Dear all,
In SN35.23 it is said that the six senses are “all” or “everything”. Many this take to mean there is no possibility for existence or experience apart from these six senses. The sutta confirms that, since it says that if you claim there is another “everything” (e.g. a seventh consciousness), then that is just groundless.
Since the six senses are “everything”, when the six senses cease, all consciousness ceases. There is nothing left to experience.
However, in AN4.173 it is said that:
"With the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact, is there nothing else?”
"Do not say so, friend.” (Bodhi)
This seems to refute the view, and has indeed been used by some to argue that the view is wrong. (Even though they generally tend to claim that there is something beyond the six senses, which the sutta addresses in the exact same way.)
I think the English translation by Ven. Bodhi (as well as Bhante @Sujato) is too free, it should be more close to the Pāli. Then the problem goes away (if we are also careful of the English phrasing used). Let me explain as best as I can so non-Pali students can also understand too.
Consider first the next two translations of n’atthi no kiñci uttariṁ karaṇīyaṁ (MN39):
- There isn’t anything more for us to be done.
- There is nothing more for us to be done.
These are equivalent in meaning. Whether there isn’t anything more to be done or whether there is nothing more to be done, the situation is the exact same. But the latter sounds better in English, so that is what people use. However, the Pāli literally says the first. Translators have turned “not anything” into “nothing”.
That’s no problem in this case, but it creates an issue for the subtle philosophical statements on the nature of parinibbāna in AN4.173. Now, here are two translations of the relevant passage, first Bhante Sujato’s and then mine:
“Reverend, when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does something else exist?” “Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Does nothing else exist?” “Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Do both something else and nothing else exist?” “Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Do neither something else nor nothing else exist?” “Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Venerable, after the six senses completely fade away and cease, will something else still exist?” “Don’t say that, venerable.”
“After the six senses completely fade away and cease, will something else no longer exist?” “Don’t say that.”
“After the six senses completely fade away and cease, will something else both still exist and no longer exist?” “Don’t say that.”
“After the six senses completely fade away and cease, will something else neither still exist nor no longer exist?” “Don’t say that.”
We’re concerned with: "after the six senses completely fade away and cease, will something else no longer exist?” This implies that something beyond the six senses existed before death, which now also ceases to be. This “something” can be a self, for example, in which case this becomes the view of annihilation: the idea that a self ceases at death.
The commentary the agrees with my interpretation. It says this statement is about annihilationism (uccheda).
So now we can understand why things shouldn’t be put like that! But the translation “nothing” doesn’t portray this properly, I think.
The suggested translation also agrees much better with the classic tetralemma:
- X
- not X
- both X and not X
- neither X nor not X
This tetralemma is famously applied to the situation of a supposed tathāgata-being (i.e. self) after death. Notice how equivalent the following is to AN4.173:
“Sir Gotama, tell me, will a truthfinder (tathāgata) still exist after death?”
“Vaccha, I don’t affirm that a truthfinder will still exist after death.”
“Then how is it, will a truthfinder no longer exist after death?”
“I don’t affirm that a truthfinder will no longer exist after death.”
“Then how is it, will a truthfinder both still exist and no longer exist after death?”
“I don’t affirm that a truthfinder will both still exist and no longer exist after death.”
“Then how is it, will a truthfinder neither still exist nor no longer exist after death?”
“I don’t affirm that a truthfinder will neither still exist nor no longer exist after death.” (SN44.8)
This is essentially the same exchange as in AN4.173, just in different words.
I think this equivalence to the tetralemma is also lost if we translate “does nothing else exist” in AN4.173.
For another indication of the equivalence between the passages, AN4.173 continues to say all four statements are elaboration (or ‘proliferation’, papañca), and in AN7.54 this is also said about the four statements on the tathāgata. In this case I take papañca to mean you “elaborate” beyond what exits by posing either a thing beyond the six senses or a tathagata-being.
AN4.173 indeed says that the scope of elaboration should only go as far as the six senses. So all statements must be wrong because they go beyond this scope. But saying “there is nothing else” does not do so! It stays exactly within the boundary of the six senses, by posing there is nothing outside of them. So this also indicates that this is not a good translation.
As a final thought, the Pāli for “does something else no longer exist” is natthaññaṃ kiñci (= na atthi aññaṃ kiñci, overly literally, “no exist else something”). It seems to me that if the question meant to ask whether there is nothing left after the six senses cease, the word aññaṃ shouldn’t be there. Because na atthi kiñci already means “there is nothing” (or literally “there isn’t anything”). The ‘else’ (aññaṃ) is here exactly to indicate the statement is about something else from the six senses.
Would love to hear your comments. Do you get my reasoning? I mean, I’m arguing against great translators here, so I’m a bit hesitant.
(PS. I hope we can prevent this from becoming another debate on the nature of nibbāna and knowledge, and discuss the translation issue instead.)