Bhava doesn't mean 'becoming'

Thanks for the references!

You haven’t mentioned the common phrase bhavataṇhā (and the related bhavarāga). Using “becoming”, this would have to be rendered as “craving for becoming”, which is essentially craving for change. Change, of course, is a problem, not something we crave for.

The one thing in your write-up I do not quite agree with is that bhava does not have a kammically active side. Bhava is properly defined in only two suttas in the Canon, that is, AN3.76 and AN3.77. Both of these suttas show the link between kamma and its result. The sense I get from this is that bhava bridges the gap between lives, showing how the existence in one life leads to a particular result in the next, often via an intermediate existence.

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Bhante. I recall viewing a post from 2016 where you posted Bhikkhu Bodhi mistranslated “kamabhava” as “sense-sphere existence”. Assuming you have not changed your view about this, Dependent Origination refers to sensual bhava, form bhava & formless bhava. If bhava means “a life”, this seems it would imply: (i) a type of bhava, such as “sensual”, is fixed; and (ii) no change from say “sensual existence” is possible during a lifetime. This seems it would then imply a Non-Sensual Noble Eightfold Path is not possible to practice & complete. Have I misunderstood something here? Thank you :saluting_face:

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I have no recollection of saying this, nor do I agree with it!

I would say that within a single life you are both trapped and capable of change. You are trapped in the sense that you cannot fully escape that life until you get reborn elsewhere, or ideally attain final extinguishment. On the other hand, you can change the inclination of your mind from leaning towards sensuality to leaning towards meditation, including the jhānas. It is the inclination of your mind that will determine your next rebirth.

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It is here: A mistranslation in the analysis of dependent origination?

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Thanks! My issue here is with the word “sphere”. “Sphere” tends to suggest a world “out there”, whereas the Dhamma focuses on personal experience. Saṃsāra is the personal experience of repeated birth and death, not an objective reality in itself. I base this view on such suttas as the Rohitassa Sutta, AN4.45.

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Hey all,

That’s an interesting point, Ajahn. I would also say “becoming” misses the whole context of the dhamma, of what leads to suffering and what we need to end to end suffering, namely rebirth.

Continued existence (bhava) is a vital condition for rebirth. Rebirth (jati) is a vital condition for suffering. (SN12.23)

So how then do you reconcile the suttas that say bhava ends at parinibbana only, and that the arahant still has bhava? They don’t have karma anymore.

I do not think those suttas (AN3.76-77) include karma in bhava. To me they say karma results in bhava, not that they are the same. So I like Ven. Sujato’s translation:

“If, Ānanda, there were no deeds (kamma) to result in the sensual realm, would continued existence (bhava) in the sensual realm still come about?”

As long as you have a human body, you are bound to the sensual realm. The mind may temporarily achieve the “formless” states, for example, but you can’t stay there forever. It only is “formless bhava” for beings that are reborn in those places, that live in those realms permanently. Although some translations obscurify it, AN3.67 clearly talks about rebirth.

That’s how there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future. (AN3.76)

Here “rebirth into a new state of existence” renders “punabbhavābhinibbatti”. Both the terms punabbhava and abhinibbati imply rebirth. Abhinibbatti for example is found in the definition of birth. (SN12.2)

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So the Buddha did not have a human body? :saluting_face:

  1. (He has) well-placed feet,
  2. under the soles of his feet there is the mark of a wheel,
  3. the heels of his feet are long and deep,
  4. his fingers are long,
  5. his hands and feet are webbed,
  6. his hands and feet are soft and tender,
  7. his body has seven prominent marks,
  8. his calves are like an antelope’s,
  9. what is covered by a cloth is ensheathed,
  10. his torso is like a lion’s,
  11. between his shoulders it is firm,
  12. his upper back is even all round,
  13. the arms hang low without bending,
  14. the limbs are bright,
  15. his neck (has lines) like a conch,
  16. his jaw is like a lion’s,
  17. his forty teeth are even,
  18. his teeth are without gaps,
  19. his teeth are very white,
  20. his tongue is large,
  21. his taste buds are supremely sensitive,
  22. his voice is like Brahmā’s or like the sound of the cuckoo,
  23. his eyes are very dark,
  24. his eyes have eyelashes like a cow’s,
  25. he has fine skin,
  26. he has golden skin,
  27. his body-hairs arise singly,
  28. his body-hairs bristle and turn to the right,
  29. the hair of his head is very dark,
  30. the tuft of hair between the eyebrows on his forehead is very white,
  31. he has a protuberance on the head,
  32. his (body) is well-proportioned like a banyan tree.

