Just to push a bit further… There is no self. It is a mirage. Hence talking about a 'mistaken self ’ is still holding on to the ‘conceit of self’. (This is where samadhi comes into it’s own). But because the Path is gradual, as per MN1 the way the world is conceived is different for the 3 classes of individuals (wordlings, those in training, and arahants) and as such the way words are used/perceived varies. So there is no choice but to talk in terms that are understandable for each level. And as such, some statements that will appear (be perceived) true for a wordling will appear false for an ariya
Everything gets turned on its head - “where they see happiness I see suffering”. Cessation/Nibbana is destruction and loss v/s cessation is the highest bliss.
when perceiving as a wordling (with perception still clouded by delusion/ignorance) v/s seeing reality as it is with clarity > Knowledge and Vision. So teachings are aimed as required.
In this case the asankhata has been constructed into a thing, rather than being a description of being free from the conditioned/constructed (the experience of not being constrained/enslaved/imprisoned by the conditioned - which s blissful). It is the same as when one says The Deathless, as opposed to saying Free from Death. Language is a serious constraint and one needs to penetrate the effect it has on perception. So it depends at what level you are talking.
My assumption in this particular thread is that we are talking at the trainee level so it is good to push a bit deeper.
This all goes directly to the first Noble Truth, where life/existence/samsara/the conditioned is suffering/unsatisfactory. Being free from this, Liberated/Awakened/Extinguished/Nibbana is Bliss. One is no longer enslaved by Ignorance, no longer perceiving things through the perceptual filters of defilements, no more craving and grasping, no more re-birth. So beautiful…
All food for thought. Happy contemplations. May everyone be happy and well
Dhammas means something close to ‘things which can be known by mind’ as in that which is cognized & understood.
So the asankhatadhatu is something that one can talk & think about whilst being aware that such talking & thinking is then mental activity describing the cessation mental activity.
So it’s analogical to using sound to describe silence. Can we do it? I could explain silence by uttering words but whatever sound i make to describe will not be like the perception of silence.
Likewise our perdicament we can explain the end by uttering words & thinking but whatever i say to describe will not be like the perception of cessation.
We are using mind to imagine the cessation of mind, it’s unimaginable and one can’t use language or logic to express how it actually is.
To see it as it actually is one has to train for the cessation of perception & feeling.
It’s just that it makes much better sense to think of Nibbāna as freedom from suffering rather than as nonself. Since the five khandhas are suffering, their cessation must be happiness. There is no parallel to this with nonself. Again, the whole idea of nonself only makes sense in relation to phenomena that can be taken as a self. It makes no sense in relation to cessation: “the cessation of the five khandhas is nonself” is not meaningful. And so the proper contemplation is to see Nibbāna as freedom from suffering.
The suttas only rarely speak of Nibbāna as happiness, and even more rarely as permanent. I think there is a clear parallel here to not speaking of it as nonself. Happiness and suffering normally relate to experiential phenomena, not to the ending of things. When you say that Nibbāna is “the highest happiness”, you are stretching the usage of happiness outside of it’s normal domain. The Buddha does this, but only rarely, no doubt because he understands it is bound to be misunderstood by many.
The same is true of the idea of permanence. You could argue that Nibbāna is permanent in the sense that there is no return to saṃsāra. But the normal usage of the term is to speak of a permanent self, thus a permanent experiential reality, as in the Vedic ātman. In fact the Buddha never uses nicca (the opposite of anicca, impermanence) to describe Nibbāna. It is true, however, that he very occasionally describes Nibbāna as dhūva, “steady” to show you have reached the end of the journey. And again, the rarity of such usage suggests it is easily misunderstood.
In both the case of describing Nibbāna as sukha or dhūva there is a significant possibility that some people will interpret that to mean that Nibbāna is an experiential phenomenon, which is precisely what we see happens so often. Yet when we come to anattā, it is hard to see how it is applicable to Nibbāna at all. Cessation and extinguishment are not just not describable in this way. Rather, the moment you say Nibbāna is anattā, a natural conclusion for some will be that it is some sort of experience where there is no sense of self, basically a deep state of samādhi. It is only when you emerge from samādhi that you take that state as a self. If the samādhi were to last forever, we might - mistakenly - consider it a nonself eternal phenomenon. The fact that the underlying tendency to the conceit “I am” (asmimāna) has not been eradicated would seem irrelevant.
