SuttaCentral
Sorry, but this is not my view or conclusion.
Again, as mentioned previously, the boldened print in your quote is full of I, me mine, self views.
And that is related to the annihilationist view. Which is not what cessation of selfless processes are about.
Fortunately, this is not true.
The latter two terms have nothing to do with final cessation as I’ve tried to describe.
My apologies of I haven’t been clear about distinguishing these aspects.
But having the view of ”selfless processes” is already there in the first sentence = Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.
What is ”cessation of selfless processes” about? The khandhas, right?
You also reject eternalism just like mentioned in the sutta.
Just because I is used in the generalization of annihilists views - ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ it is said in the context of claiming that Nibbāna is ”cessation leading to 100% unconscioussness”.
You did claim that Nibbāna is an unconscious state in the other thread. This is what the Buddha refuted.
You bring up in your defence the khandhas = (first sentence from the sutta) Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. and you also reject ”brahmanical ideas” just like in the sutta: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’
I think you’re picking out lines and separating them from their context.
is immediately followed by their holding views involving I, me, mine which the Buddha rejects as forms of annihilationism.
Sorry, but no.
Cessation points to the ceasing of all the khandhas and senses, which includes the consciousness khandha. This is different than something or some entity being unconscious.
You’ve said that you don’t adhere to an eternal sort of nibbāna, like a timeless citta or ineffable being-ness, but your comments also seem to suggest that cessation isn’t your understanding either.
It’s not clear to me what your position is. Which is fine, but leaves the basis for the discussion unclear.
The conversation seems to be going in circles at this point. 
I’ve enjoyed the convo but maybe it’s best to leave things here.
Santi
Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. Nor do they have such a view: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ Still, they have such a view: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ But that annihilationist view is just a conditioned phenomenon.
As you can clearly see I’m not picking out any sentence from their context.
You assume this just because the Buddha refutes the annihilationist view of reasoning in the following way:
”‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’”.
So now your main gripe is the usage of the word I when the Buddha is explaining certain practioners reasons for their views in a generalized way…
We are just playing around with the usage of words at this point.
Your view of Nibbāna only differs from those mentioned in the sutta in a very shallow way: You don’t regard ”form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self” & you don’t think that ”‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ These two views you have 100% in common with the practioners in the sutta.
It is going in circles because you jump straight back to
”they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.” as your explanation.
You said it yourself:
You do in reality have the view ”I will not be” just like those practioners in the sutta but you choose to instead say that the khandhas have always been selfless from the get go when they finally cease.
That is the only difference between you and those practioners.
My position is the Tetralemma. 
This unequivocally the position of the ebt, including SN, and it is only possible to maintain the “a fictional self permenently cease when the aggregates cease and there is therfore a difference bwtween nibanna and parinibanna” fallacy by selectivly ignoring the tetralemma.
“My person is an illusion and there are only aggregates that arise and cease” is wrong view.
“Aggregates are an illusion and there is a real person” is wrong view.
“There are both aggregates and persons” is wrong view.
“There are niether aggregates nor persons” is wrong view.
What is right view?
While there is still greed, hatred, and delusion there is still a person
Having uprooted greed hatred and delusion, that person cannot be understood in terms of life or death, existence or non existence, etc etc. “they are freed I say”
For the basic rundown of the argument see
DN1 DN2 DN9 MN72 and my other thread
Note especially the SN suttas about kamma and the undeclared for an example of how the reasoning is used and note especially that by implication in those suttas if people are not real then niether is suffering.
Again, not really.
Your assertions about what you believe I’m saying don’t match up with what I’ve been saying.
For one example,
Fortunately, this is not true.
There is no “I will not be” in cessation. But I’m choosing not to restate prior points.
Regarding the tetralemma, there are many interpretations.
If you haven’t read these posts yet, you may find them interesting.
One can conventionally say “person” or" being" regarding an assemblage of conditional aggregates. Hence, no “everything is illusion or a dream” kind of mysticism.
But I think we’re in agreement there is no permanent essence or atta in all this.
So in the EBTs the teaching is directly expressed as " While there is greed, anger, and delusion, there is dukkha."
“With the ending of greed, anger, and delusion, there is awakening and no rebirth.”
