How broadly should saññā be interpreted in Snp 4.2?

I would note that when you google “apperception” it says;

“noun, DATED, PSYCHOLOGY” - so its not even clear to me that this is a word that means anything in contemporary english or contemporary cognitive science or psychology.

It is in my opinion a MAJOR problem with Buddhism in english that it relies so heavily on psycological terms from the 19th century to translate and make sense of Buddhist technical terms in Pali. “apperception” is an awful, obscure, dated, non-scientific term of art, not in common usage, and should absolutely not be relied on as a translation for anything, even if it does capture some of the semantic scope of sanna.

Metta.

Would you prefer recognition? I am just looking to nail down the meaning for the purpose of getting the practice right so recognition is sufficient even if not perfect.

Yes! I was actually going to append that suggestion to my rant before the inevitable terror of the complexity of Buddhsit term translation cowed me.

But yeah, i think its a good word, in common usuage, similar semantic range, its just a question of if its parsimonious in a sufficient variety of the contexts in which sanna appears…

Im really not much of a fan of one english word to one pali one as a rule, its more that i loathe seeing words that are basically as foreign to most english speakers as the words they alledgwdly translate, such as “aggregate” and “apperception”, if you have to go to a dictionary of english to try and figure out what the qord means then youve gone wrong imo.

Several years ago, during a retreat Ven. Analayo “demonstrated” sañña by slowly drawing on white paper. At first, only lines and curves, lines and curves until suddenly the mind perceived/recognized: car!

The Venerable said the sudden aha! moment was perception/recognition/sañña. Actually, it was pre-verbal. The concepts, “car” label, etc. came later, though quite quickly.

As is common, the Pāli terms are pointers to experience that can’t quite be pinned down with words and concepts. From a practical and practice standpoint, the demonstration by Ven. Analayo clarified more about sañña than pages of definitions.

Peace.

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I like the example you shared. One things that struck me a few minutes after I shutdown my browser was the two step process: recognition and naming. Then I wondered if vitakka and vicara were just that process.

Vitakka and vicāra are more present-intention based. The former generally pointing to intentionally directing attention to an object and the second pointing to attention staying there, so to speak. Both have ceased in the 2nd jhana.

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With best wishes :pray:

This is from Bhante @sujato 's article

Couldn’t the nonverbal thought(vitakke) be the recognition of something and the examination(vicara) of it yield a name?

I don’t mean to come off as stubborn. Its just that I think there is a lot at stake here. If ‘sanna’ is synonymous with ‘nama’ and both are constituted of ‘vitakka’ and ‘vicara’, there are many loose ends that tie themselves up into a nice bow.

The connection between sanna (perception/recognition) and phassa (contact) in Snp 4.2 makes sense given that nama and rupa are the cause of contact in Snp 4.11. If vittaka and vicara together constitute or are at least required by sanna and nama then it becomes clear how the jhanas with their cessation of vitakka and vicara lead to the cessation of sanna and nama and would help meet the requirement in Snp 4.2 for complete understanding of sanna(perception/recognition).

This is precisely the way vitakka and vicara are translated to Chinese. Noticing something and then examining it. The term used for vitakka is more perceptual than cognitive in nature in the context of meditation. Vitakka’s ordinary use is when people are thinking verbally in their minds without speaking the words, and the Chinese translate it with a different word for that context.

The analogy I like to use is seeing an animal run unexpected across a footpath. If you notice it, initially it’s just an indistinct recognition (vitakka) of size and shape. If it stops for a moment so you can get a good look at it (vicara), then you can identify and name it. If you’re absorbed in some topic in your mind at the time, you likely wouldn’t even notice it (no vitakka or vicara of the animal).

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Beautiful. It all comes together perfectly just as I would expect from the Buddha.

You seem to be settled with this question. So this is not to keep stirring the pot, and I can’t comment on the Chinese.

