SuttaCentral
Round and round we go:
SN12.65:2.12: ‘When consciousness exists there are name and form. Consciousness is a condition for name and form.’
SN12.65:2.16: ‘When name and form exist there’s consciousness. Name and form are a condition for consciousness.’
A lot of coconuts on that tree… 
May we all be happily stumped.
AN5.71:5.2: It’s when a mendicant has given up craving, cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, obliterated it, so it’s unable to arise in the future.
I think there is a misunderstanding here. Based on what Ceisiwr said, I was looking for discourses where consciousness is included as a component of name nama. Because, most Suttas I have read define nama as contact, feeling, perception, intention and attention and consciousness is defined as arising in dependence of nama & rupa.
I know Vissudhimagga defines nama with consciousness included which according to the Suttas do not make sense.
With metta
Hi Nimal,
It does appear that in some places in the Commentaries nama-rupa is used as essentially a synonym for the aggregates.
However, in the case of Dependent Origination, nama-rupa in the Visuddhimagga specifically excludes consciousness, for obvious reasons.
VISM XVII 187. 1. By analysis of mind and matter: here “mind” (náma—mentality) is the
three aggregates, that is, feeling, perception, and formations, because of their
bending (namana) on to the object. “Matter” (rúpa—materiality) is the four great
primary elements and the materiality derived [by clinging] from the four great
primaries. Their analysis is given in the Description of the Aggregates (XIV.34f.,
125f.). This, in the first place, is how the exposition of mentality-materiality should
be known “by analysis.”
Of course, this means that the definition does still differ from the suttas on Dependent Origination. But the Commentators acknowledge that. Here is the explanation from Bhikkhu Bodhi’s notes on SN12.2:
“And what, bhikkhus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention: this is called name. The four [4] great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. Thus this name and this form are together called name-and-form.
Footnote: On the translation of nāmarūpa, see the General Introduction, pp. 47-49. Vism 558,23-28 (Ppn 17:187) explains that nāma denotes the three aggregates—of feeling, perception, and volitional formations—which are called thus because of their “bending” (namana) on to an object (in the act of cognizing it). Volition, contact, and attention belong to the aggregate of volitional formations and, according to Spk, have been selected to represent that aggregate here because they are operative even in the weakest classes of consciousness.
One might, of course, still disagree with the detailed reasoning of the Commentators, but it is clear that their reasoning was not the result of some simple oversight.
Thank you for your input. To tell you frankly, I am not a fan of Vissudhimagga or the commentaries because my personal opinion is that they make things more confusing than clarifying. I have heard even from those famous Ajahns that one can understand and practise the true teaching without them. That is based solely on discourses.
Having said that, I am still interested to know what you mean by " their reasoning was not the result of some simple oversight". So what what do you think is their reasoning?
Thanks in advance
With Metta
Regarding the explanation of nama, the SA version (SA 298) is: feeling, perception, activities (= cetana ‘volition’), and consciousness (see p. 163, The Fundamental teachings of Early Buddhism).
In SN.12.19 = SA 294, nama and rupa are referred to external objects. Choong Mun-keat suggests that nama and rupa are also about the six external sense spheres; i.e. visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles (for rupa ‘material form’), and mental objects (for nama) (see pp. 184-188, in The Fundamental teachings of Early Buddhism).
I don’t think it’s a matter of reasoning. It’s simply a matter of categorising. I guess a more relevant question might be, purely in terms of the usage in the Suttas does ‘nama’ have the semantic breadth to encompass all the immaterial aggregates. For me there is, but that is a job for the experts.
I think its more likely that the definition of nama that we see in the agamas, where consciousness is defined as part of it, is the result of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmic systematisation.
