Does “all Dhammas” include Nibbāna?

The Aggappasāda Sutta has:

To whatever extent there are phenomena conditioned or unconditioned, dispassion is declared the foremost among them, that is, the crushing of pride, the removal of thirst, the uprooting of attachment, the termination of the round, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna.

Yāvatā, bhikkhave, dhammā saṅkhatā vā asaṅkhatā vā, virāgo tesaṃ aggamakkhāyati, yadidaṃ madanimmadano pipāsavinayo ālaya­samug­ghāto vaṭṭupacchedo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.

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That quote is interesting because it potentially speaks of a theoretical plurality of unconditioned dharmas and is agnostic concerning them. Definitely a mysterious turn of phrase, “To whatever extent there are phenomena conditioned or unconditioned,” why say it like that? It is as if it is unknown.

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I don’t read it the same way.

My paraphrased translation: “As far as phenomena are concerned, be they conditioned or unconditioned, dispassion is the foremost, that is, […], nibbana.”

My understanding:

This doesn’t imply a theoretical plurality of unconditioned dharmas, just like “as far as government officials are concerned, be they elected or unelected, the king is the foremost” doesn’t imply that there is a theoretical plurality of unelected officials, of kings. It doesn’t imply either that there is only one unelected official, only one king. But you wouldn’t jump at that statement and think it’s interesting that it potentially speaks of a theoretical plurality of kings.

The reason for introducing the dichotomy is specifically to include the unconditioned dharma (/unelected official) because when one thinks of phenomena (/government officials), there is the chance one might naively restrict one’s thinking to only conditioned dharmas (/elected officials) — in which case one might erroneously conclude that, say, the prime minister is the foremost instead of the king.

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The A.4.34 passage clearly refers to Nibbana as a/the dhamma which is uncondirtioned, mwhile the Noble Eight-factored Path is the best of all conditioned states. As unconditioned, Nibbana is a dhamma which is not anicca or dukkha, but like all dhammas is anatta.

Patisambhidamagga I.15-16 shows Nibbana does share some qualities with a Self though- see Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind, pp.51-2

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Doug from Doug’s Dharma also uploaded a video about it yesterday. I haven’t watched it yet, so I can’t comment on the details.

But I can say I disagree with Ven. Sujato’s ideas as explained here.

This is not obvious to me at all. If you see nibbana, the freedom from suffering, you get repulsed by all else (by suffering), because you have seen something better. Notice that the text specifically says “you get repulsed (or ‘disillusioned’) by suffering”, not by nibbana itself.

(Does anybody have Ven Kheminda’s writing on this topic, by the way?)

DN33 says there are two dhammas: the conditioned and unconditioned (or, as I prefer, the ‘created/constructed/fabricated’ and ‘non-created/constructed-fabricated’)

What two things (dhamma) should be directly known? Two elements:
the conditioned element and the unconditioned element.

Ven Sujato himself comments, “The ‘unconditioned element’ is Nibbāna, everything else is conditioned.” Since this is called a dhamma right alongside “the conditioned element”, it seems this passage applies to the verses in the Dhammapada:

The conditioned/created things (sankharas) are suffering and impermanent. Nibbana, however, the end of conditioned/created things (asankhata) is not suffering and impermanent but still without a self. It is included in all dhammas.

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This suggests you should contemplate Nibbāna as freedom from suffering, not as nonself. In the suttas you find a large number of descriptions of Nibbāna, and nonself is not one of them. By contrast, sukha, “happiness”, is used to describe Nibbāna, which suggests that the contemplation of suffering, or of Nibbāna as freedom from suffering, is what is required.

Contemplating Nibbāna as nonself is potentially problematic. Only existing phenomena can have the attribute of self, which of course is precisely the delusion most people have. The contemplation of nonself is to counter this delusion and so must refer to phenomena that exist in one way or another. The idea that “ending” or “extinguishment” is nonself is not meaningful.

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Hmmm MN 1 comes to mind:

He perceives Nibbāna as Nibbāna. Having perceived Nibbāna as Nibbāna, he conceives himself as Nibbāna, he conceives himself in Nibbāna, he conceives himself from Nibbāna, he conceives Nibbāna to be ‘mine,’ he delights in Nibbāna. Why is that? Because he has not fully understood it, I say.

