Instead of nihilism, Nibbana is the only thing that exists

Mental pain/dukkha doesn’t arise in one who has reached Nibbāna, but physical pain still can.

Bhikkhus, when the uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. He feels two feelings—a bodily one and a mental one. Suppose they were to strike a man with a dart, and then they would strike him immediately afterwards with a second dart, so that the man would feel a feeling caused by two darts. So too, when the uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling … he feels two feelings—a bodily one and a mental one.

[…]

Bhikkhus, when the instructed noble disciple is contacted by a painful feeling, he does not sorrow, grieve, or lament; he does not weep beating his breast and become distraught. He feels one feeling—a bodily one, not a mental one. Suppose they were to strike a man with a dart, but they would not strike him immediately afterwards with a second dart, so that the man would feel a feeling caused by one dart only. So too, when the instructed noble disciple is contacted by a painful feeling … he feels one feeling—a bodily one, not a mental one.

— SN 36.6

Yes they do; hundreds of times—anattā by itself literally means no/not-self (‘a’ negative prefix, ‘atta’ self).

The Buddha kept silent when asked by Vacchagotta if there was a self because saying so would have resulted in Vacchagotta being more deeply confused (as well as declaring not having a self falling under the annihilationist view).

Then the wanderer Vacchagotta rose from his seat and departed.

Then, not long after the wanderer Vacchagotta had left, the Venerable Ānanda said to the Blessed One: “Why is it, venerable sir, that when the Blessed One was questioned by the wanderer Vacchagotta, he did not answer?”

“If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are eternalists. And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists.

“If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ would this have been consistent on my part with the arising of the knowledge that ‘all phenomena are nonself’?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now.’”

— SN 44.10

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The two main and different defintions of the word dhamma are, one, the teachings, and in this context, it is (simply) translated as ‘phenomena’. It’s not Abhidhammic, but repeatidly present in the EBT.

See:

Nibbāna is unconditioned. It is categorically and solely a result (for the lack of a better word) based on the absence of the defilements/fetters (kilesa/saṃyojana) and dukkha—nothing more, nothing less.

You have the common assumption that Nibbāna is a magically blissful state. Nibbāna is probably highly blissful due the complete/absolute absence of dukkha; but not blissful in the way “nirvana” is described by the mainstream.

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a current translation is a choise. My question is - how is it backed up? That someone translated dhamma as phenomena is not a sufficient proof. It would need more specific contexts that force us to translate as phenomena. If the context is not specific then the doors for interpretation are open. But then also we cannot make strong assertions about the doctrine based on a really undefined statement like this.

This sounds to me like the more reasonable interpretation. The idea of a substantiated nibbana is in my eyes so alien to the EBT that one would really need a solid backing from various suttas. Not impossible but that backing needs to be produced first.

Phenomena, all things, substance of existence—or its other definition, apart from the Buddhist teachings—laws of existence, structure of reality. Translate it how you want, it essentially point to these three definitions.

Here is the PTS Pāli-English definition of the word dhamma (this is the first few paragraphs, as the whole entry is 4 and a half pages long, which I am not going to quote):

Dhamma1 (m. & rarely nt.) [Ved. dharma & dharman, the latter a formation like karman (see kamma for expln of subj. & obj. meanings); dhṛ (see dhāreti) to hold, support: that which forms a foundation and upholds= constitution. Cp. Gr. χρόνος, Lat. firmus & fretus; Lith. derme (treaty), cp. also Sk. dhariman form, constitution, perhaps=Lat. forma, E. form] constitution etc. A. Definitions by Commentators: Bdhgh gives a fourfold meaning of the word dhamma (at DA i.99= DhA i.22), viz. (1) guṇe (saddo), applied to good conduct; (2) desanāyaṁ, to preaching & moral instruction; (3) pariyattiyaṁ, to the 9 fold collection of the Buddh. Scriptures (see navanga); (4) nissatte ( — nijjīvate), to cosmic (non — animistic) law. — No. 1 is referred to freq. in expls of the term, e. g. dhammiko ti ñāyena samena pavattatī ti DA i.249; dhamman ti kāraṇaṁ ñāyaṁ PvA 211; as paṭipatti — dhamma at VvA 84; No. 3 e. g. also at PvA 2. Another and more adequate fourfold definition by Bdhgh is given in DhsA 38, viz. (1) pariyatti, or doctrine as formulated, (2) hetu, or condition, causal antecedent, (3) guṇa, or moral quality or action, (4) nissatta — nijīvatā, or “the phenomenal” as opposed to “the substantial,” “the noumenal,” “animistic entity.” Here (2) is illustrated by hetumhi ñāṇaṃ dhammapaṭisambhidā: “analytic knowledge in dhamma’s means insight into condition, causal antecedent” Vibh 293, and see Niyama (dhamma°). Since, in the former fourfold definition (2) and (3) really constitute but one main implication considered under the two aspects of Doctrine as taught and Doctrine as formulated, we may interpret Dhamma by the fourfold connotation: — doctrine, right, or righteousness, condition, phenomenon.

[…]

— PTS Pāli-English Dictionary

Nibbana is described in a variety of ways in the suttas. The absence of the taints is certainly a common description, but that absence could be symptomatic rather than definitive. Maybe the absence of the taints is a prerequisite for “accessing” Nibbana.
As I said, I think the suttas are quite ambiguous and open to interpretation.

Post some of these Sutta passages to see. While you’re searching, count all the passages that describe Nibbāna as the destruction of the taints or the abandoning of the fetters (or complete understanding of the truths, resulting in the destruction/abandoning of these). :stuck_out_tongue:

However, it is true that there are other factors associated with Nibbāna—such as the 7 Factors of Enlightenment (bojjhanga)—which comprises perfected rapture (pīti), tranquillity (passaddhi) and equanimity (upekkhā), among others—as well as the perfected faculties, such as concentration (samādhi), mindfulness (sati) and energy (viriya).

Still probably not like the magical and conceptual bliss that random people think of when they hear the word “nirvana”—as if the point of reaching nirvana is to feel the supposed sensual bliss that would entail. :slight_smile:

The reference to a dictionary is okay for many cases, but in the end not sufficient. Where did the dictionary get it from? It has to be shown in the EBT themselves ultimately.

So it doesn’t matter then if Dhamma means Law, Doctrine, Teaching, Thought, Phenomanon, or Thing? I don’t understand. There is no way around searching sutta passages that make clear what the term means

The PTS Dictionary is based on the Suttas (and the Vinaya, the main Commentaries, as well as Pāli language works).