SuttaCentral
Wandering ever further into the haze, it is like providing a type checker to a prose conversation. Type checkers are enormously useful in programming to guard against bugs and to indicate soundness of an algorithm. Whether the program does what you want it to do is another question, but with the type checker at least you know the code is sound according to the types of the underlying language.
I had in mind atthitā & natthitā. Dhammas arises and cease due to conditions. Because of that they can’t be reified. Without substantial existence they can’t be said to be real. Without them being real, we can’t say if they truly cease. We can’t talk of individual things either, because dependent origination also means emptiness of essence. So dhammas arise and cease, but ultimately we can’t speak of arising or ceasing of anything. That is nibbāna.
I can potentially understand this in two ways:
You have a positive proof that the definition of Nibbana given is incompatible with N8FP and are stating a conclusion. If so, I would like to see this proof and broken down as you do with other arguments in this thread and presented in a formalish way.
You are unsure of how the proposed definition of Nibbana can be reconciled with N8FP as it seems from general intuition incompatible and are thus asking for more dialogue to help you confirm this intuition or possibly refute it.
Is it one of these two and if so which?
It is the second. It looks to me like what has been given is just a description of dhammas. I think maybe what was meant was the [realization of the truth] of that description.
Is this definition of nibbana compatible with the cessation of dukkha of three types:
If so, how? Note: I am not presupposing your definition is incompatible at all. I’m asking for clarification on how/if you understand your definition to lead to the cessation of above?
Be careful with using the word “real” here as it is not defined and I have found in the past that various people are quite attached to various definitions which might not necessarily fit with the usage you put it to here.
I don’t object to your usage here with any passion, but it does not necessarily fit with my preferred definition: something is said to be real if and only if it actually exists in the way it appears to exist. On a mundane level individual things are real as they exist as individual things and appear to so exist. I think you might agree with this but your usage above can be ambiguously read to deny it.
Further, if you use my preferred definition, then it is not straightforward how you go from not being real to not being able to say if they truly cease. Just because things don’t actually exist as they appear to exist does not mean that we can’t say if they truly exist.
Of course, you are under no obligation to use my preferred definition at all and I don’t mean to suggest otherwise. I’m just trying to point out that definitions matter and “real” is a particularly tricky one as so many cling very hard so being explicit about what you mean might be advantageous.
Perhaps it would be useful to breakdown your definition into formalish as @Soren has been doing in this thread to illuminate definitions and premises so as to try and prevent anyone getting lost in the haze.
I tend to read that more as
Or, more deeply
How it compatible? When one sees the emptiness in all things, then the condition for continued rebirth is severed.
Ah, that appears to my mind as perhaps too narrow a definition or understanding of dukkha and the problem. Of course, it is possible that I am misunderstanding you but all three forms of dukkha I think can be and are experienced in everyday phenomenal life.
The third type - the all pervasive dukkha of phenomenal existence - seems particularly important to address with any definition of nibbana. Well, not to diminish the importance of the other two, but your definition of nibbana is not foreign to me.
I recognize it quite clearly as an attempt at stating the middle way school understanding of Nagarjuna. Understanding how that is compatible with the cessation of the three types of dukkha and thus compatible with the 4NT and N8FP is quite important.
I agree. There is no conflict between the two, which is why we see the traditional presentation of the 12-link formula of dependent origination in the MMK.
How would you validate this?
Investigation and analysis whose details would depend upon what was being analyzed.
I do not understand what you say. I give an example: you might experience an object as green, with a certain shape, as solid, with a certain hardness. We know that this ofcourse also depends on how our senses work, nerves, brain, mind.
But how do you determine how it actually exist? What does it mean…actually exist?
You investigate and analyze the thing in question and if you discover a discrepancy between how it appears and the results of that analysis, then you conclude it is not real. If on the other hand, you can discover no discrepancy after deep analysis and investigation then we say it is real according to our best understanding.
Can you give an example.
Sure.
You are walking through the Sahara parched and looking for water desperately. You see a glare or reflection in the distance and water appears to your mind. You walk closer and closer convinced that your parched throat will soon be satiated. As you draw even closer the mirage evaporates and you discover to your horror that the water you saw was not real. They way it appeared and the way it actually is is not concordant.
Or take the case of the older woman who sees holes in the world wherever she looks. The holes that she sees are not real. By investigating further she discovers the way they appear is not in concordance with what they actually are. Cataracts in her eyes.
I think it’s important to define nothingness too.
I would map “the highest level of nothingness, without any possibility of anything arising again” to Parinibbana, or after the death of an arahant.
Hi all 
Well, you replied to me first. So it would seem to me considerable if you engaged my argument, rather than drawing us into a tangent about logic, just because of a little mistake, where through quick and careless typing I called it a logical fallacy instead of an illogical fallacy—just semantics with no bearing on my actual argument. Either way, I did acknowledge the distinction as well as my mistake. I also said why I think your syllogism is inaccurate and, despite that, which premise I disagreed with. So I don’t think I neglected your point. I just don’t want to get bogged down in this, like we indeed are now… With respect, I don’t think this is the place for Logic 101, with the assumption that I and/or others don’t appreciate it. So let’s move on from that?
