Do you mean vinnana can also refer to unconsciousness?
I believe this is an interpretation. Another interpretation is that sannavedayitanirodha is not an absence.
I think Sariputta describes here the cessation of existence as the cessation of a personal perspective of me or I who perceives. There are only perceptions arising and ceasing.
Cessation of existence is here not literally a cessation of the All, or of existence.
He refers to the cessation of the existence of a me, a perceiver.
Those are also quotes of Sariputta and other mendicants and not the Teacher. I do not think you can find similar quotes from the Teacher anywhere in the canon.
Does all dhammas include nibbana? According to SA 352-354 = SN 12.13-14, SN 12.71-81, nibbana is the cessation of dhamma: “dhammānaṃ nirodhaṃ” (SN ii, pp. 14-16, 129-130).
(See p. 180, note 129 in Choong MK’s Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism).
Can that be interpreted as including the cessation of any perception of a self in things? As including the cessation of any perception of the phenomenal world as composing any true distinctions? As including the perception of the cessation of name and form?
Sariputta says that when there is only perceiving, and not a me who perceives, that is taught here as the cessation of existence? It does not mean that there are no perceptions.
And there is also still a…in me…perceptions arose in me.
This is what i believe is the one constant and stable. Although the stream of vinnana’s changes we do not change.
Sure; that is one way of interpreting those quotes. I tend to think of the cessation of existence as the mere cessation of ignorance regarding “existence”, but I do not claim to know Sariputta’s mind when he uttered those inspired and for me figurative words.
We don’t actually know where on the Dhamma path Sariputta was when he uttered those words do we? They were nor verified by the Teacher afaik.
The Teacher himself said on numerous occasions that just before the realization of nibbana occurs one does not make a choice to either continue existence nor to cease existence. Curious isn’t it?
Can you remind me exactly what your mind was when we discussed? Your mind is anicca so when you said you changed your mind, it’s no surprise to me. Also, I will not be surprise either if after some time, you will change your mind again.
I also have the same understanding: “Nibbāna is a kind of dhamma” and “Nibbāna is not self”.
Alright, can you tell me how do I apply your diagram to each item in the following list:
apple
black hole beyond event horizon
unicorn
1=0
person named “Brandon”
law of gravity
principles of dependent origination
the sentence with content: “this sentence is false”
the arahant while alive
the arahant after death
Also, in your diagram, how do you prevent the “self” that sneaks into the part on the right hand side where your diagram says “doesn’t really exist”? Expressing in other words: for certain people (example: who claims “there is no self”) who accepts your diagram, can your diagram prevent these people not to perceive “self” as something “doesn’t really exist, but instead, represented by nāmarūpa”?
Hi Bhante,
I have followed the exchange with interest and I am compelled to ask this question again.
As I understand, dhamma is the input to the mind in the same way that sight is input to the eye. Nibbana is an experience that an Arahant experiences before parinibbana. As an experience it is the input to the Arahant’s mind. If Nibbana is not nonself, the Arahant must be experiencing it as self.
I see a contradiction there and appreciate if you can please clarify.
With Metta
If we go by the Buddha’s advice to Bahiya, there is only the seen in what is seen etc. So, for the Arahant, there is no self or anything equivalent to a self in what is seen etc. But they can use “I am” as a linguistic necessity to communicate.
As I understand, Nibbana too is a pleasant experience which is why it is described as sukha etc. Obviously, when the Arahant experiences the sukha of Nibbana, he knows that there is no self in the experience. This means that he must be experiencing non self.
Anyway, let us wait for the Bhante to respond.
