Namo Buddhaya!
I think the literal is closer to agenetic, not genetic; that does not have a genetic cause; and is not genesis.
When you say Nibbāna is nonself, you are assuming a certain idea that Nibbāna is a “state” after the death of the arahant. But to the ancient Indians Nibbāna meant “extinguishment”. You have to show that “extinguishment is nonself” makes sense, or that “cessation is nonself” is meaningful. I don’t think it is. Nonself does not apply to these ideas. So I still think it is a category mistake.
And it’s not just the literal meaning of Nibbāna which favours extinguishment. Nibbāna is consistently defined in the suttas as the ending of desire, ill will, and delusion. This is an extinguishment or an ending, happening when you become an arahant, and not a post-parinibbāna “state”. The use of Nibbāna in this latter sense is rare, and so we should give precedence to the former.
We haven’t discussed the important point of what is meant by Nibbāna in these cases. Nibbāna in the suttas normally means the living experience of an arahant. It is not at all obvious that parinibbāna can be qualified in all these ways.
But this is slightly distorting what we are discussing. Sabbe dhammā anattā means “all dhammas are nonself”, that is, Nibbāna is nonself, if it is included in dhammā. By adding “involve” we are discussing something else.
But why use a synonym? Surely if the Buddha wanted to say that nicca applies to Nibbāna he would. I suspect he is deliberately using a different word because he wants to keep things separated. Anicca refers to existing phenomena, whereas dhuva is used - very occasionally - as a kind of metaphor for Nibbāna.
The truth is that even dhuva is used only once or twice to describe Nibbāna. And the suttas where it is used are marginal ones, such as repetition series. Such rarity may well mean that the Buddha himself never used the word at all. So I think the “parallel” you suggest is at best partial.
But we know it was misinterpreted. We have the well-known dialogue between Udāyin and Sāriputta. So it is not a presumption.
As for a phone line to the Buddha, I wonder what he would have said. Maybe that we are making too much of something that we should just put aside! But I find it useful. I enjoy these little exchanges, if only to clarify my understanding of the suttas. I am happy you are willing to engage with me! 
It’s just obvious that the three characteristics almost always refer to the five khandhas. If they are used about Nibbāna, we automatically have an interpretation issue. And we know how easy it is to misinterpret. I can sort of understand why the Buddha would occasionally call Nibbāna sukha, because this is what the whole Dhamma is about. The selling point of the Dhamma, as expressed in the four Noble Truths, is the end of suffering. The idea of nonself is not really a selling point as much as a reality that we need to grasp to reach the end of suffering. In this sense it is similar to impermanence. Impermanence, too, is not a selling point, but a reality to be understood. It is therefore particularly pertinent that Nibbāna does not seem to be called permanent, nicca, anywhere.
No, worries at all. This is a discussion. I take it as such. 
Likewise, I honestly hope I have not overstepped the bounds of appropriate speech.
The ariyas are obviously exempted. But I doubt they would ever call Nibbāna nonself. I mean, the moment you try to envision Nibbāna as nonself, it is almost impossible to do so without making it into something. I am repeating myself, but how can an ending be nonself. Sorry! Maybe we won’t see eye to eye on this.
But everyone knows there is no self. You don’t really see committed Buddhists taking Nibbāna as a self. This is despite the fact that many of them know very few suttas, even monastics who practice well. So it is not as if they need to contemplate Nibbāna as nonself. It is just obvious to everyone that self view is wrong.
By saying that Nibbāna is nonself, however, we are describing it with a term that is almost exclusively reserved for the khandhas, as part of the tilakkhaṇa. It is word that is closely associated with dukkha and anicca. This is dangerous territory. How could it not be a real phenomenon?
Yet nonself is not on any of those lists, just as nicca is missing. So the question then is: why is it not there?
Yes, their perceptions and thought are often not yet fully aligned with Dhamma. I mean, that’s what the sekha section of MN1 is about. I don’t see a problem here.