“With no rebirth and the cessation of all senses and khandhas at physical death, there is no possibility of dukkha.”
BTW the 37 bodhipakkhiya dhammas emphasized by the Buddha don’t include, as I’m sure you know, the tetralemma.
Not saying it has no relevance. Just that it’s not included in the 4NTs. Or DO. Or the 37. Or in the first three sermons, (whether they were really the first or not, they express foundational aspects of the teachings).
Well the only difference between you and the practioners in the sutta is that the khandhas have always been a selfless process from the get go for you, other than that your views are identical.
If you read the sutta a little further it continues with how even if you reject those annihilationist views you are still bound to have doubts:
Still, they have doubts and uncertainties. They’re undecided about the true teaching. That doubt and uncertainty, the indecision about the true teaching, is just a conditioned phenomenon.
SO just a bit more in terms of data;
samuday:
V 26
D 69
M 122
S 269
A 82
K 342
B 712
nirodh:
V 43
D 101
M 205
S 587
A 257
K 624
B 505
so here we have two terms, arising and ceasing, they both occur in all the debt and all the later material, there seems to be more talk of ceasing than of arising.
Pretty straightforward and nothing controversial here. we will conclude assuming that these terms are uncontroversial.
lets try some more, and see if we can see anything more interesting:
keep in mind we are searching for the string, so ALL words with the string in it, meaning all compounds not including other spellings or synonyms terms.
kamma: keep in mind we are taking about hundreds of different words here)
V 1110
D 195
M 365
S 185 less than D! less than any other collection bar none.
A 555
K 1386
B 1586
so karma words are strikingly less frequent in SN than in any other book including the much later KN (K) and Abhidhamma (B).
Note that this pattern is definitely a different pattern to the samudayanirodha pattern.
Lets try another one:
dukkha:
V 89
D 123
M 455
S 919 more than twice as often as any other N
A 463
K 1209
B 1617
dukkhan:
V 6
D 16
M 56
SN 177 almost four times as often as any other N
A 67
K 151
B 117
dukkhaṃ:
V 38
D 20
M 150
S 434 almost 4 times as often as any other N
A 138
K 476
B 285
here we have thrown in a few variants to see is the pattern is a glitch, but SN is again strikingly different to the rest of the early books, resembling K and B much more than D M and A.
a few more:
āsav:
V 49
D 90
M 163
S 194 fewer than A
A 335
K 1038
B 1090
āsavā:
V 26
D 72
M 117
S 94 a third as often as the similar in length A, and less than the much shorter M
A 262
K 306
B 287
like kamma, another universal buddhist theme is suppressed in SN.
catutthaṃ jhānaṃ:
V 19
D 27
M 45
S 19 a third as frequently as in the same length A, less than half the much shorter M
A 61
K 43
B 135
satipaṭṭhānā:
V 3
D 10
M 17
S 95 more than 4 times as often as any other N
A 23
K 85
B 39
anicca:
V 2
D 9
M 43
S 247 about 5 times as much as any other N
A 69
K 208
B 400
aniccaṃ:
V 1
D 0
M 29
S 191 work it out for yourself
A 18
K 29
B 24
I could go on, but a lot of more are in my other threads.
I feel it is not a good choice to translate Nibbana in its etymological meaning. I believe it is better to translated it for what it really means in the discipline of the Buddha, so in its experiential meaning or leave it untranslated.
I can see Thanissaro tries to connect with this experiential meaning of Nibbana in translating that word as Unbinding and that is, i feel, better. The same with sakkaya ditthi and others concepts. One must see where it really refers to in an experiential way, and how it as mental tendency is actually present and functions in our own lifes. That way we get a real understanding of it and also understand why the Buddha calls it a kind of fettering and cause of suffering.
The Buddha uses concepts/words to describe things that are part of our direct experience, and does not use them as philosophical concepts or in a philosophical way. Nibbana is also no philosophical concept and sakkaya ditthi is also not a philosophical view on reality. Translating these concepts that way turns Dhamma into a kind of philosophy in stead of an experiential Path and discipline.
The EBT clearly teach that there is what is not seen arising, ceasing and changing in the meantime. This element or aspect is present in our lifes and must be known too. You know all this.