You are right that there is an ontological difference between the three terms. Nibbāna relates quite directly to impermanence and suffering, in the sense that they both come to an end. This is not true for nonself. Nonself does not end at parinibbāna. And yes, this ontological difference is no doubt related to the switch from saṅkhāra to dhammā. Yet this does not mean that Nibbāna is included in dhammā. I will come back to this again below.
No, I don’t think it can. It’s a category mistake. Self and nonself can only properly be applied to existing phenomena. Apart from that, they have no meaning. A typical contemplation in the suttas, e.g. in the Anattālakkhaṇa Sutta (SN 22.59), is to see whatever is impermanent as suffering, and whatever is both impermanent and suffering as nonself. There is no scope here for seeing Nibbāna as nonself.
I have already replied to this above. But here it is again:
Again, I think it is more likely to lead to grasping samādhi as Nibbāna.
But this is about nonself before Nibbāna. Nonself after Nibbāna probably just makes the fear worse.
I certainly agree with the smiley face!
I will have to let Bhante @Sujato reply to this. I suppose an answer might be that people will take anything as a self as long as they are able to salvage their sense of self. The laws of nature will do if there is nothing else. Still, I admit this is rather abstract.
However, I believe there is another and perhaps better way of looking at this. From the Vedic point of view, dukkha and anicca belong to the mortal realm. This is what is created, the saṅkhāras. The immortal realm, however, is neither dukkha nor anicca, yet it is most definitely a self, an attā. So from the Vedic point of view it is not enough to say that the saṅkhāras are anattā. The brahmins will just point to the immortal reality after death. It’s happy, permanent, and uncreated. To counter this obvious argument from the prevailing brahmanical culture, the Buddha would have to use a different word from saṅkhāra in setting the scope for nonself. This is where dhamma fits in nicely. (I am assuming here, without any direct evidence, that the immortal state of the Vedas can be described as a dhamma.)
Having samadhi based on the cessation principle is per definition something unimaginable and unlike anything else one can think of.
As i see it,
It’s not like what atheists conceive of as death of an existing person. Such conceiving has for premise that there exists a person and this is exactly why atheists conceive of it as death of an existing person.
Therefore a buddhist-annhilationist is someone who conceives of cessation in the same way as an atheist conceives of the death of an existing person because he thinks here about the arahant in the same way as a regular person thinks about regular people.
It doesn’t matter that the annihilationist-buddhist doesn’t regard things as self because he has conceived of the arahant’s death in the same way as a regular person who does based on wrong view.
Essentially it follows that they think it the same thing. The two disagree only whether it happens conditionally (only to arahants) or unconditionally to all people. Therefore both having thought the same thing are describing annihilation of an existent being.
There are two different concepts to wit
Something is unimaginable because there is nothing to imagine. Like the son of a barren woman is unimaginable as to feature & detail.
Something is unimaginable because imagination can’t do it justice. Like if one was to try painting sound it’d be unpaintable or using spacetime models to describe the center of a black hole. Here something is but it is paradoxical & unimaginable.
Two very different concepts and lines of reasoning.
In #1 the unimaginable something is nothing
In #2 the unimaginable something is not nothing
The road to Bangkok leads to Bangkok. If we reach the end of the road, we arrive in Bangkok. The road ceases but the end of the road is not the same as the city of Bangkok.
As i understand this: It only means that when the mind is purified, and any view of self is gone, any conceit of self is gone, any conceiving of a self is gone, then you are truly yourself. You will also experience that only suffering has ended. That is the only difference between a pure and defiled mind.
That is what i believe.
But you must not see this as a doctrine of self. It only means that we are usually, due to the influence of adventitious defilements, mistaken about who or what we are, what mind is. We feel, perceive, that what knows, mind, is an ego, a homunculus, a me-like thing. This usual distorting of the nature of the mind is exactly the same as the usual distortion of who or what we believe we are: perceiving that we are an ego-like mental entity that senses, feels, knowns. This distortion (moha) upholds a pattern of instinctive reactions. In other words, we act as if we are mental entities.
If one has a direct understanding of the nature of the mind, one sees that it has never been an entity, atta-like thing. In language, symbolically one says: true self has arisen…which means…there was, is and will never be an atta who knows. We always failed to see this. In symbolic language…we have never seen the true face of the one who knows. We have always conceived it as a ego-like, atta-like thing.
This is because we have no direct knowledge of the nature of mind, only a conceived knowledge.