Not from the Vedic point of view. A brahmin listening to you would agree that all saṅkhāra are impermanent and suffering, and yet still hold on to an eternal reality. It is all about who we are speaking to. The Buddha often talked to non-Buddhists. When you do, you need to understand their way of thinking. And yes, the Buddha has said all consciousness is nonself, but he often elucidates the Dhamma from a variety of perspectives. I mean, this is very much what the Dhamma is about.
Well, I am the one who started this! So of course it is reasonable for you to respond.
Just to finish off, I think the evidence for Nibbāna being included in dhammā is weak. As a general principle, we should not make too much of such weak evidence. If you think it is a good idea to contemplate Nibbāna as nonself, and you are content that you know how to do this well, then of course you can do it. But I do not think this is a contemplation I would ever recommend. If we are to contemplate Nibbāna, it is better to follow the contemplations we explicitly find in the suttas such as seeing it as happiness, sukha, and/or peace, upasama.
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I use conventional language, when I say when an arahant dies. You also just use the same concept in different words as quoted above. Let’s not argue over semantics.
The sutta SN12.34 didn’t say it is limited to trainees. Didn’t refer to any persons. So it’s quite natural to read it as one of the principle of the dhamma as well, knowledge is conditioned, whatever is conditioned would cease. Condition for knowledge includes memory, perception, having a consciousness etc.
It’s quite natural from the point of view that when rebirth is ended, there’s no more further consciousness as a basis for knowledge, that’s the latest point where knowledge ends.
If you insists that knowledge survives parinibbāna (please don’t argue over semantics again, I mean the same thing of death of arahant), then it would require some form of thing to contain it, maybe pure mind, buddha nature etc? Then that would just be inline with the eternalist view. Anyway, rather than arguing for whether knowledge ends or not based on our different views of what’s the nature of parinibbāna, it’s better to just see if knowledge ends or not from the sutta. And what I quoted is pretty convincing. Knowledge of the dependent origination, which leads to enlightenment, which dispels ignorance, that too is impermanent.
Therefore there’s no reason to posit anything leftover after parinibbāna. Of course, I understand that some mahayana practitioners wouldn’t accept this and would argue that a different kind of knowledge, not covered by this sutta will not end in parinibbāna. I learnt this from reddit some time ago. It’s just different views passed down through the traditions. We are not likely to change the traditions.
Namo Buddhaya!
I can give an analogy of how i think about this
Suppose in a firstperson multiplayer videogame there are 5 players. Here to wit are 5 unique & special frames of reference by which the virtual world is observed.
Suppose that player5 dies and respawns elsewhere. The special frame of reference #5, by which the virtual world was observed, changed as it persisted and we can still talk about it’s states of before & after.
This is akin to rebirth reconnecting, for there is a conception & perception of the virtual world which having ceased there arose elsewhere.
Suppose that having rather than of respawning, player5 is disconnected from the game. Then his frame of reference of the virtual world has ceased.
We can no longer ask what happens to the player5’s frame of reference after the disconnect because that frame of reference no longer comes into play but we can still talk about what happened after by describing the remaining frames of reference #1-4.
If there are no players playing the game the we can’t even talk about a continuation of the game which changed as it persisted, if all players were to disconnect then there is no further for that world and we can’t ask what happens therein after all disconnect.
These analogies are meant to show how talk of a world is dependent on there being a frame of reference in regards knowledge & vision of that world.
There is no virtual world except the coming into play of those 5 frames of reference.
As long as these frames come into play they are special & relative to oneanother. The relativity therein allows for thinking of a general case drawn out fro the special frames. When one thinks of a general case based on special relativity then one can also draw out the general relativity as the general relative to the special reference. Thus one essentially thinks up a 6th general frame of reference describing the special 5 but the 6th is not an element apart from the 5 nor is it the same thing as the 5.
