Best Namarupa translation

Q & A
74

Tangentially, I was actually thinking of writing some comment/post on this in other cultures with beliefs in rebirth. Sometimes ‘names’ are literally a separate factor in rebirth apart from the soul or spirit that relate to what incarnation someone is and their personal identity. The Kwakiutl, for instance, have complex naming systems related in part to their rebirth eschatology. What’s interesting is how nāmarūpa as a concept is still relevant and applicable to other non-Indic cultures in discussing and analyzing their rebirth models — it is not necessarily a useless Brahmanical vestige.

(The same can be said of Western conceptions of reincarnation: What do people mean when they say “John was reborn”? Not all notions of the soul, identity, or personhood are uniform, and many people have non-atomic notions of a soul, allowing the soul of one individual to go several places or several souls to inhabit one individual).

—

Also, I wanted to cite Jurewicz’ ‘Playing With Fire.’ In a footnote, she discusses nāmarūpa as cognized by viññāna compelled by sankhārā and avijjā being parallel to the Vedic structure / cosmogony as well. That is to say, she also acknowledges what Olalde calls the objective/external nāmarūpa which is outside of oneself as faithfully represented by the model of paticcasamuppāda. This is not to say we must agree with her that it is relevant in the context of DA (I think she mentions it as tangential either way with a clear correspondence), but it is there nonetheless. Being a footnote, I imagine it is easily overlooked (unfortunately):

49 This may also be expressed in the terminology of the pratityasamutpdda: the poets meet an unknown object (symbolized in the Rigveda mainly by a rock or the night), which corresponds to the image expressed in the pratitya- samutpdda as avidya; then they assume the subjective form (vijidna), which is probably preceded by the will to get the object (samskāra; the presence of this will is guaranteed by the sexual metaphor used to describe the poets’ activity). The next stage is the recognition of the object and its creation (nāmarūpa). This correspondence with the pratityasamutpdda is especially clear at BU 1.4.4. The idea that man repeats the Absolute’s creative activity is also present in the interpretation of the ritual in SB which is the step-by-step repetition of the cosmogony of Prajapati.

Mettā

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75

There are several German speakers here who you might reach out to for a more accurate translation than Google Translate. For instance @sabbamitta and @georg may or may not have the inclination or time, but it doesn’t hurt to put it out there. :slight_smile:

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76

I don’t know what sort of text this is, but I am rather good at translating from English to German, not so much the other way around. And for any longer text outside of my translation project I don’t really see the capacity to do it. Sorry if I can’t be of much help here.

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Thank you for your kind offer. (And @Adutiya for your kind suggestion.) Thankfully, the text wasn’t really so hard to translate: her language was pretty straightforward. But I do know the horror that machine translation can be. This time, though, it worked out surprisingly well.

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78

What do you think of the term “Embodied cognition” for Namarupa.

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Hi friends, :slight_smile:

I plan to leave this forum for a while soon, but before I do, I wanted to briefly pop in here, since this discussion was sort of still up in the air.

By now I’ve read Olalde’s Zurn Begriff ‘namarupa:’ Das lndividuum im Pali-Kanon (Towards the concept of nāmarūpa: the individual in the Pali Canon) and for those who can read German I can’t recommend it enough. I think it’s the definitive work on nāmarūpa in the Pali Canon. Olalde is clearly a linguist, having the unfortunately all-too-rare ability to recognize which passages are cryptic and which are not. And she also does not infer things which aren’t clearly stated in the texts.

As to our discussion (also here) on whether nāmarūpa refers to the being, to certain external objects, or even to processes of cognition, the book clearly supports the first interpretation (with one exceptoin for SN12.61). For this it brings up many arguments which I won’t repeat here. (Sorry :face_in_clouds:)

But to serve as a sort of summary, page 103 states:

“Interessanterweise beziehen sich die Autoren, die die Interdependenz von nāmarūpa und viññāṇa im Sinne einer Abhängigkeit von Wahrnehmung (viññāṇa) und deren Objekten (nāmarūpa) interpretieren, nur nebenbei auf diese Stelle und stützen ihre Argumentation hauptsächlich auf den Teil des Mahānidānasutta, in dem diese Beziehung eigentlich nicht erklärt wird, sondern die zwischen nāmarūpa und der Berührung (phassa).”