Conceiving is an illness, the sutta’s say.
I think, there is no buddhist tradition who talks about self, true sefl, Self that uses this terminology in a way that they believe there is an atta. Real self is more like a designator for the pure limitless freed mind. It is not at all used as a doctrine of self. It wants to express that only suffering disappears when defilements end. That is my opinion
I feel, there is a difference between seeing Nibbana as an experiential phenomena, and declaring that Nibbana can be known but is not a phenomena. Nibbana cannot be some phenomena.
Buddha reveals knowledge of a “sphere or dimension” (give it a name) that is beyond phenomena. That what is stable, is not seen arising, ceasing and changing in the meantime. It is from the beginning beyond formations that can be labelled as meritorious, demeritorious, good and bad, wholesome and unwholesome. It is not a normal happiness as in a nice feeling or nice perception. It is more like a totally unburdened sphere.
For me at the levels of development described in this Dhammavinaya, ñāṇa does not deal in the imagined. For there to be a completion of knowledge, an understanding that is complete regarding the sankhata there has to be a glimpse of which is absent of any sankhata nimitta. Even from a philosophical level this is a necessity.
To really know how you were wilting in the heat a chance to dive in to cool water will do the trick.
Do you have a sutta citation for this? Is it a personal realization? How would anyone verify this claim? How would anyone at all directly know this to be true?
By whom? Not by me, as far as I’m concerned. We are forced to use language to describe things, and as you acknowledge, it is a crude tool. So I’m sure that whatever way we translate or explain asaṅkhata dhātu, some people will objectify it. You’re assuming I’m using language in an objectifying way, but that’s only based on the way you (or whoever else) would potentially read the words, not on the way I meant them. So it’s just a semantic issue that doesn’t really address the underlying idea I was trying to get across—which is, I think, not that complicated to understand intellectually.
Likewise, in “all dhammas are without self” the potential objectification probably has more to do with the words dhamma and ‘are’ than with ‘without self’. But there is a clear precedence is the suttas for calling nibbāna a dhamma (DN34, Iti90, AN4.34, AN5.32), and the word ‘are’ is not in the Pāli at all, which overly literally just says, “all dhammas, without self”. So let me paraphrase the contemplation as: “nothing, including the end of suffering, involves a self”. Is that still constructing it into a thing? If not, then this is exactly what I tried to say in the words you quoted, illustrating that the problem you have with it is indeed just semantics.
If yes, the Buddha himself said nibbāna was constant (dhuva) and blissful (sukha), that it should be delighted in (AN6.14, AN6.85, @Khemarato.bhikkhu!), that it is a ‘state’ (or figurative ‘place’, padaṃ), among with many other statements that could be perceived as ontologically positive (and in fact often are). So I wonder why you seem to want me to be more ontologically precise than the Master himself. That seems unreasonable. I even put “state” in quotation marks on purpose. The Buddha never did that!
Also, your assumption in this thread is that we are talking at the trainee level. But then we should actually be allowed to be looser with words rather than more precise, because those with right view are much less likely to misunderstand things. Insight always trumps descriptions. That’s exactly why the Buddha could say the absence of sukha is sukha without being misunderstood (by trainees). I think we can take an example from this and not be so incredibly (and tiringly?) precise all the time.
Also, implying that things can’t be described in certain ways tends to mystify and potentially objectify them much the same, if not even more. In fact, that is the exact thing many Buddhist resort to when objectifying nibbāna.
Sorry in advance for a long post, but normally we just argue over words yet this seems to be something deeper. (Unless it again turns out not to…) So I thought I’d make my ideas as clear as possible.
This is simply because of the ontological difference between the three characteristics, which you acknowledged. Suffering and impermanence end, but the attainment of nibbāna doesn’t suddenly create a self out of nowhere (or, as you phrase it, “nonself does not end”), so it’s completely logical that there is no parallel to this for the third characteristic. I must be missing your point here?
Well, talking about ‘making sense’… With due respect, Bhante, but to me these statements make no sense (unless you are assuming some inherent objectification in anattā throughout, which I’m not). From my perspective, you are basically telling us that we can’t say that the complete and utter absence of suffering is also absent of a self. That we can’t say that when everything (conditioned) ceases, there still is no self. Exactly how is this a categorical mistake? If anything, it seems to be completely logical. When there is nothing, it means there is no self either! It’s like saying: when it’s quiet, then there is no noise of Martians landing behind my hut. Sure, noise of Martians doesn’t exist in any way whatsoever, but that doesn’t make it less true that I’m not hearing any. (And it may even be helpful to contemplate that there are no Martians anywhere at all, if you are scared of getting abducted. By which I mean, contemplating anattā if you fear losing your nonexistent “self” at nibbāna.)