A mistake to wit is in asserting that the 5 arise & cease in the 6th such that the 6th changes as it persists independently of there being any special frames of reference.
Most of the time it is said that what remains cannot be objectified.
Yes, many here believe that if there is no sense contact, no sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations, visuals, ideas, no sense domains, there is some kind of total absence, like one has become unconscious. But is that really what happens and the sutta’s teach? Isn’t there a sutta that teaches that when there is no sensing there is yet also no total absence?
I think i read this recently on the forum but cannot find it.
Anyway, to talk about an absence as ultimate happiness, is, i feel is cynical and nonsense. For example, if sannavedayitanirodha means a total absence, being unconscious but still alive, like deep coma, sleep, narcosis, i feel it makes no sense at all to call this realisation an even greater pleasure or happiness then all states before that (the jhana’s). Refering to absence as the ultimate happiness is ofcourse merely an intellectual construct because there is no perception at all in absence.
The happiness in jhana is not like that, because that is really tasted. Jhana is never an absence.
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Hello Venerable!
I don’t think our differences in this conversation come down to tradition or semantics, but I understand you think otherwise.
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SN 12.34 indeed does not say that it speaks of knowledge of trainees, but it is of a pair with SN 12.33 which does say exactly that. It speaks of inferential knowledge; conceptual knowledge that is not the same as direct realization. By implication due to similar language, being of a pair, talk of future and past, I believe 12.34 similarly so speaks.
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A major point of difference between us isn’t one of semantics at all: you believe parinibbāna refers only to the “death” and breakup of the body of an awakened one. I believe that necessarily parinibbāna occurs before this in temporal order. Indeed, with Shakyamuni I think parinibbāna refers to the Buddha underneath the Bodhi tree. Knowledge certainly remains, but no ignorance is found. Siddhartha became fully extinguished and cool right there. I think this has nothing to do with semantics or tradition.
Of course, all of the above is probably just my ignorant conceptions and hypothesis as I can claim no direct knowledge on any of this. It is simply my feeble and humble attempt to understand dhamma and I’m no doubt quite far off from any kind of direct realization of anything.
There he addressed the mendicants: “Reverends, extinguishment is bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!”
When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?”
“The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.
It’s not those states. Those states still have mind, according to classical theravada, it’s the bhavanga mind, which is basically unconscious, but not without consciousness (used here in the Buddhist sense, not in the colloquial sense of being awake/aware).
Again referring to the sutta AN9.34, the progressive happiness does indeed changes it’s nature as we go up and up. From 3rd Jhana to 4th, pleasant feelings is gone. Neutral feeling is considered to be superior in bliss compared to pleasant feelings. And it gets progressively more refined and subtle, with more things dropping, fading away, until perception of nothingness, where there’s only left the perception which sees nothingness, and beyond that, perception is almost completely gone, and then totally gone. It’s very hard to use the perspective of the lower level to guess at what these are.
To a dung bettle, there’s no dung in heaven, it has a hard time understanding what’s so great about heaven. To lustful humans, seeing that there’s no sex in the Brahma realm, no sensual delight there, wonders what’s so great about it. And so on.
Here it is, but it does not mean what you think it means. SuttaCentral
“On one occasion, friend Ānanda, I was dwelling right here in Sāvatthī in the Blind Men’s Grove. There I attained such a state of concentration that I was not percipient of earth in relation to earth; of water in relation to water; of fire in relation to fire; of air in relation to air; of the base of the infinity of space in relation to the base of the infinity of space; of the base of the infinity of consciousness in relation to the base of the infinity of consciousness; of the base of nothingness in relation to the base of nothingness; of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in relation to the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; of this world in relation to this world; of the other world in relation to the other world, but I was still percipient.”
Note this sutta is about arahants while still alive, can perceive nibbana directly.
“But of what was the Venerable Sāriputta percipient on that occasion?”
