Continuing the discussion from Looking for the only two EBT suttas where the Buddha talks about consciousness evolving from plants:
I wanted to briefly open this up to somewhat tangential discussion. Here are some thoughts on the subject. I hope that folks more knowledgable in this domain can also chime in.
It seems that if consciousness could emerge from unconscious structures (say, for the sake of this discussion, plants), it would be deeply problematic from the Buddhist perspective of consciousness. I can think of two main, related reasons:
- The Four Noble Truths.
The first noble truth is the truth of dukkha, which has to do with the five aggregates. These are divided into consciousness on one side, and the other aggregates on the other — with an interdependent relationship between the two sides. If there is consciousness (in the Buddhist sense), there will also be form, sensation, perception and volition or some among these. These are all categorized as dukkha, and so their origin should be the craving which produces another existence. But in this case, the origin of the aggregates is not craving, but … an arbitrary emergence from non-sentient material without prior existence.
This also means that there would be a discernible first point to suffering and samsāra for the being in question at least. It would begin when consciousness emerges together with the other aggregates. They would not be able to say that all suffering originates from craving and ignorance, because in this case there would be a definite starting point which is not from craving and ignorance.
In brief then, the doctrine of the four noble truths and the related idea of an unknown beginning to dukkha do not lend themselves to an emergence of prior non-existent consciousness.
- The Nature of Consciousness
If consciousness were to ‘emerge’ from sufficiently complex structures or systems, it would mean that consciousness is essentially a similar kind of ‘thing’ to the systems that gave rise to it. Consciousness would be algorithmic, meaning there would be a predictable recipe for generating it from other ingredients. Otherwise, it would be a random and causeless appearance — also known as magic.
From the Buddhist perspective, consciousness has no discoverable/known beginning, like I mentioned above. But it also is not supposed to be reducible to a product or aspect of non-consciousness. This is why nāmarūpa or the other four khandhas are placed in dependence on consciousness and vice-versa: they are dependent, but not the same. The fact that they are distinguished in this way is highly indicative.
Consciousness is simply the presence of the other aspects of experience. It is the basic stream of awareness or experience which is “colorless” and “flavorless,” reflecting the characteristics of the other aspects of experience which consciousness makes available. In other words, simple ‘awareness’ or ‘knowing’ is not reducible to processes present to that knowing.
There is also the ethical dimension of consciousness. In Buddhism, an important condition related to consciousness are intentional activities performed by body, speech, and mind. These will build inclinations and tendencies that steer and station consciousness into particular realms, characterized by particular sensations — pleasant, painful, or neutral. Hurtful and painful choices lead consciousness to be stationed in a hurtful realm characterized by painful sensation. And nice choices lead consciousness to be stationed in a nice realm, characterized by pleasing sensation. If consciousness emerges from something unrelated to intentional activities and sensation, then the Buddhist doctrine of kamma also suffers.
If this were the case, there would be a stream of consciousness planted in a realm unrelated to kamma, experiencing sensations unrelated to kamma, with senses that originate unrelated to kamma, as well as inclinations and tendencies unrelated to past inclinations and tendencies. Not only would the experience of pleasure and pain be completely unrelated to past deeds, but the very faculties which consciousness is dependent on would also be unrelated (contra e.g. SN 35.146). There would also be no prior reason or condition for the habits and tendencies in consciousness.
If there are no prior inclinations and intentions that condition the tendencies present to consciousness, these also would have to arise unrelated to prior conditions of the same type. Otherwise, if someone argues that the consciousness would emerge without any pre-set inclinations, then the consciousness would be inert — with no inclination, intention, tendency, etc. — in which case there would be no momentum for such consciousness to continue arising in another state of existence steered by craving. In case it isn’t clear, a sentient being with no liability to rebirth would be an arahant in early Buddhism.
Of course, there are ways of negotiating these points and trying to make things fit. The easiest way seems to be to say not that consciousness emerges spontaneously, but that there is a past series of conditions, such as a prior stream of consciousness with built in intentional structures, behind the arising of consciousness in a non-sentient basis. So in this way of thinking, if consciousness were to arise in a plant, it would not emerge but rather re-arise from prior consciousness with the plant as basis.
The main point here is to say that as the Buddha’s teachings are presented, it seems that the idea of algorithmic emergence of consciousness outside of past craving and kamma is problematic on several grounds. Maybe somebody here is more familiar with arguments in favor of this idea, or reasons why it is plausible within the Buddha’s world view described in the suttas.
Mettā
