Does the Chapter of Eights shed light on the Jhanas?

Scholars generally regard the “Chapter of Eights” to be one of the earliest Buddhist texts. I think MN119, Mindfulness of the Body, may qualify as well. I say this because neither references the five aggregates which would have come in handy to describe concepts more precisely and because of the other parallels I will discuss.

Assuming that both are early texts, I think that an analysis of both the Chapter of Eights and MN119 will shed some light on the Jhanas. Jhana meditation appears to be referenced in the “Chapter of Eights”. Snp4.14 references the practice of immersion in samadi and MN119 describes samadhi practice and includes descriptions of the jhanas which also use the phrase “immersion in samadhi”. I bold the phrase in quotes from MN119.

Snp4.14
“He whose eyes are open has explained
the truth he witnessed, where adversities are removed.
Please now speak of the practice, sir,
the monastic code and immersion in samādhi.”

MN119
“And how, mendicants, is mindfulness of the body developed and cultivated to be very fruitful and beneficial?

It’s when a mendicant has gone to a wilderness, or to the root of a tree, or to an empty hut. They sit down cross-legged, with their body straight, and establish mindfulness right there. Just mindful, they breathe in. Mindful, they breathe out. When breathing in heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing in heavily.’ When breathing out heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing out heavily.’ When breathing in lightly they know: ‘I’m breathing in lightly.’ When breathing out lightly they know: ‘I’m breathing out lightly.’ They practice breathing in experiencing the whole body. They practice breathing out experiencing the whole body. They practice breathing in stilling the body’s motion. They practice breathing out stilling the body’s motion. As they meditate like this—diligent, keen, and resolute—memories and thoughts of the lay life are given up. Their mind becomes stilled internally; it settles, unifies, and becomes immersed in samādhi. That’s how a mendicant develops mindfulness of the body.

If you scroll down the MN119 quotes on the first and second jhana also use the phrase. See bolded portions below.

Another parallel appears to be that the Chapter of Eights allude to vitakki and vicara while MN119 uses them without describing them. I bold references.

Consider the definitions of vitakka and vicara below.

SuttaCentral Dictionary
vitakka is often combined with vicāra or “initial & sustained application Mrs. Rh. D.; Cpd. 282; “reflection & investigation Rh. D.; to denote the whole of the mental process of thinking (viz. fixing one’s attention and reasoning out or as Cpd. 17 explains it “vitakka is the directing of concomitant properties towards the object; vicāra is the continued exercise of the mind on that object.” See also above defn at Vism.142). Both are properties of the first jhāna (called sa-vitakka sa-vicāra) but are discarded in the second jhāna

Snp4.4
The brahmin speaks not of purity from another
in terms of what is seen, heard, or thought; or by precepts or vows.
They are unsullied in the midst of good and evil,
letting go what was picked up, without creating anything new here.

Here “picking up” what is seen. heard, or thought alludes to the initial application of the mental process, and “creating something new” would be the sustained application.

Snp4.14
“Great hermit, I ask you, the Kinsman of the Sun,about seclusion and the state of peace. How, having seen, is a mendicant quenched,not grasping anything in this world?

“They would cut off the idea, ‘I am the thinker,” said the Buddha,“ which is the root of all concepts of identity due to proliferation.

Here “having seen” is vitakka and the idea, “I am the thinker”, is vicara.

In both cases, vitakka is an act of perception, but I suppose it could be a more general term.

What is note worthy here is that vitakka and vicara are very much under control. What is picked up is put down. Nothing new is created. Nothing is grasped when seeing. The idea that I am the thinker is cut off.

This level of control would seem to justify the use of the word jhana even if there is perception or even a deliberate response. It would also seem appropriate that the first jhana would be required for truly mindful right action and right speech. In these cases the action and speech are appropriate rather than shutdown.