“One perception arose and another perception ceased in me: ‘The cessation of existence is nibbāna; the cessation of existence is nibbāna.’ Just as, when a fire of twigs is burning, one flame arises and another flame ceases, so one perception arose and another perception ceased in me: ‘The cessation of existence is nibbāna; the cessation of existence is nibbāna.’ On that occasion, friend, I was percipient: ‘The cessation of existence is nibbāna.’”
And the cessation of existence is nibbana is directly how they can know nothing leftover after the death of an arahant. Directly stated there. For those who think that there’s something leftover after the death of an arahant, they have to reinterpret existence in a different manner to not include whatever is leftover. This is mental gymnastics to preserve the delusion of self, although it can happen subconsciously so it’s not going to be acknowledged.
In the previous sutta, AN10.6, the Buddha said it’s about seeing Nibbana directly.
, but he would still be percipient?”
“He could, Ānanda.”
“But how, Bhante, could he obtain such a state of concentration?”
“Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu is percipient thus: ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is, the stilling of all activities, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna.’ It is in this way, Ānanda, that a bhikkhu could obtain such a state of concentration that he would not be percipient of earth in relation to earth; of water in relation to water; of fire in relation to fire; of air in relation to air; of the base of the infinity of space in relation to the base of the infinity of space; of the base of the infinity of consciousness in relation to the base of the infinity of consciousness; of the base of nothingness in relation to the base of nothingness; of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in relation to the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; of this world in relation to this world; of the other world in relation to the other world, but he would still be percipient.”
It is not about the state of after the death of an arahant, as there’s no more 5 aggregates to be perceipient.
You’re forcing me to use death of an arahant instead of one simple word, but ok, fine. Here you’re understanding fully extinguished in a different manner to what is meant as well. Here I can draw a diagram to make it more clear.
Total extinguishment refers to even the 5 aggregates are gone. The red and green lines are both not self, just delusions of self (I lump them into this term). Due to dependent origination requires ignorance to keep it going, once it’s gone, the whole chain falls off, and while still alive, there’s still the consciousness and name and form of the arahant, until death, where there’s no more ignorance and formations to create a new rebirth, there is complete cessation there.
Reifying say the xxxx below, to be something (nibbana, buddha nature etc), one might come to the view of something left after the death of an arahant. It’s just meant as a representation of no self, but it might as well not be there too, for those who prefer it.
I have no idea the meaning of which the above is meant to convey. How am I forcing you? What am I forcing you to do? What is the “one simple word” you are referring to? What do you mean by “what is meant?”
Your diagram is interesting, but my poor mind is still not clear on what meaning you are attempting to convey. I apologize.
Again, I think there is a distinction that we disagree on that has nothing to do with semantics or tradition. I think the five grasping aggregates cease with the paranibbana of an awakened one which again with Shakyamuni was underneath the Bodhi tree. Siddhartha having been extinguished, what could be said to grasp the aggregates? The burden was put down right there underneath the Bodhi tree not to be picked up again. The extinguishment of the five grasping aggregates happened right there.
Hi,
In the suttas, the word parinibbāna is not always associated with the death of an awakened one, but quite often it is. As always, context is important.
In AN9.49 and MN84 the context points to nibbāna at death.
From MN84:
"“But where is that Blessed One at present, the perfected one, the fully awakened Buddha?”
"“Great king, the Buddha has already become fully extinguished.”
“Parinibbuto kho, mahārāja, etarahi so bhagavā arahaṁ sammāsambuddho”ti.
““Master Kaccāna, if I heard that the Buddha was within ten leagues, or twenty, or even up to a hundred leagues away, I’d go a hundred leagues to see him.
But since the Buddha has become fully extinguished, I go for refuge to that fully extinguished Buddha, to the teaching, and to the mendicant Saṅgha.”
“Yato ca, bho kaccāna, parinibbuto so bhagavā, parinibbutampi mayaṁ bhagavantaṁ saraṇaṁ gacchāma dhammañca bhikkhusaṅghañca.”