In case you don’t want to reply to the rest of my post, if you can please just show me how this is all categorically wrong. Because to me it seems like you’re defying logic. Unless I am?
You also seem to be contradicting the above quote when you say, “You are right that there is an ontological difference between the three terms. […] Nonself does not end at parinibbāna.” If nonself doesn’t end, then it still does apply, no?
But you can’t argue from silence. There are lots of other things which that sutta doesn’t say, which are still true Dhamma. You could tag onto the end of it something like, “does cessation involve a self or not?” “not, bhante”. And it wouldn’t contradict anything that was said before. (Don’t make too much out of that suggestion, though. As I’ll explain in a moment, the sutta is still complete regarding all we need to know about anattā, exactly because nibbāna (I particularly mean parnibbāna) only has meaning in relation to the aggregates.)
And following your line of reasoning, then there also is no scope in this sutta for seeing sabbe dhammā to be anything other than the five aggregates—such as natural principles—for they also aren’t mentioned in the sutta. So in that case, I think it simply can’t be explained why the statement isn’t just sabbe saṅkhāra anattā. (I’ll reply to your argument about the Vedas later.)
I don’t think it’s that rare, especially for nibbāna to be called sukha or similar positive attributes, like peaceful, etc. And this says little anyway, especially since sabbe dhammā anattā isn’t exactly the most common statement either. Either way, I don’t think we can make any reasonable conclusions about such matters based on counting instances in the texts. There are plenty of unique statements which can be just as valuable and authentic as those that are often repeated. So if anything, you agree nibbāna actually is called constant (dhuva, which seems to be just a synonym for nicca) and to be a kind of sukha, even if just in a few texts. So that at least sets a parallel, as you say, for it to be implied to be nonself as well, even if just in a few texts.
You’re also saying, Bhante , that “no doubt” the Buddha didn’t say certain things often, because they are bound to be misinterpreted. But unless the suttas tell us this explicitly (which they don’t), or you have some special phone line with the Buddha (in which case, hook me up!) , that must just be a presumption on your part, with plenty of room for doubt left. There could be hundreds of other reasons why the suttas are the way they are. Perhaps certain things just didn’t get recorded as often as they were actually said, or not at all. Or some things the Buddha actually only said once (or even never at all) got shared around a lot so proliferated in the canon. Or perhaps certain things were perfectly fine to say (frequently), but the Buddha just didn’t do it (frequently). Etc. etc. What I’m saying is, since we’re not the Buddha, I think we should try to not interpret the suttas based on what we think he would and wouldn’t say. We also shouldn’t judge ‘sabbe dhammā anattā’ on such bases. Instead, we should look at what the suttas actually say, not what is left unsaid or what we think should (not) be said, and figure out what is most reasonable based on that.
You’re likewise assuming to know how people would react to certain statements, which may well be correct (though I doubt it in case of anattā), but you’re not basing it in the texts. The text do not say that people will mistake statements about nonself to be a thing, or anything like that. So it’s projecting onto other people, living 25 centuries ago, how we expect them to react, and then from that we assume what the Buddha surely wouldn’t have said, and from that we assume what a certain ambiguous statement (sabbe dhammā anattā) can’t possibly mean. Forgive me if this all sounds a bit brusque, Ajahn, I feel a bit bad about it, I just didn’t know how else to phrase it, but that is all very presumptive to me.
Could you at least envision how it may be possible for some people to not fall into the objectifying trap, even if they contemplate the end of suffering as not involving a self? I think so, because you say the objectification of nibbāna based on anattā is “a natural conclusion for some”. But then, if it’s just some people, is it really reasonable to assume the Buddha would consider every single person in everything he said? Especially in these deep statements—which I would like to recall are, when properly understood, the stream winner’s insights? There are many other things he said that are much more easily objectified or otherwise misunderstood. I’ll get back to that.