Again I think that’s not a proper rewording of the premise. His argument is that in a particular text the Buddha doesn’t say such things (and not just clearly but not at all). That is an important difference from the Buddha never saying these things—if anything because it (usefully) limits the scope of what we would be discussing. Also, because that is the actual argument. I read Ven Anālayo’s book and I can’t remember him suggesting the premise that the Buddha never says such things (although, again, he probably thinks so, and concludes as much). And even if Ven Anālayo were to suggest this elsewhere, that is still not what I was replying to, not the argument that was introduced by Pyjter.
To quote Ven Anālayo again:
Since Upasīva’s query concerned either annihilation or an eternal condition, it seems that he should be envisaged as operating under the assumption that there is a self. Hence, there may have been an additional need [for the Buddha] to clarify that there is no self in the first place to be extinguished or perpetuated. But that [doesn’t happen because that is] not beyond the reach of language […]. Thus, the reply to Upasīva does not fit the assumption that Nirvana is a mere nothingness […]
So the syllogism I think should be something like:
I would reject both premises. If accepting the premises, we can logically conclude the Buddha didn’t teach it to Upasīva. However, I think the general conclusion is unwarranted as well—which from the wider context is that he therefore doesn’t teach it at all, to anyone.
To clarify, Ven A. makes an almost identical argument based on MN22, where the Buddha is accused of teaching annihilation of a self. He thinks that in his response the Buddha’s should have clarified that what he teaches is the cessation of self-less suffering. The Buddha doesn’t, is the thinking (although it seems to me he very much does); therefore, he didn’t teach that. Again, even if technically this is logically valid, this is still flawed reasoning; it is still illogical. I could likewise ask why the Buddha didn’t simply respond to the accusation by saying he taught a type of lasting transcendental experience, like Anālayo thinks. The Buddha doesn’t; therefore, he doesn’t teach that, I could argue. But this is an argument from ignorance, going by what is not said.
But let’s put aside MN22 and let’s focus on the Upasiva Sutta first, for we haven’t really gotten much further than my first post. Instead of zoning in on the logic issue, if you can help me realize where my argument is actually wrong or how Ven Anālayo’s is right, I would appreciate that. I am thinking of replying in a more official form to Ven Anālayo and it’s good to get some feedback to remove potential blinders on my side.
I thought as much, but that’s still just falling back on semantics about what “thing” and “existence” and “real” mean to you, which is different from what they mean to most people—including the Buddha, as far as we can tell, because he often affirmatively espoused the existence of things using the verb atthi (like here, specifically in context of the middle teaching). So I think it’s also a misunderstanding of atthitā & natthitā, see a brief explanation here. Anyway, if you don’t want to answer the question, which seems to me to have only two possible answers (yes and no), that is fine.
And to go back a bit (somewhat off topic but anyway):
I think that’s generally a good observation. But moreover, we actually can be sure that there has been editing here, because the manuscripts are inconsistent. None of them actually correctly attributes the quote to the Buddha. The Burmese one sort of does, but does it in a broken way. All others (PTS, Sri Lankan, and Thai) are not broken and attribute the quote to Brahma Baka. So to me it’s quite clear that the editing happened in the Burmese one. Alternatively, the others were edited, or all of them, but either way, because there are differences, there was some editing for sure.
If by the Dharmaguptaka parallel you are referring to DA24, the translation by Patton indeed uses “formless” but the Chinese term is different from the usual symbol for ‘form’ (形 instead of 色), so in that sense it is not clearer than the Pāli.
I understand that, thanks. Your examples were helpful
I am gonna take some time rest and pauze for a few days.
Okay, you are right, this has been my mistake. In my original post I should have been more explicit and added something like, “what I am saying here is not a direct engagement of your argument (yet).” So I apologize for that, because I think that from your point of view that is the most natural assumption to make about my initial reply to you.
I agree you did not neglect my point, but you have so far said:
So what it seems to me that you have done is:
So yes, I don’t think you totally neglect my point, but the attempts in (2)-(6) above to shift the discussion away from my point would neglect my point. As for point(3), I again have to say that this was my mistake to begin with. What I was saying was not supposed to be a refutation or a counterargument to what you had written, but instead was the beginning of an approach to the issue from a different angle.
I do not have the assumption that others do not appreciate what I am saying. As far whether or not you appreciate it, it does not seem to me like you have, because you say
but to me this is not at all the distinction I am trying to make, and I have never heard of the distinction between a logical and an illogical fallacy? I am making the distinction between a “valid” and a “sound” argument. Anyway, I know that you are intelligent, so maybe when you said “logical fallacy vs illogical fallacy” that was your shorthand way of referring to the distinction between a valid and a sound argument? I can’t tell. You know what they say about assumptions 
. Rather than assuming I should just ask if I have been making any sense with regards to this distinction? Yeshe is the only one in this thread who has seemed to appreciate my post, but I know that he has already studied these things, so I doubt I have been a good spokesperson.
