Now, I would like to know precisely what does it mean “pressure” and how fundamental it is in experience and most important thing where the Lord Buddha uses such concept. As I understand Dhamma all experience is telelogical, it based on pain/ pleasure principle, any reliable psychological textbook which deals with motivation recognises it. But instead of quoting learned textbooks, let me get straight into the heart of matter:
And so I came to understand that all our actions, from the most deliberate to the most thoughtless, and without exception, are determined by present pleasure and present pain. Even what we pompously call our ‘duty’ is included in this law—if we do our duty, that is only because we should feel uncomfortable if we neglected it, and we seek to avoid discomfort. Even the wise man, who renounces a present pleasure for the sake of a greater pleasure in the future, obeys this law—he enjoys the present pleasure of knowing (or believing) that he is providing for his future pleasure, whereas the foolish man, preferring the present pleasure to his future pleasure, is perpetually gnawed with apprehension about his future. And when I had understood this, the Buddha’s statement, (M. 22: i,140)
Both now and formerly, monks, it is just suffering that I make known and the ceasing of suffering,
came to seem (when eventually I heard it) the most obvious thing in the world—‘What else’ I exclaimed ‘could the Buddha possibly teach?’
Nanavira Thera L 114
Pain/pleasure principle is so fundamental that arahat experience in no way is exeptioned from it. Contrary, it is due to this principle experience continues, despite the absence of the concept “I am”.
Again Nanavira to sister Vajjira:
You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat’s experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.
The puthujjana’s experience, however, is still more complex, since there is also avijjà, and there is thus appropriation as well as teleology.
But this, too, functions automatically, without any self or agent to direct it. On account of the appropriation, however, it appears to be directed by a self, agent, or master. Avijjà functions automatically, but conceals this fact from itself. Avijjà is an automatically functioning blindness to its automatic functioning. Removal of the blindness removes the appropriation but not the teleology.
Her answer:
In that way, the subject is removed from experience, and pañcakkhandha can function apart from upādāna. Thus the question is settled. I have lost dimension of thought, at least to the degree to grasp this matter, i.e, my own upādāna.
Now, we cannot escape pain/ pleasure principle, and of course Lord Buddha doesn’t ask us to do so. What he asks us to do is to redefine our ideas about pain and pleasure, so they will be in agreement with Dhamma standard of what is suffering and what is pleasurable. In shortes possible way, here we have such standard:
**Pleasurable is dispassion in the world, **
The getting beyond sensuality.
**But the putting away of the conceit ‘I am’ **
—this is the highest pleasure.
Udāna 11
Concept of noble endurance creates problems where there weren’t any before. One who starts practice celibacy has to teach his mind that absence of sensual thoughts is actually pleasant. The more clearly mind sees dispassion as pleasant, the less it will be attracted towards unwholesome states.
Most people have much less sophisticated problem with celibacy, again Nanavira:
There is a mistaken idea, common [and convenient] enough, that our inclinations are in the nature of impulsions to which we can only submit, rather as a stone passively suffers the pressure that moves it. But, far from being an imposition that must be passively suffered, an inclination is an active seeking of a still only possible state of affairs.
J.-P. Sartre, L’Être et le Néant, Gallimard, Paris 1943, p. 556:
‘Besides, if the act is not pure movement, it must be defined by an intention.
In whatever way we may consider this intention, it can only be a passing beyond the given towards a result to be obtained. …When the psychologists, for example, turn tendency into a state of fact, they fail to see that they are taking away from it all character of appetite .’
Intentions and inclinations towards sensuality are due to not seeing sensual desire as actually painful and harmful, and mind has to be taught about the true nature of them:
“> Bhikkhus, whatever a bhikkhu frequently thinks and ponders upon, that will become the inclination of his mind. If he frequently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of sensual desire, he has abandoned the thought of renunciation to cultivate the thought of sensual desire, and then his mind inclines to thoughts of sensual desire. If he frequently thinks and ponders thoughts of sensual desire. If he frequently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of ill will…upon thoughts of cruelty, he has abandoned the thought of non-cruelty to cultivate the thought of cruelty, and then his mind inclines to thoughts of cruelty.