Seems awfully close to “he delights in Nibbāna” no? :pray:

Are you making a distinction, Bhante, between “not contemplating as self” and “contemplating as nonself”? :pray:

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Several excerpts from Ven. Kheminda’s essay Path, Fruit, and Nibbana appear to be germane to this discussion:

"… the Dhammapada states:

”All things are not-self and when one sees this with wisdom, he wearies of ill. This is the path to purity.”
The commentary in accordance with the above mentioned Sutta passages, and a host of others besides, rightly says: “There all things (sabbe dhamma) means the five aggregates only.”
Dhp 178: Sabbe dhammá anattá ti yadá paññáya passati, atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyá.
Dhp-a III 406: Tattha sabbe dhammáti pañcakkhandhá eva adhippetá."

“On another occasion the Buddha, teaching the practice that is helpful, or conducive to, nibbána (nibbánasappaya) says, that one views eye, forms, eye-consciousness, and eye- contact as impermanent (anicca). Whatever is experienced, whether happiness, ill or neither happiness nor ill arises dependent on eye-contact, one views that too as impermanent (anicca). So also with regard to ear and sounds etc., nose and smells etc., tongue etc., all of them he views as impermanent (anicca).”

“In the next Sutta these same things are viewed as ill followed by the next Sutta in which these same things are viewed as not-self (anattá).”

“Now, when viewing of things as not-self is helpful for, or conducive to, nibbána, nibbána itself cannot be not-self (anattá).”

"These Suttas show clearly that not-self (anattá) cannot be considered apart from impermanence (anicca) and ill (dukkha) since they are linked together. Not-self (anattá) does not stand by itself, for it proceeds from these two conditions, impermanence and ill. One condition flows into the other. "

“Nibbána is not ill (dukkha) but is happiness (sukha) and has to be regarded as such if one ever hopes to attain it. Thus it cannot be considered in the same way as everything else has to be considered. Even the happiness of nibbána is different from every other kind of happiness. Nibbána’s happiness is the happiness of relief, while all the other kinds of happiness are bound up with feeling (vedaná).”

I’m not sure that anattā proceeds from anicca and dukkha but is rather intrinsically interrelated with them, although this doesn’t invalidate the premises of Ven. Kheminda.

More importantly, I’m not convinced of the logic of his statement that because the contemplation of anattā is conducive to nibbāna that, therefore, nibbāna cannot be anattā.
Turning it around, it’s like saying because thoughts are conditional clouds cannot be contemplated because they are also conditional.
In either case, cessation might in an abstract sense be considered anattā since nothing is present so to speak, but it’s a stretch and doesn’t seem to apply.

I’m not sure whether nibbāna is considered to be a dhamma or not has much practical importance – seems theoretical and interesting but I’m not sure either view would be an obstruction unless there was clinging.

Yes, non-ariyans will misperceive Nibbāna, often taking it as a real phenomenon. But the way out of this misperception is not to contemplate it as nonself. In fact, this will just reinforce the idea that it is some sort of phenomenon. The right approach, in my opinion, is to make it clear that Nibbāna is the ending of things. And it does not make sense to speak of an ending as nonself.

Good point! One should should certainly not contemplate Nibbāna as self. Yet this does not mean one should contemplate it as nonself. Self and nonself are categories that apply to saṃsāra, not to Nibbāna.

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:pray: Bhante, in my opinion:

When you contemplate nibbāna to be without a self, you at the same time also need to realize what it actually is, namely freedom from suffering. You can’t contemplate it as nonself in isolation, without having this realization, otherwise you’re simply not contemplating nibbāna but something else. In other words, nibbāna has no meaning apart from the end of suffering, because that’s exactly what it is (I’m talking about parinibbāna specifically). So regardless of how you contemplate it, even as nonself, as long as you do so with right view, you’ll automatically also reflect on the freedom from suffering—and thereby on suffering itself. For those who understand what it is, it’s impossible to think about nibbāna, in whatever way, and NOT get disillusioned. It’s like saying you can look at the shape of a ball but not see it’s color. Theoretically possible, perhaps, but in practice you can’t.