The first jhana is descibed here:

MN119
Furthermore, a mendicant, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters and remains in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, [while controlling vitakka and vicara.(this is my wording)] They drench, steep, fill, and spread their body with rapture and bliss born of seclusion. There’s no part of the body that’s not spread with rapture and bliss born of seclusion. It’s like when a deft bathroom attendant or their apprentice pours bath powder into a bronze dish, sprinkling it little by little with water. They knead it until the ball of bath powder is soaked and saturated with moisture, spread through inside and out; yet no moisture oozes out. In the same way, they drench, steep, fill, and spread their body with rapture and bliss born of seclusion. There’s no part of the body that’s not spread with rapture and bliss born of seclusion. As they meditate like this—diligent, keen, and resolute—memories and thoughts of the lay life are given up. Their mind becomes stilled internally; it settles, unifies, and becomes immersed in samādhi. That too is how a mendicant develops mindfulness of the body.

Yet another parallel to be found is that there are references to purity in The Chapter of Eights and MN119. In The Chapter of Eights purity appears to be the cessation of namarupa/name-form by implication

Snp4.13
When a person sees, they see name and form,
and having seen, they will know just these things.
Gladly let them see much or little,
for experts say this is no way to purity.

and in MN119 it is achieved in the fourth jhana. There are references to pure bright mind and being clothed in white. White symbolizing purity.

MN119
Furthermore, a mendicant, giving up pleasure and pain, and ending former happiness and sadness, enters and remains in the fourth absorption, without pleasure or pain, with pure equanimity and mindfulness. They sit spreading their body through with pure bright mind. There’s no part of the body that’s not filled with pure bright mind. It’s like someone sitting wrapped from head to foot with white cloth. There’s no part of the body that’s not spread over with white cloth. In the same way, they sit spreading their body through with pure bright mind. There’s no part of the body that’s not filled with pure bright mind. As they meditate like this—diligent, keen, and resolute—memories and thoughts of the lay life are given up. Their mind becomes stilled internally; it settles, unifies, and becomes immersed in samādhi. That too is how a mendicant develops mindfulness of the body.

I said at the beginning that neither the Chapter of Eights nor MN119 reference or include the five aggregates. Note: Namarupa predates Buddhism. The closest thing to feelings is the mention of pleasure and pain. Consciousness and volition are not explicitly mentioned.

Could the fourth jhana be the cessation of namarupa? Given that the closest thing to perception, vicara, and the closest thing to feeling, pleasure and pain, do not exist in the forth jhana, and these texts may very well predate the five aggregates, this would be the the closest thing to a cessation of perception and feeling that could be expressed.

The canon is very inconsistent about samadhi so proof texting across different strata of text against this argument will be as easy as it will be pointless. I hope that feedback will be centered around validity and soundness of the argument.

2 Likes

I will elaborate, starting with an analogy.
But first I will note that the chapter of eights contains no direct insight on Jhana, but contains a crucial reference to liberation, which is also important for Jhana. I will come to that in a moment, after a note on Jhana.

In the time of Buddha there was oral tradition, not written. This makes that a specific analogy on vitakka and vicara could not be made.
When you learn to cook nowadays you can use a book with recipes for reference. This describes the ingredients used, the order of preparation as well as some instructions on how to proceed. If you give someone who has never cooked before just the book, some will do great but far more will struggle or even fail. This is because cooking is an acquired skill. The same applies to Jhana. There is far more than the basic instruction, but this is extremely dependent on the actual process. Just as with cooking you learn by doing.

Vitakka and vicara can be seen as switching between the actual cooking and the use of the book with recipes. Both are part of the cooking process, failing to pay attention to one and the dish will spoil.
However, someone skilled at cooking a particular dish will no longer have need for the book. The cooking will be identical, yet the process not. It also allows for more concentration on other parts of the cooking process, because the “disturbance” of switching between book and cooking is no longer present.

The instructions on Jhana are both a description of what’s present (ingredients) as well as what to do with them. It’s not that you can’t reach making the most perfect dish while using a recipe, it’s just that you have not fully mastered the dish. There are disturbances present which with mastery are no longer present.
This is my understanding on vitakka and vicara.