“Just as in the last month of the rainy season, in the autumn, when the crops thicken, a cowherd would guard his cows by constantly tapping and poking them on this side and that with a stick to check and curb them. Why is that? Because he sees that he could be flogged, imprisoned, fined, or blamed [if he let them stray into the crops]. So too I saw in unwholesome states danger, degradation, and defilement, and in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.
On verbal level one cannot find in Suttas any such thing as endurance of the states of greed, hate and delusion. They are painful states, and our primary task is to see them exactly as such. The absence of them is pleasant, mind has to see it.
Now, if one claims that based on the teaching of noble endurance one gradually frees oneself from what is painful and unwholesome, that’s great. I find such interpretation of Dhamma as totally unnecessary, more, it seems to be the case of:
“Bhikkhus, these two misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? One who explains a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation as a discourse whose meaning is explicit, and one who explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation. These two misrepresent the Tathāgata.” AN II 24
“And how, bhikkhus, is one subject to decline? Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu has seen a form with the eye, there arise in him evil unwholesome states, memories and intentions connected with the fetters.
If the bhikkhu tolerates them and does not abandon them, dispel them, put an end to them, and obliterate them, he should understand this thus: ‘I am declining away from wholesome states. For this has been called decline by the Blessed One.’ SN 35: 96
It is a tendency - quite justified - not wholly trust one’s own intellectual powers, in the most cases things are more complicated than we suspect. So we may think that perhaps still due to his penetrative mind Venerable Nyanamoli sees such subtitles which aren’t accessible to us.
Unfortunately I know certain Dhamma discussion where Ven Nyanamoli insisted that sotāpanna doesn’t suffer. Another monk wasn’t able to convince him, that this is not so. But it was enough to ask question: Are the states of hate, greed and delusion painful?
Ven Nyanamoli arrived at such inference based on certain Sutta which opposed unshakability of ariya savaka, with unstable mind of puthujjana. His logic was quite simple, sotāpanna is ariya therefore he doesn’t suffer.
Perhaps when asked about the greed, hate and delusion he would explain that he meant merely unshakability it the face of pleasant and unpleasant sensory experience, but since sotāpanna isn’t free from from ill will and desire, it is still as much absurd to claim freedom from suffering in the case of sotāpanna.
Now, everyone can have weaker day, I think this discussion became quite famous, and Ven Nyanamoli was able to provide a certain rationalisation of it. Evidently his disciples weren’t discouradged. But I think it a good sign to be rather sceptical about his ideas when they on verbal level seem to contradict Suttas. Instead of acknowledge that in this particular context term “ariya savaka” has to be limited to arahat, and perhaps non-returner, he did opposite: acknowledged the term as valid for all ariya puggala and so arrived at proposition, which contradicts most of other Suttas. It is not an innocent mistake, it actually shows how the mind of Venerable works, or at least how it worked at that time. While such reasoning is misleading about sotāpanna, it provides valuable data about thinker who proposes it.
Before the advent of ven Nyanamoli’s school, we haven’t any such thing as noble endurance and pressure which has to be endured:
When you have a certain, say, sensual thought that is pressuring you, replacing it with something else is exactly like using a peg that is just as coarse, meaning you end up with just a different form of the same problem (you removed the sensuality which is welcoming the pressure, but are now left with aversion towards the pressure, and the “amount” of craving did not even diminish, it just “morphed”). The “finer peg” would be establishing a peripheral context that does not deny what has arisen, but also prevents you from welcoming what has arisen, and that can only be achieved through that endurance of the pressure. That context could even be the second reflection that is explained in that very sutta (and in MN 19 as well).
So we have it: if you are unsophisticated fellow and just do what the Lord Buddha says: remove from your mind sensual thoughts, you are according to Bhikkhu Antigua victim of aversion.
But why not a wise man who prefers what is pleasant and wholesome, namely mind free from sensual thoughts?