You can’t take anattā apart from dukkha. The insights into the three characteristics described in the Dhammapada come as a package. In that I agree with Ven Kheminda as quoted by Jasudho. When you see that all things are without a self, at that moment you also see the freedom from suffering, hence it leading to disillusionment with suffering. Considering the interconnectedness of these insights, the verses at Dhp277–279 effectively say: “When you see with wisdom that all sankharas are suffering and impermanent, and you see all things are without a self, then you become disillusioned with suffering.” We can’t really take any of the three verses in isolation, practically speaking.

But you’ll agree anatta isn’t just a contemplation; it is also an ontological description of reality, a reality that should be known. And nonexisting phenomena (to use that bad terminology) can have the attribute of nonself. Anattā is about the absence of something (a self), so it can apply to the absence of phenomena as well. In this way it fundamentally differs from dukkha and anicca, which reflect the presence of certain qualities. (Even though anicca literally is “not-permanence”, it implies the presence of impermanence.) I think we should consider this ontological difference between these three terms when asking ourselves why the Buddha shifts to sabbe dhammā with the third.

Exactly why would it be problematic? I don’t think you explained that.

As to it not being meaningful, like some people already said, in MN1 even those in training are told not to “conceive” nibbāna in various ways, and to not see it as ‘mine’. How does this differ from contemplating it as nonself? Or, else, how would this not be meaningful?

Contemplating nibbāna as nonself seems meaningful for multiple reasons:

The word nibbāna, though often referring to the moment of things ending, is sometimes also used to refer to the “state” of nonexistence of suffering that happens after the ending of the aggregates (i.e. theasaṅkhata dhātu). It is helpful to contemplate this “state” as without a self, because it means that even when the final goal is attained, there still is nothing there for “me” or “my self”. The insight that even extinguishment has no owner, that even it is impersonal and not “mine”, helps us to let go of desire for it too. It’s the ultimate anattā contemplation, in a sense, if we can even let go of any personal involvement in the end of suffering, let alone suffering itself.

This will be especially helpful for people who misunderstand nibbāna to be some state of existence, but it will even be helpful for those who don’t, because they will realize that even the “state” of complete ending has nothing to do with them personally. The deluded mind is creative, and although theoretically it makes no sense to take the absence of things as a self, emotionally it still can (and will) do so. That is just the nature of the unenlightened mind: as long as there is a sense of self, even the absence of things will be seen through this lens. For example, it will be subtly perceived as “I will experience the absence of things” or “I won’t experience suffering”.

Further, many people will take the cessation of things personally on a coarser level. In MN22 the Buddha says when he teaches nibbāna, some think, “Oh no! So I will stop existing!” They see nibbāna as the ending of their self (which may either be undesired, as in this case, or desired). It will be meaningful for them to contemplate that it is actually an impersonal process, an ending that does not involve a self. That seems to be pretty much what MN1 is saying. As I said, it says that even those who are in training (i.e. non-enlightened noble ones) should still train not to see conceive nibbāna as ‘mine’, “so that they may completely understand it”. Even they should contemplate it as nonself, in other words.

So I disagree that the contemplation of anattā “must refer to phenomena that exist in one way or another”. We can also contemplate the nonexistence of a self in “nonexistent phenomena”.

All that aside, I can also approach the whole topic another way: Sabbe dhammā still includes the saṅkhāras alongside nibbāna, and you’ll agree that seeing the saṅkhāras as nonself leads to disillusionment. So therefore, seeing sabbe dhammā anatta leads to disillusionment too! :slight_smile:

You might object that in that case the insight could just as well be sabbe saṅkhāra anattā instead of sabbe dhammā anattā, but that would be taking a backward approach, working from the result of disillusionment back to what we think the insight into anattā should be. That is not what the Buddha does in the Dhammapada, where he first describes the insights as they actually occur, and only then mentions their natural result. Notice that he says: “When you see that with wisdom, you become disillusioned with suffering.” In this case the phrase sabbe dhammā anattā definitely isn’t just a pragmatic contemplation but the stream winner’s actual insight into reality: they know that all dhammas, both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata are without a self. That knowledge leads to disillusionment.

In other words, if someone has true insight into the absence of a self, it won’t just be “all sankhāras are without a self”. It will always be “all things, including nibbāna, are without a self”. And that insight is what leads to disillusionment. So, even if I were to agree that contemplating nibbāna as nonself wouldn’t lead to disillusionment, the stream winner’s actual insight of anattā still includes the saṅkhāras as well, thus it would lead to disillusionment regardless.

