Arahat and the end of the world are synonyms.
There is no self without world, and there is no world without self. attā ca loko ca
It is enough to investigate the Dhamma: we know that certain wrong views in Brahmajala don’t mention self only just make statements about the world. And yet, since ultimately all views in Brahmajala are dependent on sakkayaditthi, and sakkayaditthi is inseparable from attāvada, we see confirmation, the very mention of the world implicitly assumes self, which lives in the world. When there is attāvada there is also concept of the world.
The concept of the world is dependently arisen, when duality in the name-and-matter, eye + visible forms, (and so on) what with consciousness constitute strictly impersonal experience of seeing, due to ignorance is interpreted subjectively: "I see things in the world ". The body with the sensory organs becomes “self”, and surrounding it matter create “external world”.
Idea of external world is dependent on ignorance, since primarily all experience is in the field of consciousness, and there is nothing external to consciousness.
In his statement Ven Brahmavamso completely ignored diversity of puggalas. Of course it is true that regardless it is puggala who carries the burden of sakkaya, (puthujjana) or it is puggala without sakkaya (arahat) such puggala as a certain component of impermanent things, is in space and time.
But in the case of arahat, such puggala is as much part of objective reality as sticks and grass. In other words there is no person (sakkaya) who is in the world, in the case of arahat. When things are described from this stance, we can say that there is no one who is in space, and no one who is subjected to duration, no one who has past or future.
‘I was’ is not for me, not for me is ‘I shall be’;
Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs?
Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants—
For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear.
Theragāthā 715, 716
Fear however is a quite rational emotion in the case one who considers himself to be person, living in the world. Since as a matter of fact there is no such thing as safe place. To be is a very dangerous thing.
Fortunately Buddha teaches us that world is empty of self. While it contradicts the direct experience of puthujjana, when he properly understands Dhamma instructions, he doesn’t have to wait for the death of the body in order to leave the world. What puthujjana sees as events in his world, arahat sees as events in the field of consciousness, but there is no any such person (sakkaya) as arahat “who is there” in the field.
There is nice pun, localization (loka) is a state of puthujjana, but seeing things through lens of right view we aren’t able to localize an arahat even now and here.
“But, friend, when the Tathāgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here and now , is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death’?”
“Formerly, friend Sāriputta, when I was ignorant, I did hold that pernicious view, but now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable Sāriputta I have abandoned that pernicious view and have made the breakthrough to the Dhamma. SN 22 : 84
Being is a state of puthujjana, and the death of the body doesn’t change his state at all. Cessation of being is the state of arahat, and it is such no matter the body is alive or dead.
Puthujjana not so much experience suffering (which of course is true in certain sense), but he is suffering, or his very being (conceit “I am” and attavada) is suffering. To be is to suffer. What puthujjana doesn’t understand, the state of being isn’t compulsory. No need to localize oneself in space and time by self-identification with things extended in space and time.
The point is that one who is a victim of such localization, doesn’t understand his own situation, and takes for granted existence of external world where he lives. And so the insistence that the presence of living body in the field of consciousness = being.
“He understands thus: ‘Whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of sensual desire, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of being, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of ignorance, those are not present here. There is present only this amount of disturbance, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
He understands: ‘This field of perception is void of the taint of sensual desire; this field of perception is void of the taint of being; this field of perception is void of the taint of ignorance. There is present only this non-voidness, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’ Thus, Ānanda, this is his genuine, undistorted, pure descent into voidness, supreme and unsurpassed.
MN 121
In short, the question “is arahat in the world” is a question which has no one-sided answer, and it has to be analyzed before answering it.
Since arahat can be described as certain puggala and such puggala can be localised in space and time, on very gross level (accessible to puthujjana understanding) we can say that arahat is in the world.
But this is a very gross level, since if puthujjana wants to cease to be puthujjana, and this should be his primary concern, he must understend that Tathagata is not to be found even now and here and as such has to be described in term “cessation of being” and cessation of world.
But it cannot be done by one who transforms doctrine of anatta into wrong view “there is no self” and next starts wondering “if there is no self, how can be such thing as rebirth”? And proposes dependent arising as an answer to that question.
But rebirth is possible only when notions of subjectivity, attavadupadana and being which is dependently arisen on upādāna, are present.
“It is fitting for you to be perplexed, Vaccha, it is fitting for you to doubt. Doubt has arisen in you about a perplexing matter. I declare, Vaccha, rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel. Just as a fire burns with fuel, but not without fuel, so, Vaccha, I declare rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel.”
SN 44: 9
Sa-upādānassa khvāhaṃ Vaccha upapattiṃ paññāpemi no anupādānassa. There is a double meaning here, with upādāna meaning both “fuel” and subjective “clinging,” but I have translated the sentence in consonance with the following simile.
Bhikku Bodhi