Also while on verbal level such teaching may seem to have some logic, after all aversion is an unwholesome state and aversion towards aversion seems to be contradictory idea; existence transcendents logic, one must start to practice from where one is, namely as a victim of greed, hate and delusion. And what seems impossible on verbal level, works on existential level.
“> When it was said: ‘This body has originated from craving; in dependence on craving, craving is to be abandoned,’ for what reason was this said? Here, sister, a bhikkhu hears: ‘The bhikkhu named so-and-so, with the destruction of the taints, has realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, he dwells in it.’ He thinks: ‘When will I, with the destruction of the taints, realize for myself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, dwell in it?’ Some time later, in dependence upon craving, he abandons craving. When it was said: ‘This body has originated from craving; in dependence on craving, craving is to be abandoned,’ it was because of this that this was said.
“When it was said: ‘This body has originated from conceit; in dependence on conceit, conceit is to be abandoned.’ With reference to what was this said? Here, sister, a bhikkhu hears: ‘The bhikkhu named so-and-so, with the destruction of the taints, has realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, he dwells in it.’ He thinks: ‘That venerable one, with the destruction of the taints, has realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, he dwells in it. Why, so can I!’ Some time later, in dependence upon conceit, he abandons conceit. When it was said: ‘This body has originated from conceit; in dependence on conceit, conceit is to be abandoned,’ it was because of this that this was said. AN IV 159
Nanavira Thera:
Your question about the propriety of sending good wishes (‘Is not wishing desire, and so to be shunned?’) can be answered, though not in one word. There is desire and desire, and there is also desire to end desire. There is desire that involves self-assertion (love, hate) and desire that does not (the arahat’s desire to eat when hungry, for example), and the former can be either self-perpetuating (unrestrained passion) or self-destructive (restrained passion). Self-destructive desire is bad in so far as it is passionate, and therefore good in so far as, translated into action, it brings itself to an end. (By ‘translated into action’ I mean that the desire for restraint does not remain abstractly in evidence only when one is not giving way to passion, but is concretely operative when there is actually occasion for it, when one is actually in a rage. To begin with, of course, it is not easy to bring them together, but with practice desire for restraint arises at the same time as the passion, and the combination is self-destructive. The Suttas say clearly that craving is to be eliminated by means of craving [A. IV ,159: ii,145-46]; and you yourself are already quite well aware that nothing can be done in this world, either good or bad, without passion—and the achievement of dispassion is no exception. But passion must be intelligently directed.) Since an arahat is capable of desiring the welfare of others, good wishes are evidently not essentially connected with self-assertion, and so are quite comme il faut.
One more objection:
It is overlooked that if one where to have a person wholly unfamiliar with meditation and Buddhist ideas—say, an average European from the 18th century equipped with a perfectly literal Pali dictionary, who will take what they read on its own terms and not those of Christianity or any other religion—read through the collection of early texts exclusively, without being told what they mean in advance (as most of us today are way before we actually read them), there is simply no way that they would come to the conclusion that the Buddhist path to liberation centers around stopping one’s thinking and/or watching bodily sensations.
Certainly venerable author doesn’t come to conclusion that ability to stop thinking has something in common with path to liberation, but how he arrived at that conclusion it is hard to say, most certainly not bssed on the following Suttas:
“Then the Tathāgata disciplines him further: ‘Come, bhikkhu, abide contemplating the body as a body, but do not think thoughts connected with the body… … Nanamoli’s translation. of MN 125
“But what is the source of desire?”
“Thought is the source of desire.” When mind thinks about something, desire arises; when the mind thinks about nothing, desire doesn’t arise. …
DN 21
When there is no manifestation of thinking, it is impossible to point out the manifestation of besetment by perceptions and notions [born of] mental proliferation. MN 18
It looks like Venerable author teaches not from textbooks, but just from his own experience, unfortunately if this is so, it looks like there is nothing in his experience based on which he could come to conclusion:
There is happiness when followed after by me makes unwholesome states vanish and good states grow, and should be followed after. This may be done with thinking and pondering or without thinking and pondering. Of the two that without thinking and pondering is better. DN 21
Venerable author speaks much about concrete thinking. It is indeed useful concept, I was introduced to it by Ven Nanavira Thera*. But unjustified extension of the validity of certain truth may be more dangerous than a mistake. And thinking, however useful it is, when done properly and correctly, isn’t the only source of knowledge, more, certain perceptions based on which one can develop knowledge, arise due to ability to investigate the mind empty of thoughts. Dhamma is atakkāvacara, not in the sphere of reason or logic.