But you seem to denie/neglect this and teach that there is only arising, ceasing and change. And because you think that Buddha teaches that there are only formations or temporary states build upon them, you also believe parinibbana must be a mere cessation. This is how you think, right?
But i do not see that the EBT teach that there are only formations or only condioned existence.
The unconditioned, unborn, unmade, unestablised reality, not supported by conditions is mentioned in the EBT. Texts even talk about an eternal state in Snp. Textst are clear. But while you read this, you and others start to apply all intellectual power to turn also this into something conditioned, temporary, subject to arising and ceasing. Why? (see further)
This is, i believe, you and others do not see an alternative. You and others believe that something is OR…subject to arising and ceasing, OR… it must be something eternal, and Buddha rejected eternalism. So you do not see a way out of this.
I believe, this shows an involvement in reification. What is not seen arising and ceasing is regarded as an existent thing, but it is not like that. Conceiving the unconditioned means the reification of it, and that is like entering a wrong Path. It cannot be grasped by reasoning and conceiving.
It cannot be understood that way. You cannot even conceive it as something eternal. So it does not refer to a kind of eternalistic view or doctrine of atta.
Hope this is helpful
can’t remember if I already pasted this but
SO just a bit more in terms of data;
samuday:
V 26
D 69
M 122
S 269
A 82
K 342
B 712
nirodh:
V 43
D 101
M 205
S 587
A 257
K 624
B 505
so here we have two terms, arising and ceasing, they both occur in all the debt and all the later material, there seems to be more talk of ceasing than of arising.
Pretty straightforward and nothing controversial here. we will conclude assuming that these terms are uncontroversial.
lets try some more, and see if we can see anything more interesting:
keep in mind we are searching for the string, so ALL words with the string in it, meaning all compounds not including other spellings or synonyms terms.
kamma: keep in mind we are taking about hundreds of different words here)
V 1110
D 195
M 365
S 185 less than D! less than any other collection bar none.
A 555
K 1386
B 1586
so karma words are strikingly less frequent in SN than in any other book including the much later KN (K) and Abhidhamma (B).
Note that this pattern is definitely a different pattern to the samudayanirodha pattern.
Lets try another one:
dukkha:
V 89
D 123
M 455
S 919 more than twice as often as any other N
A 463
K 1209
B 1617
dukkhan:
V 6
D 16
M 56
SN 177 almost four times as often as any other N
A 67
K 151
B 117
dukkhaṃ:
V 38
D 20
M 150
S 434 almost 4 times as often as any other N
A 138
K 476
B 285
here we have thrown in a few variants to see is the pattern is a glitch, but SN is again strikingly different to the rest of the early books, resembling K and B much more than D M and A.
a few more:
āsav:
V 49
D 90
M 163
S 194 fewer than A
A 335
K 1038
B 1090
āsavā:
V 26
D 72
M 117
S 94 a third as often as the similar in length A, and less than the much shorter M
A 262
K 306
B 287
like kamma, another universal buddhist theme is suppressed in SN.
catutthaṃ jhānaṃ:
V 19
D 27
M 45
S 19 a third as frequently as in the same length A, less than half the much shorter M
A 61
K 43
B 135
SO maybe there is simply something about S that makes it have less of the usual technical terms on average, but;
satipaṭṭhānā:
V 3
D 10
M 17
S 95 more than 4 times as often as any other N
A 23
K 85
B 39
anicca:
V 2
D 9
M 43
S 247 about 5 times as much as any other N
A 69
K 208
B 400
aniccaṃ:
V 1
D 0
M 29
S 191 work it out for yourself
A 18
K 29
B 24
I could go on, but a lot of more are in my other threads.
The point is that it works both ways, the difference of S is both in expansion and omission.
Yes “become cool”, but is this the same as …everything ceases?
Yes, the end of becoming is realised here and now, i believe. The mind that is without becoming, meaning without grasping, is, here and now, free of bhava. It is detached from khandha’s and therefor cannot be identified as a form, feeling, will, perception or perceptual awareness. Because it cannot even be described in terms of form/body, this mind cannot even be called man or woman nor human.
There is also a sutta that describes this. The Tathagata cannot be pinpointed as being this or that. Not only after death but even in this life cannot be pinpointed as being this or that. This might look very complicated but i believe it only means: there is the realm of the unconceived, the realm beyond Mara’s reach.
