Yes, but only a Buddha of all the beings in Samsara teaches DO.
I don’t understand how you can even come to these conclusions and ask me such questions.
My point is:
You have access to the The Buddha’s teachings on Dependent Origination while partial-eternalists and eternalists do not.
But without DO, both you and eternalists come to exactly the same conclusions.
Eternalists as I have shown have neutral feelings towards death and rebirth, despite the suffering involved.
It is thanks to feelings that these eternalist views are impossible to let go of.
When The Buddha refutes all the eternalist view he says:
Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
Without DO: one has no other choice but to come to the same conclusions as Sāti did in MN 38 or the eternalists in DN 1.
And in this context:
Eternalists due to their neutral feelings accept the suffering of death and rebirth and despite this still hold on to the Self (or what you call individuality) in this wandering with no beginning where one can recollect past lives.
On top off that the planes in Rupa/Arupa Loka during their entite duration have no dukkha and are exclusively pleasant.
So exactly how is impermanence a thing that is evident and obvious if we take all these factors into account?
Especially without never having heard about Dependent Origination:
yet to me it seems as plain as can be.”
“Don’t say that, Ānanda, don’t say that! This dependent origination is deep and appears deep.
It is because of not understanding and not penetrating this teaching that this population has become tangled like string, knotted like a ball of thread, and matted like rushes and reeds, and it doesn’t escape the places of loss, the bad places, the underworld, transmigration.”
Explain how can you convince an eternalist that already has neutral feelings toward the suffering involved in death and rebirth that they should give up all feelings?
You can’t say that if they don’t follow DO, ”that they will suffer”.
They already know this and are neutral to death and rebirth.
I don’t understand you. You bring in impermanence, dependent origination, the happiness of brahma realms, and I don’t see how it fits together with your notion of rebirth vs reincarnation. You do not address your stance, are you agreeing that rebirth and reincarnation look the same from the outside?
Do you even believe in rebirth at this point?
To say an individual doesn’t mean the same consciousness, it arises and ceases every moment.
It seems that you deny individuality, do you then say that the kamma I do, you can receive the results?
Please respond to the points one by one, not just keep saying the same points which has no clear links to each other. I don’t know your end goal or even the steps you’re trying to build.
If you refuse to see the links there is nothing I can do.
We were asked to make a new thread but the discussion is still about more than rebirth/reincarnation and what you say is individuality and what eternalists call self.
I take these further ”question-statements” of yours as a way of avoiding my initial questions that you have actually never replied to.
If you truly don’t understand and find it all very confusing you shouldn’t reply with what you claim are ”facts” in The Buddha’s teaching regarding the topics like ”impermanence, dependent origination, the happiness of brahma realms” and ’how it fits together with rebirth vs reincarnation” ”nibbāna” - while simultaneously not understanding what I’m actually saying regarding impermanence, dukkha, self, rebirth and all those other things we have already discussed.
Bottomline: You have already admitted that what eternalists call Self and what you call Individuality are identical. The eternalists do not know about DO.
If you can’t understand my points, how can you even teach eternalists how and why to give up their feelings?
Dependent origination explains rebirth, looking at feelings lead to the end of rebirth. We are not talking about how to end rebirth in rebirth vs reincarnation right? Although there’s an important point in my previous answer about the difference between individuality and self.
This is too tangential a leap. There’s no logical step.
I already used the (very tangentially) dependent origination thing to say there’s nibbāna, therefore end of rebirth and therefore end of individual, thus different from self. If anything,
This statement tells me you don’t read me seriously enough.
But my point is that impermanence in itself is not evident and obvious to brahmas, to devas nor to humans who who can recollect countless past lives:
Then we have this part:
And you respond:
And:
Which I of course am not confusing at all since I mention DO several times.
So exactly how is impermanence a thing that is evident and obvious if we take all these factors into account? Impermanence makes it dukkha, but dukkha is not apparent to even the brahma gods. So dukkha in this context is only death and rebirth, and the brahma gods are only forced to say not-self about the experience when it has ended, and is later recollected.
But now we have another problem: eternalists being fully aware that beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise - they do not see the suffering from death and rebirth as a problem.
They have neutral feelings to the passing away and re-arising, despite the suffering involved:
If they feel a neutral feeling, they feel it attached.
They’re called an unlearned ordinary person who is attached to rebirth, old age, and death, to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress; who is attached to suffering, I say.
