“If that’s a bit heady, then get ready for Dennett’s next metaphor: If our brain is a smartphone, then consciousness is the screen. In other words, consciousness is not how our brain works, it’s only how we interface with it. A screen doesn’t really have much to do with how the phone works, and in fact, the phone could do nearly everything it does without it. It just wouldn’t be useable by humans.
According to Dennett, our brains are like smartphones in another way as well: they are basically robots, or thinking machines, and like any robot, they need a medium through which to communicate with their users.
But it goes even further than that: if our brains are robots, then our neurons are smaller robots, which are in turn made up of even smaller robots. So even if we lose the concept of consciousness along the way, we’re still pretty incredible “machines.””
Sure there is some (a lot of) merit in Dennett’s thought, but he didn’t really convince me with his solution of the hard problem of conciousness: to pretend it doesn’t exist 
“You may well ask how consciousness can be an illusion, since every illusion is itself a conscious experience—an appearance that doesn’t correspond to reality. So it cannot appear to me that I am conscious though I am not: as Descartes famously observed, the reality of my own consciousness is the one thing I cannot be deluded about. The way Dennett avoids this apparent contradiction takes us to the heart of his position, which is to deny the authority of the first-person perspective with regard to consciousness and the mind generally.
(…)
The trouble is that Dennett concludes not only that there is much more behind our behavioral competencies than is revealed to the first-person point of view—which is certainly true—but that nothing whatever is revealed to the first-person point of view but a “version” of the neural machinery. In other words, when I look at the American flag, it may seem to me that there are red stripes in my subjective visual field, but that is an illusion: the only reality, of which this is “an interpreted, digested version,” is that a physical process I can’t describe is going on in my visual cortex.”
Okay, so what is first-person point of view, then?
Does it sound like Yogacara turned inside-out or am I the only one who thinks so?
when I look at the American flag, it may seem to me that there are red stripes in my subjective visual field, but that is an illusion: the only reality, of which this is “an interpreted, digested version,” is that a physical process I can’t describe is going on in my visual cortex
But what if there is a flag and also a physical process of visual perception of that flag ? 