Also, SN6.15:
In a recounting of the last moments of life of the Buddha, similar to DN16:
“These were the Realized One’s last words… Then he entered the fourth absorption. Emerging from that the Buddha immediately became fully extinguished.”
“Catutthā jhānā vuṭṭhahitvā samanantaraṁ bhagavā parinibbāyi.”
Yes, I’m aware that the word parinibbāna comes up in different sutta in different context. However, I’m not sure what you’re attempting to convey when you say this. I think there is a distinction here that is not semantics or context or what have you: I think the parinibbāna of Siddhartha occurred underneath the Bodhi tree. I doubt that you or most on this forum would agree. I’m probably wildly ignorant and wrong and willing to accept others admonishment if they wish to administer said admonishment. However, would you agree that the distinction is not one of semantics?
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You wrote:
So what was offered was for clarification not admonishment.
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nevermind,
parinibbāna, because we have different meanings for it, I cannot use it if I want clarity in talking to you.
Death of Arahants is meant as the body (and mind) of the arahant breaks up, you already acknowledged this concept by using it. or else you would have to tell me where are the living bodies of all the immortal Arahants.
I said 5 aggregates, you said 5 clinging aggregates. Clinging is gone at Arahanthood, but since they don’t go disappear immediately, the 5 aggregates obviously are still there for the Arahants. or else buddha cannot teach, he has no more body to teach.
Hello @Jasudho, I know I wasn’t saying I felt I was admonished by you. I was saying that we have a non-semantic, non-tradition based difference and I think you acknowledge that difference. Thank you. 
I acknowledge that having arisen, bodies break up yes, but I don’t acknowledge that mere bodies utterly cease; manifestly they do not. Rather they transform into other things and become new bodies. This occurs after the breakup of all bodies including those of awakened ones. Similarly for minds.
They don’t disappear at all, rather they breakup and transform and are “reborn” as other things. The aggregates are completely insubstantial, hollow and void things and they do not cease being completely insubstantial, hollow and void things.
If you wish to understand how the cessation of even the mere aggregates can be said to occur under the bodhi tree this is also possible. The mere aggregates are completely insubstantial just like the self. In your diagram you might list non-substantial aggregates right along side non-self as occurring as X all along the bottom. Never at any time can we find a substantial aggregate.
Thanks,
There is so much to say about all this, but i leave it at this:
If the cessation of existence can be directly known, for me, this means: the nature of mind has never ever really been involved in existence and that can be known. It was never of a human nature, never of an animal nature…but all these endless lifes we failed to see this. Even now it cannot be described as human.
Departing from the idea that we are now humans is merely like doing the same as we have done in endless lives. Identifying with khandha’s and building ideas of identity upon them. That is what keeps us trapped in limitations.
The use of Dhamma is not to stop to exist but to know and see we have never really existed the way we think, feel, experience we do. That is, i feel, the clue. If we now think about ourselves as humans that means we do not know the mind without limits and are still me and mine making. We do not know ourselves.
The whole clue is: our perspective does never seem to escape that of the mind with limits.
That is what we have to break away from. A Buddha shows what this limitless mind is.
It is clearly not what we can see as humane. Because it can fly, walk on water, transform into elements etc. The mind without limits is like a wishfulfilling jewel and this is our birthright. This is the beauty of Dhamma. It is even the birthright of animals, deva’s, hell beings. Because a Buddha knows this, his love and compasison is boundless.
Dhamma makes us feel alive, and being that fully alive as a Buddha, is the real medicine against craving and desire, longings. One will always feel fed. A Buddha has fully come to life. Has escaped the prison.
So, i believe, to understand suffering and its cessation, we must understand why we do not feel fed. If you investigate this you can that you do not really feel alive. Like something is blocking that. Buddha describes in detail all these fetters.