With Metta
Another reply by me, I’m sorry! But it seems we got stuck in semantics:
Bhante, so if I understand correctly, the category mistake depends on the meaning of the word nibbāna to the ancient Indians—in particularly whether it implies only an event of “ending” or also the state after that event. But that is a moot linguistic issue, which doesn’t get down to what I was actually trying to get across. I said before, for sake of this discussion just assume that here by nibbāna I mean (primarily) the lasting “state” of things having ended. Whether this state is also called nibbāna in the suttas is beside the point (though it is). My argument simply was that this state, regardless of what we call it, because it is not a self, is also included in sabbe dhammā anattā. The technical meaning of the word nibbāna is irrelevant to this, because the text doesn’t say sabbe nibbānā anattā, but sabbe dhammā anattā. So with that clarification, maybe you can explain why it is a category mistake “to say that the complete and utter absence of suffering is also absent of a self”, which is what I was actually wondering. I purposefully left the word nibbāna out of that question.
You further say nibbāna is defined as things ending and ceasing, which is not wrong, of course, but I think it oversimplifies things if we read this only as a “happening”. Although ‘ending’ and ‘cessation’ are action nouns, they clearly imply that things cease forever—that’s the whole point of the path. So cessation is not just a temporal event but also something that has a lasting outcome. It’s the lasting outcome that I intended to include in sabbe dhammā (although the event can be included too, not really being separable from the outcome).
This is both true for things ceasing at enlightenment and things ceasing at death. I focused on the latter, mainly for simplicity’s sake, but as I said, it seems asaṅkhata can also refer to the former. Either way, even if I did only mean the latter, whatever the rarer use of the word nibbāna in the suttas may be, doesn’t matter for my argument.
But on the word nibbāna: Just like cessation has lasting consequences, when we extinguish a fire, it is also extinguished forever. Extinguishment is not only an event but also something that lasts afterwards. In English too, according to Wiktionary, ‘extinguishment’ means the act of putting out a fire but also the state of it being extinguished. As to the Pāli term, I think there are a lot of indications for it to also refer to a permanent outcome, not just an event, both for enlightenment and for parinibbāna. I can look up some references if you (or others) are interested, but as I said, it should be a moot point, because my reasoning doesn’t depend on the technical meaning of the word nibbāna.
I will respond to some other thoughts, hopefully touching upon the main ones:
As I read AN9.34, Udāyin doesn’t misinterpret nibbāna. He just wonders why Sāriputta says, “extinguishment is happiness (sukha)”. The fact that he immediately asks him, “how can it be happiness when nothing is experienced?” indicates he actually understands what nibbāna is and certainly doesn’t objectify it. He doesn’t ask, “so nibbāna is a happy phenomenon/thing?” or anything like that. He just wants to know why Sāriputta describes the absence of experience the way he does. If anything, he might think Sāriputta is the one who is misinterpreting things! But once Sāriputta explains that happiness to him means not experiencing anything, Udāyin apparently agrees, because he doesn’t question any further. So it was just a semantic issue, an issue of definition, that confused him.
But the main point you’ve made throughout assumes a very different issue would occur, namely that people will objectify nibbāna through such statements, and in particular anattā. As I said, they well might, but I think there is no evidence in the suttas that they will, certainly not in the case of anattā (which this sutta doesn’t mention, by the way). So your argument against including nibbāna in sabbe dhammā anatta relies on an assumption. Who know, maybe most people won’t misunderstand it?
It is also interesting that, when Sāriputta calls extinguishment happiness, Udāyin’s immediate assumption is that he is talking about the lasting state of nonexperience (or “non-feeling”) after death, not a “happening” at enlightenment. So ‘extinguishment is happiness’ here refers to parinibbāna.
Dhp202-203 also refer to nibbāna as the highest peace and sukha, and opposing it directly to the suffering of sankhāras and aggregates. The most natural reading is that this is also about parinibbāna. This is also the case in “sankhāras are impermanent … their subsiding is sukha” (aniccā vata saṅkhārā … tesaṃ vupasamo sukho), spoken after the Buddha’s death. Iti43 also says the subsiding of saṅkhāras, the cessation of suffering, is a sukha, peaceful, and constant state (padaṃ). Thag3.3 says “extinguishment is sukha … when all suffering ceases.” And so forth. It seems descriptions of nibbāna as happiness and peace often are about parinibbāna.