The realm beyond conceiving is impossible to describe but it can be known to be there. It can also be known that conceiving starts and ends and the mind can get lost in conceivings and it cannot. This can be seen or known. When mind gets lost in conceivings Buddha teaches that it becomes deluded in understanding. It does not see things anymore as they are but how they are conceived to be. And there is huge difference between them .
Seeing this realm of the unconceived is what we fail to do. Or…it feels like nothing special, and we just ignore it. It is always present in our lifes but we are so involved in conceivings and conceived understanding, that we just ignore it and do not see and understand the depth of it. The Tathagata is deep, unfathomble, deep like the ocean.
Our lifes have always both aspect of the non-conceived and the conceived. The proces of unintentionally getting lost in conceivings is what the Buddha describes as grasping. The forces which cause this are called anusaya , asava, tanha. It is not that an atta rules this proces. Getting lost in conceivings and experiencing that as real at the moment, is unvoluntairy and, for the fettered mind, in no way a choice.
An awakened one has uprooted this unintentionally getting lost in conceivings and the deluded understanding that arises together with it.
In other words, it knows and understand what is conventionally true. It knows that the mind lost in conceivings experiences those conceivings as true and real. Like getting lost in a film.
So, in the awakened one there is always an awareness of the great, huge, enormous difference between an understanding rooted in conceiving and not.
Everything is an illusion or dream refers to the fact that all we experience is constructed, and not some absolute reality or in some absolute sense real. It is not true that an apple is red or has this or that form. Maybe for us as humans, in the way our body and mind functions, it has such features, but this a complete constructed and subjective reality. There is nothing ultimately real about the way we experience things. Great master know this and are also able to do wonders.
If another being would see an apple as green or as another shape, it is useless to discuss which perception is right. It is like debating about which dream is true. It is not about mysticism.
The inner perception of being a human being is also a fully 100% subjective and constructed experience and kind of understanding. Totally conceived. That is what Buddha teaches. One cannot see the Buddha as just a human being.
Hi Green,
I do not have the most prominent Dutch translations (which are by De Breet and Janssen) here. However, the only way I remember nibbāna and related verbs to have been translated is along the lines of ‘uitdoving’, which basically means ‘going out’ (as a noun).
Sorry, but the fact that translators disagree doesn’t mean they are all correct. Translators too make mistakes. As to translating nibbāna as ‘unbinding’, you will not find that in any dictionary nor in serious academic works. The consensus in the English scholarly world is that it just means ‘going out/extinguishment’. Ven. Thanissaro is really the outlier here. If you read Mind Like Fire Unbound, you’ll see it is largely based on Vedic texts, which is problematic for various reasons.
The Visudhimagga’s “etymology” which Ven T. follows, is not actually an attempt at serious linguistics. It’s a didactic tool instead, as are most “etymologies” in the Visudhimagga. It reminds the reader that nibbāna is the escape from (nir) craving, which is a thing that weaves (vāna) together life to life. This was never meant to be a true derivation of the word nibbāna nor was it meant to give it’s real meaning. It’s just a play of words with a practical message. The Vism is full of these.
No text in the Pāli canon suggests nibbana to mean ‘unbinding’, and various texts use nibbāna as an explicit synonym for cessation. As Ven Ñānananda said in his Nibbāna sermons:
[…] on the meaning of the word Nibbāna. Here too one can see some unusual semantic developments in the commentarial period. It is very common these days to explain the etymology of the word Nibbāna with the help of a phrase like: Vānasaṇkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantattā. And that is to say that Nibbāna is so called because it is an exit from craving which is a form of weaving. […] It is said that craving is a kind of weaving [vāna] in the sense that it connects up one form of existence with another and the prefix ni is said to signify the exit from that weaving. But nowhere in the suttas do we get this sort of etymology and interpretation. On the other hand it is obvious that the suttas use the word Nibbāna in the sense of ‘extinguishing’ or ‘extinction’. In fact this is the sense that brings out the true essence of the Dhamma. […] The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought that there is some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But what had the Buddha to say about existence? He said that what is true for the fire is true for existence as well. […] He pointed out that existence is a fire kept up by the fuel of grasping, so much so that, when grasping ceases, existence ceases as well.