A Buddha reveals this to the world. He shows to Path to Life, to the deathless. Being fully alive, as a Buddha is, also means, being without tanha. The mystics say, God-like. Detachment is like being fully alive. Attachement is like being not fully alive.
Buddha and Dhamma is the ulitmately honouring of Life.
It is meaningful. By the way, I’m very appreciative for your dhammatalks, Ajāhn.
I agree with Bhante Sujato’s original post, but I think there’s actually a small yet logically large contradiction happening in this discourse:
I’m reminded of a debate I had with a college teacher, where I tried to convince him that everything is an illusion. He posed
This table is illusion.
I said yes.
Everything is illusion.
I said yes.
But then he asked
Illusion is illusion?
and I said yes, but he said this is a contradiction, so everything else couldn’t be an illusion, and not everything is an illusion, breaking my original claim.
The answer is in the word “is”. It really means “has the quality of”. And the first word “illusion” is not referring to exactly the same thing as the second word “illusion”. How could that be?
We use the word “is/are” for adjectives and attributes: e.g. The Buddha’s teachings are sublime.
It’s really
Object of (illusion) is illusory.
…and on the topic of qualities that everything has: not-self.
Object of (something) is anattā-y.
(The word anattā could linguistically be an adjective. More grammar around it is seen in SN22.59, but I’m not going to claim it’s an adjective or not, as what I’m saying applies either way and doesn’t depend on whether it actually was or wasn’t supposed to be an adjective or somehow a mix of both adjective and noun.)
This is how phrases like
centaurs are not-self
something that doesn’t exist is not-self
nothing is not-self
nibbāna (really the absence of certain arisings) is not-self
death is not-self
not-self is not-self
self is not-self
could be possible without making surface ontological contradictions.
It does matter that nibbāna is not-self. Whether it’s included in some certain meaning of dhamma is less important. Because what’s the alternative? nibbāna being self. We can agree these texts don’t mean that nibbāna is self.
This is absolutely of pragmatic relevance. How can we suffer over something? How can we suffer over something which doesn’t exist? How can we suffer over nibbāna? It’s if we become attached to the object/dhamma of those things. Of course it’s ironic and delusional to become attached to nibbāna (warning, practical example incoming!) “Oh I thirst and want badly enlightenment”, but that’s what attachment is after all: delusion. What would be the antidote for people with this delusion of thirst for something they don’t have, enlightenment? It’s understanding that enlightenment is not-self (which, yes, would ironically bring them closer to enlightenment).
Nibbāna is not-self, but not literally. It’s that the personal, perceived object of nibbāna has the quality of not-self; there’s no self behind it; not mine, not me, not myself. “Nibbāna” here isn’t actually literally what the term (aka nāma) “nibbāna” is pointing to. This has nothing to do with there being an actual self going away when nibbāna happens, because our original phrase “sabbe dhammā anattā” is about everything, so how could this be a really specific remark about nibbāna and self when that doesn’t apply or make any sense with any other hypothetical object being self or not-self. How could the object of nibbāna be some sort of exception to all other objects. So, I’m in agreement that nibbāna has nothing to do with self any more than anything else (besides the wisdom that leads to it), but I say that this is why it’s a dhamma in this scenario.
Nibbāna is no special case of dhamma being anattā, this functions exactly the same as attachment to anything else: it becomes an object of attachment by worry or distress or lust or tastiness. We should theoretically be able to become attached to permanent things without suffering, but we can’t truly come into contact with those things, and when we seem to, it’s just in the form of some personal perception or imagination. The same logic can be used to explain when suffering over non-existent things.
My perception of nibbāna is different from yours, it’s different each time it arises within me and you too, even if the term logically points to one specific, shared thing. Our understandings of things does not truly come into contact with permanent actual principles, and we work in terms of conditioned associations and connections, processes and cycles. When we solve math problems, we never actually come into contact with the actual mathematical properties, you trained and conditioned your mind to react to the sense of those properties in certain ways which allow you to deduce answers in new situations. You aren’t constantly thinking about mathematical derivatives, you only think about it when you come into contact with something that reminds you of it like a math question about them, so it’s conditioned. Enlightened people aren’t always thinking about being enlightened, they can just check to see. Nibbāna the principle and reality itself is unconditioned, but dhamma in “dhamma anatta” doesn’t exactly refer to that side of it. It’s not the math rule itself, it’s your reaction of it.