Cool! But then most of your objections don’t apply, because I’ve said all along that sabbe dhammā anattā can only really be understood by noble ones, that it is their insight. I can agree that others will always misinterpret it in some sense. (Although I doubt it will necessarily happen as an objectification of nibbāna.)
I’ll repeat myself as well then, sorry Ajahn. You say anattā implies a thing somehow, but in my understanding that’s not what it is about. It simply is about the absence of a self, about something that doesn’t exist anywhere at all, neither inside nor outside saṅkhāras, neither in supposed permanent things nor in temporary events, neither in beginning nor in ending. So ariyas can call everything anattā, including nibbāna, simply because no attā exists anywhere. It may not be all that pragmatic to call certain things (like natural laws) anattā, but ontologically it is still true, so at least it can always be said from that point of view.
For that you just have to agree that the opposite, “extinguishment is a self”, does not make sense. Because logically there are only two options: either it is a self, or it is not. And if it is not, then that means it is anattā, which simply means ‘not a self’ (i.e. na attā).
Compare the statements we’ve been discussing with the following from AN1.268–288:
It is impossible, mendicants, it cannot happen for a person accomplished in view to take any created thing (saṅkhāra) as permanent.
It is impossible, mendicants, it cannot happen for a person accomplished in view to take any created thing as pleasant.
It is impossible, mendicants, it cannot happen for a person accomplished in view to take anything (kañci dhammaṃ) as self.
To accommodate your point of view, let’s assume that dhamma in this text doesn’t include nibbāna. Considering its obvious parallel with sabbe dhammā anattā, we can still conclude something important from it: namely, that any dhamma which is not taken as a self, is seen as anattā:
Not taking taking any thing as a self (na kañci dhammaṁ attato upagaccheyya)
equals seeing that all things are not a self. (sabbe dhammā anattāti passati)
So na attā = anattā.
You agree noble ones won’t take nibbāna as a self. So that means they see it as anattā, as not a self. It’s a simple principle, really, which is why I’m so confused about your objections. When something is not a self / lacks a self, it is, literally, anattā. Nibbāna is not a self, so it is anattā. @bran I think got the idea.
I hate to keep coming back to the same point, Venerable, but I still don’t think you really acknowledge the problems here. Your reasoning was that the contemplation of anattā leads to objectifying nibbāna into a “real phenomenon”. But sekhas, who have seen what nibbāna actually is, wouldn’t ever do that. You appear to agree when you said they are exempted from this objectification. So why does the Buddha teach them to not see nibbāna as ‘mine’? Sure, their perceptions are not fully in line with dhamma, but clearly the point of this contemplation is to get their perception to be more in line with it. Yet you say it is meaningless and problematic to contemplate nibbāna as anattā, that it would lead to objectification of nibbāna. That seems to be contradicting the sutta.
I don’t think you considered the main problem here either, Bhante, so let me rephrase it. This eternal reality of the Vedas, which you assume is included in sabbe dhammā but not in sabbe saṅkhāra, why would the Buddha call it nonself but not suffering or impermanent? In other words, what’s preventing him from saying sabbe dhammā dukkhā/aniccā? From my perspective it’s clear: because nibbāna isn’t suffering or impermanent. If I approach the statements from your perspective, however, then the Buddha seems to be saying the Vedic realm isn’t suffering or impermanent.
I don’t disagree with this, but think it’s the most reasonable conclusion we can draw from what little textual evidence we have. So to clarify, as I said earlier, my main reason for continuing the discussion was not to fortify the point that nibbāna is included in sabbe dhammā anattā, as that can never be proven conclusively. I continued because I disagree with some (most?) of the arguments that were brought up against that idea.
But as a little extra argument in favor of what I was saying—which is inferential but I think still interesting to consider: in the suttas we find the sequence: anicca > dukkha > anattā. Whatever is impermanent, is suffering; whatever is suffering, is not a self. (E.g. SN22.15) The sequence is never the other way around, which I think is because extinguishment, which is also not a self, is not suffering or impermanent. So you can’t say that whatever is anattā is dukkha. (The Anattalakkhana Sutta says that the aggregates not having a self leads to affliction, so anattā > dukkha, but it is specifically only about the aggregates.)
