lacking.
That is why not a single sutta mentions materialists converting to buddhism but only mentions plenty from other spiritual paths becoming buddhists.
Even when Payasi eventually died and realised that ”total termination” is not the case at the moment of death, Payasi did not become a buddhist but was more inclined towards the brahmins and their rituals since he realised that one should not give gifts the way Payasi did: ”carelessly, thoughtlessly, not with his own hands, giving the dregs.” But more like the way brahmins give gifts: ”Carefully, thoughtfully, with his own hands, not giving the dregs.”
Dana that is found in all other religions was the only major insight that the materialist-annihilationist Payasi had, after death.
The eternalist may have seen the famous horned rabbit. It can only be captured if he grabs one of its horns and his annihilationist opponents take hold of the other.
The basis for eternalism and annihilationism is feelings…
One can still perceive while beyond all conditioned phenomena, as clearly stated in AN 10.6 & AN 10.7:
‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’” - MN 136
And that is why Sariputtā said:
“Reverends, extinguishment is bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!” When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?” “The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.
So how is it that this immersion without feelings where one can still perceive, is somehow ”something” like eternalism? Or ”nothing” like annihilationism?
I see a difference in how this is translated (as usual):
Bodhi:
“To him another says: ‘There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. For there is, good sir, another self belonging to the base of nothingness, (reached by) completely surmounting the base of infinite consciousness (by contemplating): “There is nothing.” That you neither know nor see. But I know it and see it. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death—at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.
Sujato
But someone else says to them: ‘That self of which you speak does exist, I don’t deny it. But that’s not how this self becomes rightly annihilated. There is another self that has gone totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness. Aware that “there is nothing at all”, it’s been reborn in the dimension of nothingness. You don’t know or see that. But I know it and see it. Since this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death, that’s how this self becomes rightly annihilated.’ That is how some assert the annihilation of an existing being.
Thanissaro
“Another says to him, ‘There is, my good man, that self of which you speak. I don’t say that there’s not. But it’s not to that extent that the self is completely exterminated. There is another self where—with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing’—one enters & remains in the dimension of nothingness. You don’t know or see that, but I know it, I see it. When this self—with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’ This is how some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, & non-becoming of an existing being.
Only in the translation of @sujato it mentions rebirth
At this moment i see it like this that all these annihilationist views only have a different understanding of what the true self is that is being annihilated at death. I am not sure, but what exactly do you read?
What is it exactly that makes you conclude that all these views assume rebirth, samsara.
And what is exactly the condition for the annihilation of an existing being in all these views?
For example Buddha teachers: must we see it like this that they believed in an endless samsara, but which comes to an end only when one has realised the true self (nothingness is true self, and last jhana is true self)?
This would make a funny Zen Kōan.
But I’ll keep engaging you a bit more because it helps me think more clearly about these matters, which I hope to communicate to others one day. Not because I’m here to prove you wrong or anything! (You know that already, but I point it out for those who may read along.) 
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