With this introduction I can start on the Eights.
We read:

“Without normal perception or distorted perception;
not lacking perception, nor perceiving what has disappeared.
That’s how to proceed so that form disappears:
for concepts of identity due to proliferation spring from perception.”Snp4.11

We might view this from the process of breathing.
Normal perception: I’m breathing in. Distorted perception: Anticipating breathing out while breathing in. Lacking perception: Not being aware of breathing in. Perceiving what has disappeared: recollection.
When all these are not present “form” is said to have disappeared.

This brings me to the important part, same sutta:

Knowing that these states are dependent,
and knowing what they depend on, the inquiring sage,
having understood, is freed, and does not dispute.
The wise do not go on into life after life.”

The state “I am breathing in” depends on the notion of breathing in. The anticipation of breathing out depends on both the notion of breathing in, as well the natural result of breathing out (the same applies to birth - life -death). There are many moments during the day that we are not aware of breathing in, yet this does not mean it stops. This state depends on our lack of attention. And finally we might recollect our past breathing in (for example while breathing out) which depends on earlier breathing in.
None of these exist independent of each other.
For “the wise” the notion of breathing in is no longer just that, but contains also the notion of past and future breathing out, as well as knowing the perception of breathing in itself.
I’ve used the example of breathing in because it’s relatively easy to follow, but there are references to (full) enlightenment based on viewing corpses and such. You could wonder why Buddha gave instructions on repulsiveness/ugliness instead of breathing (SN54.9 comes to mind) unless you understand that both have the same ultimate result: disenchantment, dispassion/disillusionment, liberation.

With reference to Jhana and the formless states we know that the same is said: Knowing that these states are dependent and knowing what they depend on…

There is a lot of confusion on Jhana, because we try to learn meditation from reading a book instead of following the instructions. In analogy again: we read about the sounds in the pan and wonder if our sound is the correct one. We read about the colour, golden brown, and think ours is too light. We fail to pay attention for a moment and are confronted with charred food. You should understand: that’s fine. You learn from it since you are learning to cook, but someone has to tell you that charred food is not how it’s supposed to be.

For he is the undefeated, the champion,
seer of the truth as witness, not by hearsay—
that’s why, being diligent, they would always respectfully train
in the Buddha’s teaching. Snp4.14

The witness is not the witness of Jhana, but knowing that these states are dependent, and knowing what they depend on.
Jhana is a tool to achieve just that, and the most pleasant one.
Don’t mistake the recipe for the cooking process, and don’t mistake the cooking process from the knowledge of tasting the finished dish. You want the last, but have to follow the former two to get just that.
Because of this I’d urge you to be cautious while making assumptions, reading things which might or might not be present in suttas. It’s similar to comparing the recipes from the same cook, written down on different occasions for different people. A skilled cook can see past this, but someone with no cooking experience might easily think these are different when in fact identical, and identical when in fact different. Learn to cook, learn to meditate, and after that return to theory to boost your understanding.

Learn to cook, learn to meditate, and after that return to theory to boost your understanding.

This is presumptuous and condescending. I have meditated for many years. My practice informs my study of the canon.

But first I will note that the chapter of eights contains no direct insight on Jhana, but contains a crucial reference to liberation, which is also important for Jhana.

I have to disagree with you here. I think the references to jhanas are there, but indirect. They can be seen more directly when comparing the texts of the Chapter of Eights with MN119.

In the time of Buddha there was oral tradition, not written. This makes that a specific analogy on vitakka and vicara could not be made.

All we have is the texts. I am comparing early texts. How does the fact that there was an oral tradition prevent analogies between early texts?

Vitakka and vicara can be seen as switching between the actual cooking and the use of the book with recipes
… [I am using ellipses because it is such a large part of your post that someone should just go back to the original.]
This is my understanding on vitakka and vicara.

This appears to me to be an idiosyncratic understanding of vitakka and vicara. Do you have anything to back it up?