I also wouldn’t recommend it in the way you phrased it, “to contemplate Nibbāna as nonself”, because all those concepts are loaded with assumptions, as this thread has shown. But to realize that cessation isn’t “my” cessation and not something experienced by “me”, I think that is very helpful. And that’s what I think the inclusion of nibbāna in sabbe dhammā anattā pragmatically comes down to.
Or seeing it as not ‘mine’, as in MN1!
Anyway, if with right view we contemplate on the peace of nibbāna, then we will always also automatically contemplate it as without a self. These concepts are inseparable, because there can be no real peace when there is a presence of a self, when there is an “I”. Any proper contemplation of nibbāna therefore is inherently a contemplation of it as being without a self, of it being anattā. This goes for both types of nibbāna. As to parinibbāna, if as per AN9.34 we contemplate its happiness and peace as the absence of all feelings (in this context meaning more widely ‘experiences’) then that is automatically also a contemplation of there being no possible self at that time either. As it says in the Mahanidāna Sutta (DN15):
‘Friend, where there is nothing at all that is felt, could the idea "I am” occur there?’.
"Certainly not, venerable sir.”
The Buddha then concludes you therefore can’t say that there is a self separate from feelings (i.e. a self without consciousness). This contemplation on the absence of experience, is how I might encourage people to contemplate extinguishment as anattā, if they would be ready for it. So this is also something quite directly found in the suttas. And it is also another indication that extinguishment can be contemplated as anattā, a quite direct one in my opinion.
If contemplated properly, we just can’t possibly separate the principle of anattā from extinguishment. It’s like you can’t contemplate extinguishment without at the same time contemplating it as being without suffering. An extinguishment (particularly full extinguishment) that is suffering makes no sense. So too, extinguishment that is a self makes no sense. If at least you can agree with this, Ajahn, then you may understand why I’m confused about your objections to seeing nibbāna as anattā.
Lastly, for me anattā is not an philosophical/rational contemplation but something you do on an intuitive/emotional level. If it would be the opposite, then maybe I can imagine some problems you suggest it may lead to. So perhaps our fundamental disagreement lies in how we approach these contemplation. In the end, it all depends on how we practice it. But just because the possible inclusion of nibbāna in sabbe dhammā anattā would have certain objectifying connotations to us, that does not seem to be a good basis to conclude that it isn’t what the Buddha had in mind.
I linked it in a private message. I only said that saṅkhāras are a subset of dhamma like the original post suggests, but I don’t think that makes any sense now.
Of course but the question is what the truth is, which doesn’t change
It’s not obvious how to point to a specific dhamma for some of those, mostly because it could be multiple ways. “apple” — which apple? I could suffer over a specific apple, thirsting over a specific apple I smelled or saw or thought about. You can also look at an apple without noticing the apple and thirsting over it such as spacing out. Choices and consciousness has to condition, looking for the sight of it first. The abstraction of apples altogether isn’t really the same, like if I became angry over apples conceptually somehow in an argument, like over whether they are a fruit. Or maybe I was an apple farmer for so many years and got fed up with famine that I started hating apples as a concept. In the end, wherever there is some dhamma, it is not-self, but maybe you are asking this to clear up what dhamma even refers to. Either way:
avijjā → saṅkhāra setting you up → viññāṇa in some sense channel →
nāmarūpa of
apple (could be rūpa (5 senses) or nāma)
black hole beyond event horizon (could be rūpa (seeing it, feeling it) or nāma)
unicorn (nāma)
1=0 (probably nāma)
person named “Brandon” (nāmarūpa), could relate to the puggala debate
for 4, 6, 7, and 8, that’s certainly possible if you are holding onto certain (false) views. We can perceive and understand laws, paradoxes, and nothing itself; they contradict in the actual world, but become sensible objects to us. You can read 1=0 and easily understand what this means and what this refers to even if it’s mathematically evaluated as “false”. If you looked at “1=0” and recognized it then you can see it as self and suffer over it.