When The Buddha refutes all the eternalist view he says:
Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
For a very good reason.
So the past lives of a buddhist were all rebirths of the same individuality?
While the past lives of a non-buddhist meditator were reincarnations of ”Self”?
It is just a play with words…
Isn’t it obvious by now why eternalists even believe in a soul in the first place?
The “no Soul” observation some notice is the aspect of Anatta or “no Self” in play. But it’s just like saying “no individuality, no body, no aggregates, no person” when one says “no Soul”, except the Soul is considered a higher aspect of an individual by the Eternalists than the others mentioned. But “no Self” negates the Soul, because in the Highest Aspect of Anatta, there is what we call Emptiness. That is my take on it.
I think “no Soul” is most synonymous with the Buddhist Nibbana of complete Cessation and non-existence. It is possible in Gautama’s Philosophy, but not the only Path.
”Ultimately”, would only really work thanks to Dependent Origination and where it leads.
For instance:
There are partial-eternalists mentioned in DN 1.
Some of these might take one plane of existence as permanent while they view other planes or aspects of themselves as impermanent.
While eternalists are 100% certain there is indeed a Self.
This comes from their own experiences and one can fully understand why they come to these conclusions, only The Buddha could make them truly see.
Ok, so it is the same individuality that has passed through all the various lives then?
No wonder there are eternalists and semi-eternalists in the first place!
This happens to be the whole crux of the issue regarding eternalists and semi-eternalists.
Doesn’t matter if you call it self or individuality.
If it the same individuailty, and this individual can access vivid memories/experiences of past lives in a completely new body and a new set of khandhas but still despite this call all those past lives ”me & mine”, and fully know that it was in fact their own past lives: how and why was these even transferred to the new khandhas?
You can’t claim it is because of kamma that one can recollect those past lives where one did evil deeds and ended up in hell, much later had an awful human rebirth and slowly but surely quit doing those deeds.
Since that kamma was extinguished and one already quit doing such things a very long time ago, how can one still remember and say ”me” and ”mine” regarding those events?
Only Dependent Origination can help here.
No matter how truthful the meditators are by these very real experiences of theirs (it is not like they are making up this stuff or imagining it) The Buddha has superior insights regarding everything in Samsara.
I’ll come back to this later in this post regarding kamma, hell and past lives.
If we just for now stick to impermanence:
Somehow The Buddha knew that planes that have billions of years of duration, are very pleasant and that anyone would experience as being permanent, actually comes to an end. And by that standard it can only be called dukkha if one truly knows and sees that there is death in such a plane and it is in fact impermanent, dukkha and lastly thanks to this not-self. No dukkha during its duration.
Then we have those that have experienced countless of lives in Kama Loka compared to the long lasting ones in Rupa/Arupa Loka:
“Herein, bhikkhus, a certain recluse or brahmin, by means of ardour, endeavour, application, diligence, and right reflection, attains to such a degree of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects his numerous past lives: that is, (he recollects his past lives throughout) one aeon of world-contraction and expansion, throughout two, three, four, five, or ten aeons of world-contraction and expansion. (He recalls:) ‘Then I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life. Passing away thence, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life. Passing away thence, I re-arose here.’ Thus he recollects his numerous past lives in their modes and their details.
“He speaks thus: ‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.
Still from DN 1 regarding eternalists but it answers your questions:
“This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands. And he understands: ‘These standpoints, thus assumed and thus misapprehended, lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond.’ He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not misapprehend. And because he is free from misapprehension, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of FEELINGS, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
A non-buddhist meditator will never be convinced that eternalism is not the case and will still claim that there is a Self (they have vast experiences as if there actually is an eternal self) unless you point to Dependent Origination and ”the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them.”
So no matter how pleasant Rupa/Arupa Loka is (that is the reason lust for these planes of existence are among the the 5 higher fetters) one has to say to all of that and to all past lives or even future lives in Kama Loka or wherever else: ”This is not me, this is not mine” And the same has to of course be applied to the 5 aggregates of clinging.
I actually don’t see kamma as an impersonal law at all.
How could the very personal choices and deliberate actions, speech and thoughts one does has, result in something impersonal?
One can only practice to the best of their ability and benefit other beings by keeping the precepts/dana/teach dhamma. But keeping the precepts is no guarantee other beings will not kill, steal, rape or lie to one. Fools do not commit such deeds against others because of the past lives kamma that person happens to have. They do it based on their own kamma.