Having said that, with respect to the Pāli Canon,

sañña is a factor of nāma; nāma is not synonymous with it. In SN12.2 - "And what are name and form? Katamañca, bhikkhave, nāmarūpaṁ? Feeling, perception, intention, contact, and attention. Vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro— This is called name. idaṁ vuccati nāmaṁ.

Vitakka and vicāra are “downstream” from *nāmarupa-viññana, which are co-dependent. Before there can be placing of attention and sustaining it, there must first be perception, sañña, along with the other factors.

rather than highlighting “subverbal thought”, highlighting
“…placing or hovering of the mind in a certain way.” appears more to the point.

The Buddha generally used vitakka and vicāra when teaching about jhanas., so these words point to processes subsequent to the more basic processes of sañña in nāmarūpa-viññana, (as in the above sutta and others that describe DO).

And in MN 19, vitakka is used as thought (not perception) with respect to wholesome and unwholesome thoughts. Even here, one is “taking up” the thought and reflecting on it.
‘Why don’t I meditate by continually dividing my thoughts into two classes?’ ‘yannūnāhaṁ dvidhā katvā dvidhā katvā vitakke vihareyyan’ti.

But perhaps I’ve misunderstood what you’ve expressed.

All best

It is true that nama of namarupa is a holistic category that includes the entire process, really. The naming part at the end of the process I just outlined as an analogy shouldn’t be confused with that. It would be just a little part of the concept of nama as a whole. It’s a case of a word with a specific literal meaning being used for a broad set of meanings as a whole.

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@cdpatton , Let’s put it this way, is the following true:

  1. If vitakke and vicara cease, recognition and nama (naming in the narrow sense) ceases and therefore contact ceases.
  2. If vitakke and vicara cease, sanna(apperception) ceases and therefore contact ceases.

I would say that this is clearly not true. Am on my phone (you can always tell by my spelling) so i cant give refrences, but there are plenty of suttas that talk about the perceptions that remain after 1st jhana, DN9 for one.

Also just on the vitakka and vicara thing, they seem to mean a thought, and turning the thought over in the mind, with vicara probably related to vicarious etymologically, meaning more or less tge same thing.

Isn’t this one of those questions about unpacking meaning rather than trying to cram more stuff into one package already?

There is an object, perception. There is also an event, perception. So my question would be, how do you see having understood perception and having crossed the flood as linked? In terms of object or event? Are you talking about perception as an event or as an object when you consider that phrase.

Myself, for instance, I look at the Paṭhamapubbesambodhasutta SN 35.13, (and its pair), for an indication of what it means to have understood the event.

@josephzizys and @Meggers ,

The context of this thread is key to understanding what I am saying so let me give a quick recap of the thread:

  1. I originally asked how broadly should ‘sanna’ be interpreted in Snp 4.2. Note: the atthakavagga does not mention the formless attainments except briefly in Snp 4.11 only to not get involved in the debate about them being higher attainments. I made a point of saying the canon is all over the map about what attainments “right samadhi” so I wanted to keep proof text within the context of the Athakavagga.
  2. Bhante @sujato referred me to the Bausch thesis that @josephzizys linked to above.
  3. That thesis answered my question in chapter seven where it says that the word ‘sanna’ by itself should, be regarded as ‘apperception’ or as @josephzizys prefers to call ‘recognition’. But there is more. Here is the quote for context and I have bolded the most important part.

Note: Apperception cannot be formless here. It pertains to the recognition of forms in the generic sense.
4. With regard to vitakka and vicara, See my quote from Bhante @sujato 's article linked to above on the meaning of vitakka. I asked the question below and @cdpatton replied

So with this in mind.

@josephzizys , sanna in the Snp is apperception of forms in the generic sense and therefore one cannot be in a formless state. The remarks about vitakka and vicara were directed to @cdpatton givan what he said. See his reply to my question. Hopefully, what I said makes sense given the context.