for 9 and 10, you can became attached to a dead person or a person you’ve never met, even if they’re an arahant. If you can’t imagine how, then ask how the opposite could ever be true: why wouldn’t you be able to? If you could, then those things would be atta, yourself, which is nonsense (not because an arahant has self like others were debating). You can suffer over them by holding onto them even if existence doesn’t apply to them personally or if they are parinibbāna. I can suffer over the Buddha when I come to believe he said something sexist, since my image of him changed to something I don’t like while I was attached. If I suffer over an apple after directly seeing it and thirsting over it, the only difference between an apple and an arahant is that the apple happens to exist near me, which isn’t too big of difference as I’m showing.
→ saḷyātana → phassa → vedanā → … → dukkhā
For the record, the things described in nāmarūpa link can be partially described in consciousness, sense plane, contact, sensation, desire, and grasping. SN12.2 is helpful:
And what is grasping? There are these four kinds of grasping. Grasping at sensual pleasures, views, precepts and observances, and theories of a self. This is called grasping.
And what is craving? There are these six classes of craving. Craving for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and ideas. This is called craving.
And what is feeling? There are these six classes of feeling. Feeling born of contact through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. This is called feeling.
And what is contact? There are these six classes of contact. Contact through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. This is called contact.
And what are the six sense fields? The sense fields of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. These are called the six sense fields.
And what are name and form? Feeling, perception, intention, contact, and application of mind. This is called name. The four primary elements, and form derived from the four primary elements. This is called form. Such is name and such is form. These are called name and form.
And what is consciousness? There are these six classes of consciousness. Eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousness. This is called consciousness.
One doesn’t truly touch the right side, it’s done through experience and perception into nāmarūpa, phassa, sensation… So, what if the actual thing is “self”? Well, go and look for it, it doesn’t exist. My diagram doesn’t explain nor tell you which things exist or not. I really can’t prove if some things do or don’t, you just have to see with time which things do.
Are you saying that “self doesn’t exist” is a contradictory or tricky phrase? Well, when I said “doesn’t exist” I meant literal physical existence (involving arising things), if that helps. Even then, self can’t arise, as it’s described repeatedly in the vedas.
Any of those things that do exist physically will change. When it changes, you don’t necessarily suffer, because you may not even know that it has changed yet. You only find out someone you know died when you actually hear about it (unless you were there to see it). Then, one may suffer over it after they see things have changed, even if they didn’t actually die and it was a terrible prank call. That may explain why some people go into denial after seeing change, they pretend it is the same so their attachment isn’t broken.
Laws don’t exist physically and don’t change, but you can’t truly touch permanent laws, only become attached upon perceiving it with your impermanent understanding and perception of laws. Holding on to views is dangerous. I suspect people love logic because they can come into contact with something that feels permanent.
Centaurs probably don’t exist, self probably doesn’t exist physically if you honestly look for it, and I think this is only the way some views of self come about like in DN1 or MN102. Other self views would be like: beings looking at an object and seeing it as self, but I think your question wasn’t about that, it was about the literal self itself somehow existing separately. Your question could also be about the puggala debate, depends.
“sabbe dhammā anattā” may not be referring to that meaning of dhamma. Especially since sights are not-self. I think it’s including both, where your referenced definition of dhamma is nāma, and the senses are rūpa.
It’s hard to say if nibbāna is even an experience, but your point would still stand. Except I think that an unenlightened one can also suffer over nibbāna as in “I desire to be enlightened”. Jealousy is possible in general.
And we have already known what the Truth is, which doesn’t change, no matter whether the Buddha arises or not. It’s clearly state in Uppādāsutta AN 3.136, this is the Truth:
What I meant was: Your diagram depends on the nāmarūpa chain on the left-hand-side. That’s why you were already in a not easy situation with a normal thing like “apple”, confusing which nāmarūpa to apply your diagram to.