In the context of the three characteristics, how could it be pragmatic and useful to treat the word “dhamma” as only “principle”: a fact, separate from you? when we touch some object or we’re reminded of it from something else (“wow, my ex-lover smells like this candle, how I miss them”), there is nāmarūpa - the idea of the object, then sensation, and when you react with desire, you haven’t understood such an object rightly as not-self (ignorance). And we should take these semantics and meanings very seriously, because otherwise, you wouldn’t realize that everything, all of it, is not-self in any way, and there is no and never was any self, so why hold on to anything and why worry and suffer over anything.
Why the phrase “dhamma anatta” wasn’t “nāmarūpa anatta” is because dhamma is more pervading and appropriate since nāmarūpa is too specific and personal of a process to be used in this universal rule of everything. This phrasing also pertains much more to the actual delusion, because it’d help you know that the object itself that you suffer over is not-self. The three characteristics function as both contemplations and as philosophical claims, so maybe there’s some degree of trade-off with that.
In this system I’m describing, saṅkhārā are not a subset of all dhammā (I changed my mind @Clarity @Saurabh), where “dhamma anatta” sometimes just refers to the case of “saṅkhāra anatta”, and permanent things are an exception, I don’t think it works like this and I don’t think the text was intended to mean that. These terms refer to different steps or parts of the same process, and The Buddha didn’t create an “exception” for the third characteristic, it’s just the best word to use and it happened to be third. Those things have the quality of impermanence and lead to suffering too, but it’s better as saṅkhāra apparently to describe those cases. In SN22.59 The Buddha makes saṅkhāra and dhamma quite comparable, rather than subsetted categories of each other: “viññāṇaṁ anattā… viññāṇaṁ dukkhā… viññāṇaṁ aniccā…”
The system some may have imagined which I am talking against and might create a problem for nibbāna:
What I just described:
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Sorry but I am not up-to-date with this rather long thread and meanwhile, you mentioned me in your post. 
Anyway, what kind of answer to the question of this topic in the title “Does ‘all Dhamma’ include Nibbāna?” that your above diagram gives? Please kindly go through again how you come up with that answer too.
That’s okay, I changed my mind over something we discussed once and it was only in the paragraph I mentioned you in, but only if you wanted you could read the rest.
I claimed in my comment that nibbāna is dhamma, or at least that it’s not-self, so the diagram could show how nibbāna has two sides: some experienced perception of it, and the actual thing, which could clear up different confusions people had about it earlier. In the diagram, the actual object sometimes conditions you to suffer over it, but nibbāna is also not really a tangible object you can sense. However, you can still suffer over things that don’t really exist as the picture suggests.
So it’d look like this in that case
and the desire could be like “I desire to be enlightened now/in the future”, “enlightenment is mine” or even “I want to not be enlightened”
Are you saying something like, “You know that thing you mistakenly think nibbana to be? Yeah, that is also nacho self.” Poor self aficionados just can’t catch a break with the crowd around here
I would say that, although note that my explanation was agnostic to whether the person attached to nibbāna really knows what it means or not . I say it doesn’t “exist” tangibly since it’s referring to the absence of suffering and stopping of rebirth. It doesn’t condition senses is the main criteria. You can suffer over someone that’s dead even though they don’t exist too. You can also suffer over a long-distance partner from the other side of the planet without ever coming into tangible contact with them.
And if you have to be enlightened to know what nibbāna really means, then I guess you can’t get attached to it given you know what it really means. But, we may all have an accurate enough idea of what it refers to.