“Interestingly, authors who interpret the interdependency between nāmarūpa and viññāṇa in the sense of a dependency of cognition (viññāṇa) and its objects (nāmarūpa), refer only in passing to this passage [on the actual dependency between the two, e.g., the passage on nāmarūpa and consciousness in the womb] and base their argumentation mainly on that part of the Mahānidāna Sutta which actually does not explain this relationship, but instead that between nāmarūpa and contact (phassa).” (translation and emphasis mine)

This reflects how I generally feel about this topic. Interpreters who see in nāmarūpa something other than aspects of the individual often keep resorting to passages which are tangential, or otherwise cryptic and open to interpretation. Also they tend to interpret words which have rather clear meanings (e.g. ‘conception’) very liberally, sidestepping relevant passages like those on the conception of a fetus (AN3.61) and the passage of the mother’s womb in the Mahānidāna (DN15).

I’m rather boldly guessing now, but perhaps some don’t like that these are the things the Buddha talked about because it doesn’t seem very relevant to their practice. But it becomes clearer why the Buddha did so, and why he specifically used the term nāmarūpa, when considering the brahmanic ideas surrounding it. Olalde explains some of these ideas. I’m still in the process of writing an essay on this topic in which I hope to add some more. I’ll share it on this forum when it’s done, so keep an :eye: out if you’re interested. :wink:

Bye for now!

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Definitely interested!

Admittedly, I am sympathetic to those authors (could I get a page number for that passage?), though I feel like I am more on the fence than the above characterization: I see, perhaps, an evolution of the definition bridging the pre-Buddhist and the classical Buddhist conceptions, consisting mostly of ambiguous passages which could go either way, and still others which are more clearly referring to the individual. As far as passages which unequivocally present it as sense objects, I would have to say that the “external name and form” passage is difficult for me to interpret any other way. But I’d like to hear your (and Olalde’s) thoughts on that passage.

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81

Hi, I’m happy to hear about this book by Olalde, but sadly cannot read German.
Does anyone know if there are plans to bring out the book in an English translation, or if someone has attempted a machine translation, and if so could they share?
Thank you

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82

As I understand 3 life model for DO, the current consciousness and namarupa are the results of the past life’s ignorance and volitional formations; therefore, the ending of current ignorance does not affect the current consciousness and namarupa (they will not cease). Since current consciousness and namarupa (the being) do not cease when current ignorance ceased, current sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, becoming also do not cease. Therefore, even if current ignorance ceased, current craving and clinging do not cease. The current being does not cease and still has sense bases, craving and clinging even if current ignorance ceased without remaining.

If current craving, clinging, becoming do not cease when current ignorance ceased, we must have birth and aging-and-death for the future, then how can we end future birth and suffering?

Do I understand 3 life model correctly?

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103

In the Upaniṣads nāma and rūpa are also commonly used to refer to beings. Olalde says this is actually the older use. (p. 104)

As a unique instance of nāmarūpa referring to external objects. (Or perhaps almost unique, since there are a few other possible candidate passages, but Olalde thinks these are uncertain and can all be interpreted as referring to the being.) The way nāmarūpa is used in this sutta is not how it is ordinarily used in Dependent Arising. It doesn’t depend on consciousness and doesn’t result in the six senses. It is also specifically called “external” nāmarūpa, which must be for a reason. The ordinary nāmarūpa is the condition for the “internal” six senses (which are defined as the eye, ear, etc; not forms, sounds, etc), so it is not external.

In a sense, but you’re over applying it.

The three life model is a commentarial explanation of one way DO can work out in it’s origination mode. Afaik it doesn’t intent to explain the cessation sequence with the three lifetime model.

But that’s a commentarial example anyway. The process is more general in the suttas (and other places in the commentaries), with ignorance and craving together creating the next life.

Putting the factors strictly in three subsequent lives is somewhat of an oversimplification. You rightly point out some problems that arise from doing so.

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84

I think things like

When a person sees, they see name and form,
and having seen, they will know just these things.
Snp 4.13

Pretty unambiguously refer to ‘external’ nāmarūpa or just in general. Other passages like the one in Snp 4.15 also seem to be best understood this way.

One who has no sense of ownership
in the whole realm of name and form,
does not grieve for that which is not,
they suffer no loss in the world.
Snp 4.15

The next verse continues the same idea and talks explicitly of general things.