In SN.12.19 = SA 294, nama and rupa are referred to external objects. Choong Mun-keat suggests that nama and rupa are also about the six external sense spheres; i.e. visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles (for rupa ‘material form’), and mental objects
I believe SA 294 talks about a “conscious body” which is in direct relation to namarupa. This sounds like the standard view of the suttas and less like namarupa equating to “external objects”. I think its more likely that namarupa stands for the 5 physical sense bases (rupa) and the mind sense base (nama) as the 6th, based off suttas such as DN 15 where namarupa is all that is needed for contact. With this understanding it seems that the 6 sense bases are the result of namarupa, in conjunction with consciousness, making sense of sense experience. This could then be why we find some suttas that omit the 6 sense bases and only discuss namarupa instead. This is close to the classical Theravadin understanding of namarupa as “mind and matter”.
The question is whether “nama” includes consciousness. If I understand you correctly it does because consciousness is an immaterial aggregate. So I am looking for discourses which support it.
With Metta.
There isn’t one. You only find that in the agamas and some abhidhamma texts.
I think you misunderstood me. I was talking about the usage of language. For example can I use the word ‘khandha’ to denote a heap of stones.
Hi Nimal,
The reasoning was in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s summary of the commentary (spk).
So in SN12.2, etc, nama is
feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention.
The Commentaries, however, make use of Abhidhamma definitions, and consider volition, contact, and attention to be a subset of formations. So, in the commentaries and Visuddhimagga, nama is defined as:
feeling, perception, formations.
Arguably, this redefinition loses something of the flavour of the Buddha’s use of nama-rupa in the suttas, so I’m certainly not arguing that it is preferable. My point was simply that such changes seem to be the result of careful analysis, not careless oversights. In fact, the oversight would be to think that the Visuddhimagga includes consciousness in nama when discussing dependent origination. That would make the dependence relations between consciousness and nama-rupa rather confusing!
Echoing Bhante @sujato in his recent course on “The Visuddhimagga for Sutta Lovers”, I think that it is important to read such texts on their own terms, and think about what they are trying to do. It is, of course, an entirely defensible option to simply ignore the Abhidhamma and Commentaries on the grounds that they are later than the suttas. The only option I would not recommend is to criticise them without investigating them carefully.
What is your main point here in response to nama-rupa as the 6 external objects?
There are also two Sanskrit parallels to SN12.2 with English translations. These also seem to have nama as the four aggregates, excluding rupa.
That the Pali sutta is the only one I’m aware of in the whole Pali canon/Chinese agama that suggests this. The Chinese parallel to it suggests to me that namarupa is in relation to consciousness and not sense objects as such.
In SN12.2, the nidana definition for nama-rupa is provided. Here nama includes contact (phassa), which involves consciousness (vinnana).
Note that most DO suttas don’t describe the mutual conditionality of vinnana and nama-rupa, so I find it puzzling that people have built whole DO theories on an exception.
What I also find puzzling is the claim that vinnana ceases for an Arahant. How does the Arahant see and hear without sense-consciousness?
It’s not that the aggregates have ceased for the Arahant, rather it is clinging to the aggregates which has ceased.
And note how consciousness and wisdom are conjoined in MN43.
The same classification is found in MN.9 too. If you look at MN.18, contact is the meeting of consciousness, senses and sense stimuli. (tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso). In DN.15 the first two links of DO are not found. And in it, there is a reciprocal relationship between consciousness and name & form. In SN 12.67 this reciprocity is compared to two bundles of reeds leaning up against each other.
So how are we to understand all this?. Let me give it a try. Hopefully it will address your query;
DN. 15 says;
“It was said: ‘With name & form as condition there is contact. How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If those features, traits, signs, and indicators (ākāra, liṅga, nimitta, uddesa) through which there is a description of the mental phenomena (nāmakāya) were all absent, would designation-contact (adhivacanasamphasso) be discerned for the physical phenomena (rūpakaya)?
Certainly not, venerable sir.
If those features, traits, signs, and indicators (ākāra, liṅga, nimitta, uddesa) through which there is a description of the physical phenomena were all absent, would impingement-contact (paṭighasamphasso) be discerned in the mental phenomena?