@Meggers , my concern is that fully understanding sanna (apperception as described above) is a requirement in Snp 4.2 that must be met. I am not saying that simply meeting it is all that that is required to cross the flood. One must master mindfulness and not attach to contacts when going
about one’s life. The cessations I am talking about can be temporary suspensions of the activity.

My other concern is whether or not the cessation of vitakka and vicara cause cessation of sanna and contact during that time vitakka and vicara are suspended. This would contribute to the complete understanding of sanna and contact(phassa).

Both, Hopefully this helps if for nothing else than to move onto the next round of questions.

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I think these things may be true in the original idea of the four jhanas.

As @jesophzizys points out, there is a problem with relating sanna to vitakka when the four jhanas are placed in the context of the eight or nine samadhis. Sanna can’t completely cease in the second jhana if it exists in the formless attainments after the fourth jhana. I had a problem in my own translations for a couple years: I was translating vitakka (from Chinese) as perception and also sanna as perception (following the convention among Pali translators). I thought about it and thought about it. Researched vitakka and vicara in Abhidharma texts. And so on. In the end, I changed my translation of sanna to “conception/concept.” I broadened its meaning to something that encompasses the cognitive “sense” better in English and left vitakka as perception.

I think the meaning of sanna was being stretched to something mystic or subtle by Buddhists. I mean, what is being described in these formless attainments? Infinite awareness? Infinite space? Nothingness? They sound like mystic experiences to me. But those experiences were then conceptualized as formless heavens the same way the jhanas were mapped onto the Brahma heavens. These two things, meditative experiences and the heavens, are intertwined in Buddhist thought. I think ancient Buddhists must have naturally assumed some heavenly place was being directly accessed in meditation, similar to the way Greeks thought Muses put ideas into their minds to explain the creative process. The four jhanas were the road to the Brahma Heaven because often visiting those places in meditation led to being reborn there.

But was that in early Buddhism? I don’t know. Maybe not. So, we have this problem of dealing with different (and ill-defined) historical strata in the Buddhist corpus that don’t always match up seamlessly. Translators end up agonizing over these issues because we naturally want to translate words uniformly and consistently for an audience in the here-and-now. But the texts themselves don’t always cooperate with us because they were written over the course of centuries. And a translator also wants to respect the original author (or, at least, I do). So, there’s compromises that have to happen. Translators are rarely “happy” with their work. If they are, I have to wonder what they are really doing.

The other problematic angle to me is in our English-speaking heads: We think it terms of five senses, not six. Which is why my analogy above uses a concrete an example of seeing an external event like an animal skittering by on a path. We have to stretch our way of thinking to consider cognitive processes as being sensory.

I think it is safe to say that the Atthakavagga was inline with the original idea of the four jhanas and not the formless attainments.

The Atthakavagga, unlike the Parayanavagga, does not mention the formless attainments except to say that the Buddha did not enter the dispute about them being highest attainments in the last verses of Snp 4.11 which was probably a later addition to rebut the Parayanavagga. The Parayanavagga, on the other hand, clearly pushes the cessation of consciousness, surely a formless attainment, as the ultimate attainment.

So I would say the Atthakavagga was inline with the Eightfold Path with its Right Concentration being the four jhanas. The Parayanavagga does not appear to be inline with the Eightfold Path. It would have the cessation of consciousness presumably as Right Concentration.

Given the importance of the four jhanas and the Eightfold Path in the EBTs, I am more inclined to believe the Atthakavagga(at least the actual octads Snp 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5) was earlier than the Parayanavagga and any other texts that appear to imply Right Concentration being a formless attainment.

So I think the two statements I asked about were true for the earliest Buddhist texts though things got confusing once formless attainments were pushed.

Just my humble opinion.

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Isn’t sanna specifically … if this is the case, then Buddhism dispenses with the noumenal, which seems correct to me.

