I think the concern about the distinction between perception and consciousness is a practical one based on the need to understand the instructions and goals of the practice. The dharma is a raft for crossing over, not to hold onto.
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Yes, and I agree with a lot of what you say and i like your instincts with regard to the EBT material as a general rule, however outside of esoteric spaces in cognitive science or experimental psychology I just dont see how ypu can realistically seperate the two terms; what one perceives one is conscious of, without perceptions, on what could consciousness arise? Outide of scientific and or religious domains im not even really clear on what distinction is being made in common english discourse by talking about perceptions rather than consciousnesses or vice-versa.
The candle sends light to the eyeball, and when we talk about one aspect of it we say “sensation” as in “what caused the migraine was the sensation of sudden brigtness from the candle” in another context we might pick out something we would rather call perception; “by the flicker of the light i percieved that it was a candle that had been lit, and i felt my head start its all too familiar pre-migraine throb”, if we wanted to highlight a different aspect, we get consciousness, “I was conscious of the suddern presense of the candle-light, and recalled my historic sensitivity to migrane in this context as my temples began to throb and i stumbled through the celler, hoping to find my companion before i was incapacitated”
The idea that there is some deep distinction, outside of context and intention, between sensation, perception, consciosness, recognition, etc etc, is explicitly argued against in the EBT’s, and I think just wrong in fact even outside them.
For definitions of the five aggregates, which include sanna/perception, two different accounts are found in the Khandha Samyutta of SN/SA. The first account is exemplified in SN 22.56-57 and their counterparts SA 41-42, the second in SN 22.79 and its counterpart SA 46. As for the sanna/perception, e.g.:
Pages 27-8 from The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (135.8 KB)
I don’t understand how someone can practice Buddhism without having a working knowledge of the vocabulary. If words like perception and contact etc don’t aid you in knowing what to do or inform you of your progress, how would you even start practicing?
I understand that in common speech words can be ambiguous and vague. That is why I started the question how broadly do you interpret the word sanna in Snp 4.2? it is possible to clarify definitions.
With regard to perception and consciousness in English, an organism possesses consciousness or awareness , but processes sensory data with perception. Perception creates precepts which we are conscious of.
When you talk about a deep distinctions, what do you mean? It is a simple case of communicating instructions. I am not committed to an ontology. Consciousness is still a mystery, the hard problem. Perception is something we are able to study meaningfully. Our understanding of them is tentative, but practical.
I think you are attributing something to me that is not the case. How am I making a “deep” distinction?
It’s also interesting that Buddha attributed each sense with is own consciousness. So our table is beginning to look like …
| Powers (indriyāṇi) |
Domains (viṣaya) |
Internal Sense Fields (ajjhattikāni āyatanāni) |
External Sense Fields (bāhirāni āyatanāni) |
Body of Consciousness (viññāṇakāyā) | Perception (Appearance) (saññākāyā) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
cakkhuṁ (eye) |
rūpā (visual) |
cakkhāyatanaṁ (seeing) |
rūpāyatanaṁ (sights) |
cakkhuviññāṇaṁ (eye consciousness) |
rūpasaññā (the visual) |
| sotaṁ (ear) |
saddā (aural) |
sotāyatanaṁ (hearing) |
saddāyatanaṁ (sounds) |
sotaviññāṇaṁ (ear consciousness) |
saddasaññā (the aural) |
| ghānaṁ (nose) |
gandhā (odour) |
ghānāyatanaṁ (smelling) |
gandhāyatanaṁ (odours) |
ghānaviññāṇaṁ (nose consciousness) |
gandhasaññā (the olfactory) |
|
jivhā (tongue) |
rasā (flavour) |
jivhāyatanaṁ (tasting) |
rasāyatanaṁ (flavours) |
jivhāviññāṇaṁ (tongue consciousness) |
rasasaññā (the gustatory) |
|
kāyo (body) |
phoṭṭhabbā (tactility) |
kāyāyatanaṁ (haptics) |
phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṁ (touches) |
kāyaviññāṇaṁ (body consciousness) |
phoṭṭhabbasaññā (the haptic) |
|
mano (mind) |
dhammā (mental phenomena) |
manāyatanaṁ (mental) |
dhammāyatanaṁ (phenomena) |
manoviññāṇaṁ (mind consciousness) |
dhammasaññā (the phenomenal) |
How is it interesting?
Well I am still in the middle of things, but Murti, in his book I passed around, suggested that Buddha identified subjectivity. Before post-structuralism/post-modernism, the subject was an individual centred in his or her own personal experience and able to draw upon it to come up with a subjective appraisal of something. And, quite frankly, a highly valued subjective appraisal of something, for instance, what you see out of great authors. Post-structuralism/post-modernism blew that up.
I already mentioned before, Buddha has an account of subjectivity. And for him to distribute consciousness into the very elements of sense, I just think, yes, this is a good subjective appraisal. So, if Murti is right, and Buddha identified subjectivity, wow, then this is something to take with a bit of depth.
I always find it so difficult to respond, because I am never quite sure what anyone is talking about. “These terms” - well there are a lot of them. “Their emptiness” - yes. I can say they’re just words: agreed upon conventions to designate some things we both know (either through perception or inference). “Because there is not atta or substance that bear them,” I think you are now referring to some of those things we both know through experience. Yes. The chain of causation is empty of self and it lays bare suffering. Good thing it’s impermanent.
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It is possible that the Brahmans or Jains had the concepts before Buddhism and they crept in later. If they were not described in the early texts, it could be simply that the Buddha didn’t have a part for them to play in his project. If he did have a part for them in his project, I think they would be there.
The Atthakavagga, does not seem to require them. I think that is because the Atthakavagga does not seem to be interested in extinguishing consciousness while the Parayanavagga clearly is. In Snp 5.5, the Parayanavagga tells us “don’t plant consciousness in a new life.” The word consciousness does not even appear in the Atthakavagga. In any case, one must go through the formless states to get to the end of consciousness. Hence the interest the Parayanavagga has in formless states.
The Atthakavagga is interested in swapping out contacts for forms. Contacts smuggle in a self, form is devoid of self. It is empty of self. I think this may have been the origin of the saying “Form is emptiness, emptiness is form.” No need for formless attainments.