So bhava is “rebirth” and jati is “rebirth”. Are you saying “rebirth” is the condition for “rebirth”? While the 3-life-model is well-accepted in Buddhism, my impression is you are proposing a 4-life-model. Is this the case? Thank you :saluting_face:

Venerable. How would you differentiate/distinguish the use of the English word “existence = lifetime” above with the term “atthita = existence” in SN 12.15? Thank you :saluting_face:

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Absolutely.

I haven’t looked up the references you supply. On general grounds, however, the way bhava is defined in these suttas, it includes the life that is a result of past kamma. The arahant still has this existence, and so it would be wrong to say they do not have bhava.

But these suttas are definitions of bhava. Why does the Buddha include the kammic process if it is irrelevant? If bhava meant mere life in a particular realm, then there are simpler and more precise ways of saying this.

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Is not “bhava” one of the three asava? How does the term “asava” reconcile with the view “bhava” refers to a lifetime? :saluting_face:

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Perhaps Bhava = Experience of Existence ? :thinking:

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Some good points by @CurlyCarl

If you say that bhava doesn’t cease in this life, then dukkha doesn’t cease in this life either. Either Dependent Origination is a one life model where bhava ceases along with everything else in a single life, or a multi life model where anything after bhava (like dukkha) ceases in another life/death. I don’t think you can hold on to both interpretations at the same time as they’re not compatible.

Another thing is that I don’t believe bhavatanha is easily discerned, as a common pattern in the suttas show that to discern something you have to “turn it off” or “calm” it, and this leads to knowledge, hence the importance of jhanas. You need seclusion from sensual desire to discern the patterns of the mind for example. If bhavatanha was easily discerned then there would be no need for jhanas, which is also a visuddhimagga interpretation. So once again, you can’t hold on to both interpretations at the same time as they are incompatible.

Depends on the interpretation you subscribe to. If you subscribe to a phenomological existential dhamma one life dependent origination model, then yes bhava, bhavatanha, vibhavatanha, etc… have to do with 3 poisons resulting in certain cravings and classes of experience.

If you believe dependent origination is not entirely visible here and now, bhava and dukkha cease only at death, a multi life dependent origination model, etc… then bhava is not anything more then where you’re born, and bhavatanha means where you want to be reborn.

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Hi Sunyo,

Yes, but the event of physical birth is cognized. That is to say, it is only through cognition that a certain experience is understood/ known as physical birth, i.e. child-birth. And it is exactly this process of cognition that the buddha explained with DO, i.e. birth of the self, and birth of suffering.

This doesn’t align with sabbe dhamma anatta.

But DO doesn’t start with craving.

All the best to you.

Warm regards,
Peter

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But where exactly did the Buddha literally explain in DO there is the birth of the self? In the definition of “jati” in SN 12.2 or MN 9, the word 'self" is not even mentioned. :saluting_face:

MN 9 explains DO starts with an asava (impulse) of sensuality, becoming &/or ignorance. ‘Becoming’ here seems to logically refer to a past becoming re-emerging. Any becoming must include craving. Therefore, DO, according to MN 9, seems to start with some type of craving-like impulse.

For example, if we take a Secular Western approach, a new born baby has a few primary needs or impulses, such as the desire to eat food and the desire to be physically comforted. While these impulses obviously arise from ignorance, surely they are a starting point of DO, similar to as described in MN 9.

In other words, contrary to your book, it seems a young child is not generating names of forms which then somehow is creating craving without any inherent underlying instinctual sensual impulse. In reality, it seems the baby has forms of sensual impulses & craving prior to its ability to name any forms. Thus, as previously suggested, your books view of ‘nama-rupa’ seems based on Theistic ideologies where a God (per the Bible) or Devata (per the Upanishads) starts to name the forms it creates via its random will.

But the Buddha did not teach like this. The Buddha taught there are “asava” co-joined with “ignorance”. For example, fish do not have sexual desires towards human females. But human males have sexual desires towards human females, not because they name the form of a female, but because there is a biological programming causing these desires to arise towards human females but not towards female fish. :slightly_smiling_face:

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This is an important point and I think it’s related to what has been discussed and debated on D&D several times.