Powers
(indriyāṇi)
Domains
(viṣaya)
Internal Sense Fields
(ajjhattikāni āyatanāni)
External Sense Fields
(bāhirāni āyatanāni)
Perception (Appearance)
(saññākāyā)
cakkhuṁ
(eye)
rūpā
(visual)
cakkhāyatanaṁ
(seeing)
rūpāyatanaṁ
(sights)
rūpasaññā
(the visual)
sotaṁ
(ear)
saddā
(aural)
sotāyatanaṁ
(hearing)
saddāyatanaṁ
(sounds)
saddasaññā
(the aural)
ghānaṁ
(nose)
gandhā
(odour)
ghānāyatanaṁ
(smelling)
gandhāyatanaṁ
(odours)
gandhasaññā
(the olfactory)
jivhā
(tongue)
rasā
(flavour)
jivhāyatanaṁ
(tasting)
rasāyatanaṁ
(flavours)
rasasaññā
(the gustatory)
kāyo
(body)
phoṭṭhabbā
(tactility)
kāyāyatanaṁ
(haptics)
phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṁ
(touches)
phoṭṭhabbasaññā
(the haptic)
mano
(mind)
dhammā
(mental phenomena)
manāyatanaṁ
(mental)
dhammāyatanaṁ
(phenomena)
dhammasaññā
(the phenomenal)

If I am correct then I would say that the Buddha did not teach that formless attainments were necessary for liberation from suffering. Is that what you mean by dispensing with the noumenal? There may be other consequences I am not thinking of that you’re referring to.

OK, I am going to set aside your first sentence.

Response to second: Well, maybe not, there can be phenomenally formless and noumenally formless.

This is within Kantian language, and this is one of the disputes that Nietzsche had with him … trying to slip God in the back door. (i.e., the noumenal is not perceptible, which is why we end up with this cliched protestant interpretation of Kant “by faith alone.”) I reserve opinion, but Spinoza definitely advanced immaterial mind (i.e., the formless or immaterial God - thought and extension - “in” our minds). Active spirit, or if you want to say force, meaning, roughly, the power to affect and be affected.

So, an aside: speaking of taking in sensory data (which means what? bits of information? hmm), and making sense of it, for me, this framework is too Kantian, because it assumes that human sense is passively receptive. It seems to me, especially with this talk of kamma, cetana, etc. going on, that Buddha was aware of a much more active, relational condition “of” “in” “to” ? perception.

So, if we cede that formlessness is a real experienced condition, meaning it can be perceived, because we have introspection - mind is active and sensing - well, what would it be …to perceive formlessly in a way that could be useful (delicately predicated) for dhamma?

Now, we have a strong visual bias in Western society.

And, also speaking of Christianity, “logos” means word, but it also means Christ. God made flesh in the Word is one way to look at our baby Jesus, (which I am now making certain connections to Scholasticism), but anyway, we are so extraordinarily tied to belief in language = the ontic in terms of human being (our covenant with God? OK, anyway).

We have to push back on that and take that we have precognitive abilities (of our own??). We’re not just a bunch of passive humours, so to speak, until some kind of mechanical entrapment brings us into coherent, articulate being, and then we have to set about cleaning out the mess.

We are active beings in a good, healthy, free way. This is one of the things that separated Kant from all the rest; he believed humans are good. Certain conditions apply, obviously, finding them is what matters. (Then you have Kierkegaard with the Call, and we move into the domain of Calvinist rapture. So let’s stop.)

What I like about Buddhist understanding of sense is body consciousness. We superficial people emphasize “touch” or “taste” or “odour,” which is the surface. But we actually have haptic sensibility (which I think still means touch, but is interpreted differently). We even have expressions for it, we think with our gut, for instance, feel it in our bones.

The formless world is a notable attainment, right? I don’t think it’s easy to attain, right? But the point is, if you got it, and it was within, right view, proper understanding, it could be something on the path. It doesn’t have to be necessary, but if you were a practitioner of visualization meditation, you would have to go through haptic sense. And this includes of the mind.

I think it’s clear. The outcome isn’t noumenal, right?