Yes. But it is a metaphorical synonym for cessation, hence ‘extinguishment’ (like SUjato) and ‘quenching’ (like Bodhi) are good translations.
That the problem in these statements is exactly the word “I”, is indicated by the Buddha’s right view version of this statement, which says, “IT will not be” instead of “I will not be”. See for example SN22.55.
The point of the sutta you quoted is that the view of a self exists on a more intellectual level, let’s say, than the sense of “I”. You can claim not to believe in a self but still have this sense of “I”, hence have the view of annihilationism. The view that avoids annihilationism is that there is no self nor an “I” yet still cessation.
Yes, good point. Cf. p. 57, note 94:
Page 57 from The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (75.2 KB)
It is to see, to know yourself as you really are.
Hoi,
The Dutch translators you mention do not translate Nibbana , i have understood of someone who send me some Dutch Texts. I think that is a good choice.
Unbinding is not that bad, i feel. Anusaya cause binding. A way to talk about Nibbana of the arahant is that all anusaya are uprooted. This means, the end of all unvoluntairy binding or fettering. Unbinding as translation gives at least some practical meaning to it. The Pali texts certainly suggest a situation of Unbinding for Nibbana. Unfettering. That is all the time suggested in almost every sutta about Nibbana. So Nibbana also refers to an enormous freedom of mind. The mind is not under controll anymore of the anusaya’s.
Cessation as synonym needs explanation i believe. Because what is ceased? It is clear the Nibbana of the arahant is no mere cessation. And i also do not believe that this is true for parinibbana.
EBT also do not teach that the cessation of future bhava is a mere cessation. That is interpretation based upon the idea that Nibbana is also an made, builded, constructed, produced state that will cease too. Is it?
The image of fire as the influence of defilement upon the mind is recognisable for me. Like an impact, impingement. And extinguishment of our own fire has meaning for me. Then all becomes cool.
Thanks, wish you well
When the Buddha was talking to villagers and village leaders, and he taught them just virtue (that is to say giving and rebirth) its really reincarnation we are talking about. To those who could understand, he taught the 4NT and dependent origination. The first isn’t wrong per se, its just not the whole story. Regarding fire in MN 72 what is being said is that because the fire arises from conditions, it will cease when those conditions cease. Because it arises and ceases the fire cannot be said to truly exist (atthitā) or not exist (natthitā). All we can say is that conditions arise and cease, and nothing more. To say then it really exists, just like the conditions really exist, and that you really exist is to go against what dependent origination is pointing towards.
Thanks for takimg.the time to respond tho!
You’re welcome.
I’d also like to address your claim that Buddhas and Arahants do not experience dukkha, if we may?
I think this is only true when we misuse “really” to mean “independently of conditions” which I do not.
In terms of suffering, the buddha was freed from suffering by uprooting greed hatred and delusion and thereafter was not “reckonable” in terms of pleasure and pain.
That is how the Buddha’s contemporaries understood it. I would argue that is how we today understand it, when we want to call something truly real. It has to have some form of independence like when we say the tree is there when no one is looking.
In terms of suffering, the buddha was freed from suffering by uprooting greed hatred and delusion and thereafter was not “reckonable” in terms of pleasure and pain.
Yet he still experienced pain, and pain is included in the 1st Noble Truth. Buddhas and Arahants are free from future dependent origination, but they aren’t free from past ignorance and kamma.
Thank you!
I still hope you can understand why Nibbāna can’t be the type of cessation as meaning an unconscious state and why I and others question this view?
I will now bring up several arguments as to why this view is wrong.
In what context would one even claim NOT to believe in a self at all, but still, for some odd reason, hold on to a view of annihilationism?
In the context of trying to attain Nibbāna under the guidance of the Buddha one would hold on to that view!
But to even have the insight to begin with that there is no self nor an “I” one has to attain Nibbāna just like the Buddha did. Same goes for the insights regarding unsatisfactoriness and impermanence, only fully understood thanks to Nibbāna - no other possible way.
But if Nibbāna equals becoming 100% unconscious; how can the Buddha or an arahant in this ”unconscious state” realize and be so certain about the three characteristics anicca, dukkha & anatta?
