Bhante, in my opinion:
When you contemplate nibbāna to be without a self, you at the same time also need to realize what it actually is, namely freedom from suffering. You can’t contemplate it as nonself in isolation, without having this realization, otherwise you’re simply not contemplating nibbāna but something else. In other words, nibbāna has no meaning apart from the end of suffering, because that’s exactly what it is (I’m talking about parinibbāna specifically). So regardless of how you contemplate it, even as nonself, as long as you do so with right view, you’ll automatically also reflect on the freedom from suffering—and thereby on suffering itself. For those who understand what it is, it’s impossible to think about nibbāna, in whatever way, and NOT get disillusioned. It’s like saying you can look at the shape of a ball but not see it’s color. Theoretically possible, perhaps, but in practice you can’t.
You can’t take anattā apart from dukkha. The insights into the three characteristics described in the Dhammapada come as a package. In that I agree with Ven Kheminda as quoted by Jasudho. When you see that all things are without a self, at that moment you also see the freedom from suffering, hence it leading to disillusionment with suffering. Considering the interconnectedness of these insights, the verses at Dhp277–279 effectively say: “When you see with wisdom that all sankharas are suffering and impermanent, and you see all things are without a self, then you become disillusioned with suffering.” We can’t really take any of the three verses in isolation, practically speaking.
But you’ll agree anatta isn’t just a contemplation; it is also an ontological description of reality, a reality that should be known. And nonexisting phenomena (to use that bad terminology) can have the attribute of nonself. Anattā is about the absence of something (a self), so it can apply to the absence of phenomena as well. In this way it fundamentally differs from dukkha and anicca, which reflect the presence of certain qualities. (Even though anicca literally is “not-permanence”, it implies the presence of impermanence.) I think we should consider this ontological difference between these three terms when asking ourselves why the Buddha shifts to sabbe dhammā with the third.
Exactly why would it be problematic? I don’t think you explained that.
As to it not being meaningful, like some people already said, in MN1 even those in training are told not to “conceive” nibbāna in various ways, and to not see it as ‘mine’. How does this differ from contemplating it as nonself? Or, else, how would this not be meaningful?
Contemplating nibbāna as nonself seems meaningful for multiple reasons:
The word nibbāna, though often referring to the moment of things ending, is sometimes also used to refer to the “state” of nonexistence of suffering that happens after the ending of the aggregates (i.e. theasaṅkhata dhātu). It is helpful to contemplate this “state” as without a self, because it means that even when the final goal is attained, there still is nothing there for “me” or “my self”. The insight that even extinguishment has no owner, that even it is impersonal and not “mine”, helps us to let go of desire for it too. It’s the ultimate anattā contemplation, in a sense, if we can even let go of any personal involvement in the end of suffering, let alone suffering itself.
This will be especially helpful for people who misunderstand nibbāna to be some state of existence, but it will even be helpful for those who don’t, because they will realize that even the “state” of complete ending has nothing to do with them personally. The deluded mind is creative, and although theoretically it makes no sense to take the absence of things as a self, emotionally it still can (and will) do so. That is just the nature of the unenlightened mind: as long as there is a sense of self, even the absence of things will be seen through this lens. For example, it will be subtly perceived as “I will experience the absence of things” or “I won’t experience suffering”.
Further, many people will take the cessation of things personally on a coarser level. In MN22 the Buddha says when he teaches nibbāna, some think, “Oh no! So I will stop existing!” They see nibbāna as the ending of their self (which may either be undesired, as in this case, or desired). It will be meaningful for them to contemplate that it is actually an impersonal process, an ending that does not involve a self. That seems to be pretty much what MN1 is saying. As I said, it says that even those who are in training (i.e. non-enlightened noble ones) should still train not to see conceive nibbāna as ‘mine’, “so that they may completely understand it”. Even they should contemplate it as nonself, in other words.
So I disagree that the contemplation of anattā “must refer to phenomena that exist in one way or another”. We can also contemplate the nonexistence of a self in “nonexistent phenomena”.
All that aside, I can also approach the whole topic another way: Sabbe dhammā still includes the saṅkhāras alongside nibbāna, and you’ll agree that seeing the saṅkhāras as nonself leads to disillusionment. So therefore, seeing sabbe dhammā anatta leads to disillusionment too!