So personally I think that it is somewhat detrimental to try and oversimplify things for the sake of ease. It’s easier to say “this is kind of complicated, so let’s just say it always means X.” But that doesn’t mean it is reflective of the reality of the situation of course.

That said, the above examples are not in the same general context of dependent arising; they refer to nāmarūpa in different contexts. I agree that nāmarūpa in dependent arising is meant to be the abode or apparatus that consciousness inhabits and co-develops within a particular station. Consciousness ‘descends’ into nāmarūpa in order to continue making contact (phassa) with the world because of craving, grasping, etc. This is also what the Ātman of reality or Brahman does in Brahmanical texts: it descends into nāmarūpa to experience the world it created. So nāmarūpapaccayā phasso.

At SN 12.63 we read:

When consciousness as fuel is completely understood, name and form is completely understood. When name and form are completely understood, a noble disciple has nothing further to do, I say.

I think this relates to the end of DN 15 where the Buddha describes the paññāvimutta arahant as understanding the stations/bases of consciousness and the different types of body/perception that exists there. By understanding the stations of consciousness into which it will descend and co-exist with nāmarūpa, one comes to understand all possible nāmarūpa and the impermanence of viññāna. I’m not sure if you had any thoughts on this passage in SN 12.63, venerable, or a different way to relating to it?

Mettā :slight_smile:

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85

I actually agree with that, but I if i recall correctly Olalde thought it ambiguous.

Nobody is trying to oversimplify or say “it always means X”. (Except for the commentaries, actually, who don’t understand the concept of external nāmarūpa.) I was just referring people to the book, where it is all explained in more detail than I can do justice to here. Nor do I necessarily agree with every little detail.

For example Snp3.6 I think is another reference to external nāmarūpa:

Having studied proliferation and name & form inside and out [or internal and external]—the root of disease;

Olalde thought internal and external didn’t refer to name & form here.

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86

Yeah, I just understood the main message as “Olalde did an extensive study of nāmarūpa in the canon, and it always refers just to the ‘being’ with one exception.” It seemed it would be helpful to be clear that, as you say, there are other examples that I find rather clearly refer to more than the individual being.

Still, these examples are not in the context of what viññānapaccayā nāmarūpam (and vice versa), and they are marginal :slight_smile: The primary sense is certainly the internal one. I think that the other cases/usages just contribute to the connotation or context of the word that can otherwise be missed. Consciousness is trapped ‘living’ inside of nāmarūpa experiencing the manifest, conditioned world; the escape from this is the cessation of both, rather than the everlasting escape. So to me phrases like ‘realm of nāmarūpa’ and so on contribute to my practice and contemplation of rebirth, existence, samsāra, etc.

Venerable, I recall in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s book on the Mahānidāna Sutta with the commentaries, he talked about how the aggregates include both internal and external domains, and how nāmarūpa would include these external ones as well. I don’t know if this was his opinion, or quoting a commentarial passage.

In the actual commentary on nāmarūpa and contact though, they talk about nāmarūpa including the internal and external bases as sense doors and their objects. The ‘rūpa’ of nāmarūpa they include for both, and the ‘nāma’ part is the supporting aggregates associated with contact/recognition/etc. with each door or object. So it seems they may have understood it as sometimes including external things, but I’m not very knowledgable of the commentary or how they express their philosophical ideas, so I could be mistaken. Then there is the Dharmaguptaka Abhidhamma which @cdpatton generously shared where they understand the term as having an external meaning as well. So maybe there is commentarial basis for this reading, even if they seem to overlook it most of the time?

Mettā :pray:

87

In The Word of the Buddha (1927) pg. 56 Nyanatiloka Maháthera translates (although I prefer to describe it as explains) it as

On consciousness depends the mental and physical existence (náma-rúpa)

I prefer this simpler translation. It seems better at conveying the idea of Thanissaro’s Name & Form, but in a more digestible context. Bodhi’s translation Mentality, Materiality, along with that of other translators, seems a bit vague to me.

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It seems to me that 3 life model has this problem because of misunderstanding of namarupa as a being. If the model only works in one way and not the other way then it is not the correct model for DO. The correct model should work for both.