In still other words, technically speaking it’s never specifically said that contemplating nibbāna as anattā leads to disillusionment. It’s a much more complete insight into anattā that is said to lead to it. So when Ven. Sujato says “nibbana does not come within the scope of such contemplation [of anattā that leads to disillusionment]”, I could even agree with that but still argue nibbāna is included in sabbe dhammā for another reason. The reason being, again, that the Buddha describes an actual insight one has into reality, not a mere pragmatic contemplation with a purpose to become disillusioned.

(As an aside, in this regard it is also interesting that AN6.102–104, which use the phrases in question more as preliminary contemplations instead of describing the stream winner’s insights like the Dhammapada, the contemplations on anicca and dukkha in all saṅkharas, respectively should be considered to lead to “non-delight with the world” and “disillusionment”. But the contemplation of anattā in all things, is not considered to have such benefits. So is “the purpose of this contemplation [of sabbe dhammā anattā] to become repulsed from suffering” in the first place? Not according to AN6.104, at least.)


And what do you think the Buddha is saying, then, Ajahn? If like Bhante Sujato you think sabbe dhammā refers to principles like impermanence, most of the objections raised seem to apply just the same. First, people don’t tend to take such principles as their self either. It likewise isn’t “precisely the delusion most people have”. If anything, more people claim that nibbāna is a self (as some scholars have) than there are people who claim that principles like impermanence are a self (which I’ve never heard anybody do). This is also the case in the suttas. As said, in MN1 nibbāna is taken as ‘mine’ by those who don’t understand it, and apparently even by the sekhas. DN1 also mentions various mistaken notions of a self attaining (false) nibbāna. I’m unaware of a single place where principles like impermanence are mistaken as a self. So from the perspective of the suttas, how meaningful is it to contemplate these principles as nonself?

Second, as far as I know, these principles are also never directly described as nonself in the Canon. So objecting that nibbāna is never described as such, seems to apply a double standard. (That is, if for sake of argument we agree sabbe dhammā in AN3.136 doesn’t refer to these principles, which seems plausible considering how flexible the term dhamma is.) Regardless, it’s an argument by silence/absence, which is never the most reliable to begin with.

Finally, in Ven. Sujato’s interpretation of AN3.136, the word dhamma actually doesn’t have a single meaning either. As he says: “‘dhammas’ encompasses the conditioned phenomena as well as the principles [dhammas] of conditionality”. So we have two different meanings of the word dhamma, with the former being more inclusive than the latter. But considering that the word has two different meanings in the same text, why should we even assume sabbe dhammā refers to the other, very different kind of dhammas? We can’t really base it on the word dhamma itself, if it has no consistent meaning in the very same text. It would be self-contradictory to do so. It’d be like saying, “apples are apples and bananas”.

Considering all that, I think it makes more sense to take sabbe dhammā to encompass both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata, which seems a more natural pair, and one explicitly called a set of dhammas in DN34 (not DN33 as I said before).

(For clarity, my fundamental disagreement perhaps isn’t so much the interpretation of the text (although I disagree with that as well) but the practical conclusions that are drawn from it, like that looking at nibbāna as nonself doesn’t lead to disillusionment and that it would be meaningless/problematic to do so.)

Hi Ven. The absence of suffering is better than suffering. If that sounds like delight, then I don’t know how to phrase it so it doesn’t. :slight_smile: The Buddha describes nibbāna in ways that seem much closer to delight, anyway, like calling it the highest sukha.

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This is such an interesting passage, from AN9.34:

At one time Venerable Sāriputta was staying near Rājagaha, in the Bamboo Grove, the squirrels’ feeding ground. There he addressed the mendicants: “Reverends, extinguishment is bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!”

When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?”

“The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.”

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Also consistent with MN59.

"It’s when a mendicant, going totally beyond the dimension of nothingness, enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.
This is a pleasure that is finer than that.

There are those who would say that this is the highest pleasure and happiness that sentient beings experience. But I don’t grant them that.
Why is that?

Because there is another pleasure that is finer than that.
And what is that pleasure?

It’s when a mendicant, going totally beyond the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling.

This is a pleasure that is finer than that. Since all feeling is conditioned, and what is conditioned is suffering, the cessation of feeling is reckoned as pleasurable."