Author says:
Therefore, instead of taking ānāpānāsati and the modern ideas of it as the starting point, one should actually interpret ānāpānāsati in the light of of the other comparatively enormous bulk of right reflections aimed at understanding the nature of things that the Buddha left behind, which are instead seen as supplementary, if at all considered.
Indeed, a good advice, however I suspect that author for unknown reasons doesn’t classifiy himself as a proponent of “modern ideas”, which is rather strange, I think he was born in twenty first century. Now, of course young man can have very traditional views, but in such case he would teach that ānāpānāsati should be practised for abandoning of thinking, unfortunately in his article there is nothing about it, for the reasons already known to us, if you escape from the unwholesome states into silent mind, you are motivated by aversion …
a bhikkhu should, in addition, maintain in being these four things. Loathsomeness (as the repulsive aspect of the body) should be maintained in being for the purpose of abandoning lust; loving-kindness for the purpose of abandoning ill will; mindfulness of breathing for the purpose of cutting off discursive thoughts; perception of impermanence for the purpose of eliminating the conceit ‘I am.’ Ud. 4:1; AN. 9:3.
Generally various people are on various level of understanding and perhaps such teaching as HH can be useful for someone. Also it cannot be excluded that my dissatisfaction with such teaching is due to my ignorance, and I am prejudiced, while in fact one who was able to insist on such nonsense as that sotāpanna doesn’t suffer, was also able to make a tremendous progress and is now in position to help me.
But after all we have to take a risk and trust someone based on our present understanding. I have no paranormal abilities, so it is possible that when translating his teaching into practice it has a positive influence on the students. If so, that’s great. Nevertheless either really I do not see something fundamental - I am blind to my own blindness - if you wish - or teaching from HH doesn’t inspire my trust quite justifiably, unlike in the case of Ven Nanavira writings.
Yes, I am aware of the catch -22. Perhaps Venerables from HH may say that it is because I failed to understand Venerable Ñanavìra and more generally the Dhamma.
And of course I am here just because from infinite time I wasn’t able to understand Dhamma, so statistically it is very likely that I still don’t understand it.
But since you were asking about HH teaching, based on my present understanding I have just explained why such teaching doesn’t inspire my trust. But I am not sure whether I should discourage you from such teaching. If it works for you that’s fine.
Lichtenberg said:
There is no more important rule of conduct in the world than this: attached yourself as much as you can to people who are abler than you and yet not so very different that you cannot understand them.
I have impression that Venerables from HH don’t think there are presently teachers more able to teach Dhamma than they, but, unlike Lord Buddha’s words or Nanavira Thera writings I simply don’t understand what they are talking about. I understand that greed, hate and delusion are painful states, and I understand why Dhamma advises me to remove them as quickly as possible when they arise.
So dialectic is as follows: either I have a problem with aversion because I am not able to “endure a pressure” of painful states and prefer what is pleasant, or they have a problem with delusion, because they weren’t able to endure pressure imposed by desire to teach what in fact is not understood by them.
But since this very sophisticated interpretation of Dhamma, which I am unable to grasp, comes from one who was able to insist that sotāpanna doesn’t suffer, however sceptical I am about my intellectual powers, I tend to think that there’s nothing wrong with removing unwholesome states as soon as they arise, and the concept of noble endurance is artificial, has no any resemblance with reality and creates unnecessary complications. Or in other words, it is misrepresentation of Tathagata, since it “explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation”. (AN II 24)
With metta
- On concrete and conceptual thinking:
Generally speaking, a concept, an idea, and a thought, are much the same thing, and can be described as an imaginary picture representing some real state of affairs. But this ‘representation’ is not simply a photographic reproduction (in the mind) of the real state of affairs in question. In a very simple case, if I now imagine or think of some absent object, the image that I have bears some sort of resemblance to the absent object.