One view appears to be that while still living and while the khandhas are still present, an arahant is utterly free of all dukkha. Clearly, the “second arrow” as in SN36.6 is extinguished and “mental stress” is not present. However, physical pain is still experienced due to the presence of the khandhas. But some view this as not being dukkha.

However, others, including several Venerables, offer a view that until the khandhas have completely ceased, as in parinibbāna, some dukkha remains, i.e. like physical pain, (even without clinging, identification, or aversion). So only parinibbāna, after the death of an arahant, is the utter and complete cessation of dukkha, with no possibility of any form of suffering. Not even an itch. :slightly_smiling_face: Such as in Iti44.
Same with bhava. It does not fully cease during a life, but can only fully cease with parinibbāna. In this way, there’s no contradiction.

With respect and heartfelt best wishes :pray:

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This whole ‘debate’ seems like two camps talking past each other.

In brief:

  1. Physical pain doesn’t make the arahant suffer.
  2. The arahant experiences physical pain, which is suffering.

These are not two compatible positions to put against one another. Physical pain itself is dukkha—what else would it be? But that doesn’t mean it causes any form of suffering for the arahant. In order for it to do so, there must be clinging / identification with that which is dukkha. This is clear all throughout the khandha samyutta: the cessation of clinging and identification frees one from reckoning in terms of that which was clung to. This includes dukkha, in fact, it’s precisely the point of the teaching. That of course does not mean physical pain magically disappears. It still occurs, it just no longer pertains to the arahant.

So these are not contradictory, and I fail to see how any debate about it is anything other than people not listening to one another.

On a related note, this is like the “is the arahant in samsāra?” debate. Any reading of MN 1 should make it clear that to say “X is in/on/with/etc. Y” is just self-view and/or an instance of conceit. The arahant cannot be reckoned in terms of or identified with anything in samsara anymore—unlike the non-arahant—and so to assign them such an identification is not true to their experience. And yet obviously nobody reasonable who is authentically sticking to the suttas is claiming that the aggregates magically fall out of samsara into another dimension or that the arahant exists in some mystical nibbana-land at the same time. People do claim this of course, but it’s clearly wrong to many people on each “camp.” The arahant being within samsāra is true as a designation of the aggregates. But as the Buddha said: the arahant is deep and profound like the ocean, hard to fathom, for not being found within any of the aggregates.

Mettā

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With respect, you appear to be taking a strong stand on what is “hard to fathom” and whether dukkha, in some form, applies or not.

It’s true that much here depends on understanding of the suttas, what they’re pointing to, and the “definitions” people are using for dukkha and arahant. Neither of which can be precisely defined. So imo that’s what’s contributing to the controversy.

While endless speculations about this and arguments over who “is right” are not productive, reasonable engagement to clarify points of controversy can be helpful – we see how each viewpoint affects the practices and the degree of Right View for ourselves and other practitioners. So exchanges like this imo can help to clarify aspects of the teachings.
I mean, this whole topic has been about the “meaning” of bhava, with a number of different viewpoints exchanged, even amongst the Venerables. To good purpose!

These positions are not the only way of looking into this issue.
Drop the “arahant” and we can have just: “physical pain is suffering.” That’s all. Just that. And until the khandhas fully cease, pain is pain, pain is dukkha, and it all utterly ceases only with parinibbāna.

Same with bhava, as discussed in prior posts here. Before death, bhava is still present even after arahanthood, (as per several of the earlier posts).
And since existence is suffering SN 36.11, SN 12.1 and other suttas, and extinguishment (parinibbana) is bliss, AN9.34, how we view these aspects of the teachings can affect one’s practice.

But, yes, at some point these discussions can go around and around…so, hopefully, a middle way is found. :slightly_smiling_face:

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Hi kaccayanagotta,

The different positions come from a different understanding of DO. The people who take DO to be speaking of the process of the physical birth of a child, forget that it is through cognition that the event of child-birth is known as such, and one can never contradict this. So DO is not replacing the biological evolution of humans through metabolism and cell division, for a magical tale of ignorance as something floating around creating physical bodies out of thin air. Instead, DO explains how the process of cognition leads to the appropriation of that what is cognized as child-birth to be that of the self, and how this leads to suffering.

So the one camp is believing this magical tale through which they experience live as inherently suffering, and believe this to be the teaching of the Buddha. They try to convince the other camp that experiencing life as suffering is actually what the buddha meant with ‘liberation from suffering’, in order to support their belief.