Certainly not, venerable sir.”
Let’s start with ākāra, liṅga, nimitta, uddesa translated respectively as features, traits, signs, and brief descriptions, which according to the Sutta are found in relation to both nāmakāya and rūpakaya respectively translated as mental phenomena and physical phenomena.
Form is the four great elements of earth, water, heat and air. Form is also the form derived from the four great elements. This means that form is basically the physical objects but because of their features, traits, signs and descriptions a mental image is constructed when senses come into contact with them. This mental image is the form derived from the four great elements.
So when for example an object enters the vision path of the eye, because of the features and traits etc. of that object, the mental image rupa takes place while simultaneously nama factors such as feeling, perception, intention and attention too take place. This is the contact which is a crisscrossing between nama & rupa. This means that contact is a hybrid of nama & rupa and this whole process is known by consciousness. In fact this process is nothing but experience and DO regardless of various interpretations must begin here because it is the experience we all grasp with craving mistaking the consciousness as (our) self.
Vinnana does not cease for an Arahant but rather, as you have stated, it is the attachment to the five aggregates of experience that has ceased. This means Arahants do experience but their mind or consciousness or thoughts do not station on any rupa because they have understood that consciousness which normally gets enticed by the features and traits of rupa is like a magician. Anidassana Vinnana is this mental state of freedom from all sense desires.
This is why MN.43 also says that consciousness needs to be understood and wisdom needs to be developed. Developing wisdom means understanding the consciousness as a dependently arisen phenomena rather than as a self. All attachments take place due to lack of this understanding.
If you go deep into the four establishments of mindfulness in DN.22, it is designed with the objective of freeing consciousness from stationing on the four establishments which represent all possible objects where consciousness, mind or thoughts can possibly station with craving or attachment.
With Metta
I don’t think that is right. Proceeding the section you quoted we find this:
“It was said: ‘With consciousness as condition there is namarupa.’
How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If consciousness were not to descend into the mother’s womb, would namarupa take shape in the womb?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would namarupa be generated into this present state of being?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“If the consciousness of a young boy or girl were to be cut off, would namarupa grow up, develop, and reach maturity?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for namarupa, namely, consciousness.
Does it make sense to say that sense objects grow up, develop and mature? I wouldn’t say so. It does however make sense if namarupa means the sense bases. This would match MN 38 where we find this:
Bhikkhus, the descent of the embryo takes place through the union of three things. Here, there is the union of the mother and father, but the mother is not in season, and the gandhabba is not present—in this case no descent of an embryo takes place. Here, there is the union of the mother and father, and the mother is in season, but the gandhabba is not present—in this case too no descent of the embryo takes place. But when there is the union of the mother and father, and the mother is in season, and the gandhabba is present, through the union of these three things the descent of the embryo takes place.
“The mother then carries the embryo in her womb for nine or ten months with much anxiety, as a heavy burden. Then, at the end of nine or ten months, the mother gives birth with much anxiety, as a heavy burden. Then, when the child is born, she nourishes it with her own blood; for the mother’s breast-milk is called blood in the Noble One’s Discipline.
“When he grows up and his faculties mature, the child plays at such games as toy ploughs, tipcat, somersaults, toy windmills, toy measures, toy carts, and a toy bow and arrow.
“When he grows up and his faculties mature still further, the youth enjoys himself provided and endowed with the five cords of sensual pleasure, with forms cognizable by the eye… sounds cognizable by the ear…odours cognizable by the nose… flavours cognizable by the tongue…tangibles cognizable by the body that are wished for, desired, agreeable and likeable, connected with sensual desire, and provocative of lust.