Sunyo, you don’t understand this teaching and training. I understand this teaching and training. What, you understand this teaching and training? You’re practicing wrong. I’m practicing right. I stay on topic, you don’t. You said last what you should have said first. You said first what you should have said last. What you’ve thought so much about has been disproved. Your doctrine is refuted. Go on, save your doctrine! You’re trapped; get yourself out of this—if you can!
Okay, I have always thought that was one of funniest passages in the Canon.
Okay, this is a great point! I may have not represented Anālayo’s position accurately. The argument summary of “his” position that I presented was also my brain filling in the gaps based on arguments elsewhere that I have seen made by others on this issue and others in the Canon.
I will address this but first let me say
So one of the end possibilities I envisioned with this conversation would be something like:
In other words, I am on your side (or at least not against you!) and I think that the counterarguments you have presented are strong. Again, I should have been more explicit that this is the framework under which I should have entered the discussion.
Now back to the more interesting stuff…
So I guess when I read Anālayo’s text, here is what I see:
I took the phrase “to clarify”, which made assumptions about what the Buddha was like, and mapped this onto premise 1:
I am, of course, somewhat stretching Analayo’s original statement, but it looks to me like a fair stretch? One that he would agree with? Do you disagree? If Analayo personally did not agree with the above, then do you think it is worth looking at that premise more closely? Because I have seen similar premisese used elsewhere in other writings.
I think the argument Analayo is interested in is more powerful than just, “the Buddha does not say exactly this in this passage.” There are other background assumptions being made by Analayo, namely about the nature of the Buddha as a teacher. Like, obviously:
If a person never explicitly said X in this instance in exactly the way we would have wanted them to, it means they don’t believe X!
is a bad argument. Why not engage with the strongest version possible of Analyo’s argument?
I think this is a clearly bad argument alone. The crucial difference between the strong and the weak argument is that the strong argument introduces assumptiosn about the qualities of the Buddha as a teacher. So, I do not think that the syllogism should be like that, because where would be the fun in that? 
Let us not try do the “Weak Man Fallacy.” The Weak Man Fallacy “chooses the opposition’s weakest (or one of its weakest) arguments or proponents for attack.”
Hi Bhante 
It’s a straw man fallacy, and by that I don’t mean deliberate misrepresentation, Ven Analāyo’s argument doesn’t have the structure of an argument from ignorance.
In our case, argument from ignorance would be if Analāyo claims that your “proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true" (Wikipedia). Which isn’t the case.
First, he presents an argument that if Upasīvas assumption about self is wrong, there would be a need for an explanation of this false premise, but there is none. Analāyo doesn’t say: therefore, cessationists are wrong. Instead, he simply points out that communication of cessation doesn’t constitute a language problem. We see plenty of such examples in suttas. In the next step, he relies on what actually Buddha said and presents a better explanation why The Teacher speaks about the limits of language. It’s challenging to talk about transcendence.
Transcendence is another name for something beyond empirical reality, logic, and by the same token beyond language. So, maybe he is saying that here and other suttas?
As I posted before, I don’t think Ven Analāyo disagrees with you here and your later remarks. But simply interprets them differently.
Ven Analāyo does consider and discusses other views; for instance, he mentions an explicit Ven @Brahmali paper about Nibbana, so he also knows your stance on this subject. He simply has a different opinion, And just because of it, to suggest that his explanation isn’t informed or careful, is not fair. He uses a cumulative argument to deliver his point, and here we discuss only a fragment of his analysis. Your criticism looks like ad hominem.
If my memory serves me well, the first time I read “Nibbana is psychologically positive, but ontologically negative,” it was in Ven Bodhi essay about Nibbana. For him and Ven Analāyo, being ontologically negative doesn’t mean mere nothingness. In addition, you don’t get psychology without ontology.
Ven Analāyo painstakingly presents the metaphor of the island, warns against the reification of Nibbana, and shows that It isn’t a being or a thing. So I don’t understand who is postulating that Nibbana is “a physical place”? Is this another straw man?
I know! Och, these limits of language! 
In that case, can I say that then the sage is beyond language, logic, like the ocean? Again, expression of cessation in language isn’t problematic.
For Analāyo the natural interpretation is that Nibbana isn’t a thing nor mere nothing. It’s a “middle path position.”
5.1vns102In the same way for the rightly released,
5.2who have crossed the flood of sensual bonds,
5.3and attained unshakable happiness,
5.4where they have gone cannot be found.”
This verse, which has a range of parallels conveying similarly positive connotations, complements the presentation in the previous verse regarding the cessation of the aggregates. When read in conjunction with the present verse, it seems that there is more to it than just the extinction of the five aggregates.