To rephrase the issue, if you think sabbe dhammā anatta as I interpret it, could be understood properly by at least some people, I don’t understand how you can be so sure that the Buddha didn’t have exactly that interpretation in mind too. His usual audience was not run-of-the mill, after all, and he knew which minds were capable of understanding certain teachings and which weren’t. And if you think nobody would understand this in the right way, with right view, then again I think it’s rather presumptive about the minds of others.
And, while we’re assuming how ordinary people would react to certain statements , I would like to argue the exact opposite. If we tell people that the end of suffering can’t be described as devoid of self, then in my eyes that is exactly what will lead to them objectifying it. Can you see how that would happen? Because they’ll think, “ah, so it is a self, then!” So even pragmatically I don’t follow you. I think it’s a good idea to say that after suffering ends there still is no self, i.e., that sabbe dhammā anattā. Otherwise, we’d just be mystifying the end of suffering unnecessarily, which it very much feels to me you’re doing, when you say extinguishment can’t be described as anattā.
If people were to indeed misunderstand such statements, it seems more reasonable that it should be blamed on the word nibbāna itself, not on words like ‘constant’ or even ‘permanent’. Because I don’t think anybody would misunderstand the basic point I would try to make if I said, “the cessation of suffering is permanent”. It just means suffering doesn’t come back. But “Nibbāna is permanent” could be misunderstood—even though nibbāna in the end is nothing but the cessation of suffering (or craving in other contexts). I get the feeling that’s also the actual issue you’re having with my take on sabbe dhammā anattā: you’re sort of reading it (on behalf of others) as “nibbāna [which is a thing] is anattā [which is a property that applies to a thing]”. But that’s not what I mean, and that’s not what it says. Sabbe dhammā are not things, and anattā is more like a “non-property”. In other words, if I would have said, “both suffering and the end of suffering do not involve a self”, I think few would misunderstand or objectify that, and I guess you wouldn’t have blinked much of an eye either, outside of the context of this discussion. Yet, that’s exactly what sabbe dhammā anatta means.
But if this is indeed the problem you perceive—that you think I’m applying properties to nibbāna that potentially objectify it—then you should actually take issue with the Buddha’s own statements like nibbānaṃ paramaṃ sukhaṃ, not with my understanding of sabbe dhammā anattā. Because the former actually is easily mistaken to be applying an ontologically positive property (“bliss”) to nibbāna, while the latter says something that’s definitely ontologically negative (no self).
And if you do take issue with such statements by the Buddha, then I don’t understand why you simply don’t take issue with sabbe dhammā anattā as well!
Also, in SN43.12-44 the Buddha applies a whole slew of properties to the end of suffering/craving, some of which are positive and others negative in purport. He’s calling it subtle, sublime, a haven, an island, the untroubled, the unafflicted, etc. Plus there’s various other suttas where he does such things. Yet, somehow it’s inherently problematic and objectifying things if we apply nonself to it? I really am confused. :S
The only difference is that nonself applies to both the saṅkhata and asaṅkhata, but surely that alone doesn’t make people people objectify the end of suffering. There are a lot of other things that apply to both—for example, both are devoid of Martians! But contrary to things being devoid of a self, that isn’t useful to teach, so the Buddha doesn’t. Yet if he would, that wouldn’t make people suddenly objectify nibbāna, because wise people know that Martians don’t exist anywhere at all. Likewise with a self.
I don’t think you did reply to this, Ajahn, because my point was that it is also said to apply to those in training, i.e., not just to non-ariyans but also to non-enlightened ariyans:
As an aside, I do not know how we could have wished for a better example of contemplating nibbāna as without a self. Apart from a literal nibbānaṃ anattā, it’s about as clear as it gets, I would say. Yet you say this kind of contemplation is problematic and meaningless.
Anyway, what I was saying is, the noble ones cannot possibly objectify nibbāna into a “real phenomenon”, because they have seen what it “is” and won’t ever take it as an eternal state of existence or existing self in any way. Still, the noble ones are implied to be able to conceive a ‘mine’ in extinguishment, which means they take it personal in some sense. How do you interpret this? To me, one interpretation is, as I explained, that even the trainees can sometimes take the ending of suffering to be the ending of a part of them, taking cessation personally, as my cessation/extinguishment. This contemplation on nibbāna is meant to counter that tendency.