If we think namarupa is a being then we should have a model that can satisfy DO in both way with namarupa as a being. If we cannot find any model that can do so because it will lead to conflict with the current definition of namarupa then we should re-examine the current definition of namarupa. That is what I see.

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89

Sorry, I realize by trying to be succinct I didn’t explain things very well. Olalde concludes there is only one clear reference to external namarupa, being SN12.19. Some others they think are candidates, but they’re never definitive.

But I do think some others are pretty much definitive. (But notably they are pretty much all verse, and not very explanatory.)

Same problem with me trying to be succinct, I suppose. :smiling_face: I havent read the entire commentaries, of course, but in SN12.19 the commentaries think external namarupa means other beings, not things. So you’re right the commentary refers to external namarupa but it the still takes namarupa to refer to beings. (Or the five khandhas of others.)

And since it doesn’t recognize external objects here I was assuming it doesn’t do so anywhere else either.

It is indeed a model, in the meaning ‘model’ being an example of how to think about DO. It is not the full picture, and thinking that it is, is not understanding its purpose. Again, the problem is not with the model but with over applying it.

We do have that, which is that of the suttas, where ignorance and craving cease together. There is no problem with this as long as we don’t insist the 12 factors are purely sequential. Which would cause a lot of other problems as well, also in other interpretations. For example, then craving would only cease after feeling ceases.

How do you interpret this link between feeling and craving? If ignorance is not somehow also a direct condition for craving, it makes little sense whatever way we interpret namarupa.

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In SN 12.19, it seems the term “kaya” (“group”; “collection”) refers to the internal five aggregates because the dyad of internal “kaya” and “external namarupa” result in sense contact. External namarupa here seems to refer to external bodies & mental inclinations of others.

The idea above sounds like a Commentary idea rather than an EBT idea. The EBTs literally say nama is feeling, perception, intention, contact & attention. which seems to obviously refer to the culmination of inappropriate attention towards the previously arisen sankharas. I suggest MN 19 as explaining this reality.

Is there typing errors above?

The above seems to depart from the principle of “pariyāya” (“order of sequence”) found in AN 5.159; thus also possibly departing from the Dhamma Refuge principle of “svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo”. To me, this would lead to utter chaos in relation to Refuge.

Ignorance is obviously a condition for craving however it seems DO is emphasizing craving arising from sense contact. In other words, SN 22.81 explains how ignorance first taints sense contact, using the term “avijjāsamphassajena”. If ignorance was a “direct condition”, I think the Buddha would have used the word “hetu” rather than “paccaya”.

91

Read some of the literature quoted in the thread. It pretty obviously means external objects more broadly. It’s the same teaching as those on phassa, where the sense and external object result in feelings. But here it’s worded differently with the “body [with the mind]” and “external nāmarūpa”.

Exactly.

Yes. Will edit it, thanks.

This principle means you teach sequentially. In other words, you don’t start with the deep ideas that people aren’t ready for. It has nothing to do with how the factors in DO are related.

Bhikkhus, it is said: ‘A first point of craving for existence, bhikkhus, is not seen such that before this there was no craving for existence and afterward it came into being.’ Still, craving for existence is seen to have a specific condition. “I say, bhikkhus, that craving for existence has a nutriment; it is not without nutriment. And what is the nutriment for craving for existence? It should be said: ignorance. (AN10.62)

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Why would I read a commentary? This would mean the Buddha was a sloppy teacher.

I don’t read any “with the mind” in the Pali. Again, these ideas are not EBT; again suggesting the Buddha was sloppy/careless with words. The easy way is to simply give up attachment to the word “kaya” meaning “physical body”.

Yes, as i suggested, the words “paccaya” & “ahara” are used above rather than “hetu”. Regardless, AN 10.62 seems to have no relevance whatsoever in explaining the twelve conditions of dependent origination.

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What is your point? :thinking: I’m not saying you should. Nor am I the defending the commentaries here. In fact I was saying this three lifetime model is very limited.

That’s why I bracketed it. But all the Chinese parallels have it, so it is EBT. It’s rather probably dropped from the Pali. I do agree kāya doesn’t mean physical body, though, which is perhaps why “with consciousness” was dropped. We find this phrase “kāya with viññāṇa” in various other places in the Pali anyway.

I dont understand your point here. The two are basically synonyms and used like synonyms throughout the canon. Regardless, isn’t it obvious ignorance underlies craving?