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MN128 is about samadhi/jhana, (written in response to a now deleted post).

They do not make any choice or intention to continue the passing parade of phenomena nor do they make any choice or intention to end the passing parade of phenomena.

Not making any choice at all for continued existence nor to end existence they are free of grasping for any dhamma whatsoever.

Absent any grasping or anxiety they personally reach parinibbāyati right there and directly grok that there is no return to any conditioned state.

:pray:

A few thoughts from a different angle.

It is the first part of all the refrains in MN1 that point to the reason why it is problematic to contemplate non-self in Nibbana… “having perceived earth as earth , they conceive it to be earth” then "Having directly known earth as earth, let them not conceive it to be earth" Seeing only the seen in the seen, means that there is no conceiving of ‘it’ (in this case Extinguishment/Nibbana) as any thing (including not as a ‘state’ and this is where the linguistic usage is so tricky). It is not just the different ways of conceiving (Nibbana) that MN1 is pointing to - but any conceiving/constructing (about Nibbana) itself. Just like the conceiving/constructing of a ‘self’ which occurs due to ignorance.

In order to contemplate it in the way you suggest, there needs to be a ‘thing’ within which one can contemplate non-self ie. you have to construct a ‘Nibbana’. By contemplating the non-self nature of Nibbana, it can assume (I’d say it must assume) that there is a separately existing Nibbana, a Nibbana absent a self. A ‘state’ of Nibbana existing whether it is with or without a self. This is the problem. This has now become a conditionally arisen concept/thing by this stage.

Regarding the insight into no self - I would say that the insight is into the fact that there is no such thing as a self, there isn’t one now, there never was and there never will be a ‘self’ ie. that it is simply a delusion and a mirage. The insight is that the idea/concept or sense of self is itself completely fabricated, constructed and conditioned due to ignorance. There is not even any ‘self’ to Nibbana/extinguish (verb). It becomes non-sensical to debate whether a self exists etc. It is a mirage. IMO this is why it is impossible to say whether it exists or not… or both or neither… the assumptions behind the questions are flawed. The Self, in itself, is simply a mirage. Does a mirage exist? Does it exist as the thing it appears as or as the ‘mirage’? – does it exist after death?? Death of what?

Nibbana is basically a verb, extinguishment. It is not a state per say. But it is used in a conceptual way as a tool to describe the end of the Path… practically there needs to be a way of describing this while people still do not see things as they are, they are under the sway of misperception and delusion caused by ignorance. It becomes a destination, a state, an element etc…

When it is used in this way, it is similar to the way ‘self’ is used… in itself there is no self, but it is used as a convention until the concept of ‘self’ is penetrated. As ‘self’ is a mirage, so too Nibbana (noun) is a ‘mirage’. Due to Ignorance it is misperceived and turned into a thing in itself rather than a description of cessation, extinguishment, absence of conditioned/constructed ‘things’.

In effect, the Buddha has to find a way to lead a re-conditioning of perception in those wishing to follow the Path, until they can see for themselves and achieve Liberation (end of Ignorance). So in essence Nibbana is simply used as a necessary concept until all conceptualisation/conceits have been penetrated. Until the Dependently Arisen nature of all Dhammas has been penetrated fully. So is Nibbana a ‘Dhamma’? Does it exist? One has to hold the concept until one penetrates the insubstantiality, the dependently arisen nature of the construction of the concept…

IMO this is why once one has crossed over, the raft has been used for its purpose and is let go of. The tools have done what was needed, one can let them go. The Dhamma has served its purpose and is let go of and not grasped. Concepts used for the purpose of transcending conceptual mind.

So how useful is it to contemplate no-self in Nibbana? I’d say not very, as it leads in the wrong direction. One can contemplate the relief from suffering, but that is the experiential outcome of extinguishment, not the subsequent state of extinguishment itself - basically the difference between treating Nibbana as a noun (constructing it into a thing/state) or more accurately as a verb - simply as a Dependently Arisen process/experience.

In this case it would be better to say that there is no self that Nibbanas, rather than there is no self in Nibbana.

SN22.95 A lump of foam

Excerpt

Suppose that in the last month of summer, at noon, a shimmering mirage appears. And a person with clear eyes would see it and contemplate it, examining it carefully. And it would appear to them as completely void, hollow, and insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a mirage?