The problem is magnified when you apply nibbāna to your diagram especially to an arahant after death, because for them, the nāmarūpa chain is removed. This leads to 2 states of nibbāna: 1) for an arahant while alive, nibbāna dhamma has 2 sides. 2) for an arahant after death, nibbāna dhamma has only 1 side. This leads to contradiction: nibbāna dhamma changes from 2 states to 1 state.
The deeper reason behind this is: your diagram is more compatible with The All related to the 6 sense fields while nibbāna is not included in The All.
That issue above is the issue of the left hand side.
For the issue with right hand side:
Other items in the list were meant to show that the part “actual” (or doesn’t really exist) can be very confusing when dealing with item which is unknowable (#2), debatable for existence (#3), contradiction (#4), related to self, debatable to include in diagram (#5), impermanent truth (#6), own nāmarūpa chain reflection loop (#7), indeterminable via logic (#8), indeterminable via nāmarūpa chain (#9), exclusive of the diagram (#10).
After walking through that list, you also said it yourself: “One doesn’t truly touch the right side” and “My diagram doesn’t explain nor tell you which things exist or not. I really can’t prove if some things do or don’t, you just have to see with time which things do.”
Also, in my opinion, to put nibbāna in the same group with these kinds of category is kind of undeserved. Nibbāna deserved the attention of much more than that. It is supposed to be the only one unconditioned dhamma, and therefore not supposed to be mixed with other conditioned dhamma. Especially those conditioned dhamma can be unavoidable very confusing as I have already shown and you also admit that your diagram can’t resolve this confusing.
What I meant was: 1) The Buddha never claimed in the sutta: “There is no self”. 2) The Buddha never claimed in the sutta: “There is self”. 3) The Buddha never claimed in the sutta: “There are both self and no self”. 4) The Buddha never claimed in the sutta: “Self is just illusion”.
Therefore, a person with a view “Self does not exist” will be in debatable situation. Such person can accept your diagram and your diagram can not deny such view. The reason your diagram can not deny such view is: that person can consider “self” as a dhamma on the right hand side with the attribute “not exist”, while nāmarūpa chain on the left hand side can simply “represents” such dhamma “self” - which does not exist. In other words, such situation circumvents the phrase “sabbe dhammā anatta” by stating “atta” is a kind of dhamma too - just that, “atta” on the right hand side has the attribute of “does not exist”.
I am not sure whether you are among people who holds such view “there is no self” but for me, I don’t hold such view (Also, the Buddha told us not to hold any view about “self”).
In summary, I was trying to show you some shortcomings of your diagram both on the left hand side and on the right hand side. It’s still a nice model for the 6 senses field though.
Thank you for bringing up this thread, I have gained benefits by the fruitful discussion from many people here.
As my understanding, anatta means “not self”: not I, not mine, not myself, not in me, not outside of me, not whatsoever regarding to self. I simply follow the sutta, not any kind of camp. It is a simple sentence to declare like “self does not exist”, “there is no self” or “self is just illusion” or “you can never find a self”, but the Buddha (and all the arahants too) never said so or said in anyway implicitly that we can logically deduce that meaning.
Instead, the Buddha told us not to make any theory about “self” (which I understand “self does not exist” is also a theory).
Anyway, please excuse me because I prefer not to join any debate about this “camp” thing.
That’s like saying that dependent origination is wrong because it doesn’t happen to arahants. This also implies that nāmarūpa is permanent, when it was always impermanent. The actual concept (right side) is ontologically permanent or existent. There are many moments where one does or does not have the nāmarūpa of some given thing.
Any sort of concept or permanent thing also does not exist in the 6 senses and yet people still suffer over them. This is because it can exist as an idea (the mind sense channel) that one holds on to. I did not fully claim this earlier because you could really hate how those statements physically look for whatever reason, so it could be the other sense channels although a weird situation.
That’s only because your posed items were not completely clarified. There were multiple answers but always at least one answer. If there were no ways it couldn’t be self, then you would be claiming that those things are self.
