Hi all 
Well, you replied to me first. So it would seem to me considerable if you engaged my argument, rather than drawing us into a tangent about logic, just because of a little mistake, where through quick and careless typing I called it a logical fallacy instead of an illogical fallacy—just semantics with no bearing on my actual argument. Either way, I did acknowledge the distinction as well as my mistake. I also said why I think your syllogism is inaccurate and, despite that, which premise I disagreed with. So I don’t think I neglected your point. I just don’t want to get bogged down in this, like we indeed are now… With respect, I don’t think this is the place for Logic 101, with the assumption that I and/or others don’t appreciate it. So let’s move on from that?
Again I think that’s not a proper rewording of the premise. His argument is that in a particular text the Buddha doesn’t say such things (and not just clearly but not at all). That is an important difference from the Buddha never saying these things—if anything because it (usefully) limits the scope of what we would be discussing. Also, because that is the actual argument. I read Ven Anālayo’s book and I can’t remember him suggesting the premise that the Buddha never says such things (although, again, he probably thinks so, and concludes as much). And even if Ven Anālayo were to suggest this elsewhere, that is still not what I was replying to, not the argument that was introduced by Pyjter.
To quote Ven Anālayo again:
Since Upasīva’s query concerned either annihilation or an eternal condition, it seems that he should be envisaged as operating under the assumption that there is a self. Hence, there may have been an additional need [for the Buddha] to clarify that there is no self in the first place to be extinguished or perpetuated. But that [doesn’t happen because that is] not beyond the reach of language […]. Thus, the reply to Upasīva does not fit the assumption that Nirvana is a mere nothingness […]
So the syllogism I think should be something like:
- Premise 1: When asked by Upasīva about eternalism and annihilationism, the Buddha should clarify that he teaches the remainderless cessation of mere self-less processes (aka what Anālayo calls a “nothingness” that yet isn’t the result of annihilating a self).
- Premise 2: He doesn’t do so.
- Conclusion: Therefore, he didn’t teach that.
I would reject both premises. If accepting the premises, we can logically conclude the Buddha didn’t teach it to Upasīva. However, I think the general conclusion is unwarranted as well—which from the wider context is that he therefore doesn’t teach it at all, to anyone.
To clarify, Ven A. makes an almost identical argument based on MN22, where the Buddha is accused of teaching annihilation of a self. He thinks that in his response the Buddha’s should have clarified that what he teaches is the cessation of self-less suffering. The Buddha doesn’t, is the thinking (although it seems to me he very much does); therefore, he didn’t teach that. Again, even if technically this is logically valid, this is still flawed reasoning; it is still illogical. I could likewise ask why the Buddha didn’t simply respond to the accusation by saying he taught a type of lasting transcendental experience, like Anālayo thinks. The Buddha doesn’t; therefore, he doesn’t teach that, I could argue. But this is an argument from ignorance, going by what is not said.
But let’s put aside MN22 and let’s focus on the Upasiva Sutta first, for we haven’t really gotten much further than my first post. Instead of zoning in on the logic issue, if you can help me realize where my argument is actually wrong or how Ven Anālayo’s is right, I would appreciate that. I am thinking of replying in a more official form to Ven Anālayo and it’s good to get some feedback to remove potential blinders on my side.
I thought as much, but that’s still just falling back on semantics about what “thing” and “existence” and “real” mean to you, which is different from what they mean to most people—including the Buddha, as far as we can tell, because he often affirmatively espoused the existence of things using the verb atthi (like here, specifically in context of the middle teaching). So I think it’s also a misunderstanding of atthitā & natthitā, see a brief explanation here. Anyway, if you don’t want to answer the question, which seems to me to have only two possible answers (yes and no), that is fine.
And to go back a bit (somewhat off topic but anyway):
I think that’s generally a good observation. But moreover, we actually can be sure that there has been editing here, because the manuscripts are inconsistent. None of them actually correctly attributes the quote to the Buddha. The Burmese one sort of does, but does it in a broken way. All others (PTS, Sri Lankan, and Thai) are not broken and attribute the quote to Brahma Baka. So to me it’s quite clear that the editing happened in the Burmese one. Alternatively, the others were edited, or all of them, but either way, because there are differences, there was some editing for sure.
If by the Dharmaguptaka parallel you are referring to DA24, the translation by Patton indeed uses “formless” but the Chinese term is different from the usual symbol for ‘form’ (形 instead of 色), so in that sense it is not clearer than the Pāli.