I do agree that certain deeds can put one in certain unfavourable circumstances in the human realm:
”And suppose that fool, after a very long time, returned to the human realm. They’d be reborn in a low class family—a family of corpse-workers, hunters, bamboo-workers, chariot-makers, or scavengers. Such families are poor, with little to eat or drink, where life is tough, and food and shelter are hard to find. And they’d be ugly, unsightly, deformed, sickly—one-eyed, crippled, lame, or half-paralyzed.”
Now it turns out The Buddha in a sutta remembers a past life where he was a chariot-maker…
I don’t want to speculate what it was that maybe led him to hell prior to being a chariot-maker but I hope you get the idea that ”And suppose that fool, after a very long time, returned to the human realm…reborn in a low class family…chariot-makers…Such families are poor…little to eat or drink…ugly, unsightly, deformed, sickly—one-eyed, crippled, lame, or half-paralyzed.”
So how is it possible for the khandhas to still have access to all this or Maha Moggallana also remembering being in hell when that type of kamma is already extinguished and has been for maybe many eons?
As to the reasons why certain things happened to arahants, feel free to post from the suttas but as far as any other sources trying to explain (Commentaries, Jatakas etc.) I take all these with a grain of salt.
Kamma is too complicated to really discuss, there are other factors that come in to play that I could mention but kamma is really intertwined with rebirth and certain circumstances in that next existence.
Not so much how others will treat you or do to you, that is their kamma.
I disagree with this based on reverse dependent origination, but am really thankful that I might finally be able clarify my perspective regarding this and even regarding Nibbāna.
Here we go:
And what is a path to company with Brahmā?
Firstly, a mendicant meditates spreading a heart full of love to one direction, and to the second, and to the third, and to the fourth. In the same way above, below, across, everywhere, all around, they spread a heart full of love to the whole world—abundant, expansive, limitless, free of enmity and ill will.
“At one time, mendicants, I was staying near Ukkaṭṭhā, in the Subhaga Forest at the root of a magnificent sal tree. Now at that time Baka the Brahmā had the following harmful misconception: ‘This is permanent, this is everlasting, this is eternal, this is whole, this is imperishable. For this is where there’s no being born, growing old, dying, passing away, or being reborn. And there’s no other escape beyond this.’
And this that I mentioned in my earlier post:
”The lifespan of the gods of Brahma’s Host is one eon…
…a disciple of the Buddha stays there until the lifespan of those gods is spent, then they’re extinguished in that very life.
If you take these three things together you get the following:
Spreading a heart full of love (metta) above, below, across, everywhere, all around, they spread a heart full of love to the whole world—abundant, expansive, limitless, free of enmity and ill will.
This is a path to company with Brahmā.
Baka the Brahmā had the following harmful misconception: ‘This is permanent, this is everlasting, this is eternal, this is whole, this is imperishable.
The Buddha tried to show Baka the Brahmā this was not the case in MN 49.
No other except The Buddha has pointed out that not only ”The lifespan of the gods of Brahma’s Host is one eon” but that all the planes above in both Rupa Loka and Arupa are also impermanent.
Now if we go back to the eternalists in DN 1 the Buddha says the following:
‘These standpoints, thus assumed and thus misapprehended, lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond.’ He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not misapprehend. And because he is free from misapprehension, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
This quote above shows that these standpoints regarding eternalism, thus assumed and thus misapprehended has to do with feelings and nibbāna is that attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.
You know very well from all our various discussions that I reject ”mere cessation” that you and others adhere to.
But maybe the following will make you see that I am certainly not an eternalist by any stretch for rejecting
”mere cessation” nor have I ever claimed
that Nibbāna is ”something”.
“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, something else exists’ you’re proliferating the unproliferated.
I have only pointed out that the following from the suttas:
“Could it be, sir, that a mendicant might gain a state of immersion like this? They wouldn’t perceive earth in earth, water in water, fire in fire, or air in air. And they wouldn’t perceive the dimension of infinite space in the dimension of infinite space, the dimension of infinite consciousness in the dimension of infinite consciousness, the dimension of nothingness in the dimension of nothingness, or the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. And they wouldn’t perceive this world in this world, or the other world in the other world.
And yet they would still perceive.” <————
So both The Buddha (AN 10.6) and Sariputta (AN 10.7) affirm that in a state of immersion beyond all the planes of existence, which happens to be such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all:
One can still perceive.