That isn’t confusing, it’s just because you were not clear on what was exactly meant by the list of items. If you included which sense channel one would be sensing it along, then it would be clearer and the answer would be more obvious. Not only that, there are 108 currents of craving to also go along with this. And in any sense channel makes 648 ways for a saṃsaric being to mistake nibbāna as self (although I think some of those referenced cravings are purely self-view, unrelated to some exterior object)
If you disagree, then you would also be saying that nibbāna can be seen as self. A saṃsaric being can’t selfishly desire nibbāna? yam picchan na labhati tam pi dukkhaṃ. Nowhere was it required for you to actually experience something in order to desire it, hence jealousy. Just because the person desiring nibbāna is delusional (and doesn’t realize that nibbāna is far from desire) doesn’t mean they aren’t delusionally desiring it.
Does “sabbe dhammā anattā” not include that?
nibbāna is not-self no matter what angle one looks at it. It’s irrational to say nibbāna is necessarily perceived by a being who has actually realized nibbāna, you’re literally perceiving it right now as you read these sentences. When we can all look and see what it is even if we aren’t enlightened or even if you haven’t fully understood it as @yeshe.tenley mentioned. You can suffer over any state of existence without being there, or even over the lack of a state of existence itself, or even over something that is neither of those, like the law of gravity, or even an apple, doesn’t matter.
I’d say it’s just a phrase for means of communication (agree in meaning and disagree in phrasing). Those might be the best words we have in some situations to describe the phenomenon of insight into what self really means. You could even say that phrase is correct by defining what the misinterpretations of it are such as “a self that goes away” being incorrect. Or, just being upfront and saying “I’m not trying to presuppose a self when I say this, but there is no self”.
You also suggested basically the same idea:
I as well haven’t seen The Buddha say that literal phrase in the suttas, but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong, especially since he easily could have avoided saying it because people would misunderstand what it really refers to, and so they suffer when they think it means that their self has disappeared. What he does say is “consciousnesses are not-self, feelings are not-self, all dhammas are not-self”, which sounds like
to me. But of course it’s not intended to be, it’s just an unfortunate aspect of language requiring you to name the thing you avoid.
Could you kindly explain in more details how “That’s like saying that dependent origination is wrong because it doesn’t happen to arahants.” and “This also implies that nāmarūpa is permanent” can come from the paragraph which you quoted earlier about what I said?
Sorry but I don’t see the connection of what you said here when you quoted what I said and replied to it. Please kindly explain too.
I think there is a miscommunication somewhere because again I don’t see connection to what you replied and the part that you quoted me.
I was thinking to ask you to explain the connection between what I said and what you quoted me. Yes, in this post so far I only asked you to say clearer.
However, on second thought, I see that I didn’t understand you enough to make clear even a single relevant argument that you were trying to tell me in your whole post. Either the reason is because you didn’t understand what I said so your reply was totally off the point. Or, the reason is, I just don’t understand the way you tried to formulate your arguments in replying to me.
I think we reached the point where we both don’t understand each other and we are both tired. Therefore, we both should accept the differences and move on. After all, your diagram is also just another conditioned dhamma.
Anyway, at least, these are still what we both agreed:
and
Thank you for the discussion and please excuse me.
But it seems we got stuck in semantics:
But once Sāriputta explains that happiness to him means not experiencing anything, Udāyin apparently agrees, because he doesn’t question any further. So it was just a semantic issue, an issue of definition, that confused him.
You say anattā implies a thing somehow, but in my understanding that’s not what it is about. It simply is about the absence of a self, about something that doesn’t exist anywhere at all, neither inside nor outside saṅkhāras, neither in supposed permanent things nor in temporary events, neither in beginning nor in ending. So ariyas can call everything anattā, including nibbāna, simply because no attā exists anywhere. It may not be all that pragmatic to call certain things (like natural laws) anattā, but ontologically it is still true, so at least it can always be said from that point of view.