In the same way, a mendicant sees and contemplates any kind of perception at all … examining it carefully. And it appears to them as completely void, hollow, and insubstantial. For what substance could there be in perception?

Suppose there was a person in need of heartwood. Wandering in search of heartwood, they’d take a sharp axe and enter a forest. There they’d see a big banana tree, straight and young and grown free of defects. They’d cut it down at the base, cut off the top, and unroll the coiled sheaths. But they wouldn’t even find sapwood, much less heartwood. And a person with clear eyes would see it and contemplate it, examining it carefully. And it would appear to them as completely void, hollow, and insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a banana tree?

In the same way, a mendicant sees and contemplates any kind of Sankharas at all … examining them carefully. And they appear to them as completely void, hollow, and insubstantial. For what substance could there be in Sankharas?

Suppose a magician or their apprentice was to perform a magic trick at the crossroads. And a person with clear eyes would see it and contemplate it, examining it carefully. And it would appear to them as completely void, hollow, and insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a magic trick?

In the same way, a mendicant sees and contemplates any kind of consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; near or far—examining it carefully. And it appears to them as completely void, hollow, and insubstantial. For what substance could there be in consciousness?

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I think the suttas also use nibbana to indicating the “state” of non-existence of the aggregates that is left after cessation (like in AN9.34 Doug just quoted), not just as the process of cessation itself. It may well be a rarer use of nibbana, but it does exist.

But if it’s just the distinction between “noun and verb” that makes people disagree with my interpretation, then let’s just redefine Nibbana, for the sake of this discussion, as the “state” of nonexistence, not as the process. This state is also without a self: That is what I meant when I said that sabbe dhamma includes the sankhata and asankhata. It is this asankhata dhatu, the “property that’s free from (a-) what’s created (sankhata)”, that is included in sabbe dhamma, not so much the process of extinguishment (although it could also be).

I do agree, to some extent, that it may be less useful to contemplate the process of extinguishment as without a self. Either way, I find it hard to see how it would be more helpful to contemplate principles of nature such as impermanence as being without a self, let alone the principle of nonself itself.

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Anyway, I do find it useful to be able to use all dhammas are not self to point out to some Buddhists who might otherwise identify nibbāna as self, of course, their notion of nibbāna is not total cessation.

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SN 22.59

“Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, venerable sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent pleasant or painful?” — “Painful, venerable sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my self’”? — “No, venerable sir.”

These seem to be, taken in the reverse sense, some of the Buddha’s criteria for “Self”. Also:

Bhikkhus, consciousness is not self. Were consciousness self, then this consciousness would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of consciousness: ‘Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.’ And since consciousness is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of consciousness: ‘Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.’

Another criteria for “Self”

But in the same sutta:

"Bhikkhus, when a noble follower who has heard (the truth) sees thus, he finds estrangement in form, he finds estrangement in feeling, he finds estrangement in perception, he finds estrangement in determinations, he finds estrangement in consciousness.

“When he finds estrangement, passion fades out. With the fading of passion, he is liberated. When liberated, there is knowledge that he is liberated. He understands: ‘Birth is exhausted, the holy life has been lived out, what can be done is done, of this there is no more beyond.’”

Self seems to be the allure mistaken in the aggregates. Nibbana is not more than a fading away of passion for the aggregates. With the fading of attachment to conditions, the unconditioned arises.

It doesn’t seem accurate to say that with the fading of a mistaken Self, Self arises.

But if we take the first criteria, it might follow that that which is not suffering or impermanent is Self.

Nibbana is not suffering. Is it permanent? I don’t know. I don’t think that definition of “permanency” applies however.

If we take the second criteria, we can ask: if Nibbana is known is it possible to say, “be thus, or be thus.”?

I don’t see how the “thusness” or “suchness” of Nibbana can be anything other than the cooling of passion. Ie. it is not self - but it is also not suffering and, arguably, permanent (in the sense that the flame of a candle, once blown out, is always blown out [assuming we don’t light it again :joy: {but that’s another barrel of monkeys :see_no_evil:}])

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It is solely ignorance that is blown out. It is only ignorance that ceases. Nothing else but ignorance fades and cools. There, what is left is knowledge. Upon the fading and cooling of ignorance, it is knowledge that remains. :pray:

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