The other camp is trying to explain the first camp that life doesn’t need to be experienced as suffering, when one understands DO as a process of cognition, and sabbe dhamma anatta, because it leads to liberation from suffering in the here-and-now.

So this is not really a serious debate, and you are right that people are just not listening to each other. For the second camp, there is no need to listen to the first camp, because they have already understood anatta, and they see that the arguments of the first camp are not supported by the suttas, besides that those in the first camp are, instead of liberated from suffering, experiencing life in its entirety as suffering.

For the first camp, there is no need to listen to the second camp, because they want to stick to their beliefs no matter what? They take the commentaries as an authority instead of their own experience? They have invested too much in their role playing act? They are too conceited? Ashamed to admit that they are wrong? Don’t want to give up their power position? Don’t want to give up their reputation? I don’t know the answer to this, as I am not in the first camp.

Warm regards,
Peter

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@Jasudho @Vaddha

To me dukkha in the first noble truth is psychological. For example, how can death be stressful if death isn’t experienced? As Epicurus says “Death is nothing to us. When we exist, death is not; and when death exists, we are not”, in short death can’t be experienced. Even in Buddhism, the aggregates die and experience ends, so one can experience dying but not death itself. “Death” only exists as a concept, and cannot actually be directly known for oneself, because the faculty of “knowing” is not functional at that point.

So the issue of death, aging, illness, etc… is psychological not physical. This is especially emphasized at the end of the first noble truth.

The first noble truth:

Now this, monks, is the noble truth of stress:[1] Birth is stressful, aging is stressful, death is stressful; sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair are stressful; association with the unbeloved is stressful, separation from the loved is stressful, not getting what is wanted is stressful. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are stressful.

So in my opinion, physical pain and parinibbana is irrelevant. The issue is craving for a self and the psychological outcomes of it.

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The above seems incorrect. It seems the Buddha was not bound to the sensual bhava because it seems sensual bhava is a state of mind.

Also, I have never read the term “sensual realm” (“kamaloka”) in the EBTs. Possibly you could offer a quote for me. I have already read about human, godly, ghost, animal & hell realm.

Note: This matter is unrelated to denial of “rebirth”. “Jati” is there to accommodate ‘rebirth’; as has been held for 100s of years by Buddhists. For example, it seems explicitly clear in DN 15 that the various human, godly, animal realms, etc, are included in “jati”.

Again, the above seems contrary to Dhamma principles. These ideas seem to completely ignore the transcendent (lokuttara) state of Noble Ones.

“Bhava” obviously does not mean a “lifetime existence”. The suttas refer to “bhava” as an “asava”. An “asava” is a mental defilement.

It seems to not be “some” translations but merely one translation. AN 3.67 does not seem to refer to “rebirth”.

The word “abhinibbati” seems to simply means “production”, as found in MN 93 about “producing” heat from fire. Thus, in the context of AN 3.67, new becoming is “produced”. In the context of SN 12.2, new jati is “produced”. “Abhinibbati” seems to be neither a synonym for “bhava” or “jati”; just as “bhava” seems not a synonym for “jati”.

To conclude, again, your ideas may lead to a sabotaging of Dhamma practice. “Bhava” seems to mean “mental becoming” or “mental existence”, regardless of whether a Buddhist believes in rebirth or not. It is the state of mental becoming that determines the “jati” of human, godly, ghost, animal or hell. If practitioners ignore bhava; ignoring what states their mind are commonly or predominantly “established” in, then it seems they won’t be above to determine their future state. :no_mouth:

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Thanks for sharing.

In the suttas, the “psychological” is not so differentiated as it has become in modern times, (especially after Descartes and the subsequent mind-body problem).
Certainly, as you wrote, craving generates existence, (re)birth, etc. → dukkha.

But, as we know, consciousness depends on nāmarūpa and vice versa. So form including, but not limited to, kāya (body) is intrinsic to all states of human existence. There is no merely “the psychological.”

Also, the Buddha sums up dukkha with the last part of the quote you posted:

Here again, this of course includes form along with the other khandhas.
Since form is intrinsic to human existence and since pain in the kāya is perceived, felt, and cognized through the other aggregates (even when there is no grasping or identification with them), it seems reasonable to consider the possibility that such pain is dukkha in and of itself regardless of “psychological states” – until all the aggregates cease completely, (parinibbāna).

We’ll know when we get there, so to speak… :slightly_smiling_face:

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