But suppose I want to think about something like ‘the British Constitution’. I cannot simply produce an imaginary picture ‘looking like’ the British Constitution, because the B.C. does not ‘look like’ anything. What happens is that, over the years, I have built up a complex image, partly visual, partly verbal, and perhaps also with elements from other senses; and this complex image has an internal structure that corresponds to that of the B.C., at least in so far as I have correctly understood it. If, in my studies of the British Constitution I have con-sulted faulty authorities, or omitted part of it, these faults or omissions will be represented in this complex image. Whenever I wish to think about the B.C. (or even whenever anybody mentions it) this complex image comes to my mind, and it is with reference to it that I (for ex-ample) answer questions about the B.C. This complex image is a concept—it is my concept of the B.C. With luck, it may correspond fairly closely with the original thing, but most probably it is a very misleading representation. (Note that, since the essence of the concept is in the structure of the complex image, and not in the individual images that make up the complex image, it is quite possible to have a number of different complex images, but all with the same structure, to represent the real state of affairs in question. Here, the concept remains the same, though the image is different. Thus, in the world of art, it is possible to express the same idea either in music or in painting.) Now all conceptual thinking is abstract; that is to say, the thought or concept is entirely divorced from reality, it is removed from existence and is (in Kierkegaard’s phrase) sub specie æterni. Concrete thinking, on the other hand, thinks the object while the object is present, and this, in the strict sense of the words, is reflexion or mindfulness. One is mindful of what one is doing, of what one is seeing, while one is actually doing (or seeing) it. This, naturally, is very much more difficult than abstract thinking; but it has a very obvious advantage: if one is thinking (or being mindful) of something while it is actually present, no mistake is possible, and one is directly in touch with reality; but in abstract thinking there is every chance of a mistake, since, as I pointed out above, the concepts with which we think are composite affairs, built up of an arbitrary lot of individual experiences (books, conversations, past observations, and so on).
What Huxley is getting at, then, is simply this. As a result of our education, our books, radios, cinemas, televisions, and so on, we tend to build up artificial concepts of what life is, and these concepts are grossly misleading and are no satisfactory guide at all to real life.
(How many people, especially in the West, derive all their ideas about love from the cinema or T.V .—no wonder they run into difficulties when they begin to meet it as it is in reality!) Huxley is advocating a training in mindfulness (or awareness), satisampajanna—in thinking about life as it is actually taking place—instead of (or, at least, as well as) the present training in purely abstract thinking. In this way, so he maintains—and of course he is quite right—, people will be better fitted for dealing with life as it really is. Does this answer your question?
Nanavira Thera L 81
But again according to Suttas there is such thing as asankhata dhatu. And concrete thinking about asankhata dhatu should lead one to conclusion that it isn’t anything concrete 
what could be the mind’s object. If one hope to arrive at direct knowledge of it, where one should look for it if not in the silence of mind free from mental objects?
Nanamoli Thera:
When we are young the noise of general conversation seems much the most fun. When we grow up we discover the possibilities of the tête-à-tête. In maturity the monologue habit sets in. But now at last there is the chance to investigate the rich depth of the silence when the monologue is suspended.
Thus MN 149 says:
is fulfilled, it fulfills the factor of listening to the true teaching. When the factor of listening to the true teaching is fulfilled, it fulfills the factor of faith … proper attention … mindfulness and situational awareness … sense restraint …the three kinds of good conduct … the four kinds of mindfulness meditation … the seven awakening factors. When the seven awakening factors are fulfilled, they fulfill knowledge and freedom.
people is fulfilled, it fulfills the factor of listening to the idiosyncratic Satre Nietzsche 
teaching. When the factor of listening to the idiosyncratic teaching is fulfilled, it fulfills the factor of faith … mindfulness and situational awareness … sense restraint …the three kinds of good conduct … the four kinds of mindfulness meditation … proper attention (yoniso manasikara)… the seven awakening factors. When the seven awakening factors are fulfilled, they fulfill knowledge and freedom.