It also happens to be that this attainment beyond existence is light:
“Where water and earth,
fire and air find no footing:
there no star does shine,
nor does the sun shed its light;
there the moon glows not,
yet no darkness is found. <—————
It also happens that the disciples in higher training in MN 1 are told not to delight in Nibbāna.
He directly knows extinguishment as extinguishment. Having directly known extinguishment as extinguishment, he does not conceive it to be extinguishment, he does not conceive it in extinguishment, he does not conceive it as extinguishment, he does not conceive that ‘extinguishment is mine’, he does not take pleasure in extinguishment. Why is that?
Because he has understood that taking pleasure is the root of suffering, and that rebirth comes from continued existence; whoever has come to be gets old and dies. That’s why the Realized One—with the ending, fading away, cessation, giving up, and letting go of all cravings—has awakened to the supreme perfect Awakening, I say.”
Because that is all I’ve actually pointed out in all these discussions we’ve had and it does not make me an eternalist nor someone who is proliferating the unproliferated.
Unless you claim that The Buddha and Sariputta are the ones who are actually proliferating the unproliferated; just because it is declared that in that attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all, one can still perceive and there is light?
So I hope it is clear that you can never put me in the eternalist camp nor that I am somehow proliferating the unproliferated. I really hope this is clear now.
——————————-
But on the other hand if we take the view of ”mere cessation” one is indeed proliferating the unproliferated when claiming such things as this:
“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.
That is mere cessation in a nutshell.
If ”mere cessation” was really true it would never be considered as proliferating the unproliferated, that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, nothing else exists’,
And claiming that there is a difference between so-called annihilationism (complete termination) and ”mere cessationists” since mere cessationists claim there is no self, while annihilationists imagine there is a self that is being annihilated, is just a play with words.
There is not a single difference.
Now at that time one of the monks had the thought,
“How do you know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life?”
Then the Buddha, knowing that monk’s train of thought, addressed the mendicants:
“Mendicants,
I’ve taught the Dhamma analytically.
I’ve analytically taught the four kinds of mindfulness meditation
the four right efforts,
the four bases of psychic power,
the five faculties,
the five powers,
the seven awakening factors,
and the noble eightfold path.
That’s how I’ve taught the Dhamma analytically. Though I’ve taught the Dhamma analytically, still a certain mendicant present here has this thought:
‘How do you know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life?’
Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. Nor do they have such a view: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’
Remember, this is a sutta about how to know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life (Nibbāna).
The Buddha mentions prior to teaching, the many ways he has taught the Dhamma:
“Mendicants,
I’ve taught the Dhamma analytically.
I’ve analytically taught the four kinds of mindfulness meditation
the four right efforts,
the four bases of psychic power,
the five faculties,
the five powers,
the seven awakening factors,
and the noble eightfold path.
It is only The Buddha that teaches not to regard the khandhas as self and those in the sutta already adhere to it, so they are obviously buddhists.
These same buddhists reject: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’
Once again this is actually buddhist ”mere cessationists” in a nutshell.
No difference whatsoever.
So please forgive me when I get called an eternalist or someone who proliferates the unproliferated when it ought to be clear I’m not,
that I in return see ”mere cessationists” as 100% proliferating the unproliferated and for pointing out that there is no difference at all between the buddhist-”cessationists” who reject eternalism and their views regarding ”how to know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life, which is of course Nibbāna.
What troubles me about this ”mere cessation” view is how the text in AN 4.174 has clearly been altered.
It now says if one clicks on it: AN 4.174
“Reverend, when these six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, does something else exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Does something else no longer exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Does something else both still exist and no longer exist?”
“Don’t put it like that, reverend.”
“Does something else neither still exist nor no longer exist?”
You somehow bring in a different topic, and your reply is too long, I still don’t see your link between your view of no self with the cessation of perception and feeling. And that being percipient of nibbāna is not the same as cessation of perception and feeling because perception is gone for perception and feeling.
After parinibbāna, there cannot be perception of anything because no 6 sense bases, to say that there’s still light remaining is to say there’s another sense left to perceive that light.
I will just take it that since your view of not-self is not purified to see that all dhammas are not self, you cannot accept mere cessation. Because the sense of self doesn’t allow such acceptance.
Your reply on the metta thing is too long, I don’t get your point as well. Do note that dukkha includes not just mental suffering, of which I can agree that mental suffering doesn’t seem to exist in Brahma realm, but dukkha of change and conditionality does. In that sense even doing the best good thing, even going into cessation of perception and feeling is also dukkha for it being impermanent.