Such tendencies will be intrinsically accompanied by an identification with any of the aggregates (like consciousness), which the trainees know will cease at nibbāna but still sometimes perceive to be theirs. So the contemplation of nibbāna as nonself cannot be separated from contemplating the aggregates as nonself. That is exactly because nibbāna (meaning parinibbāna) only makes sense in relation to the aggregates, being nothing more than their cessation. (Hence we have sabbe dhammā anattā and not just nibbānaṃ anattā.) This also means, if we would contemplate just the aggregates as nonself, and do so comprehensively, that will suffice to remove all conceit. Still, it can be helpful to also contemplate that the cessation of the aggregates is not the cessation of a self—that is, that nibbāna, just like the aggregates, does not involve a self. In other words, that all dhammas are void of self.
Would you agree that it can be helpful to reflect that the cessation of suffering is not the cessation—or continuation—of a self? If so, then your objections regarding possible practical misconceptions of nibbāna (like non-ariyans seeing it as a “real phenomenon”) do not apply to the way I interpret sabbe dhammā anattā. For in essence this is all I’ve been trying to say all along, from the pragmatic side of things at least: that no self is involved in the end of suffering, just like none is involved in the presence of suffering. And the Buddha would have known that too.
And from the ontological side you agree! But then the second line of reasoning I suggested is still valid. Then I could agree, for the sake of argument, that contemplating nibbāna as nonself is not helpful. But still the noble ones, having these ontological insights into reality, know that nibbāna, like the aggregates, is not a self. Together with their other insights, this leads to disillusionment. You say, “yet this does not mean that Nibbāna is included in dhammā. I will come back to this again below”. I don’t see where you did come back to it, but of course I agree, because it’s simple logic: this does not automatically mean that nibbāna is included in it. But that wasn’t the point I was making. My point was that we then also can’t conclude that it’s NOT included. What I was saying is, the argument that seeing nibbāna as nonself isn’t productive, could be completely agreed with, and still sabbe dhammā could include nibbāna. Because it describes an ontological insight into reality, not just a pragmatic contemplation to get disillusioned.
That said, I do find it very likely that these ontological truths—which are, after all, realizable—would be reflected in the statements on the three characteristics. And I do think they all have pragmatic use as well. The third just means that both inside and outside the saṅkhāras, there is no self. If anybody objectifies nibbāna because of that, that is their fault, and we should put the blame on them but not on the way the insight is phrased.
This argument based on the Vedas seems implausible. The Buddha already countered such views by saying all consciousness, including that of the Vedic realms, is anattā. The Vedic immortal realm is already included in “all saṅkhāras”, in other words. If it wasn’t, it would also mean he countered this Vedic concept of self only in these few statements of sabbe dhammā anattā and not in suttas like the Anattalakkhana, which just treats the saṅkhāras (the aggregates) as anattā. That seems unlikely.
Also, assuming he indeed used sabbe dhammā to include the Vedic immortal realm in the characteristic of anattā, why didn’t he do the same for dukkha and anicca? After all, in the Buddha’s view such immortality is also suffering and impermanent. Going by your assumption, it seems he is telling the Brahmins that such realms are indeed true happiness and permanent; they just aren’t a self…
Finally, because I glossed over it earlier, I want to bring up again @PeterHarvey’s (Hi!) earlier mention of AN4.34, which is also found in Iti90 and AN5.32:
To whatever extent there are principles (dhammas), whether constructed or not constructed (sankhatā vā asankhatā vā), dispassion is declared the foremost among them, that is, the crushing of pride, the removal of thirst, the uprooting of attachment, the termination of the round, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, extinguishment (nibbāna). (Adopted from Bodhi with a few quick changes)
It’s another instance of dhamma that encompasses both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata, just like DN34. Here “to whatever extent there are dhammas” further seems to mean “all dhammas”.
(Here asaṅkhata may have a double meaning, both the ending of the defilements but also the ending of “the round”, i.e. of suffering. But if so, that doesn’t make much of a difference for what I tried to say, because ontologically they are both about the absence of certain things. Even enlightenment essentially just comes down to an absence of defilements.)
PS. Thanks for the exchange. It’s very helpful, even if so far I’m unconvinced. I’m happy you allow me to disagree with you, let alone publicly.
PPS. More smileys so at least you have something to agree with: :o :X
This seems in tension with what the Teacher has said:
When a mendicant has given up ignorance and given rise to knowledge, they don’t make a good choice, a bad choice, or an imperturbable choice.
Yato kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno avijjā pahīnā hoti vijjā uppannā, so avijjāvirāgā vijjuppādā neva puññābhisaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti na apuññābhisaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti na āneñjābhisaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti.