I am sorry if I gave that impression. That was not my intention. I’m used to write for a broad audience and sometimes my more generic comment can be seen as specific.

On this I disagree. The core of Buddhism is not the texts but the practicing monastic community.
To return to my cooking analogy: just by seeing no textbooks containing recipes assuming there are no cooks is awkward.
However, I do acknowledge that people in the western world do not have access to a Buddhist monk as easily as people with a large Buddhist population. Yet we also see that people in Buddhist countries flock to certain teachers and are willing to go through quite an effort to listen to them. It might be more than just proximity.

Vitakka and vicara form a bridge between physical and mental processes. As such they are classified as verbal processes (MN44).
The reason I used my recipe analogy is that it’s an intermediate step which is not necessary for someone who’s familiar cooking the dish. It’s a step used to verify and affirm that what is done (the “physical” process) is in line with what’s experienced. The verbal notion “I am breathing in” connects the physical sensation with the mental notion.
With a written recipe we can imagine someone looking at the cookbook instead of the dish, which is harder to imagine in an oral tradition (this checking is then done mentally), which is why I used the analogy. Hope this clears up a little.

Coming back to samadhi and jhana, if you don’t mind.
I consider that part of the issue is that jhana is a subset of (advanced) samadhi.
AN4.41 for example shows that there are at least four (additional) different samadhi developments possible:

  1. Jhana - blissful meditation in the present life
  2. Knowledge and vision
  3. Mindfulness and awareness (of feeling and perception - mental factors)
  4. Observing rise and fall in the aggregates - leading to ending of defilements

These depend on immersion (samadhi) with specific focus.
This is why I’m very reluctant on stating that the Snp refers to jhana, even indirectly.
At the same time I’m confident that what’s called vitakka and vicara in the suttas is part of the samadhi experience, but it’s used in a specific way in jhana.
If we combine this with SN46.52, where we find vitakka and vicara at two points:

Rapture while placing the mind and keeping it connected is the awakening factor of rapture; and rapture without placing the mind and keeping it connected is also the awakening factor of rapture.

Immersion while placing the mind and keeping it connected is the awakening factor of immersion; and immersion without placing the mind and keeping it connected is also the awakening factor of immersion.

In between is tranquillity, as it’s always placed between rapture and immersion:

Physical tranquility is the awakening factor of tranquility; and mental tranquility is also the awakening factor of tranquility.

The combination is rapture - tranquillity - bliss, and in the AN4.41 samadhi 1, 3 and 4 (I can’t tell about 2) there can be both the verbalised and verbally silent experience.
What we do with jhana is using the verbal processes to create an interaction between body and mind: with limited physical sensations the mind calms down, due to the mind calming down the body calms down even more, which leads to even more calming down of the mind, eventually leading to the fourth jhana.
Afterwards seeing how this is desired, wanted, acted upon and achieved is observing rise and fall in the aggregates.

When a person sees, they see name and form,
and having seen, they will know just these things.

Could the fourth jhana be the cessation of namarupa? … this would be the the closest thing to a cessation of perception and feeling that could be expressed.

The large problematic part here is that there is that “the tradition” holds various views on jhana, and because of that there is confusion. The MN119 reference is to mindfulness of the body, and there is no indication that the notion of body disappears in this jhana (at least not from the MN119 perspective).
The mind still has a notion of body, and there are (known and reported) meditative states beyond this.
Cessation of perception and feelings occurs when the mind drops all “mental objects” (the mental factors mentioned above) completely stilling the mind (of all movement). The factors which were present right prior to this can also be expressed, because we can label mental factors as focal points of attention.
Again: the experience of cessation does not necessarily lead to full liberation, it’s the notion of rise and fall of the aggregates (this is how this came to be, sustained, came to an end) which will lead to this.

Based on my knowledge and understanding the notion “I am the thinker” can be cut from any samadhi state when rightfully seen as is, with the exception of the formless states except cessation.
The reason for this is that the four form-based jhana’s allow for direct evaluation afterwards, but the notion of thinker/experiencer is too subtle in non-cessation states – it however drops away entirely in cessation.