I used kamma as impersonal law as in contrast to God who’s a personal punisher and rewarded. Impersonal means it is like a law of nature, immutable, merciless.
Individuality is justified according to these observations:
Buddha got enlightened, doesn’t mean other people got enlightened.
Kamma is following the individual, it’s not that I do good, you get that reward of good.
Past lives recall is individual, at no point do we see the mapping of past lives of person A and B at present to map to the same person C who belongs to the past. But person A maps to person C, person B maps to person D, where A and B exist at the same time, and C and D also exist at the same time, but in some past lives.
From SN15.1-20, we get to understand that there’s no beginning to wandering on.
From all these, the picture is that of as you cited:
“Herein, bhikkhus, a certain recluse or brahmin, by means of ardour, endeavour, application, diligence, and right reflection, attains to such a degree of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects his numerous past lives: that is, (he recollects his past lives throughout) one aeon of world-contraction and expansion, throughout two, three, four, five, or ten aeons of world-contraction and expansion. (He recalls:) ‘Then I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life. Passing away thence, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life. Passing away thence, I re-arose here.’ Thus he recollects his numerous past lives in their modes and their details.
Each person has their own past live chains, which are not mixed, thus they are called individuals. Individual is not self because the chain can end at parinibbāna, no more rebirth. It is thus impermanent, the whole existence in saṁsāra is dukkha, thus the chain of individuality is not worth identifying as self. The whole individual existence is subject to conditionality, including kamma and rebirth, thus we cannot 100% control it, thus not worth identifying as self.
Conventionally, we can be justified in labelling each of these past life chains of individuals as self, but ultimately they are empty of self. It is the mistaken view and grasping of individuals as self that leads to so much suffering, whereas truly seeing the 3 universal characteristics is the one which unbinds the chain so that there’s no more future chain.
In which plane of existence is AN 10.6 & AN 10.7 taking place?
None of the elements apply: ”They wouldn’t perceive earth in earth, water in water, fire in fire, or air in air - this already excludes Kama Loka and Rupa Loka.
The rest excludes Arupa Loka:
And they wouldn’t perceive the dimension of infinite space in the dimension of infinite space, the dimension of infinite consciousness in the dimension of infinite consciousness, the dimension of nothingness in the dimension of nothingness, or the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. And they wouldn’t perceive this world in this world, or the other world in the other world.
And yet they would still perceive, according to both The Buddha and Sariputta.
So where is this perceiving taking place then?
Not many options really.
But it is The Buddha in the suttas, and not me, saying that Nibbāna involves light.
Same with the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, in it they also equate nibbāna with light:
”The seventh liberation is transcending all aspects of neither perception nor non-perception and abiding in a state beyond thought and non-thought.
The eighth liberation is transcending all aspects of thought and non-thought, illuminating all worlds equally, and remaining motionless.”
Once again from the suttas:
“Where water and earth,
fire and air find no footing:
there no star does shine,
nor does the sun shed its light;
there the moon glows not,
yet no darkness is found. <———————
So I ask again, where and how is that state of immersion mentioned in AN 10.6 & AN 10.7 even taking place?
By the looks of it not in any single plane of existence + ”they wouldn’t perceive this world in this world, or the other world in the other world.” - And yet they would still perceive.
The following things should maybe clarify:
I showed from the suttas that The Buddha refutes partial-eternalism and eternalism like this:
”Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of FEELINGS, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.”
The point is, only dependent origination can help, nothing else.
That is why Sāti had the views he had about future lives in MN 38 and only DO can help.
You even admit yourself that:
And last but not least:
That is also why eternalists say:
The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.
So how can you blame eternalists when Only DO, and nothing else, can help them?
They say Self, you say Individuality.
No wonder eternalists have the view that they have when ”there’s no beginning to wandering on”, right?
The whole point I tried to make is that the leader in the brahma realm corresponding to spreading metta did not even know that that realm in question is actually impermanent.
I wrote:
So in essence anicca, dukkha and anatta are not obvious and has never been to any of the brahmas or devas, nor to the humans who can recollect their countless previous lives that span over eons.
And if you also take into account that I alredy mentioned in my first post that DO is not as simple as some might have it to be:
You might see that the point is not so much, as you put it, ”that my view of not-self is not purified to see that all dhammas are not self, and I cannot accept mere cessation. Because my sense of self doesn’t allow such acceptance.”