Not choosing or intending, they don’t grasp at anything in the world.
Anabhisaṅkharonto anabhisañcetayanto na kiñci loke upādiyati;
Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished.
anupādiyaṁ na paritassati, aparitassaṁ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati.
SN 12.51
and
Therefore a mendicant thus endowed is endowed with the ultimate foundation of wisdom.
Tasmā evaṁ samannāgato bhikkhu iminā paramena paññādhiṭṭhānena samannāgato hoti.
For this is the ultimate noble wisdom, namely,
Esā hi, bhikkhu, paramā ariyā paññā yadidaṁ—
the knowledge of the ending of suffering.
sabbadukkhakkhaye ñāṇaṁ.
Their freedom, being founded on truth, is unshakable.
Tassa sā vimutti sacce ṭhitā akuppā hoti.
For that which is false has a deceptive nature, while that which is true has an undeceptive nature—extinguishment.
Tañhi, bhikkhu, musā yaṁ mosadhammaṁ, taṁ saccaṁ yaṁ amosadhammaṁ nibbānaṁ.
Therefore a mendicant thus endowed is endowed with the ultimate resolve of truth.
Tasmā evaṁ samannāgato bhikkhu iminā paramena saccādhiṭṭhānena samannāgato hoti. For this is the ultimate noble truth, namely,
Etañhi, bhikkhu, paramaṁ ariyasaccaṁ yadidaṁ— that which has an undeceptive nature—extinguishment.
amosadhammaṁ nibbānaṁ.
MN 140
There are many more sutta which describe the same.
And also their knowledge that even this knowledge of the stability of natural principles is liable to end, vanish, fade away, and cease.
From your lastest post, none of them says about after the death of an arahant, knowledge still remains.
Can also read MN30, the Jhānas are superior to knowledge and vision and knowledge and vision is not the final end point. No need to equate them with the final deliverance of mind.
For me, even though the Dhammapada verse of long debate says ‘Sabbe dhamma’ , the assignment is clear. What should be investigated is khandha(ayatanadhatu).
ñāṇa is also dependent on contact. ñāṇa clearly understands what it touches. Asankata is not withing range for us right now. Lets Leave it till after stream entry.
It is true that none of the suttas speak about the death of an awakened one, but there do exist suttas that say death does not apply to an awakened one. Old age and death is suffering. Suffering has ceased with nibbana. How can death apply?
Moreover, I am unaware of any sutta that says what you proclaim: that knowledge ceases after extinguishment. Can your provide such a sutta? I’m at a loss for how anyone would directly know this to be the case. How is it that you proclaim knowledge that after the break up of the body of an awakened one that knowledge ceases? SN 12.34 and companion are speaking of the inferential knowledge of a trainee not an awakened one. They do not speak of direct knowledge to my mind; only inferential conceptional knowledge.
You mentioned the jhanas, but those sutta I cited clearly refer to nibbana and extinguishment, not the jjanas. I have highlighted in bold the Pali which clearly says knowledge arises with extinguishment.
All dhammā is a name for everything experienced & known through allness of the all and what is not experienced & known through allness of the all.
Everything experienced & known through allness of the all is sankhara, anicca, dukkha and anatta.
What is not experienced & known through allness of the all is also anatta but it is not sankhara (as it is sankharanirodha), nor is it anicca or dukkha.
Therefore
all sankharā are anicca
all sankhara are dukkha
all dhammā are anatta
One could say
Some dhammas are sankhara one is not sankhara
Some dhammas are anicca one is not anicca
Some dhammas are dukkha one is not dukkha
All dhammas are anatta
All fair enough, but I responded as I read your posts in this thread. As always, I only aim to stimulate contemplation from different angles, as opposed to trying to convince anyone that my angle is correct. I often do this not so much only for the person writing but for all the ‘silent’ readers of the threads who do not participate, especially if I feel some aspect needs to be drawn out more.
Also I subsequently read another one of your posts on asankhata where I thought you expressed yourself very clearly on this subject. Here it is
I often use ‘constructed’ as well as fabricated. As for me this also indicates mental constructions/constructs/conceptualizations - so tying in with ‘volitional formations’ which I see as a hybrid between choices and fabrications…
I even put “state” in quotation marks on purpose. The Buddha never did that! 
By which I mean, contemplating anattā if you fear losing your nonexistent “self” at nibbāna.)