Even going so far as to applying these three characteristics, that are near impossible to see otherwise and that only a Buddha discovers, to the formless arupa planes of existence that keep going on for countless of billions of years…?
We have to REALLY understand in what context things are being said in the suttas. The Buddha even praises the same type of ”annihilationism” formula in AN 10.29.
This is applicable to various ascetic practices by others that are very painful to the body but due to the deep concentration attained leads one to the formless realm of nothingness. These meditators don’t care about a future ”existence” of any sort in rupa loka and kama-loka and couldn’t care less about ”ceasing to exist” as they have come to know existence (kama-loka & rupa-loka): since the formless realm of nothingness is seen as the highest type of ”cessation” in their dhamma.
So you see in AN 10.29 the Buddha praises this view held by outsiders as the best among non-buddhists but in SN 22.81 he refutes this view among buddhist monastics using the same formula:
”I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ But that annihilationist view is just a conditioned phenomenon.”
SN 22.81 has VERY MUCH to do with attaining Nibbāna since the whole reason for the sutta is: ‘How do you know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life?’
The ordained are taught how to attain Nibbāna and the Buddha tells them the best methods for doing this in the sutta and the obstacles that can show up. Otherwise why would ordained under the guidance of the Buddha himself during this time even get the idea that one is annihilated in Nibbāna in the first place? Well if the khandhas cease to exist and there is nothing more then the khandhas some students clearly make that logical assumption.
Yet the Buddha refutes this idea/view of annihilation that buddhists have had in the past and still have to this day in SN 22.81 quite clearly by mentioning the following:
That very first sentence in the SN 22.81 quote above is ONLY taught in buddhism, this is clearly about adressing issues that can show up for buddhists on the path and for NO ONE else. Same with refuting eternalism in the next sentences - only found in the Buddha’s teaching and up to this point the buddhists in question do follow the instructions. BUT lastly the third sentence is refuting the annihilationist Nibbāna view that some buddhists mistakenly have while on the path - this is where you and others sharing the same view are currently at, in the practice of the path.
This is crystal clear for anyone reading the sutta.
I wanted to bring up the tetralemma: Since ”The Tathagata does not exist after death” is rejected by The Buddha himself - but saw that you claim that this rejection by the Buddha is due to an ”over-literal translation”…
I must say, with no offense intended: this line of reasoning really leaves me speechless… 
Anyhow, if Nibbāna is really a 100 % complete unconscious non-existence as you and others claim why is then Nibbāna classified as atakkāvacara?
Nibbāna is atakkāvacara, “beyond logical reasoning”. It is difficult to comprehend with logic or reason, since it is not a concrete “thing.” It cannot be explained with logic or reason to someone who has not attained it by themselves.
I do understand your logical reasoning regarding the selfless khandhas ceasing and then concluding: ”how could there possibly be anything left?”
BUT by the very same logic I can claim that hundreds of millions enter Nibbāna on a daily basis via dreamless sleep - no real difference between the highest spiritual state Nibbāna and having 100% unconscious dreamless sleep. Or is there? How so? 
But if Nibbāna truly is atakkāvacara, “beyond logical reasoning”. And it is truly difficult to comprehend with logic or reason and it cannot be explained with logic or reason to someone who has not attained it by themselves; it is IMPOSSIBLE it is even remotely anything like unconscious dreamless sleep in any shape or form:
Since we all, and billions of others humans, have already experienced what it is like being unconscious!
On the contrary what would really be ”beyond logical reasoning” atakkāvacara is that one can still somehow be ”AWARE” of a unconditional state despite the nature of selfless khandhas…
I will also lastly bring up that if the Buddha said Nibbāna is bliss and Nibbāna equals unconscious non-existence - That means one can only experience the bliss of Nibbāna while in Samsara…Right? 
Yes. Nibanna cannot be an unconscious state any more than it can be a conscious state. It refers to the extinguishment of attraction repulsion and confusion.
When the fire is out we do not say that the fire is in a “state” in the sense that it is actually hidden somewhere in the timeless and non-phenomenal “state of extinguishment” consciously or unconsciously.
We also do not think that the buddha amd sariputta where unconscious like rocks after they awakened, they answered questions, so they could hear and think and talk, so nibanna does not refer to unconsciousness.