That is why I asked how me quoting the suttas that say that one can still perceive while beyond all the planes of existence and that nibbāna is light is somehow proliferating the unproliferated?
I’m actually only quoting The Buddha & Sariputta.
Did The Buddha & Sariputta proliferate the unproliferated by mentioning these things?
If yes, exactly how?
But claiming ”mere cessation” is 100% proliferating the unproliferated - and that is why it is rejected:
“If you say that ‘when the six fields of contact have faded away and ceased with nothing left over, nothing else exists’, you’re proliferating the unproliferated.
The self and the individual are different things. If there’s no such thing as individuality, then I can do bad and you get the result of it. You can practise all the way to enlightenment, and I get the reward of being freed from all sufferings. It’s clear that it doesn’t work this way. The dhamma is to be realized by the wise, each for themselves.
Don’t confuse phenomenological findings with philosophical conclusions. The phenomenological findings are the past life recall with the characteristics of individuality. The wrong conclusion is to take them as self. The right philosophical viewpoint is to not even consider the individual as self.
Dukkha is dukkha regardless of the people knowing or not.
yet no darkness is found. Doesn’t mean light.
When we close eyes, it’s first dark, then the eye doesn’t function. So without eyes, there’s no such thing as light nor dark. Only when there’s eyes can we say there’s light or dark. Same thing with the mind, and all the senses. When there’s no mind, not concept is valid, that’s why nothing or something left is not stated. Yet, the Buddha is able to say no moon, no sun, no water, earth, fire, air etc, indicating that nothing is the closer wording if we have to say anything about parinibbāna. Certainly not light.
The meditative attainment/absorptions are happening in human realm, because it’s humans who get into such states. Or devas or Brahmas. It’s just very clear separated thing between seeing nibbāna vs cessation attainment.
Perception of nibbāna is still having perception aggregate, to be able to see nibbāna, with perception also comes feelings and consciousness as they are inseparatable. Nibbāna itself is the cessation of all conditioned phenomena and it’s causes, nibbāna is the end of bhava.
The cessation attainment goes a bit further for even the perception, feelings, consciousness, all mind are gone. No experience at all not even of nibbāna.
So these are 2 different things. If we want to compare the relative happiness, the cessation attainment is happier for having less aggregates, as aggregates are dukkha. So since perceiving nibbāna is not the highest happiness, it cannot be the same thing in parinibbāna.
The cessation of perception and feeling is the highest happiness while alive, but since it’s impermanent, it’s dukkha in that respect. Thus the only thing better than that is permanently no mind, and also no body, in parinibbāna. Without mind, without body, without soul, there’s nothing left. No 5 aggregates, no 6 sense bases, no mysterious extra sense to see “light” of nibbāna. The end.
Venerable, if we take a look how partial-eternalists and eternalists reason regarding these things we find the following:
“He speaks thus: ‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.
So despite eternalists being fully aware that beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise - they do not see this a problem and are even clearly neutral to the passing away and re-arising, despite the suffering involved:
If they feel a neutral feeling, they feel it attached.
They’re called an unlearned ordinary person who is attached to rebirth, old age, and death, to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress; who is attached to suffering, I say.
And when The Buddha refutes all the eternalist view he says:
Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
That being said, are you really sure that there is a difference between what you call individuality:…
…and what the eternalists call Self?
I’m not actually confusing phenomenological findings with philosophical conclusions.
This is what eternalists call Self, you just happen to call it individuality instead of Self.
Yes, and this right philosophical viewpoint is Dependent Origination.
That is why I wrote over and over again ”only DO can help, nothing else”.
So I’m fully aware and I’m not confusing the phenomenological with the philosophical.
My main point that I mentioned numreous times was that without DO: one has no other choice but to come to the same conclusions as Sāti did in MN 38 or the eternalists in DN 1.
And in this context, where eternalists thanks to neutral feelings accept the suffering of death and rebirth and despite this still hold on to the Self (or what you call individuality) in this wandering with no beginning where one can recollect past lives; exactly how is impermanence a thing that is evident and obvious if we take all these factors into account?
I am a bit confused on your stance. You seem to think rebirth is reincarnation. Rebirth is without a soul. Reincarnation is with a soul. Externally, they look the same for rebirth evidences, past life recall. It’s only philosophically that we say rebirth operates via dependent origination, and not a soul. But since reincarnation operates via a soul, it’s much easier to understand and most uneducated (about the dhamma) people accepts reincarnation.