You might object that in that case the insight could just as well be sabbe saṅkhāra anattā instead of sabbe dhammā anattā, but that would be taking a backward approach, working from the result of disillusionment back to what we think the insight into anattā should be. That is not what the Buddha does in the Dhammapada, where he first describes the insights as they actually occur, and only then mentions their natural result. Notice that he says: “When you see that with wisdom, you become disillusioned with suffering.” In this case the phrase sabbe dhammā anattā definitely isn’t just a pragmatic contemplation but the stream winner’s actual insight into reality: they know that all dhammas, both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata are without a self. That knowledge leads to disillusionment.
In other words, if someone has true insight into the absence of a self, it won’t just be “all sankhāras are without a self”. It will always be “all things, including nibbāna, are without a self”. And that insight is what leads to disillusionment. So, even if I were to agree that contemplating nibbāna as nonself wouldn’t lead to disillusionment, the stream winner’s actual insight of anattā still includes the saṅkhāras as well, thus it would lead to disillusionment regardless.
In still other words, technically speaking it’s never specifically said that contemplating nibbāna as anattā leads to disillusionment. It’s a much more complete insight into anattā that is said to lead to it. So when Ven. Sujato says “nibbana does not come within the scope of such contemplation [of anattā that leads to disillusionment]”, I could even agree with that but still argue nibbāna is included in sabbe dhammā for another reason. The reason being, again, that the Buddha describes an actual insight one has into reality, not a mere pragmatic contemplation with a purpose to become disillusioned.
(As an aside, in this regard it is also interesting that AN6.102–104, which use the phrases in question more as preliminary contemplations instead of describing the stream winner’s insights like the Dhammapada, the contemplations on anicca and dukkha in all saṅkharas, respectively should be considered to lead to “non-delight with the world” and “disillusionment”. But the contemplation of anattā in all things, is not considered to have such benefits. So is “the purpose of this contemplation [of sabbe dhammā anattā] to become repulsed from suffering” in the first place? Not according to AN6.104, at least.)
And what do you think the Buddha is saying, then, Ajahn? If like Bhante Sujato you think sabbe dhammā refers to principles like impermanence, most of the objections raised seem to apply just the same. First, people don’t tend to take such principles as their self either. It likewise isn’t “precisely the delusion most people have”. If anything, more people claim that nibbāna is a self (as some scholars have) than there are people who claim that principles like impermanence are a self (which I’ve never heard anybody do). This is also the case in the suttas. As said, in MN1 nibbāna is taken as ‘mine’ by those who don’t understand it, and apparently even by the sekhas. DN1 also mentions various mistaken notions of a self attaining (false) nibbāna. I’m unaware of a single place where principles like impermanence are mistaken as a self. So from the perspective of the suttas, how meaningful is it to contemplate these principles as nonself?
Second, as far as I know, these principles are also never directly described as nonself in the Canon. So objecting that nibbāna is never described as such, seems to apply a double standard. (That is, if for sake of argument we agree sabbe dhammā in AN3.136 doesn’t refer to these principles, which seems plausible considering how flexible the term dhamma is.) Regardless, it’s an argument by silence/absence, which is never the most reliable to begin with.
Finally, in Ven. Sujato’s interpretation of AN3.136, the word dhamma actually doesn’t have a single meaning either. As he says: “‘dhammas’ encompasses the conditioned phenomena as well as the principles [dhammas] of conditionality”. So we have two different meanings of the word dhamma, with the former being more inclusive than the latter. But considering that the word has two different meanings in the same text, why should we even assume sabbe dhammā refers to the other, very different kind of dhammas? We can’t really base it on the word dhamma itself, if it has no consistent meaning in the very same text. It would be self-contradictory to do so. It’d be like saying, “apples are apples and bananas”.
Considering all that, I think it makes more sense to take sabbe dhammā to encompass both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata, which seems a more natural pair, and one explicitly called a set of dhammas in DN34 (not DN33 as I said before).
(For clarity, my fundamental disagreement perhaps isn’t so much the interpretation of the text (although I disagree with that as well) but the practical conclusions that are drawn from it, like that looking at nibbāna as nonself doesn’t lead to disillusionment and that it would be meaningless/problematic to do so.)
Hi Ven. The absence of suffering is better than suffering. If that sounds like delight, then I don’t know how to phrase it so it doesn’t. The Buddha describes nibbāna in ways that seem much closer to delight, anyway, like calling it the highest sukha.