So, namarupa in dependent origination is then that by which we experience sense objects. From this understanding namarupa is then what processes sense experience to give us the sense experience of the 6 sense bases. Essentially nama is the mind base and rupa are the other 5 sense bases. This would also then be why the 6 sense bases and namarupa can be used interchangeably within the suttas. Furthermore it would mean that the Abdhidhammists were onto something when they defined namarupa as “mind and body”.
In DN.15 the first two links of DO are not found.
If we go by the Nettipakaraṇa and Peṭakopadesa, the two guides to Buddhist hermeneutics, then ignorance and sankhara as the proceeding links is implicit within the sutta:
‘When one idea is mentioned, all
Ideas of like characteristic
Are mentioned too: this constitutes
The Mode Conveying Characteristics’
Nettipakaraṇa
@ Martin wrote In SN12.2, the nidana definition for nama-rupa is provided. Here nama includes contact (phassa), which involves consciousness (vinnana).
Nama always includes contact, AKA phassa, because that stimulus/contact gives rise to eye cognition, ear cognition, and other cognitions due to various sensory impacts.
In which sutta does it say otherwise? Pl bring me a few instances from sutta pitaka, or any other EBTs.
You also wrote Note that most DO suttas don’t describe the mutual conditionality of vinnana and nama-rupa, so I find it puzzling that people have built whole DO theories on an exception.
Can you give examples of suttas that reject mutual conditionality of vinnana and nama-rupa.
You also wrote What I also find puzzling is the claim that vinnana ceases for an Arahant. How does the Arahant see and hear without sense-consciousness?
Let us see if we are talking of the same thing. Previously in this interaction i pointed out that the Arahant has gone beyond sense bases with sutta to support that. The Arahant retains sentience as long as his body is alive, and gods and men get to see him. DN1.
There is no upadana-khanda in the Arahant. If so, how can vinnana of Dependent origination arise? H/she has put the cycle of Dependent Origination, to rest. The physical body of the Arahant does not die the moment Arahant’s heart awakens to Dhamma. Awakening or Nibbana has nothing to do with death. The body of the Arahant?? the arahant has no concept that it is his body anymore. He is rid of all conceit. Time, identity, location, are of no concern to the Arahant. He is not restricted by the aggregates. Pl. read the sutta on grasping and worry. SN 22.7 .
The teaching of Anatta is taught as a tool by the Buddha to reflect on each of the 5 skandhas, to let go of attaching to these transient activities of the body, and mind as being who you really are, or who the Arahant is.
With love
@faujidoc1 you brought in some excellent suttas, also very relevant. It makes me think that you already know the answer to the question you ask.
Yet, you say “aggregates associated with that body process can be viewed, if required, dispassionately and without any form of Self Identification, as constantly arising and passing away in accordance with Dhamma viz. Iddapaccaya.hy do you say” What do you mean here? according to the dhamma? Dhamma of Dependent origination? But the arahant is free of all dependencies. How can you call anything his aggregate? He has nothing? not even dependently arisen Vinnana.
You end comment with ‘The Arahant’, being outside the framework of the aggregates to begin with, is now finally released…but how to describe that (un) condition?
The answer is in SN 44.1 excerpt you gave
any form by which a Realized One might be described has been cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A Realized One is freed from reckoning in terms of form.
So however we approach from Rupa angle or Vinnana the answer is the same. Any Rupa or Vinnana (Nama) that a realized one might be described by, has been given up by him. Why do you try to define him by what he has given up? He lays claims on neither vinnana nor rupa. He is the ultimate renunciate.
Thank you for these lovely suttas. You know the answer, to your own question, do not doubt yourself. Every time you introduce a series of suttas you enrich my memory. Thank you
With love
There may be aggragates but no ownership…
Sometimes, the answers are very difficult to integrate intellectually 
As I am sure you know, this is where Samadhi and Vipassana come into their own, to try to experience it and ‘see/comprehend’ it through deeper means than our conditioned intellect.
At best, language is a very cumbersome and imprecise tool. There comes a time to turn the intellect and ‘words’ off 