So if you cannot see the difference between rebirth vs reincarnation, it seems that you’re denying that rebirth exists at all in order to deny that self (what you identify as individuality) exists? So do you regard that past life recall is a Buddhist doctrine or a wrong view?
The individual is not self, as I said, because it ends completely at parinibbāna. Nothing at all to trace or call that this was the individual. Not counting corpse. All the conditions that made up that stream of consciousness are gone, no more. Cannot arise even in any subtle form. The memories of people having about past arahants doesn’t count as that individual. Or any other impact.
The self is supposed to be eternal, unchanging, the individual ends completely at parinibbāna, thus it is not qualified to be called a soul/self. Although for those who don’t end rebirth or don’t think that it’s possible to end rebirth with nothing leftover, it comes very close. That’s the power of the delusion of self.
No, basically, you’re not helping to clarify things by mostly citing things you have said before.
I can just say that it’s not the case that you and I can remember that we have exactly the same past life in some same time in the past. It’s not the case that I do good, you get the results. I have asked you many times if you deny these, and you don’t answer. Since you deny individuality, do you deny past life recall and kamma is following the individual? Or do you believe there’s no pattern to past life recall and kamma is random and not following the person?
The dhamma is universal. No self is no self for all.
From your post, the best I can see is that you think I am an eternalist for having the concept of individual streams of consciousness, having infinite past life chains, which is actually the logical conclusion from the sutta. You think due to neutral feelings for this, that such view is attached to. And by using DO, you want to try to have me let go of such views by letting go of the neutral feelings. I don’t think it’s going to work when you don’t address my questions on past life recall and kamma above.
It would be very helpful for you not to engage in rhetoric questioning as it is not clear what your stance is and thus not clear which questions of yours is rhetoric. Just answer straightly.
PS. Just to clarify, I use individuality doesn’t mean it’s the same person from one life to another, since the 5 aggregates of the person changes, even within one life, but from one life to another, some things are passed on, like kamma, ignorance, memories (just most cannot recall), etc. Such passing on from one life to another forms a chain for one life to another.
From the suttas, it’s clear that the chain is linear, and not a mix of complicated webbing. Not 2 (or more) past life together chained to one rebirth, not one person be reborn into 2 (or more) future life. Given linear chains, they can be separated and thus labeled as individual. That’s the meaning of an individual. They are not self because of change, moment to moment and at parinibbāna, complete cessation. If you wish to deny this, do cite exactly which sentence you don’t agree with and why and your position on it. I know it’s going to include cessation at parinibbāna.
Hello Venerable,
with all due respect you chose to respond to my very first post where I tried to explain why I take the middle way when it comes to anicca, dukkha & anatta and avoid all extreme views - I was just writing down some thoughts on the topic and you happened to respond.
Please read the first post again carefully:
So despite all that is mentioned in this very first post and all that is mentioned in the other posts where I responded to you regarding dukkha, rebirth, kamma, past lives (mentioning both The Buddha’s and Maha Moggallana’s past lives), impermanence in rupa/arupa loka (something only a Buddha points out), the views of partial-eternalists/eternalists and of course DO and Reverse Dependent Origination, Nibbāna & Self where I refute all the various extreme views by quoting from the suttas - you still respond in such ways as to attributing to me extreme views which I clearly do not have.
This makes it very difficult to discuss these things with you, because you also never respond to any of my questions.
Instead you attribute those very same extreme views that I am refuting, as if I have these extreme views.
Here you are clearly missing my point, impermanence is not so evident given the context of my arguements in the initial post above.
Spreading metta is of course not dukkha, this is your extreme view - not mine.
That is why I wrote in the post above:
So you claiming spreading metta is in fact dukkha is a very extreme view that I clearly do not have.
Yet you still write: ”since you already accepted that impermanence means dukkha, so too the metta spreading is dukkha due to it being impermanent”
I totally disagree with your extreme view that since spreading metta is impermanent is automatically dukkha.
Please study Reverse Dependent Origination and please understand that I also mentioned duration in my first post as a factor as to why one can’t have the extreme view of ”all is dukkha’
There is a duration when it comes to all conditioned things, this duration can make it seem permanent.
Metta corresponds to the brahma realms, not even brahma himself knew that this plane of existence is impermanent.