Hope this clarifies, StephenRizzo

Generally speaking, you are correct. The issue here, however, is very time sensitive. We are talking about the earliest texts here, not the current state of Buddhism. Texts are the only thing we or even monastics have from that time period.

Bhante @sujato wrote an essay that relates to this. He argues that the Buddha was limited in the words at his disposal, and that abstraction was required to get to what his intended meaning was.

That said, the words that he translated vitakka and vicara to were “while placing the mind and keeping it connected”. “placing the mind” is vitakka" and “keeping it conneected” is vicara. Bhante @sujato seems to be applying the term to the meditative act of fixing one’s attention on the breath and keeping there.

I do not think his translation is in keeping with your view.

With regard to MN44, it appears to me as being written later. It makes reference to the five aggregates and the physical, verbal, and mental processes it mentions do not occur in the Chapter of Eights or MN119, but both would have been very useful to the authors of the texts to state things less ambiguously. I think this is an example of proof texting between different strata of texts.

The canon has various views on jhana. That is the whole problem. That is why we have to determine what view predated what. That is why I am interested in what texts are earlier and more likely truer to what the Buddha taught. Let’s drop perception and feeling from the equation. I said I believed the Chapter of Eights equates purity with cessation of namarupa. In trying to relate that to the five aggregate which I think came later, I made it more confusing.

Certainly there is a notion of body in the first jhana. I am not sure if that is true for the rest. That is the issue I am trying to resolve. Is the purity of fourth jhana the absence of namarupa? There are verses in the Chapter of Eights suggest they may be.

Rather than proof texting with suttas that are probably from a latter time period, can we stick with the suttas I am reasoning from and the logic I have presented to determine if it is coherent and cogent? If not, please proof text from something that can be argued to be from the same time period.

I know that what I am saying is not consistent with later texts. I want to know if it is consistent with earlier text.

Ok, let’s establish what we can derive from the book of eight first.
I consider that Snp4.16 offers the most direct reference to jhana - translated as devoted to absorption - with the overcoming of desire for the five (bodily) senses mentioned almost right after that. This is in line with later texts.

Snp4.4, the “letting go what was picked up” obscures the “attañjaho”, which as far as I can tell with my limited knowledge is the giving up/abandoning of self (atta).
The essence of this part is that if liberation is possible based on views or knowledge (seen, heard, thought) it’s possible to be liberated while still having attachment (I see, I hear, I think, I know).
By not being possessive of views or knowledge there is liberation (this is in line with the rest of the Eights). I consider it not correct to read vitakka and vicara in this.

This brings us to the question of Snp4.14: how is it possible that “having seen” [given the above] someone is liberated?
I will take some time to consider the “I am the thinker” part, the gist however is that once this “claim of ownership” is seen as it is, attachment cannot sustain.

I do understand how you get from an initial notion towards sustained thinking following that notion.

I will try to comment a bit more on Snp4.13 and perhaps other chapters later, since I’m trying to read the English suttas and the Pali as well it takes some time to process.

This is a somewhat repetitious way to answer your questions, so please bear with me. I think in the end it be clear why I do it this way.

There are two parts to liberation being spoken of hear. There is the part achieved in seated meditation where attachments to the world are severed and the part where that separation is maintained as one goes about living his life. As it turns out, the next chapter Snp 5, explains this more clearly and I will touch on that, but let’s start with Snp 4.

Snp 4.11
“What we hold dear in the world spring from desire,
as do the lusts that are loose in the world.
From there spring the hopes and aims
a man has for the next life.”

“So where does desire in the world spring from?
And judgments, too, where do they come from?
And anger, lies, and doubt,
and other things spoken of by the Ascetic?”

“What they call pleasure and pain in the world—
based on that, desire comes about.
Seeing the appearance and disappearance of forms,
a person forms judgments in the world.

