Milindapanha is not without some flaws.
Please share your thoughts in this forum.
I would suggest we try to evaluate it from the perspective of what it is and what it is not.
What it is?
It is said to be a record of a debate between a Bactrian king and a bhikkhu who is believed to have been fully successful in the fulfillment of the four noble truthsâ respective ennobling tasks (i.e. an arahant).
The name of the bhikkhu was NÄgasena and he is believed to have been an adept of Sarvastivadan thought.
The name of the king was Menander I Soter and some see as confirmation of his conversion to Buddhism the fact that after his death several Indo-Greek rulers started to adopt on their coins the Pali title of âDharmikasaâ, meaning âfollower of the Dharmaâ.
While it lies beyond our capabilities to confirm how factual the account is, it is a relatively early text and probably is related to an actual conversation between a buddhist monk and a king of a realm situated where nowadays Pakistanâs city of Sialkot is.
It is found nowadays in two canonical forms: a Pali and Chinese form. Both have English translations available in SuttaCentral:
While both Chinese and Pali share many things in common, some chapters are found uniquely in one of the two versions.
What it is not?
It is not a record of the views and doctrines of the earliest days of Buddhism. It is believed to have been put in writing between 100 BCE and 200 CE.
To put things in context, the first Buddhist Council is believed to have occurred around 483 BCE. The 283-383 years gap between things is equivalent to the amount of time separating us nowadays to the events of renaissance in Europe!
Hence, the views found in it should not be seen as fully compatible or consistent with either the views of the earliest strata of the canon (what we tend to call here EBTsâŠ) or the views of contemporary Theravadin thought.
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Hello! Iâd love to resurrect this thread because I recently read the Milindapanha. Im finding these suttas to be among the most sophisticated, richest texts of Buddhist philosophy and history. As well as, Some of the clearest explanations of rebirth and Anatta. Given as a Q&A by NÄgasena and King Milindapanha. From M.3.2.1:
ââ Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through?â
âYes, it might do so.â
âNow, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?â
âNo.â
âOr the same that burns in the second watch and in the third?â
âNo.â
âThen is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third?â
âNo. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.â
âJust so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.â
This accords with suttas like (DN9). Interestingly, this poses some questions about the sarvastivada and their doctrine of time. In Mil 3.2.9, King Molina asks what is time, if it exists at all? NÄgasena explains:
But what? is there such a thing as time?â
âThere is time which exists, and time which does not.â
âWhich then exists, and which not?â
âThere are conditions (constituent potentialities of being), O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. In the case of beings who, having died, have been reborn elsewhere, time is. In the case of beings who, having died, have not been reborn elsewhere, time is not; and in the case of beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained NirvÄna in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is notâbecause of their having been quite set free.â
This seems to be quite far away from the view âall existsâ. This explanation of time is nuanced and can maybe suggest that the past does exist to the extant its effect is continued into the present and future and so on. However it still maintains that the past has ceased. This is fascinating, what was the contention between saravastivadans and other schools?