Yet by taking the extreme view of how ”all is impermanent” and not the middle way you choose to conclude that spreading metta is dukkha…
And despite this and numerous other things I wrote in later posts you still attribute in this last reply of yours in this discussion the following view to me:
???
How could you even come to the conclusion that I have such a extreme view that I deny individuality when I not only mentioned the self-doer, as found in
”Attakārī Sutta: The Self-Doer (AN 6.38) in my very first post but also reject the extreme view of ”there is no self at all” and ”there is only the selfless khandhas”?
Venerable, you yourself wrote:
And I responded to this:
The point here is that what you happen to call Individuality is the what eternalists call Self.
You then try to make it seem like the Self of eternalists and partial-eternalists is somehow different to what you call Individuality - exactly the same thing.
Venerable, how could it seem that I deny rebirth when it was I who posted about the previous lives of both The Buddha and Maha Moggallana?
When it was I who posted how Sāti the fisherman viewed future rebirths, and it was I who posted the view of rebirth among partial-eternalists and eternslists?
This is what I mean, you attribute very strange and extreme views to me that I clearly do not have at all.
Remember, I am not the one with the extreme views regarding anicca, dukkha and anatta - I take the persective of the middle way.
What you happen to call Individuality is what the eternalists call Self.
Yet you still claim:
How exactly?
If you study the views of partial-eternalists and eternalists you see that they even have neutral feelings regarding the suffering that death and rebirth brings them.
And despite death and rebirth and sorrow they say:
And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.
This is not any different to what you happen to call Individuality.
What I mean by that is the following, and please read carefully:
That which you call Individuality is also stuck in Samsara, forced to take rebirth after rebirth and has had countless past lives in this wandering with no beginning.
This wandering will not end for the Individuality, because it doesn’t know any escape from this wandering and instead concludes that this Individuality is eternal and even has neutral feelings to rebirth, old age, and death, and all the sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress that is experienced in this wandering.
From all this above it is ought to be very clear why they believe in a soul.
Only a Buddha, out of the countless billions of beings in the universe, teaches Dependent Origination. My point in the very first post I made was that without DO one can understand why Sāti the fisherman and the partial-eternalists and eternalists came to such conclusion as they did:
Exactly! It is a logical conclusion from the suttas that beings have infinite past life chains - I never denied this. I just pointed out that what you call Individuality is what the partial-eternalists and eternalists happen to call Self.
Now when The Buddha refutes the views of eternalists he does it with:
Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
And that is exactly why I wrote:
And as we know thanks to DO: with feeling as a condition, craving comes to be.
And that is why I mentioned that both the wanderer Potaliputta and Venerable Samiddhi agreed: ‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’” + ”But, reverend, there is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.”
“Reverends, extinguishment is bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!”
When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?”
“The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.
‘Reverends, when the Buddha describes what’s included in happiness, he’s not just referring to pleasant feeling.
The Realized One describes pleasure as included in happiness wherever it is found, and in whatever context.’”
It only thanks to that attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all, that one can finally say that there will be no more continued existence.
No Venerable, I don’t think that you are an eternalist. I know very well that you are a ”mere cessationist” despite that extreme view of overreaching being refuted in the suttas:
I also have no clue if you actually have neutral feelings for the concept of individual streams of consciousness, having infinite past life chain.
What I do know is that ”mere cessationists” have many extreme views and never take the middle way and due to this:
have extreme views regarding dukkha where even spreading metta is considered dukkha.
extreme views where they deny a self or individuality in all possible ways and say ”there is no self at all” despite there clearly being a self-doer Attakārīsutta AN 6.38
“This is how he attends unwisely: ‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I become in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where will it go?’ - “When he attends unwisely in this way the view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established.”
So no wonder there is a extreme view of that attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all (Nibbāna) as well: ”there is only ”mere cessation””.
But when asking, in which plane of existence is AN 10.6 & AN 10.7 taking place?
Mere cessationists can’t answer and never will.
And even if The Buddha hints at there being light.
“Where water and earth,
fire and air find no footing:
there no star does shine,
nor does the sun shed its light;
there the moon glows not,
yet no darkness is found. <———————
This is also denied, because that doesn’t go well with the view of ”mere cessation”.
A very elborate explanation.
This is how I read the same text in a very simple way:
WHERE there is no water and earth,
fire and air, THERE no light from stars, sun or moon.
Yet no darkness is found THERE.