Anger, lies, and doubt—
these things are, too, when that pair is present.
One who has doubts should train in the path of knowledge;
it is from knowledge that the Ascetic speaks of these things.”

“Where do pleasure and pain spring from?
When what is absent do these things not occur?
And also, on the topic of appearance and disappearance—
tell me where they spring from.”

“Pleasure and pain spring from contact;
when contact is absent they do not occur.
And on the topic of appearance and disappearance—
I tell you they spring from there.”

“So where does contact in the world spring from?
And possessions, too, where do they come from?
When what is absent is there no possessiveness?
When what disappears do contacts not strike?”

“Name and form cause contact;
possessions spring from wishing;
when wishing is absent there is no possessiveness;
when form disappears, contacts don’t strike.”

“How to proceed so that form disappears?
And how do happiness and suffering disappear?
Tell me how they disappear;
I think we ought to know these things.”

“Without normal perception or distorted perception;
not lacking perception, nor perceiving what has disappeared.
That’s how to proceed so that form disappears:
for concepts of identity due to proliferation spring from perception.”

The above explains how we sever our attachment to the world. We go into a formless jhana and break contact with it. The last versa above is very cryptic. If you look at the translators notes, however, it is made cleared. The note reads:

From the following verses we can infer that these enigmatic lines refer to an advanced state of samādhi , probably the formless attainments. These are not “normal” as they have no sense-perception or defilements; they are not “distorted” as they are free of hindrances; they are not the non-percipient realm; and they do not perceive what has disappeared, namely the rūpa or the sukha of lower absorptions.

Of course not even the Buddha could not walk and talk and navigate the world in that state. That is where mindfulness comes in:

Snp 4.14
“Great hermit, I ask you, the Kinsman of the Sun,
about seclusion and the state of peace.
How, having seen, is a mendicant quenched,
not grasping anything in this world?”

“They would cut off the idea, ‘I am the thinker,”
said the Buddha,
“which is the root of all concepts of identity due to proliferation.
Ever mindful, they would train to remove
any internal cravings.

This is where watching the sense doors come in. This is how you remain severed from the world. You see, but stop proliferation that leads to the notion of self. You can navigate the world, and if you need to, walk, talk, etc…

At the time I posted this topic, I had not read the next chapter which is also very early, that is from the same strata of texts. The language is clearer and more direct.

Snp 5.2
“Once you’ve expelled relishing and dogmatism,”
replied the Buddha
“The streams flow everywhere,”
said Venerable Ajita.
“What is there to block them?
And tell me the restraint of streams—
by what are they locked out?”

“The streams in the world,”
replied the Buddha,
“are blocked by mindfulness.
I tell you the restraint of streams—
they are locked out by wisdom.”

“That wisdom and mindfulness,”
said Venerable Ajita,
“and that which is name and form, good sir;
when questioned, please tell me of this:
where does this all cease?”

“This question which you have asked,
I shall answer you, Ajita.
Where name and form
cease with nothing left over—
with the cessation of consciousness,
that’s where they cease.”

The last verse above makes it very clear that he is talking about a formless attainment. No note is needed here.

Snp 5.5
“regarding everything you are aware of—
above, below, all round, between—
don’t plant consciousness in a new life.

The verse above refers to the use of watching the sense doors so as no to plant consciousness in a new life (the I am the thinker).

Snp 5.5
A mendicant who wanders meditating like this,
diligent and mindful, calling nothing their own,
would, being wise, give up the suffering
of rebirth, old age, sorrow and lamenting right here.”

The verse above confirms this.

Agree with you if we go beyond Snp4.
For example, Snp5.15 has a clear reference to the “nothingness” state.

I know the remark of Ven. Sujato on 4.11.
It’s easy to read that into it, and I have no objection as such.
Yet, given that perceptions are something we can attach to, I would at least note that one beyond perception does not “claim to own” normal, distorted, lacking or recollection of perception.

I hope you understand that I’m trying to push the boundaries a bit, since that allows a learning opportunity for me as well.

Let’s see from my earlier answers:

But first I will note that the chapter of eights contains no direct insight on Jhana
… I consider that Snp4.16 offers the most direct reference to jhana

Perhaps we were lost in words for a moment.
In your first post you tried to link Snp4. with MN119. I still consider this to be a bridge too far.
The level of detail in MN119 is not present in Snp4 (or 5) and I can’t see how to reconcile the two, but there is a reference to jhana and other meditative states in Snp4 (and 5).

To give an answer to your question from the first post:

Could the fourth jhana be the cessation of namarupa?.

I don’t think there is sufficient information in Snp4 or 5 to draw this conclusion.
MN119 is relatively clear on the fourth jhana, awareness of the body is still present in this meditative state. It’s the state of mind (pure bright) which determines the state, not the object of perception (later suttas show that meditation on breath for example is classified as meditation on body as well).

One of the issues I have with “the tradition” is that jhana is said to be a deep meditative state, something which does not appear from the suttas. It’s not a state easily disturbed because the focus is inward and not outward, due to focus sensory impressions are no longer reaching the meditator. But to state that there is no awareness of body … that’s not in line with the sutta’s. As far as mental factors: awareness of body and equanimity are mental. The ending of verbal activity is in the second jhana, yet ending of (awareness of) bodily activity lies beyond (formless) and mental activity even further (cessation).

This level of control would seem to justify the use of the word jhana even if there is perception or even a deliberate response.

There are other meditative states which allow for this. These might have vitakka and vicara as controlling factors, or go beyond.
Jhana, as I understand, is a specific interaction between mind and body, where the calming of one results in the calming of the other. This process enforces itself leading to increased pleasure (equanimity being the highest “pleasure”). Not sure if this is described in the early suttas as such though. This is also why in the sutta’s there is an urge to go to the root of trees and other secluded places: don’t speculate … just do it.

It would also seem appropriate that the first jhana would be required for truly mindful right action and right speech. In these cases the action and speech are appropriate rather than shutdown.

The proof is in the pudding. → I seem to have something with cooking nowadays.

We start with right view and right intention/resolve: the view that lack of sensory and mental impressions lead to pleasure, intention to calm mind and body, by for example focussing on the breath (and nothing else)

The right action being:

  1. Seclusion
  2. Calming the body
  3. Calming the mind

Right speech:
4. Using verbal activity to keep focus on the mind (vitakka and vicara)

If this leads to the first jhana, it’s beyond doubt that speech and action are right.
The second jhana is known by essentially doing exactly the same, only without the verbal guidance, the mind does not require additional “force” to stick to what it’s supposed to be doing (by resolve/intention), but uses the pleasure as motivation.

Stephen, none of this is what this text is about, at all.

“Letting go what was picked up” means “letting go of attachment to this body and life that was created by craving and attachment in the past”. It has nothing to do with jhanas or vitakka.

“Without creating something new” means not doing kamma that generates a new life.

No it isn’t. These are different words, with different meanings, in different contexts.

“Having seen” refers to a hypothetical case of a practitioner who has realized the truth.

“I am the thinker” refers to conceit, to the reflective identification of the self with the one who thinks.


I’d suggest listening to some of my talks on the Atthakavagga if you’re interested to explore them more deeply. I’ll be doing another course in Barre coming up.

1 Like

Bhante @sujato ,

Note: I have changed my username at the request of my identity theft insurer.

I am registered for the sessions on the Chapter of Eights.

You might be answering the following in the sessions, but I will ask it here and wait, if necessary, for the talks:

With regard to vitakka and vicara, I am trying to make sense of the first and, especially, the fourth jhana since they are parts of right samadhi. Snp 4.11 and 5.2 strongly suggest the need to achieve a formless attainment. Given that we know both are early texts, shouldn’t we expect this formless attainment to be right samadhi?

Hi @Raftafarian, while you are waiting, you can watch a previous series here: Seminar Series for Sutta Lovers: The Sutta Nipata (Atthakavagga)

2 Likes